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*Published Annually by*  
THE PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES  
59 QUEEN'S PARK CRESCENT,  
TORONTO 5, CANADA.  
SUBSCRIPTION \$14.00 A YEAR.  
*Managing Editor:* J. R. O'DONNELL, C.S.B.

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Reprinted in the Netherlands  
ACADEMISCHE PERS N.V. — AMSTERDAM

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THE PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES  
59 QUEEN'S PARK CRESCENT, TORONTO

# Henry of Harclay's Question on the Univocity of Being

ARMAND MAURER C.S.B.

FROM the very beginning, mediaeval speculation was concerned with the problem of how we know God and how we are able to give names to Him. St. Augustine and Dionysius the pseudo-Areopagite, in this as in so many other questions, stirred the intellectual curiosity of the Middle Ages and set it along paths it was never wholly to abandon. The solutions of St. Thomas and Duns Scotus to these problems have been the object of many studies. What is not so well known is the history of the controversy which arose immediately after Duns Scotus on the univocity of being and its transcendental properties when attributed to God and creatures. By the keenness and originality of his insight Scotus gave to the fourteenth century a new outlook on the problem of the divine names and set the stage for a long debate, whose literature is for the most part still unedited and unstudied.

The present article is a small contribution to the history of this controversy. Henry of Harclay, Master of Theology and Chancellor of Oxford, who died nine years after Duns Scotus in 1317, was an outstanding theologian and philosopher in his day. His contemporaries spoke of him with respect and admiration, and Ockham thought him sufficiently important to single out for special criticism.<sup>1</sup> Up to the present, however, his only certainly authentic works, the *Quaestiones*, are unedited, and few studies have been devoted to him.<sup>2</sup>

J. Kraus has made an important contribution to our knowledge of Harclay's philosophy by his long study of his Question on universals.<sup>3</sup> As a result of his research, Harclay appears as an anti-Scotist who is on his way to Ockhamism, although he has not completely arrived there. He serves as an important link between Scotus and Ockham, the two main thinkers of the fourteenth century. The present article is a study of another Question of Harclay—that on the univocity of the concept of being.<sup>4</sup> Since this is a question dealt with at length by both Scotus and Ockham, it will afford a good opportunity to compare his teaching with theirs. We shall first analyze Harclay's Question; then, in the second part of the paper, we shall indicate its relations to Scotism and Ockhamism.

Harclay's Question on univocity is divided into two parts. In the first, which is by far the longer of the two, he asks whether anything is univocally common to God and creatures; in the second, the same question is raised regarding substance and accident. His reply to both queries is in the affirmative.<sup>5</sup>

The reasons Harclay gives in support of this position recall those Duns Scotus had already given in favor of it. He argues that every cognitive power has only one primary and adequate object. Indeed, according to Aristotle, it is this very object that distinguishes it from other powers. Now the intellect is one power;

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *infra*, note 78.

<sup>2</sup> For Harclay's life, works and much valuable information about his philosophy, cf. F. Pelster, 'Heinrich von Harclay, Kanzler von Oxford, und seine Quaestiones', *Miscellanea Ehrle* I (Rome, 1924), 307-356. F. Pelster is preparing the edition of Harclay's Questions. Ms. Troyes 501 may contain his commentary on the *Sentences*. Cf. *art. cit.*, p. 322.

<sup>3</sup> J. Kraus, 'Die Universalienlehre des Oxforder Kanzlers Heinrich von Harclay in ihrer Mittelstellung zwischen skotistischem

Realismus und ockhamistischem Nominalismus', *Divus Thomas* (Freiburg), X (1932), 36-53, 475-508; XI (1933), 76-96, 288-314.

<sup>4</sup> The Question is contained in Ms. Bibl. Vat. Lat. Borgh. 171, fols. 1-3<sup>v</sup>. All references are to this manuscript unless otherwise indicated.

<sup>5</sup> Ad quaestionem primo dicendum quod Deo et creaturis aliquid est commune univocum. Secundo dicendum est quod substantiae et accidenti aliquid est commune et univocum. Fol. 1<sup>ra</sup>



hence its primary object is one; and this, as Avicenna says, is being. Being, then, as the primary and adequate object of our intellect is one.<sup>6</sup>

Furthermore, the primary object of our intellect, or being, extends to both uncreated and created being. Let us suppose for a moment that it did not. Nothing could make it possible for our intellect to know uncreated being, for no power of knowing can extend beyond its primary and adequate object. For example, nothing could render it possible for sight to know what is not color or light, nor for hearing to know anything but sound. So the very fact that we can know uncreated being proves that it falls under the primary object of the intellect, which is being. The conclusion is inevitable: being is univocally common to created and uncreated being.<sup>7</sup>

The Scotist inspiration of this position is evident. Duns Scotus had taught that being, as the proper and adequate object of human knowledge, is indifferent to created and uncreated being. Moreover, following Avicenna, he had maintained that in this sense being has one meaning (*una ratio*), and so it is univocal to God and creatures.<sup>8</sup>

In support of this, Scotus had appealed to the fact that we know the being or existence of God. Harclay follows him on this point. The philosophers, he says, demonstrate that God exists. Now what does "exists" signify in this proposition? A concept common to God and creatures? In that case, his position is established. If it does not signify a univocal concept, it signifies precisely either the being of creatures or the being of God. It cannot signify the being of creatures because such being does not belong to God. Neither can it signify the divine being, because then a proof of God's existence would be simply a proof that God is God, which indeed is true but needs no proof.<sup>9</sup>

The objection may be raised that we do not demonstrate absolutely that God is, but that He is above every other being,—in short that He is above being, as Dionysius says. But this is the common notion that everyone has of God. Everyone presupposes that He is superior to everything. What must be proved is that there is actually in reality a being corresponding to this concept. In brief,

<sup>6</sup> *Unius potentiae cognoscitivae est tantum unum obiectum primum et adaequatum. Ista patet ex II De Anima (4, 415a18), ubi dicitur quod potentiae distinguuntur per actus et actus [et] per objecta; et hoc est verum maxime de objectis primariis. Sed intellectus noster est potentia cognoscitiva una. Ergo et (Ms. est) primum obiectum erit unum. Haec autem est ens, quia ens occurrit primo nostro intellectui per Avicennam I Metaph., c. 5. Ergo ens est unum. Fol. 1<sup>ra</sup>. Cf. Avicenna, Metaph. I, 6 (Venice, 1508), fol. 72<sup>a</sup>A.*

<sup>7</sup> *Tunc quaero utrum illud ens unum quod est obiectum primum nostri intellectus extendat se ad ens incausatum et ad causatum. Quod si sic, habetur propositum, quod enti causato et incausato aliquid est commune univocum. Si dicat quod non se extendat ad ens incausatum, ergo sequitur quod intellectus noster nulla virtute potest cognoscere (Ms. ignorare) ens incausatum. Consequens falsum. Probo consequens. Potentia cognoscitiva quaecumque nulla virtute potest cognoscere illud ad quod non se extendit suum primum obiectum et adaequatum et illud quod non continetur sub suo primo obiecto adaequato, sicut visus nulla virtute potest cognoscere illud quod non est color vel lumen, nec auditus illud quod non continetur sub sono. Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Scotus, Quodl. XIV, nn. 11, 12, 13; Opera Omnia (Paris, 1891-1895) XXVI, pp. 40, 46, 47. In Metaph. II, 3, n. 22; VII, p.

112; In Metaph. IV, 1, n. 5; p. 147. Cf. E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Paris, 1952), pp. 31, 32, 91-93. (Texts of Avicenna, p. 93, note 4). For Scotus' doctrine of univocity, cf. C. Shireel, The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Philosophy of John Duns Scotus (Washington D.C., 1942); T. Barth, 'Zum Problem der Eindeutigkeit. Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis ihrer Entwicklung von Aristoteles über Porphyrius, Boethius, Thomas von Aquin nach Duns Scotus', Philosophisches Jahrbuch, LV (1942), 300-321.

<sup>9</sup> *Prima ratio est ista. De Deo demonstratur esse per philosophos, nam haec propositio "Deus est" est conclusio demonstrationis, saltim factae a posteriori. Tunc quaero utrum esse quod demonstratur de Deo significet conceptum communem Deo et creaturis. Si sic, habetur propositum. Si non, tunc significat praecise esse creaturae; quod est impossibile, quia tale esse non convenit Deo; aut praecise significat esse divinum, et tunc probare Deum esse nihil aliud est probare nisi Deus est Deus, quia esse praecise Dei non dicit aliud, nec rem nec conceptum, nisi esse Dei. Consequens est falsum, quia illud non est probabile sed per suppositum et per se notum, Deus est Deus. Ibid. Note Harclay's opposition to St. Bonaventure's reformulation of the Anselmian argument: Si Deus est Deus, Deus est. Cf. E. Gilson, La philosophie de S. Bonaventure (Paris, 1943), p. 109.*

we must demonstrate that God is, and this necessarily requires a univocal concept common to God and creatures.<sup>10</sup>

Once more Harclay is following Scotus. The Subtle Doctor had argued against St. Thomas that when we prove that God is, "is" does not simply signify the truth of the proposition, but the very being of God.<sup>11</sup> So we must know the being of God in itself and have a concept of being which is univocally common to God and creatures, from which we obtain the concept. Indeed, every investigation of God supposes that our intellect has a univocal concept taken from creatures: *Ergo omnis inquisitio de Deo supponit intellectum habere conceptum eundem univocum, quem accipit ex creaturis.*<sup>12</sup>

This is the general principle underlying most of Harclay's demonstrations for the univocity of the concept of being. We can rightly argue that it is better for creatures to be wise than not to be wise, or to be intelligent than not to be intelligent; therefore God is intelligent. Now when it is said that it is better to be wise than not to be wise, what does "wise" mean? Simply created wisdom? But then the conclusion does not follow, for it is not necessary that created wisdom is better than uncreated wisdom or the absence of created wisdom, for God is not wise in this sense. In order for the conclusion to follow, the phrase "not to be wise" must deny wisdom for both created and uncreated wisdom. But this entails that there is something common to created and uncreated wisdom which renders the negation possible.<sup>13</sup>

So the proper attribution of names to God requires univocal concepts common to God and creatures. We can say that God is wise or is light in a proper and not simply in a metaphorical sense, as we say He is a stone. This means that in the formal concept of wisdom or light there is included no imperfection, or limited perfection; neither is there included the highest perfection proper to God. In other words, it abstracts from God and creatures as animal does from man and ass. It follows that there is something univocally common to God and creatures.<sup>14</sup>

Harclay uses still another argument of Scotus to prove his point. A concept such as "wisdom" is predicated formally of God and creatures, and it is not predicated equivocally. We can be sure of this because it is possible to compare the wisdom of God and creatures: we can say God is more wise than creatures. Now Aristotle lays it down in his *Topics* that if several things are comparable

<sup>10</sup> Dicit forte quod de Deo probatur non absolute esse sed superesse, modo loquendi Dionysii in libro *De Divinis Nominibus* (5, 8; PG 3, 824B): Deus est supersubstantia et superens, hoc est, est ens modo excellentiori quam alia entia, et ideo non univoce. Contra. Acceptum est falsum, nam Deum esse superentem non est probatum sed praesuppositum, nam omnes concipiunt Deum ut quod Deus excedit omnia, sicut dicit Augustinus primo *De Doctrina Christiana* (7; PL 34, 22): "Hoc Deum esse ens concipiunt quod ceteris rebus anteponunt." Sed utrum illi conceptui subsit aliquid in rerum natura vel tantum in imaginatione, hoc non fuit omnibus notum. Ideo hoc via demonstrationis est probatum ex creaturis. Ergo necessario esse erit commune univocum Deo et creaturis. *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> Scotus, *Opus Oxon.* I, 3, 1, 2, n. 2; ed. Garcia I (Quaracchi, 1912), pp. 305, 306. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.* I, 3, 4, ad 2<sup>m</sup>.

<sup>12</sup> Scotus, *loc. cit.*, n. 10; p. 312.

<sup>13</sup> Haec consequentia est bona: Sapiens in creaturis est melius non sapiente, vel intelligens melius non intelligente. Ergo Deus est intelligens. . . . Tunc arguo: Quaero de antecedente, cum dicitur sapiens est melior non sapiente, aut negatio cum

dicitur "non sapiens" negat sapiens pro sapiente causato et incausato. Quod si sic, habetur propositum, quod sapienti causato et incausato est aliquid commune, quia illa pro quibus sit negatio necessario conveniunt in aliquo communi quod primo negatur, sicut et illa pro quibus fit distributio conveniunt in aliquo communi necessario quod distribuitur primo pro omnibus. Si autem dicas quod negatio negat sapiens tantum pro sapiente causato, tunc antecedens est falsum, quia non est necesse quod sapiens causatum est melius sapiente non creato vel non sapiente causato, nam Deus est non sapiens hoc modo, quia non est sapiens causatum, sicut Socrates in rei veritate esset non homo si homo tantum negaretur pro Platone. *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> Sapientia dicta [est] de creatura non pro alio repugnaret Deo nisi quia sapientia dicta [est] de creatura in suo formali intellectu includeret aliquam imperfectionem Deo repugnantem. Sed hoc est falsum, ut probabo. . . . Si ergo lux proprie dicatur et non lapis, oportet quod lux in suo formali intellectu non includat imperfectionem, nec similiter perfectionem summam, sicut nec animal includit hominem nec asinum. Fol. 1<sup>rb</sup>.

—if they are similar, or if one has more of a perfection and the other less—then they are not equivocal. For example, it is impossible to compare the “clearness” of a voice with the “clearness” of a colour. This shows that they are “clear” in an equivocal sense. But this is not the case with concepts predicated formally of God and creatures. Here a comparison with something common is possible: *illud quod convenit Deo formaliter et creaturis non dicitur aequivoce, quia comparatio potest esse secundum idem commune*. Now if these concepts are not predicated equivocally, they must be predicated univocally, for according to Aristotle, whatever is comparable is univocal.<sup>15</sup>

The obvious rejoinder is that Aristotle says nothing about analogy; he writes as though terms are either equivocal or univocal without mentioning analogy as another alternative. Harclay replies that Aristotle is silent about analogy, but he himself sees no contradiction in extending univocity to analogy and calling an analogous concept univocal: *Si diceretur quod extendit univocum ad analogum, concedo. Si tu vocas analogum univocum, non est contradictio; de univoco loquitur Aristoteles, de analogo non*.<sup>16</sup>

Harclay's notion of analogy, then, does not oppose it to univocity; rather he conceives it as a special kind of univocity. He thought that the whole controversy between the supporters of univocity and analogy is simply one of words: *Dico ergo quod non est nisi controversia in verbis*.<sup>17</sup> The supporters of analogy argue that concepts predicated formally of God and creatures cannot be univocal because they belong to them unequally; to God first and then to creatures. They think that what is univocally predicated of several things belongs to them equally and not *per prius et posterius*.<sup>18</sup>

In reply Harclay shows that a relationship of priority and posteriority does not prevent univocity: *Contra ostendo quod ordo per prius et posterius non impedit univocationem*. For a genus is predicated univocally of its species, but it is attributed to one *per prius* and to another *per posterius*. So it is clear that a relation of priority and posteriority is not incompatible with univocity.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>15</sup> *Sapientia dicitur formaliter de Deo et de creatura et non aequivoce, ergo univoce. Probatio antecedentis. Primo Aristoteles I Topicorum (15, 107b13-19) dat unam considerationem ad sciendum utrum aliqua dicantur aequivoce, sicut utrum album univoce dicatur vel aequivoce de sono et de veste. Et dicit quod considerandum est si sint ad invicem comparabilia, similiter vel secundum magis, tunc sunt non aequivoca. Si vero non sint comparabilia, tunc sunt aequivoca; sicut album (Ms. argumentum) in voce comparatur ad album (Ms. argumentum) in colore; et ideo dicuntur aequivoce alba. Sed Deus et creatura comparantur secundum sapientiam, nam Deus est magis sapiens quam creatura, nam quicquid convenit causae aequivocae formaliter et effectui formaliter, per prius et posterius convenit causae quam effectui. Ibid. Cf. Scotus, *Opus Oxon.* 1, 8, 3, 1, n. 12: pp. 598, 599; *In Metaph.* IV, 1, n. 2; (Paris, 1893) VII, p. 146.*

<sup>16</sup> Fol. 1<sup>va</sup>.

<sup>17</sup> Fol. 1<sup>vb</sup>. Thomas of Sutton criticizes Scotus for abusing the term “univocal” by extending it to what others call analogy. For him too, the dispute is chiefly one of words. “Quarto ponit (scil. Scotus) ens esse univocum, vocans univocum quod alii vocant analogum. Hoc patet, quia iste concedit quod ens dicitur de substantia et accidente secundum prius et posterius, et de uno in attributione ad alterum, quod alii ponunt analogum. Unde quia in hoc abutitur significatione vocabuli, ideo licet minus bene dicat, non potest argui contra eum nisi ex

usu loquentium. Ms. Florence, Bibl. Naz. Conv. soppr. C.3, 46, fol. 39<sup>rb</sup>. Quoted by F. Pelster, ‘Thomas von Sutton O. Pr., ein Oxford-Verteidiger der thomistischen Lehre’, *Zeitschrift für kath. Theol.*, XLVI (1922), 395, n.2.

<sup>18</sup> Dicitur forte huic: Concedo quod necesse est esse unum conceptum tertium respectu cuius comparatio, tamen ille non dicitur univoce de Deo et aliis pro eo quod per prius convenit uni quam alteri. Illud autem quod univoce convenit aliquibus aequaliter convenit et non per prius et posterius. Fol. 1<sup>va</sup>.

<sup>19</sup> Contra ostendo quod ordo per prius et posterius non impedit univocationem. Primo quia tunc calidum non conveniret univoce igni et ligno, quia prius convenit uni quam alteri, quod est contra Aristotelem II *Metaph.* (1, 993b25) ut dictum est. Item et hoc est contra Aristotelem I *Topicorum* (15, 107b13), ut dictum est. Dicit enim ibi quod omne univocum est comparabile similiter est secundum magis. Ergo non repugnat univoco comparatio secundum prius et posterius. Item et genus non dicitur univoce de suis speciebus, quod non est verum. Probatio consequentiae, quia genus per prius convenit uni speciei quam alteri. Fol. 1<sup>va</sup>-1<sup>vb</sup>.

This extension of the notion of univocity was opposed by Peter of Sutton: Ratio univocorum, quantum est ex se, aequaliter convenit illis, quibus est nomen commune non secundum prius et posterius. Cf. M. Schmaus, ‘Die Quaestio des Petrus Sutton,

In this question everything depends on how the term "univocal" is used. If we follow Aristotle and Averroes, it will be understood in a broad sense so as to include what is usually called analogy. Do they not speak of the heat of the sun and of its effects as univocal, and so too of the truth of the first principles, which are most true, and of the other lesser truths which depend on them? Algazel, on the other hand, requires three conditions for univocity: no relationship of priority and posteriority, no degrees of perfection, and no mediation of one thing by another. It is understandable, then, that he should call being analogous and not univocal, for it belongs by prior right and more perfectly to substance than to accidents, and it is possessed by accidents through substance.<sup>20</sup>

It should be clear from this that the philosophers use the term "univocal" in two different senses. It has a broad meaning, accepted by such great authorities as Aristotle and Averroes, which is not opposed to analogy; and it has a strict and popular meaning (*famosam significationem*) adopted by Algazel.<sup>21</sup>

For Harclay, then, as for William of Ockham, there is no basic opposition between analogy and univocity.<sup>22</sup> Univocity admits of degrees, and analogy is simply one of its weaker or lesser types; but it is nonetheless fundamentally univocity. It is in this looser sense of the term that we must say that being and all other concepts predicated formally of God and creatures are univocal.

Harclay has now stated in brief the position he wishes to uphold. It remains for him to meet more specifically the objections of those who deny the univocity of being. By answering these objections he reinforces the validity of his own doctrine and incidentally clears up some of the obscurities which still remain in it.

#### CRITICISM OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

The first position Harclay criticizes is that of St. Thomas in his *Contra Gentiles*, which he cites by name. He chooses five of the Angelic Doctor's arguments in Book I, chapter 32, against the univocity of the divine names, states them briefly but quite accurately, and then criticizes them.

St. Thomas' first argument runs as follows: When an effect does not receive a form similar in species to the form through which the agent acts, no name taken from that form can belong univocally to the cause and effect. He proves this with an example. Fire generated by the sun does not receive a form similar in species to the form through which the sun acts. So "heat" is not predicated univocally of the sun and fire. Now it is clear that God's creatures do not have a form similar in species to that through which God acts. So no name taken from the form can belong univocally to God and creatures.

Harclay does not think St. Thomas' major proposition is true. A frog, he says, generated by the sun does not receive a form similar to the form of the sun in species, but it does in remote genus. For both are substance and body, which are predicated univocally of the sun and the frog. So it is sufficient for univocity that the effect be similar to the cause in the widest genus. The genus "sub-

O.F.M., über die Univokation des Seins', *Collectanea Franciscana*, III (1933), 17.

<sup>20</sup> Tres conditiones requiruntur ad univocationem secundum eum (scil. Algazel): quod non prius et posterius, quod non magis aut minus, quod non uni mediante altero. Fol. 1<sup>va</sup>. Cf. Algazel, *Metaphysics* I, 1, 4; ed. J. T. Muckle (Toronto, 1933), p. 26.

<sup>21</sup> Ergo ut concordent auctoritates, necesse est quod univocatio habeat gradus, et Algazel accipit eam secundum suam famosam significationem; sed alii auctoritates majores, puta Aristoteles, accipit uni-

vocationem alio modo magis large. *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> Ockham describes several degrees of similarity of the things of which the univocal term is predicated. Cf. *Sent.* I, 2, 9 (Lyons, 1495) N; III, 9 Q. Cf. M. Menges, *The Concept of Univocity regarding the Predication of God and Creature according to William Ockham* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1952), pp. 72-82. Analogy is not a distinct mode of predication for Ockham; it is always reduced either to univocity or equivocality. Cf. *Quodl.* IV, 16 (Argentine, 1491). Cf. Menges, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-136.

stance", for instance, is predicated univocally of all like things existing in that genus. Harclay goes even farther: it is sufficient that they have in common a concept more universal than the widest of all genera: *Et ego dico quod sufficit quod convenient in intentione communiore quam sit genus generalissimum*. He is here referring to such concepts as being and the transcendentals, which, while not being genera, are, according to him, predicable of God and creatures univocally.<sup>23</sup>

Turning to St. Thomas' example, he points out that simply because the sun and fire do not agree univocally in heat, it does not follow that they agree univocally in nothing else. The reason why they are not univocally "hot" is that the sun is not formally, or simply speaking, hot: it is called hot only because it causes heat, as it can be called liquid because it causes ice to melt. Both the sun and its effects, however, are formally substances and, since they both formally agree in this perfection, it is predicated univocally of them. The conclusion follows: since God and creatures are formally and properly being and substance, these terms are predicated of them univocally.<sup>24</sup>

It is significant that St. Thomas agrees with Harclay that a generic concept, such as "body" or "substance", is univocally predicable of the heavenly bodies and their sublunar effects, but according to him it is univocal only from the point of view of the logician and not from that of the philosopher of nature and the metaphysician. Because the latter consider things as they actually exist, with their different kinds of matter, potentiality and modes of existence, generic concepts are not univocal for them but analogous.<sup>25</sup> Harclay has no notion of St. Thomas' distinction between the "physical" and "logical" consideration of a genus. From the point of view of the Angelic Doctor, his notion of a concept remains on the level of logic and does not rise to that of the philosophy of nature or metaphysics.

The second argument of St. Thomas given by Harclay is the following: Nothing can belong univocally to a cause and its effect unless it belongs to them according to the same mode of being. This is why "house" does not belong univocally to the house existing in the mind, that is to say, the idea of a house, and the house in reality, which is the effect of the idea of house, for each has its own distinctive mode of being. Now the same is true of God's effects: they do not have the same mode of being in themselves, i.e. in reality and in God. It follows that nothing is predicated univocally of the two.

Harclay replies that not every diversity of mode of being causes equivocity. For instance, spiritual and corporeal qualities do not have the same mode of being, and yet "quality" is predicated univocally of them, for both are species of quality. In the example used by St. Thomas the mode of being is such that it "diminishes" the thing to which it belongs, for the being which house has in the soul is "diminished being." This is why Aristotle says in the *De Anima* that the idea of a stone is not a stone. Any mode of being which diminishes or

<sup>23</sup> *Propositio major est falsa. Non habet apparentiam, nam rana causata a sole non accipit formam similem in specie formae solis, sed tantum in genere remoto, puta substantiae vel corporis; et tamen substantia vel corpus dicitur univoce de sole et rana. Unde sufficit ad univocationem quod effectus sit similis causae in genere generalissimo. Nam substantia, quae genus est, univoce dicitur de omnibus similibus in genere existentibus. Et ego dico quod sufficit quod convenient in intentione communiore quam sit genus generalissimum. Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> Ad probationem suam dico quod exemplum non valet. Fallacia consequentis. Non sequitur: Sol et ignis non conveniunt

univoce in calido, ergo in nullo alio. Immo ego dico quod substantia ignis est causata a sole sicut caliditas sua, et tamen sunt univoce substantia. Causa autem quare non sunt univoce calida est quia sol non est formaliter calidus sicut est formaliter substantia. . . . Quod autem sol simpliciter non sit calidus patet, quia non est calidus (*Ms. alius*) nisi quia effectivus caliditatis in alio a se. Sed sic eadem ratione diceretur liquidus quia efficit liquiditatem in glacie. Fols. 1<sup>vb</sup>-2<sup>ra</sup>.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, 19, 5, 2, ad 1<sup>m</sup>; *Summa Theol.* I, 66, 2, ad 2<sup>m</sup>; I, 88, 2, ad 4<sup>m</sup>; *In X Metaph.*, 12, n. 2142.

destroys the thing to which it belongs will cause equivocity. But this has nothing to do with the present case, because both God and creatures are formally wise, that is, the mode of being wise in creatures does not "diminish" or "destroy" wisdom.<sup>22</sup>

The reply is significant for it shows once more the logicist trend of Harclay's thinking. The mediaeval logicians developed the notions of a *determinatio diminuens* and *distrahens*. According to them, qualifying determinations can be added to words which "diminish" their sense. For example, if to the proposition "The Ethiopian is white" there is added the qualification "as to his teeth", the meaning of white is weakened or "diminished." If "dead" is added to "man", the qualification weakens the meaning of man.<sup>23</sup> Harclay's point is that St. Thomas bases his position on an example of such a "diminishing" determination, which has nothing to do with the case at hand.

St. Thomas' third argument is that if anything is common to God and creatures, it must be one of the five universal predicables: genus, species, etc. But none of these apply to God. Harclay agrees that there are only five universals if we restrict ourselves to the direct predicamental order; but, like Scotus, he points out that there are others not reducible to this order. For example, "not man" is said univocally of everything not a man, and yet it is not a genus, species, etc. Moreover, there is the universality of the transcendentals, such as being and unity, which are not limited to any determined genus.<sup>24</sup>

The fourth argument of St. Thomas is that whatever is predicated of several things by the intellect is simpler than they are. Hence there would be something simpler than God if there were a univocal concept predicable of God and creatures. To this Harclay retorts that nothing prevents there being a more simple concept than that which we have of God. He leaves for later the explanation of how this is possible.<sup>25</sup>

Lastly St. Thomas argues that what belongs to one thing *per prius* and to another *per posterius* does not belong to them univocally. There is no need to repeat Harclay's position on this point. As we have seen, he does not think the unequal degrees of a perfection hinder univocity.

#### CRITICISM OF HENRY OF GHENT

After replying to St. Thomas' arguments against the univocity of the divine names, Harclay turns his attention to another group of objections to his position.

<sup>22</sup> Responsio. Non omnis varius modus essendi facit aequivocationem. Nam qualitates spirituales, scilicet virtutes, et huiusmodi, non habent eundem modum essendi quam habent qualitates corporales, quia subjecta eorum sunt alterius rationis; et tamen qualitas univoce dicitur de illis, quia species qualitatis sunt. Si autem modus essendi sit talis quod sit diminuens vel distrahens a re cuius est, non est mirum si causat aequivocationem. Et ita est in exemplo adjuncto, quia esse domus in anima est esse diminutum. Unde lapis in anima non est lapis, secundum Aristotelem III De Anima (8, 431b29). . . . Sed tunc nihil ad propositum, nam Deus vere et formaliter est sapiens et non secundum quid, et creatura similiter. Fol. 2<sup>ra</sup>.

<sup>23</sup> For the logical notion of *determinatio diminuens*, cf. Peter of Spain, *Summulae Logicales*, ed. I. Bochenski (Rome, 1947), VII, pp. 83, 84; XI, pp. 104, 105. Siger of Courtrai, *Fallaciae*, ed. G. Wallerand, *Les Oeuvres de Siger de Courtrai*, (Les Philosophes Belges VIII, Louvain, 1913), pp. 82, 83. C. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik in Abend-*

*lande* IV (Leipzig, 1927), pp. 51, 124. For the meaning and origin of *ens diminutum*, A. Maurer, 'Ens Diminutum: a Note on its Origin and Meaning,' *Mediaeval Studies*, XII (1950), 216-222.

<sup>24</sup> Dico quod universalis secundum quod subserviunt rebus ordinabilibus in recta linea praedicamentali sufficienter distinguuntur per quinque, et sic sufficit ad intentionem Porphyrii, cuius liber, scilicet *Isagoge*, subservit libro *Praedicamentorum*. Tamen nihil prohibet alia esse communia et indifferenter quae nullum istorum sunt directe sed reducibile ad aliquod istorum. . . . Et tunc dico quod communitas eorum quae sunt transcendentia, scilicet entis et unius, est communitas non determinata ad aliquam unam determinatam communitatem, sicut nec illa transcendentia sunt limitata ad determinatum genus. *Ibid.* Cf. Scotus, *Report. Paris.* I, 8, 5; XXII, p. 171.

<sup>25</sup> Dico ad illud quod nihil prohibet aliquem conceptum esse simpliciorum conceptu quem nos habemus de Deo, sicut dicitur infra. *Ibid.*



He leaves their authors anonymous, simply calling them *alii*. It is possible that he refers to some of his contemporaries, perhaps to Peter of Sutton, who, like St. Thomas, but for other reasons, opposed the univocity of being.<sup>30</sup> The objections, however, can be traced back to Henry of Ghent. Duns Scotus had already disputed against Henry on the univocity of being; Harclay now takes up the dispute on the side of the Subtle Doctor, but in terms of his own conceptualist philosophy.

Harclay says that there are some who argue in this way: A univocal concept is based upon some thing, otherwise it is empty. So a universal reality (*rem communem*) corresponds to every universal concept. Now there is no reality common to God and creatures. It follows that neither is there any concept common to them.<sup>31</sup>

Henry of Ghent had argued against the univocity of being precisely on this ground. He pointed out that, since there is no one meaning or "intention" common to substance and accident, there can be no real community of being itself between them. Now the creator and His creatures share in one reality even less than substance and accident. So it is impossible that being is something real, common to God and creatures: *nullo modo ens potest esse aliquid commune reale Deo et creaturae*.<sup>32</sup> Henry of Ghent's conclusion is that since there is no real community between God and creatures, or between substance and accident, being cannot be predicated of them univocally, but only analogically.<sup>33</sup>

Duns Scotus was willing to agree with Henry of Ghent that God and creatures have no thing or reality in common: in reality they are fundamentally diverse (*primo diversa*); that is to say, they differ by their whole selves and share in nothing common.<sup>34</sup> But this does not prevent their having a concept in common:

Ad tertium patebit in secundo articulo quod Deus et creatura non sunt primo diversa in conceptibus, tamen sunt primo diversa in realitate, quia in nulla realitate conveniunt; et quomodo esse possit conceptus communis sine convenientia in re vel in realitate in sequenti dicitur.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Cf. *infra*, note 36.

<sup>31</sup> Praeterea contra istam opinionem arguunt alii primo sic: Communis conceptus fundatur super aliquam rem; alioquin esset conceptus vanus. Ergo si sit dare conceptum communem, est dare rem communem. Cum ergo nulla res sit communis Deo et creaturis, (?) sequitur etiam quod nullus (*Ms. nulla*) conceptus erit communis. *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> Circa secundum, quod Deus in esse communicet cum creaturis, idest, quod esse sit aliquid commune Deo et creaturis, arguitur. . . tertio sic: Dictum de pluribus quod habet per se intellectum propter intellectus illorum, est aliquid reale commune ad illos, quia omnis conceptus fundatur in re aliqua, ens est huiusmodi, quia secundum Avicennam ens imprimitur impressione prima etiam antequam in ipsa imprimitur intellectus aut creaturae aut Dei. Ergo, etc. Dicendum ad hoc: Cum ens, ut *infra* dicitur, non significat aliquam unam intentionem communem substantiae et accidenti, sed significat significationem prima unumquodque decem praedicamentorum, nulla communitate reali ipsum ens potest esse commune substantiae et accidenti. Quare cum multo minus in aliquo uno reali conveniunt creator et creatura quam duae creaturae, substantia scilicet et accidens, immo multo plus distat ratio essendi creatoris a ratione essendi creaturae quam differat ratio essendi unius creaturae a ratione essendi alterius, nullo modo ens potest esse aliquid commune reale Deo et creaturae. Henry of Ghent,

*Summa* I, 21, 2 (Paris, 1520), fol. 123EF.

<sup>33</sup> Et ideo absolute dicendum quod esse non est aliquid commune reale in quo Deus communicet cum creaturis; et ita si ens aut esse praedicatur de Deo et creaturis, hoc est sola nominis communitate, nulla rei. Et ita non univoce per definitionem univocorum, nec tamen pure aequivoce, secundum definitionem aequivocorum casu, sed medio modo, ut analogice. *Loc. cit.*, fol. 123F.

<sup>34</sup> *Primo diversa* is Scotus' technical expression to signify that several things are distinguished by their whole selves: quae se totis distinguuntur sunt primo diversa. *Opus Oxon.* I, 26, n. 2; p. 961; n. 6; p. 938. Scotus also holds that the Persons of the Trinity are *primo diversa* in reality but not in concept: Dico igitur quod paternitas et filio non sunt duo primo diversa quantum ad intellectum, quin possit intellectus abstrahere ab eis aliquam conceptum realem communem; sed sunt primo diversa quantum ad realitatem et realitatem, ita quod nullum unum gradum realitatis includunt qui sit quasi potentialis et determinabilis per proprias differentias specificas vel quasi per proprias. *Op. cit.*, I, 26, n. 48; p. 1005.

<sup>35</sup> Scotus, *Opus Oxon.* I, 8, 3, 1, n. 11; p. 598. Nulla realitas est communis Deo et creaturae, nec tamen intellectus est falsus qui habet univocum conceptum de eis. *Collatio* 24, ed. C. Balic, 'De Collationibus J. D. Scoti,' *Bogoslovni Vestnik* IX (1923), 215. Also in C. Harris, *Duns Scotus* II (Oxford, 1927), p. 374. There is no reality

In this way Scotus dissociated a univocal concept from the real sharing of several things in a common thing or reality. He was opposed on this point by Peter of Sutton, a contemporary of Harclay's. Using basically the same argumentation as Henry of Ghent, Peter denied that two things can be *primo diversa* in reality but not in the conception we form of them. For something in reality must correspond to that concept; otherwise it is empty. A univocal concept of God and creatures, therefore, demands some real community between them, which he has proved to be false.<sup>36</sup>

Harclay follows Scotus on this point, opposing both Henry of Ghent and Peter of Sutton. Indeed, as we shall see, like William of Ockham he goes beyond the Subtle Doctor in completely dissociating the univocity of concepts from common natures or realities, for he maintains that there are univocal concepts while denying that any two things share any reality in common. Scotus did not go as far as that, for, according to him, at least finite beings in a genus and species share in a common nature, which has a real being outside the intellect.<sup>37</sup> In his Question on universals Harclay criticizes this view, maintaining that only individual things are real and denying the reality of common natures.<sup>38</sup> In the present Question on univocity he denies that there must be a community in reality corresponding to the community of the concept: *Dico ad illud, quod communitati conceptus non necessario correspondet communitas in re*. A concept is based upon a thing in the sense that it is taken or formed from the thing, or is a concept of the thing; but fundamentally it is in the intellect which conceives it. So it is not necessary that whenever there are distinct concepts there are distinct things corresponding to them. Reality is an equivocal cause of the concepts in our intellects, and it is a general rule that we cannot argue from a distinction in the effect to one in an equivocal cause, nor from a distinction in what is posterior to one in what is prior. The explanation of universal concepts is quite different. Our intellect takes from one simple thing both confused and common concepts and distinct and more particular ones. The fact that the intellect can form confused, common concepts does not warrant our affirming any common reality.<sup>39</sup> So the fact that there is no reality common to God and creatures does not prevent there being a univocal concept common to both.

Harclay states still another argument against the univocity of being which has its basis in Henry of Ghent—an argument which he finds the most difficult of all to answer. The burden of the argument is as follows: If there is something univocally common to God and creatures, they must agree in that which they have in common and differ in something else. But this implies that there is some composition in God, for no simple being can be understood to agree with,

common to God and creatures because of the modalities of infinity and finitude proper to each in actual existence. On the other hand, there can be concepts common to God and creatures without any real community between them because the concepts of God's essential attributes are not genera but transcendentials. Cf. *Opus Oxon.* I, 8, 3, 2, nn. 16-18, pp. 602-606; E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 236-239; T. Barth, *art. cit.*, 318.

<sup>36</sup> Item ista quae sunt primo diversa nihil possunt habere commune. Si enim haberent aliquid commune, non essent primo diversa, sed per differentias primo diversas different ab invicem. Sed Deus et creatura sunt primo diversa *Super decem praedicationibus*. Igitur, etc. Dicitur quod sunt primo diversa in re, non in conceptu. Contra: Aut illi conceptui aliquid correspondet aut nihil. Si nihil, cassus est. Ergo habent commune aliquid in re, quod improbatum est. M. Schmaus, *art. cit.*, 20. The reference to the commentary on the *Categories* has not been

identified.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. *Opus Oxon.*, *loc. cit.*, nn. 16, 17; pp. 602-605; II, 3, 1, n. 7; pp. 228-230. Cf. E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 110, 451.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. J. Kraus, *art. cit.*, X (1932), 49-58.

<sup>39</sup> Dico ad illud quod communitati conceptus non necessario correspondet communitas in re, sed ab eadem re simpliciter omnino accipitur conceptus communis et confusus vel non differens, et conceptus distinctivus et magis particularis. Et cum dicit conceptus fundatur super rem, dico quod hoc est sic intelligendum, quod conceptus accipitur vel formatur a re vel est conceptus rei; tamen fundamentaliter est in intellectu concipiente. Et tunc nego consequentiam, quia non sequitur quod distinctis conceptibus distinctae res correspondeant, quia distinctio in posteriori non arguit distinctionem in priori, nec distinctio in effectu arguit distinctionem in causa aequivoca. Ideo non sequitur quod aliqua sit communis res. Fol. 2<sup>a</sup>.



and be distinguished from the same thing. For agreement and distinction are contrary relative forms. Now, as contraries, they cannot be simultaneously present in the same thing, just as two absolute contrary forms, like whiteness and blackness, cannot be together in the same thing. If God, then, agrees with a creature in something and at the same time differs from it in something else, He must agree and differ by distinct forms, and this is contrary to the divine simplicity. We must conclude, then, that nothing is univocally common to God and creatures.<sup>40</sup>

Faced with this difficulty, Henry of Ghent had concluded that God and creatures have nothing in common, neither a reality nor a concept. If being or *esse* is predicated of both, it is only the *name* which they have in common. The *concept* of being is predicated of them analogically, not univocally.<sup>41</sup> Since being signifies no reality common to both, God does not agree with creatures insofar as He is a being by any other reality or concept than that by which He differs from them insofar as He is God:

Cum nihil sit commune reale in ente significatum ad creatorem et creaturam, ut supra dictum est, non oportet quod aliquo alio vel re vel intentione conveniat Deus cum creatura inquantum ens, et alio differat inquantum est Deus.<sup>42</sup>

To this, Duns Scotus had replied in the same way as he did to the previous objection to the univocity of the concept of being. Granted that God and creatures share in no common reality, and that they do not agree and differ by distinct realities, this does not prevent their sharing in a common *concept*.<sup>43</sup>

Henry of Harclay's answer is basically the same. "I agree", he says, "that it is by something different that God and creatures are alike and differ, but by different concepts and not by different things." It is possible to have distinct concepts of the same simple thing. By one of these concepts it can agree with another thing if that concept is indifferent and does not distinguish between them. By still another concept of the same thing the intellect can distinguish between them. It is true, then, that one thing agrees with, and is distinguished from, another thing by the same reality. However, since the relation of agreement formally speaking belongs to a concept and not to a thing, we must deny that one thing formally agrees with, or is distinguished from another by the same reality, but rather by different concepts.<sup>44</sup>

This presupposes that the intellect can form distinct concepts of one absolutely simple being, such as God. How indeed is this possible? We form concepts of God from His creatures, in which the perfections united in God are distinct from

<sup>40</sup> Praeterea arguitur contra istam opinionem; et est responsio difficilis inter omnia. Arguit sic: Impossibile est quod ab eodem simplici accipiatur convenientia et distinctio respectu ejusdem. Ita est quasi primum principium: sicut duae formae absolutae contrariae, puta albedo et nigredo non possunt inesse eidem simili (*Ms. similis*), nec simpliciter nec respective, nam idem non potest esse album et nigrum, nec etiam respectu diversorum, nec etiam respectu ejusdem, ita duae formae respectivae contrariae sunt impossibiles in eodem respectu ejusdem. Unde impossibile est esse idem simile et dissimile alicui secundum idem. Sed convenientia et distinctio sunt formae respectivae contrariae. Ergo, etc. Major ergo vera. Ergo si Deus convenit cum creatura in aliquo et distinguitur ab illa, non potest eodem (*Ms. eidem*) convenire et distingui. Ergo alio et alio convenit et distinguitur. Hoc autem repugnat simplicitati divinae. Ergo, etc. Fols. 2<sup>ra</sup>-2<sup>rb</sup>.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. *supra*, note 33. The difficulty is stated

in Henry of Ghent, *Summa* I, 21, 2, fol. 123E; also in I, 21, 3, fol. 125A.

<sup>42</sup> Henry of Ghent, *Summa* I, 21, 3, fol. 126I.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Scotus, *Opus Oxon.* 1, 8, 3, 1, n. 11, p. 598. He is here answering an objection based on Henry of Ghent's doctrine, stated *loc. cit.*, n. 2, p. 590. Cf. E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 236, 237.

<sup>44</sup> Concedo quod alio et alio conveniunt et distinguuntur Deus et creatura, sed alio et alio conceptu, non alia et alia re. Nam ab eadem re simpliciter possunt haberi distincti conceptus, quorum uno potest convenire cum alia re quia ille conceptus indifferens est et non distinctivus unius rei ab alia, et alio conceptu formato ab eadem re potest intellectus distinguere rem unam ab alia. Et tunc ad formam dico quod eodem a parte rei convenit et distinguitur; sed quia re non convenit formaliter sed in conceptu formato a re, ideo non eodem formaliter convenit et distinguitur. Fol. 2<sup>rb</sup>.

each other. For one perfection of God shines forth more in one than in another. For instance, in one person we find wisdom rather than goodness, and vice versa. So the intellect can consider these different perfections in creatures and form distinct concepts of them, and then attribute them to God. So even though God Himself is absolutely one, we can form distinct concepts of Him.<sup>45</sup>

Moreover, it is evident that our intellect need not conceive an object in the most perfect manner possible. It can know something first confusedly and then distinctly, without any distinction on the part of the object: *sub eadem ratione a parte objecti*. Now a confused concept is not the same as a distinct one. So it is certain that there can be different concepts of something which itself is without distinction in object and *ratio*.<sup>46</sup>

If something is conceived more distinctly than it was before, the same thing is conceived and not several things, but it is conceived in a more perfect way. Suppose some simple degree of whiteness is seen by an eagle and an owl: the eagle will know it more perfectly than the owl, not because it sees more things in the object or more formal *rationes*, because we have supposed the object is simple, but because it sees the same thing more perfectly. The same is evident in the Beatific Vision, for one person does not see more than another from the point of view of the thing or mode of the thing, but he has a more perfect knowledge.<sup>47</sup>

The reason for this is that a concept depends on two causes: the object and the intellect. Now whenever an effect essentially depends on two causes, if one varies, the effect varies, even though the other cause does not. So even though the object is in no way altered, it will cause a different concept because of a different disposition in the intellect. It is evident, then, that one and the same object can cause distinct acts and concepts because of different dispositions on the part of the knower; we need not suppose any distinction on the part of the object.<sup>48</sup>

Because of the difference in the concepts we form of God, the names which signify these concepts are not synonyms. The concepts of "God", "being",

<sup>45</sup> *Modo primo probo illud, quod ab una re simplici, in fine simpliciter (leg. simplicitatis?) potest intellectus formare tales distinctos conceptus. . . . Nam quia intellectus noster concipit Deum ex creaturis, et perfectiones quae sunt unitae in Deo distinctae apparent in effectu, nam una perfectio Dei magis relucet et apparet in uno effectu quam in alio, puta sapientia magis quam bonitas, et bonitas magis apparet in alio effectu quam sapientia; et ideo intellectus deveniens in cognitionem Dei per effectus, potest Deum concipere sub ratione unius perfectionis quae magis relucet in effectu, et ideo concipere eum sub ratione alterius perfectionis, et iterum convertendo se ad alium effectum, alium conceptum alterius perfectionis potest formare. Et ita stante omnimoda simplicitate divina in re intellecta, puta in Deo, potest intellectus habere distinctos conceptus. . . . Ecce ex diversis effectibus habentur distincti conceptus distinctarum perfectionum, quae tamen sunt una simplex perfectio in Deo. Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> *Non est necesse quod intellectus noster, concipiens aliquod objectum sub aliqua ratione objecti, concipiat ipsum sub ipsa ratione primo intuitu perfectissimo modo quo possibile est intellectum concipere illud. Nam intellectus noster respectu cuiuscunque intelligibilis et sub quacunque ratione natus est procedere a confusa cognitione ad distinctam. Primo ergo potest habere confusam*

*cognitionem et postea distinctam (Ms. distincti) ejusdem objecti et sub eadem ratione a parte objecti. Sed conceptus confusus et distinctus non sunt idem. Certum est ergo, stante unitate objecti, et rationis cuiuscunque a parte objecti, potest esse diversi conceptus de eo. Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> *Confirmatur hoc argumentum, nam distinctius concipere quam prius non est plura concipere quam prius, sed idem, tamen modo perfectiori cognoscendi. Verbi gratia, si esset unus gradus albedinis indivisibilis et simplex, ille gradus perfectius videretur ab aquila et distinctius quam a vespertillone, ita quod aquila perfectius cognosceret illud objectum quam noctua, non quia plura cognosceret in objecto, nec formales rationes plures, quia objectum simplicem est suppono, sed quia idem perfectius. Exemplum etiam patet in visione beata, nam non videt plus unus quam alius, nec rem nec modum rei; tamen perfectiorem cognitionem habet unus quam alius. Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> *Quando aliquis effectus essentialiter dependet ex duabus causis, facta variatione in altera illarum causarum, etiam alia non variata, sequetur tamen variatio effectus. Sed conceptus noster dependet ab objecto similiter et ab intellectu. . . . Ergo altera causa, puta objecto, omnino non variato, propter variam dispositionem in intellectu cognoscente, erit conceptus alius causatus. Ibid.*

"wisdom" are not the same. So even though in God all these are one, still they are not so in our manner of conceiving Him.<sup>49</sup>

Harclay has said that nothing real outside thought is common to God and creatures; they have in common only the concepts formed by the intellect. It would seem to follow that if no intellect considers or conceives God and creatures they have nothing whatsoever in common and they are in no way alike.<sup>50</sup>

Harclay has said that nothing real outside thought is common to God and foundation he thought our univocal concepts of God and creatures have. Even if no intellect considers them, he says, there is still something common to them, for in reality God and creatures are so much alike (*tantum conveniunt*) that it is possible for any intellect to form one concept of them, because their relation and conformity to each other always remains on their part. Consequently, on their side there is always a community and likeness:

Ad secundum dico quod si nullus intellectus consideraret aliquid, adhuc diceretur esse commune Deo et creaturis pro quanto Deus et creatura tantum conveniunt ex natura rei quod intellectus quicumque considerans posset formare unum conceptum de illis, nam habitudo eorum et conformitas ad invicem ex parte illorum semper manet. Ideo ex parte illorum semper est communitas et convenientia.<sup>51</sup>

In the same way, even though truth exists only in the intellect, the necessary proposition: "Man is an animal" is always true even if no intellect thinks about it. The reason for this is that every truth in the intellect depends on reality as on its cause, and the conformity of reality to the intellect exists on the side of reality.<sup>52</sup>

So it is clear that Harclay does not absolutely deny that there is a real community between God and creatures, even though that community is not a thing or a reality. There is a real likeness between them which serves as the foundation for our univocal concepts of them.

What precisely is this relation of likeness? First of all, we must realize that it is in no sense a kind of unity or founded on a kind of unity. Because there is a real likeness between God and creatures, it might be thought that there is some real unity between them which serves as the basis for the unity of our univocal concepts. Not at all. Likeness and unity are absolutely different: *convenientia et unitas sunt primo diversa*. This is obvious, for likeness always implies diversity and distinction, since only different things can be alike. Unity, on the other hand, is the contrary of distinction. So there can be degrees of likeness but not degrees of unity. One thing can be more like another than it is like a third thing, and different concepts can be formed on the basis of these likenesses. But unity admits of no degrees. It is not true that the more alike two things are the more one they are. Likeness can be increased to infinity and unity will not be reached, for distinction still remains, and consequently lack of unity, in the things that are alike. Two things are not more one than a thousand things.<sup>53</sup>

Harclay is here opposing Duns Scotus' doctrine of degrees of real unity, as Ockham will also do later on.<sup>54</sup> Scotus distinguished between a greater and lesser

<sup>49</sup> Fol. 2<sup>va</sup>.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.* The manuscript omits part of the objection, but the reply indicates this is the sense.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> Fols. 2<sup>va</sup>-2<sup>vb</sup>.

<sup>53</sup> Ad tertium dico quod necesse est quod sit convenientia ex natura rei inter illa a quibus formatur unus conceptus, sed non est necesse quod sint magis unum ex natura rei quam alia; immo nec aliquo modo unum nec minus nec magis. Ratio istius est, nam convenientia et unitas sunt primo diversa;

ideo major convenientia numquam facit maiorem unitatem, etiam si convenientia cresceret in infinitum, nam semper convenientia supponit distinctionem, sed unitas contrariatur distinctioni, Fol. 2<sup>vb</sup>.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Ockham, *Sent.* I, 2, 6 X. Henry of Ghent admitted a minimal unity of analogy between God and creatures: Habent igitur creator et creatura aliquam identitatem et unitatem, sed illa non est alicujus communis participatione, sed analogia imitationis, ut dictum est, et haec est unitas minima. *Summa* I, 26, 2, fol. 159V.

real unity, corresponding to his distinction between individual things and the natures they have in common. According to him, an individual, like Peter, is numerically one, while the specific nature it possesses in common with other individuals, like humanity, has in itself a real unity less than the numerical unity of the individual. In his Question on universals Harclay opposes the Scotist distinction between the individual thing and its common nature; for him, as for Ockham, there are no real natures shared in common by several individuals. It is only to be expected, then, that Harclay will refuse to accept degrees of real unity. The only real unity he recognizes is that of the individual thing, which indeed alone is real.<sup>55</sup>

Harclay's dissociation of likeness and unity enables him to assert a real likeness between God and creatures without any real unity: *concedo quod inter Deum et creaturam ex natura rei est similitudo et tamen nulla unitas*. On what, then, is this real likeness grounded? Harclay replies that it is based, not on one foundation, nor on the real unity of the foundation, but on distinct foundations:

Et tu dicis, super quid fundatur ista similitudo ex natura rei? Dico quod super fundamenta distincta et non super unum fundamentum, nec super unitatem fundamenti realem.<sup>56</sup>

This is perfectly in accord with his doctrine of relation. He stoutly maintains that there are real relations; he will not agree with those who deny real relations because the foundation of a relation must be multiplied in the terms of the relation. A relation is indeed based on distinct foundations and not on the real unity of the foundation. But this does not prevent distinct things being really similar and equal.<sup>57</sup> God and creatures, then, can be really alike without this real relation being grounded on one reality common to both.

There is no need, then, to affirm the reality of something common corresponding to the universality of our concepts. The objection may be raised that a person who conceives God under the aspect of being conceives something real outside thought. And if he does not know Him precisely as God when he knows Him as being, he knows a reality other than the deity. Hence being in God is a reality distinct from deity: *Ergo entitas in Deo est alia realitas quam deitas*. It would seem from this that there is a real community of being corresponding to our concept of it.<sup>58</sup>

In reply, Harclay says that in conceiving God as being, the intellect conceives the reality of the deity although it is not aware of it. If we have a concept of being, predicated of God, we have a concept of the deity, but we do not perceive that we have that concept.<sup>59</sup>

When we conceive being, then, we conceive a reality; but what exactly does "reality" mean in this case? "Reality" is a term which does not stand for any one definite thing; rather, it has a confused supposition and stands indeterminate for any thing. The fact that, in conceiving being, we conceive a reality does not prove that outside the intellect there is some definite thing common to

<sup>55</sup> Cf. J. Kraus, *art. cit.*, especially X (1932), 49-58. For Scotus' doctrine of real unity, cf. *Opus Oxon.* II, 3, 1, n. 7; pp. 228-230.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> Nam ideo dicunt quod relationes communes in diversis, ut similitudo et aequalitas, non sunt reales, quia necesse est fundamentum numerare in extremis. Nam, ut dicunt, ipsamet fundamenta similitudinis et aequalitatis sunt similia et aequalia. Et ideo cum aequalitas et similitudo includant distinctionem extremorum, necesse est fundamenta numerari. Illud tamen non teneo, sed concedo quod similitudo et convenientia stant cum distinctione. *Ibid.* Other texts on relation will be found in F.

Pelster, *art. cit.*, 339.

<sup>58</sup> Probo quod communitati conceptus correspondeat necessario communitas in re. Nam qui concipit Deum sub ratione entis vere concipit aliquid reale extra animam; et si non cognoscat Deum, cognoscit ergo aliquam veram rem extra animam, et non cognoscit et deitatem. Ergo entitas in Deo est alia realitas quam deitas. Fol. 2<sup>a</sup>.

<sup>59</sup> Ad quintum respondemus uno modo sic, quod intellectus concipiens de Deo quod est ens concipit realitatem deitatis, sed non percipit se hoc concipere; eodem modo si habet unum conceptum entis dicti de Deo, habet conceptum deitatis, sed non percipit se habere illum conceptum. Fol. 2<sup>b</sup>.

several things corresponding to our concept. At the present moment, Harclay says, I know that some degree (*gradus*) of the heavens is rising in the east, for the heavens are continually in motion. But I do not know what degree it is, whether it is the Lamb or the Bull. This does not mean that there is in reality one "degree" common to all the degrees of the heavens. The universality involved in conceiving a "degree" is only in the mind, just as "man" is common to all men only in thought.<sup>60</sup>

It is owing to its very indeterminateness, then, that the concept of being or reality is predicated univocally. We have seen this to be true with regard to God and creatures. In the second part of his Question Harclay shows that it is equally true of its predication of substance and accident. His determination of this point only serves to reinforce the notion of being we have met in dealing with the predication of being of God and creatures.

What in fact does being primarily signify: substance or accident? According to Henry of Ghent, being primarily signifies one of the ten categories; what it does not signify is a concept common to substance and accident. It was for this very reason that he concluded that being cannot be really common to the two:

Cum ens, ut infra dicitur, non significat aliquam unam intentionem communem substantiae et accidenti, sed significat significatione prima unumquodque decem praedicamentorum, nulla communitate reali ipsum ens potest esse commune substantiae et accidenti.<sup>61</sup>

Following Duns Scotus, Harclay opposes Henry of Ghent on this point. Being does not primarily signify one of the ten categories, but something common to both—at least, Harclay adds, a concept: *Ens non significat sua prima significatione substantiam nec accedens, sed aliquid commune, puta conceptum saltem.*<sup>62</sup>

His arguments in defense of this recall those of Duns Scotus. We can know that something is a being without knowing whether it is a substance or accident, for example, the powers of the soul. Further, as Algazel says, we can know that something is a being without knowing whether it is an agent or patient, for instance the will. For everyone knows that the will is a being, but, Harclay adds, in these days they question whether it is active or passive. The concept of being, then, is quite distinct from that of substance and accident: it is predicated commonly of both without primarily signifying one or the other.<sup>63</sup>

Again, if being were not a univocal concept, it would be equivocal. And if that were so, the verbal copula "is" would also be equivocal, for: *Tot modi dicitur esse, quot modi dicitur ens*. So every proposition having the copula "is" would have a multitude of meanings. This would be especially true of the principle of non-contradiction; which is impossible, for as the first of all principles it is the measure and standard of all truth, and the standard in any genus must be most simple and uniform. There is no other alternative, then, to admitting that being has one meaning and is a univocal concept.<sup>64</sup>

<sup>60</sup>Ideo dico aliter quod cum dicitur intellectus concipiens ens concipit rem, quod res ibi habet suppositionem confusam tantum, non supponit pro hac re nec pro illa, sed confuse. Nec sequitur propter hoc quod in re sit aliqua res signata communis uni et alteri rei. Ergo ego scio modo quod aliquis gradus firmamenti ascendit in oriente, quia coelum continue movetur; tamen nescio quis sit, utrum arietis vel tauri. Et ex hoc non sequitur quod sit unus gradus communis omnibus gradibus in re; immo suppositum gradus est commune secundum considerationem ad hoc et illud suppositum, sicut homo est communis. *Ibid.*

<sup>61</sup>Henry of Ghent, *Summa* I, 21, 2, fol. 124F.

<sup>62</sup>Fol. 3<sup>ra</sup>. Cf. Scotus, *In Metaph.* IV, 1, n.

6; p. 148.

<sup>63</sup>Nam si conceptus entis dicti de substantia et conceptus substantiae non essent distincti, impossibile esset intellectum cognoscere quod sit ens et non cognoscere quod sit substantia. Consequens falsum. Probatio consequentiae. Item conceptus non potest esse eidem intellectui notus et ignotus, vel distincte notus vel non distincte, vel perceptus vel non perceptus. *Ibid.* Cf. Algazel, *Metaph.* I, 1, 4; ed. J. T. Muckle (Toronto, 1933), p. 25. Cf. Scotus, *In Metaph.* IV, 1, n. 6; p. 148.

<sup>64</sup>Si ens esset aequivocum, ergo et esse, quia tot modi dicitur esse, quot modi dicitur ens, *V Metaph.* (I, 1017a24). Ergo omnis propositio esset multiplex in qua poneretur esse copula verbalis. Et per consequens

In a concluding argument for his position Harclay points out that names can be classified according to their greater or lesser generality. There are some which signify individual things and are proper to them; for example, "Socrates." These individual names are equivocal in the highest degree and are never used univocally; if several men have the name "Socrates" they are so named entirely equivocally and by chance: *Socrates et nomen individui est maxime aequivocum et totaliter a casu*. But these same men, equivocally called Socrates, are univocally called men. Again, certain things are equivocally given the name of a species, as the dog-fish and the animal dog are equivocally called dog, but they are univocally called animals. So we can see that the more universal a name is the more univocal it is. Individual names are always equivocal. At the opposite pole is the most universal name "being", which accordingly must be absolutely univocal. In between are names which are univocal with respect to some things and equivocal with respect to others. Being, then, as the most universal of all names, is most univocal, for it is univocal with respect to everything and equivocal with respect to none.<sup>65</sup>

### HARCLAY'S LOCATION IN MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY

In the light of the foregoing analysis several conclusions can be drawn concerning the thought of Henry of Harclay and its location in fourteenth-century philosophy.

Harclay's doctrine of univocity brings out the same conceptualist and logicist tendencies evident in his treatment of universals. His reaction to St. Thomas' notion of analogy is instructive on this point. The analogy of being is inevitable in a metaphysics of essence and *esse* like St. Thomas', in which each being is fundamentally an act of existing (*esse*).<sup>66</sup> Since any one act of existing is irreducible to any other, it is always diverse from every other act of existing, while remaining proportionate to the being's essence, for everything exists according to its nature. So every being is at once diverse from, and proportionately the same as every other being. In a doctrine such as this, a univocal concept of being in metaphysics, which would have only one meaning applicable to all things, is impossible.

Harclay's thinking moves on a quite different level from that of St. Thomas. His interests are not so much those of a metaphysician as those of a psychologist describing the formation of distinct and confused concepts on the basis of our more or less distinct awareness of things. The metaphysical structure of being seems to present no problem to him, as it will present no problem later on to William of Ockham. Each individual thing is conceived as a metaphysical unit or block, which is individual in virtue of itself, and which can be conceptualized more or less vaguely by the human mind.<sup>67</sup> To think of it as being is simply to

primum principium esset maxime aequivocum, cum dicitur de quolibet esse vel non esse. Consequens falsum. Necesse est enim metrum in omni genere esse maxime simplex et non multiplex, et maxime uniforme. Sed primum principium est metrum omnis veritatis. Ergo, etc. Ista ratio non est nova, sed est Algazelis, ubi supra. Fol. 3<sup>rb</sup>. Cf. supra, note 63; Scotus, *In Metaph.* IV, 1, n. 2; p. 146.

<sup>65</sup> Dico quod impossibile est quod ens dicatur de aliquibus aequivoce, immo de omnibus univoce, quia nomen maxime commune de nullo dicitur aequivoce, et nomen maxime singularis de nullo univoce. Et sic ascendendo a nomine significante singulare semper minuitur aequivocatio usque ad supremum, quod nullo modo est aequivocum et aliud esse nomen nullo modo univocum. Media autem istorum quodammodo univoca, quodammodo aequivoca, quia

respectu aliorum univoca, respectu aliorum aequivoca. Verbi gratia, Socrates, quia significat individuum signatum, quod nulli est commune. Ideo Socrates et nomen individui est maxime aequivocum et totaliter a casu . . . sed illa quae aequivocantur in nomine individui, univocari possunt in nomine speciei. Unde plures Socrates sunt homo univoce. Item illa quae aequivocantur in nomine speciei univocari in nomine generis, sicut marinus piscis et latrabile animal, quae aequivocantur in nomine speciei, scilicet canis, univocantur in nomine animalis; sunt enim animal univoce. Fol. 3<sup>rb</sup>.

<sup>66</sup> For St. Thomas' notion of being, cf. E. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto, 1952), pp. 154-189. For his doctrine of analogy, cf. G. B. Phelan, *St. Thomas and Analogy* (Milwaukee, 1941).

<sup>67</sup> Cf. J. Kraus, *art. cit.*, (1933), 82. For Ockham's notion of individual being, cf. A.

conceive it as vaguely and indistinctly as possible. This is precisely why the concept of being is predicable in exactly the same sense of everything. This conceptualist tendency in Harclay's thought foreshadows that of Ockhamism and later English philosophy.

Harclay's relations to Duns Scotus on this point are more complex and difficult to define. One reason for this is the very obscurity of the Subtle Doctor's notion of univocity, which has received different interpretations.<sup>68</sup> We have seen, however, that Harclay agrees at least verbally with Scotus on the univocity of being and the transcendentals, and that he makes use of many of his arguments in support of this position. He continues Scotus' opposition on this point to St. Thomas and Henry of Ghent.

At first sight it may be surprising to find Harclay agreeing with Scotus on the univocity of being, for his philosophy appears to have little in common with that of the Subtle Doctor. He takes issue with him on the reality of common natures, maintaining that nothing is real save individual things, which share in no common essences, and consequently have no need of being individualized by an added *hecceity*.<sup>69</sup> In this respect Harclay anticipates William of Ockham. But in his own way Ockham also accepted the univocity of the concept of being, despite his criticism of Scotus' metaphysical analysis of individual being.<sup>70</sup> It appears that in this regard Harclay prepared the way for him.

Our analysis of Harclay's Question on univocity reveals that he also anticipated other Ockhamist doctrines. Not only did he assert the univocity of the concept of being and the transcendentals in a universe of radically distinct individuals, but his use of confused supposition to justify it prefigures the role of this logical doctrine in Ockham's philosophy.<sup>71</sup> Harclay is also a pre-Ockhamist in his denial of any real unity except the unity of number. Furthermore, he is on the way to the Ockhamist doctrine of relation.<sup>72</sup> Like Ockham, he does not deny that there are real relations, at least in the sense that individual things are really related to each other. But he considers them as related by nothing distinct from themselves; nor is the relation founded on anything common to the things related; they are related by virtue of themselves.

From all this it is evident that Harclay moves in a mental world quite foreign to that of Duns Scotus. His universe contains none of the formalism of that of the Subtle Doctor. His notion of being is not that of Scotus' *entitas*, which, taken in its ultimate abstraction, is univocal even to God and creatures, but which is analogical in its various modes of existence.<sup>73</sup> An indication of his rejection of Scotus' formalism is seen in his refusal to distinguish a *parte rei* entity and deity in God. It is impossible, according to Harclay, even to conceive the being of God without conceiving the deity: the concept of the former, he says, is the unperceived concept of the latter.<sup>74</sup> If the commentary on the *Sentences* attributed to him is authentic, he does not admit any distinction a *parte rei* between God and the divine attributes. With St. Thomas he says that God is really identical with His attributes (*vere Deus est omnia ista realiter*); their plurality resides on the side of God only in the sense that the fullness of the divine being makes it necessary for our weak intellect, accustomed to knowing creatures, to think of Him by distinct concepts.<sup>75</sup> This is entirely in agreement

C. Pegis, 'The Dilemma of Being and Unity', *Essays in Thomism*, (New York, 1942), 151-183.

<sup>68</sup>Cf. the works cited *supra*, note 8.

<sup>69</sup>Cf. J. Kraus, *art. cit.*, (1932), 49-58.

<sup>70</sup>Cf. Ockham, *Sent. I*, 2, 6 (Lyons, 1495). For Ockham's doctrine of univocity, cf. M. Menges, *op. cit.* Reviewed by the present writer in *The Modern Schoolman*, (1954), 143-145.

<sup>71</sup>For an example of Ockham's use of the doctrine of supposition, cf. *Sent. I*, 2, 6,

KK, LL.

<sup>72</sup>For Ockham's doctrine of relation, cf. *Sent. I*, 30, 1; *Summa Logicae I*, 49-55; ed. P. Boehner (St. Bonaventure, 1951). Cf. P. Donceour, 'Le nominalisme de Guillaume Occam. La théorie de la relation', *Revue néoscholastique*, (1921), 5-25.

<sup>73</sup>Cf. E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-115.

<sup>74</sup>Cf. *supra*, p. 13.

<sup>75</sup>*Et ideo dicitur et bene quod causa multitudinis nominum (divinorum) dependet ex tribus: ex plenitudine Dei excedentis,*

with his remarks about the divine attributes in the present Question.<sup>76</sup> No doubt a study of Harclay's Questions on the divine ideas will throw further light on his position with regard to Scotus' formalism.<sup>77</sup> Even from the data at hand, however, it appears that his notion of being differs basically from that of Scotus. Unlike that of Scotus it is entirely divorced from a metaphysics of common natures. Harclay's concept of being is one whose universality consists simply in its very confusion and indistinction, standing indifferently for any conceivable being. So even though both Harclay and Scotus speak of the univocity of the concept of being, we are warned in advance that the meaning they attach to this concept is quite different.

If we wish to find a philosophy with more affinity to that of Harclay, we should look rather to William of Ockham's. But even here we must make serious reservations. Ockham himself criticized Harclay's doctrine of universals. Although, like Ockham, he rejected the Scotist common nature, he nevertheless taught that an individual is universal when it is confusedly conceived. Socrates is Socrates, he says, and he is also man, animal and body. All of these are really one (*omnia ista in re sunt unum*); the only difference is in the generality of our concepts of the same individual. Now, according to Ockham, an individual is never universal, not even when indistinctly conceived. To say otherwise is to admit that, even in this tenuous manner, universality can be found on the side of reality,—a proposition Ockham will not accept.<sup>78</sup>

It is this same principle which led Ockham to deny that there is any real community between God and creatures.<sup>79</sup> On this point, too, we have seen Harclay refuse to go as far as Ockham: he wished to retain some vestige of real community between the two as a basis for the univocal concepts we form of them. We have seen him affirm that even if no intellect considered God and creatures, there would still be a community between them, because *ex natura rei* there would still be a conformity and relation between them: *Ideo ex parte illorum semper est communitas et convenientia*.<sup>80</sup> A statement such as this places Harclay outside the strict limits of Ockham's terminism.

There is still a further difference between the two philosophers. We have seen that, according to Harclay, the concept of being is always predicated univocally and never equivocally.<sup>81</sup> This is owing to the very universality and confusion of the concept of being, which never permits it to signify distinctly one thing any more than another. Ockham agrees that being is predicated univocally, although he adds significantly that, properly speaking, what is predicated univocally is not a concept, but a word.<sup>82</sup> If the concept of being is said to be univocal, it is only in an improper sense. Unlike Harclay, therefore, Ockham locates univocity in the proper sense on the level of words and not on the level of concepts. Moreover, again unlike his predecessor, Ockham admits that sometimes being is predicated equivocally. It is true, he says, that there is one concept common to every being, and hence it is univocal. But when the term "being" is predicated of the various categories and they are understood significatively, it stands not for one concept but for different concepts, and hence it is predicated equivocally.<sup>83</sup> Ockham's point is that when the categories are taken as signs of things, some signify things one by one

ex infirmitate nostri intellectus deficientis, et ex parte modi cognoscendi intellectus assuescentis, quia per creaturas assuescit Deum apprehendere. *Ms. Troyes* 501, fol. 19<sup>rb</sup>. Cf. St. Thomas, *In I Sent.* 2, 1, 3; ed. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929), pp. 69-70.

<sup>76</sup> Cf. *supra*, pp. 10-13.

<sup>77</sup> For these Questions, cf. F. Pelster, *art. cit.*, 325, 326. In a subsequent article I hope to publish a study of these Questions.

<sup>78</sup> For the text of Harclay, cf. J. Kraus, *art. cit.*, (1933), 82. Ockham quotes this text and criticizes its doctrine of universals in his *Sentences* I, 2, 7, E ff.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Ockham, *Sent.* I, 2, 9 GG; III, 9 X.

<sup>80</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 12.

<sup>81</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 15.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. *Summa Logicae* I, 13; p. 41, ll. 6-9.  
<sup>83</sup> Cf. *op. cit.*, I, 33; p. 99, ll. 35-39; *Quodl.* V, 14.



(*divisim*) and some signify things in conjunction with each other (*conjunctim*). For example, the category "substance" or "quality" signifies individual things taken one by one, whereas a category such as relation signifies things in conjunction. So the term "being", predicated of these categories, understood as signs of things, stands for different concepts; it is thus equivocal and not univocal.<sup>64</sup>

It is evident, then, that there are differences between the philosophies of Harclay and Ockham. The former is not simply an undeveloped and incomplete Ockhamism. While Harclay's conceptualism anticipated certain doctrines of the Venerable Inceptor and perhaps exercised a real influence upon them, it appears to have an inner consistency of its own which marks it off from the terminism of Ockham. It would be rash, however, to make definitive judgments in this matter until the works of Harclay are published.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Ockham, *Expositio Aurea. Liber Praedicabilium*, cap. de specie (Bologna, 1496), fol. 17. Cf. M. Menges, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-170. For the equivocal predication of being of the categories, cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* VI, 2, 1026a32-1026b1.

# The Vocabulary of Jean de Meun's Translation of Boethius' *De Consolatione Philosophiae*.

ALEX J. DENOMY C.S.B.

THE date assigned by lexicographers to the initial appearance of words into French are, at best, tentative and provisory. They await, for the most part, modifications that will result from a more detailed examination and study of published texts, the edition and analysis of hitherto unpublished material. Every revision of dates is, however, a step towards the completion of our knowledge of the history of the words in question and a contribution to etymological research. In the course of an examination of the recently published translation of Jean de Meun of Boethius' *De Consolatione philosophiae*,<sup>1</sup> words have come to light that are earlier than the dates assigned to their first appearance in various dictionaries; others enlarge the number of rare appearances in Old and Middle French. Jean de Meun's *Roman de la Rose* is recognized as an important source by French lexicologists; the *Consolacion*, in manuscript form, has been utilized in part by them.<sup>2</sup> It is hoped that in listing the following 'neologisms,' the value of Jean de Meun's translation will be made more evident for the history of the French language.

The following analysis is concerned solely with the dates of certain individual words used by Jean de Meun in his translation. It is not concerned with the use he made of them to render the equivalent Latin original. The appraisal of Jean de Meun's worth and competence as a translator, the analysis of the methods and techniques he followed to achieve his set purpose of avoiding a purely literal translation in favor of one that would adhere to the intent and spirit of the original,<sup>3</sup> must be left to critics more competent in that field.<sup>4</sup> Jean de Meun was the first to attempt the reproduction of ancient texts into the vernacular. In the case of the *De Consolatione philosophiae* the frequent obscurities of his original and its unfamiliar philosophical phraseology must have constituted a formidable challenge to the vocabulary of his mother tongue and to his own native ingenuity. A lexicographical analysis of the result may form a preliminary to further study of how well he met that challenge.

Of the four translations Jean de Meun made previous to that of the *De Consolatione*,<sup>5</sup> only the first enumerated by him can be dated accurately. The explicit of the *Livre de Vegece de Chevalerie* reads: *Ci fenist li livres de Vegece de l'art de chevalerie, que nobles princes Jehan, contes de Eu, fist translater de latin en françois par maistre Jehan de Meun en l'an de l'incarnation M II<sup>o</sup> III<sup>o</sup> et IIII. . . .*<sup>6</sup> If the enumeration Jean makes be chronological in character, then

<sup>1</sup> 'Boethius' *De Consolatione* by Jean de Meun,' ed. V. L. Dedek-Héry, *Mediaeval Studies*, XIV (1952), 168-275.

<sup>2</sup> Cf., for example, Godefroy, *Dictionnaire de l'ancienne langue française, s.v.*, musicien II Pr6 52 (199); prefecture III Pr4 40 (212); providence V Pr6 70 (272); puterelle I Pr1 27 (173); regardable I Pr1 3 (174); tragedie II Pr2 40 (189); universalité (*Complement*), V, Pr5 33-6 (269); etc.

<sup>3</sup> Et por ce que tu me deis—lequel dit je tieng pour commandement—que je preisse plainement la sentence de l'auteur sens trop ensuivre les paroles du latin, je l'ai fait a mon petit pooir si comme ta debonnaireté le me commanda. Or pri touz ceulz qui cest livre verront, s'il leur semble en aucuns lieux que je me soie trop esloigné des paroles de l'auteur ou que je aie mis aucunes fois plus

de paroles que li aucteur n'i met ou aucune fois mains, que il le me pardoignent. Car se je eusse espons mot a mot le latin par le françois, li livres en fust trop occurs aus gens lais et li clers, neis moieusement letré, ne peussent pas legierement entendre le latin par le françois. *Preface*, 9-18 (168).

<sup>4</sup> Cf., for example, Paulin Paris, 'Jean de Meun, traducteur et poète,' *Histoire littéraire de la France* XXVIII (1881), 391-439; Antoine Thomas, 'Traductions françaises de la *Consolatio Philosophiae* de Boèce,' *ibid.*, XXXVII (1938), 436-41.

<sup>5</sup> . . . le livre Vegece de Chevalerie et le livre des Merveilles de Hyrlande et la Vie et les Epistres Pierres Abaelart et Helyos sa fame et le livre Aered de Esperituelle Amitié. . . . *Preface*, 5-7 (168).

<sup>6</sup> *L'Art de Chevalerie, traduction du De re*

the *Consolacion* must have been done some little time after 1284. The work itself is dedicated to Philip IV who began his reign in 1285 and so must have been begun, or perhaps completed, after that date. Jean de Meun died between May 27th and November 6th, 1305.<sup>7</sup> His translation, therefore, of Boethius' *De Consolatione philosophiae* lies somewhere between these two dates, possibly closer to 1305 than to 1285.

One of the oldest manuscripts of the *Consolacion* is Ms B.N. lat. 8654B (F<sup>1</sup>), a fragment which belongs to the end of the thirteenth or to the beginning of the fourteenth century.<sup>8</sup> V. L. Dedek-Héry, editor of the *Consolacion*, was of the opinion that this manuscript, presenting as it does a remarkably good text almost free of errors, derived from a copy, made during Jean de Meun's lifetime and now lost, of the original.<sup>9</sup> At any rate, unlike the other manuscripts which are written in Picard or in the literary language of that period, it alone preserves numerous traits of the Orleans dialect of the original. The editor was inclined, therefore, to date F<sup>1</sup> at the end of the thirteenth rather than at the beginning of the fourteenth century. In contrast, the second oldest manuscript that remains is that of Rennes (R) and it dated 1303.<sup>10</sup> It is a mediocre manuscript, carelessly copied, and descended along with A<sup>2</sup> (Ms Arsenal 2669) and P<sup>4</sup> (B.N. fr. 809) from an imperfect copy of the archetype of F<sup>1</sup>.<sup>11</sup> As such, by 1303 the translation had passed through the hands of two or more scribes. In view of this, it seems reasonable to place the date of Jean de Meun's translation towards the end of the thirteenth century, ca. 1300.

# SIGLA

- Godefroy ..... Frédéric Godefroy.  
*Dictionnaire de l'ancienne langue française et de tous ses dialectes du IX<sup>e</sup> au XV<sup>e</sup> siècle* and *Complément*. 10 vols. Paris, 1881-1902.
- Littre ..... Emile Littré.  
*Dictionnaire de la langue française*. 4 vols. Paris, 1883, and *Supplément*, Paris, 1921.
- DG ..... Adolphe Hatzfeld et Arsène Darmsteter.  
*Dictionnaire général de la langue française*. 2 vols. Paris, 6<sup>e</sup> éd., 1920.
- Tobler-Lommatz . . *Altfranzösisches Wörterbuch*.<sup>12</sup>  
A-fréquentable. Berlin, 1925-54.
- Gamillscheg ..... Ernst Gamillscheg.  
*Etymologisches Wörterbuch des französischen Sprache*. Heidelberg, 1928.

militari de Végèce par Jean de Meun, ed. Ulysse Robert (Paris, 1897), p. 177. Cf. also, *ibid.*, p. viii.

<sup>7</sup> Antoine Thomas, 'La Date de la mort de Jean de Meun,' *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres: Compte-rendu des séances de l'année 1916*, 138-40; Cf. also, Paulin Paris, *art. cit.*, 436-7 and Antoine Thomas, *art. cit.*, 439.

<sup>8</sup> Léopold Delisle, 'Anciennes traductions françaises de la *Consolation* de Boèce, conservées à la Bibliothèque Nationale,' *Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Chartes*, XXXIV (1873), 5-32.

<sup>9</sup> 'Un fragment inédit de la traduction de la

*Consolation* de Boèce par Jean de Meun,' *Romanic Review*, XXVII (1936), 123.

<sup>10</sup> *Catalogue général des manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques des départements* XXIV, p. 241. The date appears on fol. 1 of the manuscript.

<sup>11</sup> V. L. Dedek-Héry, 'The Manuscripts of the Translation of Boethius' *Consolatio*,' *Speculum*, XV (1940), especially 442-3.

<sup>12</sup> It is unfortunate that this dictionary has not progressed beyond this letter. There is no doubt that many words listed below will be found to postdate the initial appearance as marked in future fascicules of Tobler-Lommatz.

- Hauterive ..... R. Grandsaignes d'Hauterive.  
*Dictionnaire d'ancien français.* Paris, 1947.
- AD ..... Albert Dauzat.  
*Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue française.* Paris, 10<sup>e</sup> éd., 1949.
- OB ..... Oscar Block avec la collaboration de W. von Wartburg.  
*Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue française.* Paris, 2<sup>e</sup> éd., 1950.
- Wartburg ..... Walther von Wartburg.  
*Französisches etymologisches Wörterbuch.* A-L. Bonn, 1928-.

I

AJUSTER, verb.

(*Littre Godefroy DG Gamillscheg Tobler-Lommatz*: XVI (Et. Boileau); AD: XVI, mais plus anc.; Wartburg: seit 1480; OB *sv* juste: pour la date, voir les dérivés ajustage 1350, ajustement 1328, ajuster XVI).

Diex seigne les temps et les *ajouste* a leurs propres offices. I M6 8 (184).  
 ... quant tu les as *ajusteez* en hault par legieres veictures ... tu les semes ou ciel et en la terre. III M9 20 (221).

Et la cause de ceste occurté et ceste ignorance est pour ce li mouvement de la raison humaine ne se puet *adjuster* a la simplece de la divine prescience. V P4 7 (264).

ALLECHEMENT, subst.

(*Littre Godefroy DG AD OB*: XIV Bersuire).

Telle estoit elle quant elle te blandisoit et quant elle se joiait a toy et te decevoit par les *allechemens* de fausse beneurté. II PI 32 (187).

AMONCELEUR, subst.

(Listed only by Godefroy: 1478).

Certes ces chosez resplandissent miex et rendent plus nobles et miex renomméz les despendeurs que les *amonceleurs*. ... II P5 9 (195).

BOUTURE, subst.

(Godefroy, action de bouillir: 1347; Wartburg: XVI; DG: 1627; possible also is bouture connected with \*bottan: AD OB: 1446).

... la rage et les menaces de la mer demenant, sa *bouture* tornee du fons jusques en hault, s'esmouvra pas celui. ... I M4 4 (176).

BROCON, subst.

(Unlisted in the various dictionaries. L. F. Flutre cites the word in the *Fait des Romains*, dated 1213, 'Vocabulaire des Faits des Romains,' *Romania*, LXV (1939), 522, with the meaning of 'ramifications secondaires d'un bois de cerf.' He classifies it among those 'mots dont les *Faits des Romains* fournissent les seuls exemples'. The passage Flutre cites from Tilander, *Glanures*, to illustrate its meaning of 'branche, cor', seems to suggest that *bronçon* really means a 'jagged projection' or 'pointed knob' of rock protruding from the horns or arms of a mountain even as do the secondary growths on a stag's horns to form antlers: Genz essilliés de Crete fonderent cete vile et l'apelerent Brandis por les cornes de montaigne, car *brundus* est *cers* en lor langage, et ces cornes ont plusors bronçons de roches autresi comme le corne dou cerf a plusors rains. This meaning of 'jagged

projections' or 'pointed humps' coincides quite well with that attributed to *bronçons* by Jean de Meun in his translation of the original in Boethius:

Rupis achaemeniae scopulis ubi uersa sequentum  
pectoribus figit spicula pugna fugax. . . .

*Es bronçons* de la roiche Eschimenienne, la ou la fuitive bataille des Turs  
getent et fichent leus javeloz retournéz es piz de ceulz qui les suivent . . .  
V MI 1 (258).

CARDINAL, subst.

(Not listed by the dictionaries in the sense of 'pivot' or 'principal point'; as an adjective: *Wartburg*: XIV; *Godefroy*, AD: Bersuire 1372; OB: 1279; *Littre* XIV Oresme).

O tu mestresse de toutez vertuz, descendue du souverain *cardinal*, pour  
quoy es tu venue en ces solitaires lieux de notre essil? I P3 6 (175).

Se aucuns ne scet que celle estoille que on apele Arctur est tournée par le  
souverain *cardinal* prochaine a lui — c'est au hault pol du firmament. . . .  
IV M5 2 (247).

Car aussi comme des cercelez qui se tournent entour un meismes *cardinal*,  
cil qui est dedens se joint a la simplece du milieu et est aussi comme  
uns *cardinalz* des autres cercelez qui se tournent entour lui. . . IV P6 65-6  
(249).

. . . de tant est la chose plus delivre de destinee, de tant comme elle requiert  
de plus pres ycelui *cardinal* de toutez chosez. IV P6 74 (250).

. . . ne li ordres venans du *cardinal* au souverain bien ne se flechiroit pas en  
nulle maniere de son commencement. IV P6 99 (250).

CELEBRITE, subst.

(*Wartburg*: 1680; *Godefroy Littre* DG: XVI; OB AD: XV).

Juges tu que celle chose suffisant, puissant, honorable soit vilz et obscure,  
ou se elle est tres noble et tres clere par *celebrité* de renommee? III P9  
27 (218).

COEMPTION, subst.

(*Littre*: lited but not dated; DG 1788; *Gamillscheg*: XVII).

. . . *coemption*, c'est a dire communs achéz griéz et non mie desploiable  
commandéz et establiz seur le pueple ou temps de la fain eigre. . . I P4  
44 (178).

CONDITIONNEL, adj.

(*Godefroy Littre* Tobler-Lommatz DG *Wartburg* OB AD:  
XIV Oresme).

. . . l'autre est neccessité *condicionelle*, si comme se tu sces que un homme  
aille, il couvient par neccessité que il aille; car ce que chascuns scet, ce ne  
puet estre autrement que si comme il le scet, mais ceste *condicion* ne trait  
pas avec soy celle simple neccessité. Car ceste neccessité *condicionnelle* sa  
propre nature ne la fait pas, ainçois la fait li ajustemens de la *condicion*.  
. . . V P6 105-8 (273).

CONDUISERESSE, subst.

(*Godefroy*: XIV; Tobler-Lommatz: XIV Pél).

"O", dis je, "tu qui es lanterne et *conduiseresse* de vraie clarté. . . VP1  
5 (233).

CONSULAIRE, adj.

(*Godefroy Littre* DG Tobler-Lommatz *Wartburg* OB AD:  
XIV Bersuire).

Certez bien te remembrez, si comme je cuit, que celle dignité que on

apeloit l'empire *consulaire*, qui avant avoit esté commencement de franchise. . . . II P6 6 (198).

CONTREMETTRE, verb.

(Godefroy: XV Eust. Deschamps).

Quantes foiz couvri je, par l'auctorité de moy *contremise* aus perilz, les chetis que l'avarice neant punie des estranges travailloit touz jours? I P4 34 (177).

. . . ja soit ce que les qualitéz des corps qui nous sont *contremisez* et offertez par dehors esmeuvent et entalentent les instrumens des sens. . . . V P2 2 (268).

. . . mais n'ensuivent pas les chosez *contremisez* par dehors. . . . V P2 12 (268).

COROLLAIRE, subs.

(Littré DG *Gamillscheg Wartburg OB AD*: XV Monstrelet).

. . . aussi te donrai je ci aussi comme un *correlaire* ou un loier de coronne. III P10 77 (223).

"Ce est", dis je, "bele chose et precieuse; appelle la, si comme tu veulz miex, ou porisme ou *correlaire* ou esclarcissement ou loier de coronne. III P10 87 (223).

Car remembre toy de ce *correlaire* que je te donné si noble un pou ci devant. . . . IV P3 22 (239).

CUIDABLE, adj.

(Godefroy<sup>13</sup> Tobler-Lommatz: XV Eust. Deschamps; *Wartburg*: XIV).

Mais, s'il te plaist, nombrons la entre celles des quiex tu deis un pou ci devant que elles n'estoient pas *cuidablez* au peuple. IV P7 12 (254).

DEPUTER, verb.

(Godefroy DG OB AD: Jean de Vignay 1328; *Gamillscheg Hauterive*: XIV; *Littré*: XV; Tobler-Lommatz: G. Muisis 1272-1352).

Pour quoy *deputez* tu donques et alleguez que les chosez que diex voit ou scet soient faitez par neccessité. . . . V P6 73 (272).

DESPENDEUR, subst.

(Godefroy Tobler-Lommatz: XIV Jean de Condé).

Certes ces chosez resplandissent miex et rendent plus nobles et miex renomméz les *despendeurs* que les amonceleurs. . . . II P5 9 (195).

DESSEVERABLE, adj.

(Godefroy Tobler-Lommatz: XIV).

Et comme ces chosez soient ainsi, nul sage hom certez ne puet doubter de la pardurable et non *desseverable* paine des mauvais. IV P3 30 (239).

DETERMINEEMENT, adv.

(Godefroy Littré DG: XIV Oresme).

. . . car les autres chosez qui sont requierent *determineement* et sens erreur et ensuivent leur bien. Preface, 50 (169).

ECHAPEMENT, subst.

(Godefroy DG Tobler-Lommatz: XII; OB XII, rare avant le XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle; AD XII, rare jusqu'au XVIII<sup>e</sup> s.).

. . . il cuident ou que li laisirs des maus fere ou que li *eschapemens* sans paine soit beneureuz. IV P4 98 (244).

ECRIVAIN, subst.

(Godefroy *Gamillscheg Hauterive Tobler-Lommatz Littré AD*: XII-XIII with the meaning of 'public scribe,

<sup>13</sup> Godefroy II 394b had questioned the meaning of this adjective. Tobler-Lommatz s.v. glosses it: susceptible de présomption.

Schreiber, Schriftsteller etc'; OB: XVI with the meaning of 'author, personne qui compose des livres').

Mais certez maint homme qui tres noble furent en leur temps sont mis en oubli par faute d'*escripvains*. Ja soit que li escript (var. B leurs *ecrivains*) ne leur vaillent niant, les quiex ancienneté longue et obscure efface avec leurs aucteurs. II P7 46 (201).

ELEATIQUE, adj.

(Listed but not dated by *Littre* only).

Mais vous me toléz cestui qui a esté norris es estudes *eleatiques* et *academianz*. I P1 36 (173).

EPICURIEN, subst. and adj.

(*Godefroy DG AD: XIV Mir. hist.* vers 1327; *Gamillscheg Wartburg: XIV; OB: 1512*, déjà au sens fig., 1495, au sens propre; *Littre* listed but not dated).

Du quel comme le peuple *epicuriens* et stoiciens et pluseur autre. . . I P3 18 (175).

Et ces seules chosez regarde seulement li *Epicurians* et puis juge tantost et establist que deliz esté li souverains biens. . . III P2 45 (207).

ENTRE-SOUFFRIR, verb.

(Listed only by *Littre*: XVI Cotgrave; Cf. also La Curne de Sainte-Palaye, *Dictionnaire historique de l'ancien françois*, Paris, 1879, s.v.).

. . . elle ne veut pas estre melleez ne eulz *entresouffrir* a estre ensemble? V M3 5 (263).

ESSENTIALITE, subst.

(*Littre*: listed but not dated; *Godefroy*: vers 1372 *Trad. du Rationale* de G. Durant).

. . . ainçois regarde toutes chosez ensemble par un seul coup de pensee formablement et par *essencialité*, pour ce que je ne le sai autrement dire. V P4 106 (267).

ESTADE, subst.

(*Godefroy DG Hauterive Tobler-Lommatz OB AD s.v.* stade: XIII-XIV with the meaning of 'unit of measurement; AD: 1549 R. Estienne with the meaning of 'enclosure, stadium'; *Gamillscheg: XVII*).

. . . si comme il avient a celui qui queurt en l'estade que la coronne gist illec pour quoy on queurt et ce est li loiers du cors. IV P3 5 (239).

EXPERIMENT, subst.

(*Godefroy Tobler-Lommatz: XIV*).

Et ce n'est pas prouvé tant seulement par l'auctorité du philosophe, mais par raison et par *experiment* apparant. Preface, 21 (168).

Et ce meismes veons nous apertement et par *experiment* es chosez vivans . . . Preface, 28 (168).

FORMABLEMENT, adv.

(Listed only by *Godefroy: Mir. hist.* 1327).

. . . ainçois regarde toutes chosez ensemble par un seul coup de pensee formablement et par *essencialité*. . . V P4 106 (267).

FORTUNEL, adj.

(*Godefroy Wartburg: 1387; Tobler-Lommatz: XIV*).

. . . homme premierement et par moult de temps est norris es biens sensibles forains et *fortunex*. . . Preface, 112 (171).

. . . si certaines chosez fussent meues par *fortunele folie*. . . I P6 7 (184).

Car se cist vains nons de *fortunele* beneurté te meut. . . II P4 8 (192).

Et pour ce que tu cognoisses que beneurté ne puet estre en ces chosez

*fortuneles* et temporiex. . . II P4 80 (194).

. . . et comme ce soit aperte chose que la *fortunele* beneurté se defenist par la mort du corps. . . II P4 96 (194).

Mais ou sera trouvé aucun homme qui puisse seur aucun autre homme hanter aucun droit fors seulement sus le corps et sus les chosez plus basses du corps, les quelles je apele *fortuneles* possessions? II P6 26 (199).

. . . car je m'en merveillasse moins, se je creusse que toutez chosez fussent melles par *fortunieus* cas. IV P5 18 (247).

Or cuide on donques que ce soit avenü par cas *fortunel*. . . V P1 41 (258).

Ce sont donques les causez de l'abregement du cas *fortunel* qui est avenü par causez qui s'entrencontrerent et coururent ensemble. . . V P1 46 (258).

FUYANT, adj.

(*Littré*: listed but not dated; *DG AD*: 1539 R. Est.; a first time in 1213, *Fait des Romains*, L. F. Fluttre, *Romania*, LXV [1939], 492).

Mais la biauté de forme, comment est elle ravissable et isnele et plus *fuians* que la muableté des fleurs de printemps! III P8 21 (216).

HANON, subst.

(Listed only by *Littré Suppl.*: XIV).

. . . si comme sont les oestrez, les *hanons* et les autres conchez de la mer qui se aherdent et sont norriez es roichez. V P5 17 (268).

IMAGINABLE, adj.

(*Littré*: listed but not dated; *DG*: 1579; *AD*: XV; *OB* Laurent, *Romania*, LI [1925], 40: 1450).

Certez raison, quant elle regarde aucune chose universele, elle ne use pas ne de ymaginacion ne de sens et, toutevoiz, comprent elle les chosez *imaginables* et sensibles. Car c'est celle qui deffenist ainsi l'universel de sa conception: homme est beste a deus piéz raisonnable. Et comme ceste cognoissance soit universele, toutevoiz n'est il nulz qui bien ne sache que homs est chose *ymaginable* et sensible. V P4 108-12 (267).

Car ce qui est sensible ou *ymaginable*, ce ne puet estre universel. V P5 27 (269).

Se raison voloit a ces chosez encontre respondre et deist que vraiment regarde elle et comprent par raison de universalité et ce qui est sensible et ce qui est *ymaginable*. . . V P5 34 (269).

IMAGINATIF, adj.

(*Godefroy Littré*: XV; *OB DG*: XIV Froissart; *AD*: XIV *Mir. hist.*).

Aussi ymaginacion . . . avironne elle et comprent toutez chosez sensibles nommie par raison sensible de jugier, mais par raison *ymaginative*. V P4 118 (267).

INCLINATION, subst.

(*Littré*: XV; *Godefroy*: XIV Eust. Deschamps; *DG AD*: XIV Oresme; *OB*: vers 1350).

Es autres chosez neis qui sont peut l'en aussi ce meismes veoir, car en toutez est nee *inclinacion* qu'elles se meuvent a bien. . . Preface, 43 (169).

INDIAN, adj.

(Listed only by *Littré*; not dated).

Li autres comme tigres *indians* s'en va debonnairement par les maisons. IV M3 7 (241).

JOYEUSETE, subst.

(*Littré*: XV; *DG*: XIV-XV; *AD*: XIV; *Wartburg*: ca. 1400; *OB*: vers 1400).



. . . si comme sont fame et enfans qui sont requis par cause de delit et joieuseté. III P2 30 (207).

. . . deliz est le souverains biens pour ce que toutez ces chosez, si comme il li est avis, aportent joieuseté au courage des hommes. III P2 47 (207). Certes tres honneste fust la joieuseté de fame de enfans. . . . III P7 11 (215).

. . . si que, ce qui est suffisance, ce meismes soit puissance et reverance, noblece et joieuseté. . . . III P11 13 (225).

LOUABLEMENT, adv.

(Wartburg: 1531; Littré: XVI; DG: 1404; Godefroy: 1372).

Car ainsi plus clerement et plus loablement est trectié et demenez li offices de sapience, quant la beneurté et la proece des gouverneurs est aussi comme espandue entre les peuplez. . . . IV P5 7 (246).

MALFIABLE, adj.

(Listed only by Godefroy: XVI).

Quant fortune *malfiable* m'otroioit sa grace en ses biens legiers et fuitis. . . . I M1 14 (172).

MATERIAL, subst. and adj.

(s.v. *matériel*. Godefroy: 1327; Littré: XIV; OB: 1314).

. . . mais il geterent aussi comme un fondement du sugét *material*, c'est a dire de la nature de toutez chosez faitez per raison. V P1 27 (257).

Car elle cognoist et l'universalité de raison et la figure de l'imaginacion et le sensible *material* conceu par sens . . . V P4 104 (267).

MECONNAISSABLE, adj.

(Godefroy DG: XIII-XIV; AD OB: XIII; Littré: XVI).

Donques gesiez vous du tout *mesconnoissable* ne vostre renommee ne vous fait pas cogneuz. II M7 14 (203).

MEDECINEUR, subst.

(Listed only by Godefroy: XVI).

Et quieux autres est ou gardeur des biens ou osteur des malz fors diex, gouverneur et *medecineur* des pensees? IV P6 120 (251).

MOMENTAIN, adj.

(Godefroy Littré: XIV J. Lefevre).

. . . et pour ce que ceste *momentaine*, petite et isele presence porte une ymage et une semblance de celle permanant presence de dieu, a quiconques chosez que celle *momentaine* presence vient, elle leur donne. . . . V P6 49-51 (272).

OURSE, subst.

(DG Littré: listed but not dated; OB AD: XVI. The word occurs also in Jean's translation of Vegetius' *De Re militari: L'Art de Chevalerie*, ed. Ulysses Robert, p. 168).

Ne l'Ourse qui flechist son ravissable cours entour la souveraine hautece du ciel ne se vet onques laver en la mer de occident. . . . IV M6 5 (253).

PARJUREMENT, subst.

(Godefroy: XIV; Hauteville: XV-XVI).

Ne li *perjurement* ne li baraz couvers de mençongiere couleur ne nuisent riens aus mauvais. . . . I M5 26 (182).

PERTURBATION, subst.

(Littré DG Gamillscheg OB AD: XIV Oresme).

et regardanz mon voutl pesant et grief de pleur et par pleur en terre degeté, s'est complainte par ces vers de la *perturbacion* de nostre pensee. I P1 47 (173).

Or usons donques d'un petit plus legiers pour ce que les plaies, qui par *perturbacions* seurvenans sont endurcies en enfleure, se amolissent. . . . I P5 40 (184).

"Je ne sui pas," dist elle, "deceue qu'il ne te faille aucune chose par quoy maladie de *perturbacions* est entree dedens ton courage. . . . I P6 20 (185). Mais itieux sont les costumes des *perturbacions*; ce pooir ont elles qu'elles peuvent mouvoir homme de son lieu. . . . I P6 28 (185).

. . . la nature des pensees est tele que toutes les fois que elles gettent les vraies opinions elles se vestent des fausses des quies nest l'occurté de *perturbacions* confundans ycelui vrai regart. . . . I P6 55 (186).

PLANICE, subst.

(Listed only by Godefroy: 1488).

Ja soit ce que li vens tonne et trouble les *planices* de la mer par trebuchances de floz, tu seras couvers en repos. . . . I M4 9 (194).

. . . si comme nous soulons aucune foiz par un isnel greffe fichier letres emprainteiz en la *planice* de la page de cire ou de parchemin. . . . V M4 6 (267).

PLANTE, subst.

(Godefroy: 1426; Littré: XVI; DG OB: listed but not dated; AD: rare en anc. fr. ce qui peut présumer une reprise sav. du latin *planta*).

. . . car li soleil est peres des *plantes*, si comme il est escrit ou livre des Plantes. . . . Preface, 35 (168).

POLE, subst.

(DG: 1372; OB: 1372, rare avant le XVII<sup>e</sup> s.; AD: 1372, rare jusqu'au XVIII<sup>e</sup>; Laurent, *Romania*, XLV [1939], 177: 1338; Menut and Denomy, *Mediaeval Studies*, V [1943], 320: 1377).

. . . celle estoille que on apele Arctur est tournée par le souverain cardinal prochaine a lui — c'est au hault *pol* du firmament. . . . IV M5 2 (247).

PORISME, subst.

(Littré: listed but not dated; DG AD: 1701; Gamillscheg: 18 Jhdt.).

"Seur ces chousez donques," dist elle, "aussi comme li geometrien, quant il ont demonstré leurs propos, seulent conclurre et ajuster aucunes chousez que il apelent *porismes* ou esclarcissemens des chousez devant ditez. . . . III P10 76 (223).

"Ce est," dis je, "bele chose et precieuse; apele la, si comme tu veulz miex, ou *porisme* ou correlaire ou esclarcissement ou loier de coronne. III P10 87 (223).

POSSIBLE, adj.

(Littré: XIV Oresme; DG AD OB: 1337).

Car il n'est pas chose *possible* a homme ne de comprendre par engin ne de despoier par parolez toutes les soutivez ordenancez de l'œuvre divine. IV P6 195 (253).

. . . donques n'est ce pas *possible* que cas soit nulle chose telle comme nous avons defeni un pou ci devant. V P1 30 (257).

PREMISSE, subst.

(Godefroy Littré DG Gamillscheg OB AD: XIV Oresme).

"Certez," dis je, "je ne puis aler contre les raisons propousees et bien voy que ce s'ensuit de ces *premisses*. III P10 61 (223).

. . . puis que les *premisses* sont ottoiees, il n'est nulle riens pour quoy il doie blasmer l'argument. IV P4 37 (242).

PRISABLE, adj.

(Littré DG Hauterive: XVI Montaigne).

Mais nous, par le pris de droiturier et de vraie humilité, deservons le guerredon de la divine grace qui n'est mie *prisable*. . . . V P3 106 (263).

PROVINCE.

(Littré AD: XIII; DG Gamillscheg: XIII-XIV; OB: 1213,

peu usuel avant le XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle . . . n'a servi à designer une division administrative que depuis la seconde moitié du XV<sup>e</sup> siècle; Flutre, *Romania*, LXV [1939], 499: 1213).

Quant je veoie les fortunes du peuple des *provinces* estre grevees et misez au desouz. . . I P4 37 (177).

. . . fust veuz a desgaster et a tormenter par souffreté et par mesaise la *province* de Champagne. . . I P4 46 (178).

QUESTEUR, subst.

(Godefroy AD: XIV; *Littre Gamillscheg*: XVI; OB: 1488 . . . une première fois au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle; DG: 1539; Flutre, *Romania*, LXV [1939], 499: 1213).

. . . et li *questeurs*, qui se prenoit garde de l'annee du peuple, comme des blez et de telz autres chosez, fu jadis tenus pour grant. III P4 42 (212).

REFLECHIR, verb.

(Godefroy *Littre Gamillscheg*: XIV; DG: 1314; OB AD: XVII).

Quiconques encerche verité par pensee parfonde et ne veult estre deceuz par nulles desvoialetéz, *reflechisse* et retourt en soi meismes la clarté des yeulz de son cuer par dedens et restraingne en *reflechissant* entour son cuer les lons mouvemens de ses pensees. . . III MII 2-3 (228).

REPONNEUR, subst.

(Listed only by Godefroy: XIV Gilles li Muisis).

Car se li coutiveur du champ ne foist la terre et se li *reponieur* de l'or n'eusse en ce lieu son or repost, li ors n'eust pas esté trouvéz. V P1 44 (258).

REQUERABLE adj.

(*Littre* DG: XVI).

Mais quiex est ceste vostre puissance si *requerable* et si tres noble? II P6 14 (193).

REVOMIR, verb.

(*Littre*: listed but not dated; Godefroy DG: 1539; OB AD: 1538; Flutre, *Romania*, LXV [1939], 501: 1213).

. . . ainsi comme se porte Eurupus esboillans—c'est un naturex cours marins qui ores receit les ondes de la mer et ores les *revomist* hors. . . II MI 3 (188).

SANGLIER, subst.

(*Littre*: XVI; OB: d'abord sengler, d'où, par substitution de suffixe, sanglier vers le XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle; AD: sengler XII<sup>e</sup> s., -ier, XVI<sup>e</sup> s., par changement de suffixe).

Et puis que sa main puissant sus les herbez les a muéz en diversez manierez, li uns est couvers de forme de *sanglier*, li autres est muéz en lion. . . IV M3 5 (241).

Li homme que li serpent et li lion et li tigre et li ours et li *senglier* requierent aus dens pour eulz tuer. . . IV M4 4 (246).

Il leva le *senglier* escumeus sus les espaulez seur les quiex li hault cielx devoit seoir. IV M7 22 (256).

SENATOIRE, subst.

(Listed only by Godefroy: XIV).

. . . et li cens du *senatoire* estoit jadis grief charge. . . III P4 41 (212).

SINGULIER, adj.

(Godefroy:—ier: 1388; *Littre*: XIV Oresme; OB: d'abord singular XII<sup>e</sup> siècle, puis singulier, XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle par substitution de suffixe; AD: -ier XIV).

Raison seurmonte ymaginacion et comprend, par un commun regart, l'espece commune qui est es *singulierez* piecez. V P4 89 (266).

Et dont est celle force qui regarde les chosez *singulierez* ou celle qui devise les chosez cogneuez. . . . V M4 13 (267).

. . . donques est vaine et fausse la conception de raison qui regarde et comprend ce qui est sensible et *singulier* aussi comme un universel. V P5 31 (269).

. . . si comme tout quanque apert a sens, se tu le raportez a raison, il est universel; se tu le raportez a soi meismes, il est *singulier*. V P6 139 (274). *Singulier* appears as a variant for *sengle/sangle*: au sengle comblement: var. au *singulier* comblement P<sup>a</sup>A<sup>a</sup>M II P3 24 (190); des sanglez hommes: var. des *singuliers* hommes P<sup>a</sup>A<sup>a</sup>M II P7 27 (201).

SONNABLE, adj.

(Listed only by Godefroy: XIV Deguilleville).

. . . neis les causes dom ce vient que li vent *sonnable* esmeuvent les planices de la mer. . . . I M2 9 (174).

TREMBLABLE, adj.

(Listed only by Godefroy: XIV Lég. doree).

Et quiconques *tremblables* craint ou desire, ce que il ne soit pas estables et de son droit, il a geté son escu. . . . I M4 10 (176).

VAINQUERRESSE, subst.

(Godefroy: XIV; Littré: XV).

. . . et raconte Lucans, nostre familiers, que la cause *vainquerresse* avoit pleu aus diex. . . . IV P6 128 (251).

STOICIEN, adj.

(Godefroy DG OB AD: XIV Oresme).

Du quel comme le peuple epicuriens et *stoiciens* et pluseur autre s'aparaillassent a aler ravir l'heritage. . . . I P3 19 (175).

TAISIBLE, adj.

(Godefroy: XIII-XIV with the meaning of 'silencieux, taciturne' Mace de la Charité).

En dementiers que je, *tesibles*, recordoie ces chosez. . . . I P1 1 (172). . . . et, mon regart en terre geté, commençai *tesibles* a atendre que elle feroit des ore en avant. I P1 44 (173).

Et comme elle m'eust veu non mie tant seulement *tesibles*, mais du tout sans langue et mu. . . . I P2 9 (174).

TRAGEDIE, subst.

(Godefroy Littré DG Gamillscheg OB AD: XIV Oresme).

Et quelle autre chose pleure li cris des *tragedies* fors seulement comme fortune tourne les riches royaumes par coup despourveu? II P2 40 (189).

TRANSFORMER, verb.

(Godefroy Littré Gamillscheg: XIV; DG OB: XIV Oresme; AD: XIV Mir. hist.).

Donques avient il que, se tu en vois aucun qui soit *transformé* en vices, tu ne peus pas prisier ne cuider que il soit hom. IV P2 51 (240).

Celle ordenance muet le ciel et les estoilles et atrempe les elemens entre eulz et les *transforme* par entrechajable mutacion. . . . IV P6 83 (250).

TRANSMUABLE, adj.

(Godefroy Littré DG OB AD: XIV Oresme).

. . . ne onques estrangez causez ne te esmurent a former euvre de matere flotant et *transmuable*, mais la forme du souverain bien assise en toy sans envie te meut tant seulement. . . . III M9 5 (220).

TROUBLEMENT, subst.

(Hauterive: XIV; Littré AD: XIV).

. . . car douleur et *troublement* de cuer pour biens temporex sont en homme de faible et de enferme pensee. . . . Preface, 127 (171).

TURBATION, subst.

(Listed only by *Godefroy*: XIV Peter of Langtoft).

Et pour ce que plusieurs *turbacions* de desiriers t'ont assailli et douleur et ire et pleur te traignent diversement. . . . I P5 36 (184).

. . . ire trouvable qui en eulz eslieve les floz des ses *turbacions* tourmente d'autre part leur pensee. . . . IV M2 6 (238).

## II

The basic manuscript used by the editor for his edition of Jean de Meun's translation of the *De Consolatione* is the fourteenth-century *Ms Paris B.N. fr. 1097* (P<sup>1</sup>). In addition to the reading of this manuscript he has given the variants for the other sixteen extant manuscripts. Included in these variants are the following words that corroborate the dates assigned to them by lexicographers and, in some cases, are prior to them. For the dates of the various manuscripts, see *Mediaeval Studies*, XIV (1952), 166-7.

CONCILIER, verb.

(*Godefroy DG AD*: 1549; *Wartburg*: 1529, a first time in the XII *Guernes de Pont Saint-Maxence*; *Littre Gamillscheg*: XVI; *Tobler-Lommatz*: XIV Gilles li Muisis; *OB*: XII, rare avant le XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle).

Mais li ami qui sont acordé nommie par vertu mais par fortune, aident il au besoing? III P5 37 (214). *Var.*: b au besoing ne sont donques cil pour aidier ami que fortune *concilie* (*S* conseille *P*<sup>s</sup> consilie) ou conjoint et non mie vertu.

EXTIRPER, verb.

(*Godefroy*: 1336; *Littre Gamillscheg DG Wartburg OB AD*: XIV Oresme).

. . . ce pooir ont elles qu'elles peuvent mouvoir homme de son lieu, mais arrachier le du tout et lui tout estreper (*var.*: *DS* *extirper*) a soy meismes ne peuvent elles pas. I P6 30 (185).

GOVERNANT, subst.

(*Godefroy Littre DG AD*: XV; *OB*: 1437; *Wartburg*: 1449).

Mais di moy, puis que tu ne doutes pas que cist mondes ne soit gouvernéz par dieu, aparceus ne par quieux gouvernaus (*var.*: *P*<sup>1</sup>*C*<sup>2</sup> *gouvernans*) il est gouvernéz? I P6 17 (185).

Et pour ce que tu as oublié par quieux gouvernaus (*var.*: *P*<sup>1</sup>*C*<sup>2</sup> *gouvernans*) est gouvernés li mondes. . . . I P6 44 (185).

Et prouvoiez en desputant que diex gouverne toutez les chosez du monde par les gouvernaus (*var.*: *P*<sup>1</sup>*C*<sup>2</sup> *gouvernans*) de bonté . . . III P11 88 (231).

. . . quant la beneurté et la proece des gouverneurs (*var.*: *B* *gouvernans*) est aussi comme espandue entre les peuplez voisins que il ont a gouverner. . . . IV P5 8 (246).

GRIEVEMENT, adv.

(*Godefroy Wartburg*: XIV; *Littre*: XVI; *DG OB AD*: 1539).

. . . il retournent a leurs courages de jadis qui longuement avoient esté repost et fremissent griefment (*var.*: *A*<sup>2</sup> *griefement*) et leur remembre de leur nature. . . . III M2 10 (208).

IMPERIEUX, adj.

(*Godefroy Littre DG AD*: XV A. Chartier; *OB*: vers 1420).

Mais je, de cui la veue plungiee en lermes estoit occurcie, ne ne peusse pas cognoistre qui fust ceste fame de si emperiable (*var.*: *P*<sup>2</sup>*A*<sup>1</sup>*A*<sup>2</sup>*M* *imperieuse*) auctorité, m'esbahi. . . . I P1 43 (173).

INCERTAIN, adj.

(*Littre*: XVI; *Godefroy DG OB AD*: XIV Oresme).

Ou combien neis vaudra mieux la divine prescience de l'opinion humaine,

se elle juge aussi comme li homme les chosez non-certaines (*var.*: P<sup>a</sup> *incertaines*) des quieux li avenemens n'est pas certains? V P3 77 (262).

INFINITIF, adj.

(*Littré*: XVI; *DG Gamillscheg*: XV-XVI as a mood; *OB AD*: 1368 as a mood; *Godefroy*: XV *Mist. du viel test.* with the meaning of 'infini').

... si comme dit Aristotes du monde, que celle chose n'ait onques eu commencement ne ne defaille jamais et que sa vie soit estendue avec l'infinité (*var.*: C<sup>1</sup> *l'infinitif*) de temps. ... V P6 20 (271).

MINEUR, adj.

(*Godefroy Littré Gamillscheg*: XV; *DG*: 1437; *OB AD*: XIV).

Tu par semblables et par pareillez causez essauez les ames et les vies meneurs (*var.*: M *mineur*) et, quant tu les a ajusteez. ... III M9 19 (221).

MOMENTANE, adj.

(*Godefroy*: 1338; *Littré DG*: XVI; *OB AD*: 1542).

... et pour ce que ceste momentaine (*var.*: P<sup>s</sup> *momentanee*), petite et isnele presence porte une ymage et une semblance de celle permanant presence de dieu. ... V P6 49 (272).

NAVIRE, subst.

(*Littré OB AD*: XIV).

Endementiers que cil Agamenon desire donner vaille a la navie (*var.*: BRA<sup>a</sup>P<sup>s</sup>MDS *navire*) grezesche. ... IV M7 4 (256).

NEIGE, subst.

(*Godefroy Littré Gamillscheg DG*: XIV; *OB AD*: vers 1325).

... ne quant la pesanteur de la neif (*var.*: P<sup>a</sup>A<sup>2</sup>DS *nege* A<sup>1</sup>M *neige*) endurcie par froit est remise et dissolue par l'ardant chaleur. ... IV M5 13 (247).

NONPAREIL, adj.

(*Littré OB AD*: XIV).

... touz les coups que Fortune me puet faire et me cuide bien deffendre d'elle ne ne me cuit pas despareil (*var.*: P<sup>a</sup> *nonpareil*) a ses coups. III P1 9 (205).

OCTROYER, verb.

(*Littré Hauterive*: XV; *DG*: otroyer XII, écrit plus récemment octroyer; *OB*: XV; *AD*: otreier XII, oc- XV d'après le latin; Menut and Denomy, *Mediaeval Studies*, V [1943], 311: XIV Oresme).

Mais or soit licence otroié (*var.*: P<sup>a</sup>P<sup>a</sup>A<sup>1</sup>A<sup>2</sup>MBR *octroiee*) que li felon homme qui desirent. ... I P4 107 (179).

ORDONNANCE, subst.

(*Littré*: XIV; *OB AD*: XV).

... mais destinee est l'ordenance (*var.*: P<sup>a</sup>A<sup>1</sup> *ordonnance*) qui se tient et se ahert aus chosez mouvablez. ... IV P6 35 (249).

OUVRAGE, subst.

(*Littré*: XV; *DG Gamillscheg*: XIV-XV; *OB AD*: XIV E. Deschamps).

Ses robes estoient de tres deliéés filz et de soutille ouvraingne (*var.*: b except P<sup>a</sup>BF<sup>s</sup> *ouvrage*), de matiere pardurable parfetes. ... I P1 12 (172).

ROCHETE, subst.

(Listed only by *Godefroy*: 1318).

Ainsi se tu veulz foir la perilleuse aventure du delitable siege pour estre certains et seurs, fonde ta maison en une petite basse roche (*var.*: RA<sup>a</sup>P<sup>a</sup> *basse ou petite rochete*). II M4 8 (194).

TANTET, subst.

(*Godefroy*: 1335; *Littré AD*: XV; *Gamillscheg*: XIV-XV;

DG: XIV; OB Flutre, *Romania*, LXV [1939], 503: 1213).

... il couvient que tu te seuffrez un petit (*var.*: P<sup>3</sup> *tantet*) de ce delit. . . . IV P6 19 (248).

TRAGEDIEN, subst.

(*Godefroy*: XIV-XV; OB: XVI, une première fois en 1372; DG AD: 1372).

Et quelle autre chose pleure li cris des tragedies (*var.*: b les *tragediens*) fors seulement comme fortune tourne les riches royaumes. . . . II P2 40 (189).

### III.

The following words have been refashioned from their earlier Old French forms. They are listed separately because it is uncertain whether their actual form is due to Jean de Meun or to the scribes of the various manuscripts, especially that of P<sup>1</sup>.

ACHET, subst.

(*Godefroy*: aichet 1326, achat XVI, notes that 'les exemples aquaiz 1225, acheit 1269, semble indiquer la confusion d'achat dans la region du Nord Est au XIII<sup>e</sup> et XIV<sup>e</sup> siècles; OB: achat XII en outre achat, XVI; *Gamillscheg*: achat XIII, daneben seit dem 13 Jhdt. auch achat).

... coemption, c'est a dire communs *achéz griéz* et non mie desploiable commandéz et establiz seur le peuple ou temps de la fain eigre. . . . I P4 44 (178).

ADMINISTRATION, subst.

(DG: 1409; OB AD: XIV; *Tobler-Lommatz*: aministracion XIII, administracion XIV Guillaume de Digueville).

Je donques ensivanz ceste auctorité desirai metre en fait de commune *administracion* ce que avoie apris de toy entre nos oiseuses secrees. I P4 23 (177).

COMMIXTION, subst.

(*Godefroy*: XIV Oresme; *Littre*: XV).

... pour ce que il la feissent obscure par la *commixtion* d'aucune felonnie, il me mistrent assus et mentirent. . . . I P4 134 (180).

DICTER, verb.

(*Littre* OB AD: XV).

Et quant elle vit les Muses des poetes estans autour notre lit et *dictanz* paroles a mes pleurs, elle en fu un petit esmeue. . . . I P1 24 (173).

DUEIL, subst.

(*Littre*: XVI; OB AD: XV).

... lors je, qui n'avoie pas du tout oublié le pleur et le *dueil* qui estoit assis en mon cuer, li entrerompi s'entencion. . . . IV P1 3 (233).

ENQUERIR, verb.

(*Godefroy*: 1335; *Littre*: XIV).

En ce croi je que nous devons premierement *enquerir* (all other manuscripts: *enquerre*), savoir mon, se aucuns itieux biens. . . . III P10 4 (221). Cf. V P3 25 (260): *enquerre*: *var.*: MF<sup>2</sup> *enquerir*.

HYDRE, subst.

(*Godefroy* DG: XIII idre; OB: XIII, écrit alors idre, rare avant le XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle; AD: idre XIII, rare jusqu'au XVI<sup>e</sup> s.).

Il occist en la palu de Lerne *hidre*, le serpent qui avoit neuf testes, et en ardi le venim. IV M7 17 (256).

LETHARGIE, subst.

(*Godefroy Wartburg*: letargie XIII; DG *Gamillscheg*: XIII; *Littre*: letardie XIII lestartie litargie XV; OB: XVIII; AD: 1539, rare jusqu'au XVIII<sup>e</sup> s.).

"Ci n'a point de peril; il est cheuz en *letargie*; c'est commune maladie de pensees deceues. I P2 11 (174).

MALGRE, prep.

(*Littré* OB AD: XV).

... peccune n'a riens de sa propre nature par quoi elle ne puisse estre tolue a ceulz qui la tiennent *malgré* euls". "Je le recognois", dis je. "Pour quoi ne le recognoistriez tu, comme li plus fors la toille chascun jour au plus foible *malgré* lui? Car dont viennent donquez les complaintez des plaiz fors que de ce que les pecunes sont requizez qui ont esté toluez a ceulz qui les avoient, par force ou par barat *malgré* eulz?" III P3 33-8 (210).

OCCIRE, verb.

(*Littré*: XIV Oresme; DG: not dated; *Hauterive* OB AD: XVI; cf. Menut and Denomy, *Mediaeval Studies*, V [1943], 310).

Antonius commanda et fist que les chevaliers *occeissent* de glaive Papinian. ... III P5 30 (213).

... aussi comme croissoient les testes au serpent que Hercules *occist*. ... IV P6 10 (248).

Il *occist* en la palu de Lerne hidre, le serpent qui avoit neuf testes. ... IV M7 17 (256).

OUI

(*Littré* OB AD: XVI).

"Oy", dis je. "Mais certes celle qui hante ou. ... IV P7 18 (255). All other manuscripts: *oil*.

QUERIR, verb.

(*Gamillscheg*: the beginning of the XV; AD: XIV *Mir. hist.*; OB: vers 1327; 2<sup>e</sup> éd.; relevée au XV<sup>e</sup> siècle).

... quelle chose ont elles en eulz par quoy on y doie *querir* biauté. ... III P4 51 (212).

"Donques ne doit on en nulle maniere *querir* beneurté es chosez que on croit qui puissent donner senglement aucune des chosez que on requiert". III P9 69 (219).

Cf. also *acquérir*: IV P4 145 (245).

Cf. also *requerir*: III P9 94 (220); III P10 118 (224); III P10 124 (224) *var.*: R *requierre* BS *conquerre* D *acquerre*; III P11 15 (225); IV P2 125-6 (238).

SEXE, subst.

(*Littré*: ses XII sexe XVI; DG: sex XII; OB: XII, rare avant le XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle; AD: sex XII, rare en anc. fr.).

... et celle meismes renouvelle les chosez nessans et decheans par semblablez engendreurez de sexes et de semences de naturez maslez et femeles. IV P6 85 (250).

SUFFIRE, verb.

(*Littré*: XVI; *Hauterive*: souffire XII-XV, forme prim. de suffire; *Gamillscheg*: seit dem 16 Jhdt. für seit dem 12 Jhdt. souffire; OB: XVI refection de de l'anc. fr. souffire XII; AD: souffire XII, suff- forme plus latinisée XVI).

Car il ne doit pas *suffire* a regarder ce qui est presentement assis devant les yeux. II P1 45 (187).

... selonc ce que il *suffist* a nature, il n'est pas raison que tu quierez habondance de fortune, car pou de chosez et tres petites *suffisent* a nature. ... II P5 47-8 (196).

... il n'est pas du tout *suffisant* a soi meismez. III P3 26 (210).

Or nous *suffise* jusques ci que nous avons demonsté la forme. ... III P9 1 (217).



Cf. also III P3 26 (210); III P3 43 (210); III P9 25 (218); III P9 28 (218); IV P4 37 (242); IV P4 127 (245); IV P6 7 (248); IV P7 197 (253); V P1 12 (257); V P3 46 (261); V P4 13 (264).

SUFFISANCE, subst.

(*Littre* OB: XV).

... par ces chosez leur viengne *suffisance*, honneur, puissance. . . . III P2 69 (208).

"Ceste faute donques de *suffisance* et ceste souffraite. . . . III P3 28 (210).

... pour quoy vous creéz qu'elle vous doignent *suffisance*? III P3 56 (210).

"Certes", je dis, "je voi bien que *suffisance* ne peut venir par richece. . . . III P9 5 (218).

*Suffisance* donques et puissance sont d'une meismes nature. III P9 18 (218).

Cf. also III P9 22 (218); III P9 43 (219); III P9 53 (219) etc.

SUPPLEER, verb.

(OB AD: XVI; cf. Menut and Denomy, *Mediaeval Studies*, V [1943], 317; Block suggests that a confusion with *souploier* resulted in the use of *supplier* with the meaning of *suppleer* from the XIV to the XVI).

... tu *supplieras* a celui qui les donne. III P8 6 (216).

VOLONTAIRE, adj.

(*Littre*: *volentaire* *voluntaire* XIV Oresme; DG: XIV; OB: 1350 écrit *voluntaire*, au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle Oresme dit *volentaire*; *Gamillscheg*: *volentaire* XIV; AD: XIV, var. *-entaire* Oresme).

... et jugiez que l'un est *volontaire* et l'autre est necessaire. . . . V P6 88 (273).

Ne nous ne traictons pas ores ici des *volenterins* (var.: P<sup>s</sup> *volentaires*) mouvemens de l'ame cognoissant. . . . III P11 81 (227).

... nulz ne puet doubter que elles ne soient gouvernees *volenterinez* (var.: P<sup>s</sup> *volentairement*) et qu'elles ne se convertissent. . . . III P12 45 (230).

# Averroism in Early Fourteenth Century Bologna

CHARLES J. ERMATINGER

THAT the university of Bologna was in the early fourteenth century the seat of a well developed Averroistic tradition is a fact to which the attention of modern scholars was drawn through the manuscript studies of M. Grabmann. The first representative of this tradition to whom Grabmann drew attention was Thaddaeus de Parma, professor at the university of Bologna in 1321.<sup>1</sup> A summary examination of Thaddaeus' chief work, a commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima*, revealed that this Bologna professor defended positions and, generally, philosophized in a manner traditionally labelled as Averroistic. A further study of Thaddaeus' commentary on *De Anima*, conducted by S. Vanni Rovighi on the basis of the manuscript copy of this work discovered by Grabmann, confirmed the latter's belief that Thaddaeus was indeed the representative of a flourishing school of Averroism in the university of Bologna.<sup>2</sup>

Other representatives of this school were subsequently studied. Grabmann, in a manuscript containing works by Thaddaeus de Parma, had noted works by an Angelus de Aretio and later identified him as a late contemporary of Thaddaeus.<sup>3</sup> A. Maier's study of *Cod. Ottobonianus latinus* 318 at the Vatican Library brought a considerable increase to the number of known exponents of Averroism in early fourteenth century Bologna.<sup>4</sup> To Thaddaeus de Parma and Angelus de Aretio were added Zilfredus de Placentia, Cambiolus Bononiensis, Matthaeus de Eugubio, Anselmus de Cumis and Petrus de Bonifatius, O.E.S.A., all teachers at Bologna between 1325 and 1345. To the long list of works by Matthaeus de Eugubio, C. Piana was able to add one more work of considerable importance.<sup>5</sup>

Only recently did a work by a member of this school become available in print, when Vanni Rovighi published a partial edition of Thaddaeus de Parma's commentary on *De Anima*.<sup>6</sup> Any comprehensive study of this school must therefore rely on the manuscripts and must take account of the possibility that other important works of its known representatives, and other representatives as well, still remain to be discovered.

Information on the representatives of Averroism at Bologna in the early fourteenth century is still comparatively meager. In some of the manuscripts containing their works there appear also many anonymous works, some of which probably belong to this Bologna group but cannot as yet be positively identified. Biographical information of any great detail is lacking. M. De Wulf, for example, suggests that Thaddaeus de Parma may have attended the university of Paris, but as yet nothing is known about him prior to his appearance as a

<sup>1</sup> M. Grabmann, 'Studien ueber den Averroisten Taddeo da Parma (ca. 1320),' *Mélanges Mandonnet* II (Bibliothèque Thomiste XIV Paris, 1930), 331-52. The same article, with a single addition relative to Thaddaeus de Parma, appeared in M. Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben* II (Muenchen, 1936), 239-60.

<sup>2</sup> S. Vanni Rovighi, 'La psicologia averroistica di Taddeo da Parma,' *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica*, XXIII (1931), 504-17.

<sup>3</sup> M. Grabmann, 'Der Bologneser Averroist Angelo d'Arezzo,' *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben* II, 261-71.

<sup>4</sup> A. Maier, 'Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des italienischen Averroismus im 14.

Jahrhundert,' *Quellen und Forschungen aus Italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken*, XXXIII (1944), 136-57. The same article, with important revisions, appeared in A. Maier, *Die Vorlaeufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert. Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spaetscholastik* (Roma, 1949), pp. 251-78.

<sup>5</sup> C. Piana, 'Nuovo contributo allo studio delle correnti dottrinali nell'Università di Bologna nel sec. XIV,' *Antonianum*, XXIII (1948), 221-54.

<sup>6</sup> S. Vanni Rovighi (ed.), *Le Quaestiones de anima di Taddeo da Parma* (Biblioteca di Testi Medievali XVIII Milano, 1951)

teacher in Bologna in about 1320.<sup>7</sup> Zilfredus de Placentia was among the scholars who left the university of Bologna for Sienna in 1321.<sup>8</sup> He also appears as a teacher in Bologna from 1329 to 1333.<sup>9</sup> Whether the intervening years were all spent in Bologna, or some of them perhaps at another university, is still an open question.

The present study will be of only a preliminary nature. It is intended as the first step toward a more comprehensive study of the Bologna school of Averroism. Part of this first step will consist of a collation of the manuscript findings reported in the studies so far published. Such a collation has not yet been made.<sup>10</sup> It will show the present status of research, reveal the locations of the manuscripts which have so far been found relevant and show with what types of problems philosophers in early fourteenth century Bologna were preoccupied. Anonymous works will be largely omitted, but some of those occurring in the manuscripts so far examined should eventually be studied, since their style, structure and subject matter are similar to those of already identified works. Into the lists of works resulting from the collation there will be incorporated several others which have been discovered in *Cod. Vaticanus latinus* 6768.<sup>11</sup> This fourteenth century codex includes among scores of short works several by Thaddaeus de Parma, Angelus de Aretio and Matthaeus de Eugubio which have not yet been found elsewhere; and one or two additional copies of works which have been identified elsewhere. From the works appearing in this codex several passages will be selected and examined for their doctrinal content.

Through Grabmann's investigations into the history of Italian Averroism, six works by Thaddaeus de Parma were brought to light:<sup>12</sup>

1. *Utrum dimensiones interminate praecedant formam substantialem in materia et utrum corruptantur supposito, quod praecedant. Queritur, quia Commentator in substantia orbis ponit, quod dimensiones interminate praecedant formam substantialem in materia* (Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale, *Cod. I, III, 6* [Conventi soppressi], ff. 115v-117r).

2. *Utrum propter speciem rei sensibilis in sensu receptam et propter sensum, qui est subiectum sensationis, sit aliqua alia virtus. Quaestio Magistri Tadei de Parma disputata: Utrum in anima sensitiva sit aliquis sensus agens* (*ibid.*, ff. 146r-160v. A question with the same incipit, in which *praeter* is intelligently substituted for *propter*, occurs in *Cod. Vaticanus latinus* 6768, ff. 232ra-235vb).

In the question found in *Cod. Vaticanus latinus* 6768, repeated references are made to a *Tractatus de sensu agente* and a *Quaestio de specie intelligibili*. The author of these works is not named, but Johannes de Janduno is credited with works bearing these titles.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>7</sup>M. De Wulf, *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale* III (6th ed., Louvain, 1947), p. 177.

<sup>8</sup>F. Filippini, 'L'esodo degli studenti da Bologna nel 1321 e il Polifemo dantesco,' *Studi e memorie per la storia dell'Università di Bologna*, VI (1921), 107-88; L. Banchi, 'Alcuni documenti che concernano la venuta in Siena nell'a. 1321 dei lettori e degli scolari dello studio Bolognese,' *Giornale storico degli archivi toscani*, V (1861), 323, 327, as cited by C. Piana, *Antoniano*, XXIII (1948), 222, nn. 1-2.

<sup>9</sup>S. Mazzetti, *Repertorio di tutti i professori antichi e moderni della famosa università . . . di Bologna* (Bologna, 1847), p. 151, as cited by A. Maier, *Die Vorläufer Galileis*, p. 264, n. 38.

<sup>10</sup>An incomplete summary of the status,

in 1946, of investigations into the history of Averroism at Bologna is given by M. Grabmann, 'L'aristotelismo italiano al tempo di Dante con particolare riguardo all'università di Bologna,' *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica*, XXXVIII (1946), 260-77.

<sup>11</sup>The manuscript codices of the Vatican Library cited in this study have been consulted on microfilm copies which are included in the collection being formed at Saint Louis University by the Knights of Columbus Foundation for the Preservation of Historic Documents at the Vatican Library.

<sup>12</sup>Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben* II, pp. 239-60.

<sup>13</sup>De Wulf, *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale* III, p. 126.

3. Secundum quod dicit Aristoteles in primo Metaphisice veteris inest autem veritatem investigare volentibus sepe et bene dubitare et ideo dubites primo de possibilitate augmentationis et de modo eius. Sit ergo questio nostra, utrum augmentatio sit possibilis. . . . Explicit questio de possibilitate et modo augmenti (*Cod. Vaticanus latinus* 4454, ff. 135v-139r).<sup>14</sup>

4. Questio disputanda proponebatur, utrum elementa sub propriis formis maneat in mixto et arguebatur primo, quod sic, quia illa sub formis propriis manent in mixto que sunt elementa ipsius mixti. . . . Explicit questio de elementis determinata per me Thadeum de Parma Anno Domini MCCCXXI ad honorem et utilitatem Universitatis scoliarium Bononie et aliorum in philosophia studentium (Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, *Cod. lat.* 15805, ff. 26v-31r).

5. Commentum super theoricam planetarum Gerardi Cremonensis (Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, *Cod.* I 90 Sup., ff. 161r-194v; Florence, Biblioteca Mediceo-Laurenziana, *Cod. Ashburnham* 205, ff. 1r-24v; Erfurt, Stadtbuecherei, *Amplonianische Handschriftensammlung*, *Cod. F.* 380, ff. 1r-28v).<sup>15</sup>

6. Quaestiones super libros de anima (Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale, *Cod.* I, III, 6 [Conventi Soppressi], ff. 58r-82v).

To these can now be added the following works from *Cod. Vaticanus latinus* 6768:

7. Questio est utrum esse et essentia sint idem realiter vel differant. . . . Explicit questio determinata per magistrum thadeum de parma in senarum civitate (ff. 195ra-197vb).

Thaddaeus de Parma's association with Sienna in the explicit of this question suggests that he may have been among the groups of professors who left Bologna in 1321 and in the same year found positions at the university of Sienna. For at least part of this year he was in Bologna, as is attested by item four of the present list.<sup>16</sup>

8. Queritur per quam causam contingat magis scire, quia philosophus dicit in principio tertii metaphisice quod res cum cognoscitur per causam maxime cognoscitur per causam formalem. . . . Et sic de isto. Explicit questio recollecta sub magistro Taddeo de palma (ff. 220rb-221rb).

This question would seem to be part of a commentary on the *Metaphysics*. The opening reference is to *Metaphysics* V, 2, 996b12-18. On f. 221rb there occurs a suggestive reference to what is undoubtedly V, 2, 1013a33-b2: *Verumtamen habent esse multae dubitationes quas magister dixit non valere. . . . , determinabit tamen illas in quadam alia questione de fine in quinto huius*. Whether *de palma* is anything other than a variant of *de Parma* is left undecided for the moment.

9. Queritur quia philosophus dicit in tertio metaphisice contra antiquos dubitantes utrum unum et ens sit genus quod ista non sunt genera, quia cum ens et unum per se predicent naturam cuiuslibet, tunc genus per se predicaretur de differentia; et ideo queratur utrum genus per se predicetur

<sup>14</sup> This question should perhaps be compared with Johannes de Janduno, *Utrum augmentio sit possibilis*, copies of which occur in *Codd. Vat. lat.* 845, ff. 355r-359v, and 6768, ff. 272va-275va. These copies show many discrepancies, but their joint use would probably afford a fairly accurate text.

<sup>15</sup> Regarding Gerardus Cremonensis, cf. G. Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science* II, Part I (Baltimore, 1931), pp. 338-44; L.

Thorndike, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science* II (New York, 1929), pp. 87-90.

<sup>16</sup> On the exodus of professors and students from the university of Bologna in 1321, cf. H. Denifle *Die Entstehung der Universitäten des Mittelalters bis 1400* (Berlin, 1885), pp. 437-40. It was not possible to consult the works on this subject cited in connection with Zilfredus de Placentia, *supra*, n. 8.

de differentia. . . . Explicit questio recollecta sub provido magistro taddeo (ff. 245vb-248rb).

The reference with which this question begins is to *Metaphysics* III, 3, 998b14-28. It may be further indication that Thaddaeus de Parma—if this is the person designated by “taddeus”—is the author of a commentary on the *Metaphysics*. In the following question, which is attributed to a *taddeus de palma*, Bk. VI, chap. 3, 1027a29-b16, is referred to in such a manner as to suggest that the *Metaphysics* is the subject of a series of questions:

10. Consequenter queratur quia philosophus dicit in sexto huius quod si nullum esset ens per accidens, tunc omnia evenirent de necessitate, ideo queratur utrum omnia eveniant de necessitate. . . . Explicit questio magistri taddei de palma (ff. 276ra-277va).

Grabmann's study on Thaddaeus de Parma brought to light two questions attributed to Angelus de Aretio:<sup>17</sup>

1. Utrum ordo predicamentalis sit possibilis circumscriptis proprietatibus rerum (Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale, Cod. I, III, 6 [Conventi soppressi], ff. 53r-54r).<sup>18</sup>

2. Utrum propter impressionem speciei sensibilis in medium vel in sensum quantitas rei sensibilis minuat (ibid., f. 123r).

An anonymous question with the same incipit occurs in *Cod. Vaticanus latinus* 6768, ff. 207vb-208ra. In his subsequent short study on Angelus de Aretio, Grabmann added two more works, one of which supplies biographical data in its explicit:<sup>19</sup>

3. Volo ne aliquis manum suam ad scientiam medicinae committat nisi doceatur imprimis: Deus est animal sempiternum optimum ex quo celum et terra dependent. . . . Explicit scriptum libri Porphyrii recollectum sub provido magistro Angelo de Aretio. Bononie . . . (*Cod. Vaticanus latinus* 4472, ff. 4r-14r).

Grabmann listed another copy of item three contained in *Cod. Strozianus* 99, ff. 15r-42r, in the Biblioteca Mediceo-Laurenziana in Florence. The biographical data in the explicit of this second copy are more detailed:

Explicit sententia cum divisionibus et notabilibus quaestionibus quam pluribus libri Porphyrii edita per Nicolaum Bononiensem prenommatum clericum domini Gabrielis de Brocaticosso sub magistro Angelo de Aretio qui fuit auditor et repetitor magistri Gentilis de Cingulo de Marchia Anconitana cuius commentum sequitur infra sequenti proximo folio super eodem libro Profirii.<sup>20</sup>

4. A commentary on the *Categories*: Equivoca dicuntur quorum nomen est commune et secundum nomen illud ratio substantiae est diversa. Eiusdem artis est considerare finem et que ad finem ordinantur. . . . (*Cod. Vaticanus latinus* 4472, ff. 14v-17v; Florence, Biblioteca Mediceo-Laurenziana, *Cod. Strozianus* 99, ff. 49r-78v. Both incomplete.).

<sup>17</sup> Grabmann, *Mélanges Mandonnet* II, pp. 334, 336.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. item 36 in the list of works of Matthaeus de Eugubio, *infra*, p. 42.

<sup>19</sup> Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben* II, pp. 261-71.

<sup>20</sup> Regarding Gentilis de Cingulo, cf. Grab-

mann, 'Gentile da Cingoli, ein italienischer Aristotelesklärer aus der Zeit Dantes,' *Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Abteilung*, Jahrgang 1940, Heft IX (München, 1941).

Maier's study of *Cod. Ottobonianus latinus* 318 drew attention to another work of Angelus de Aretio:<sup>21</sup>

5. *Utrum subiectum sit causa efficiens passionis* (ff. 75r-80v).

To this relatively small group of works can now be added the following from *Cod. Vaticanus latinus* 6768:

6. *Querebatur utrum ista: homo est homo, sit per se in quarto modo dicendi per se necne. . . . Explicit questio utrum homo est homo sit in quarto modo perseitatis disputata per m. angelum de aretio* (ff. 197vb-200ra).

7. *Queritur utrum quantitas sit principium individuationis. . . . Questio disputata secundum mgrm. Angelū de Arē* (ff. 244ra-244rb).

8. *Queritur utrum scientia sit substantia vel accidens. . . . Questio disputata secundum magrm. Angelū utrum scientia sit substantia vel accidens* (ff. 244rb-245ra).

9. *Queritur utrum individuum in suo significato includat principia individuantia. . . . Questio [?] [utrum] individuum in suo significato includat principia individuationis. Secundum magm. Angel.* (ff. 245ra-245va).

10. *Queritur utrum species qua cognoscitur substantia et quod quid est rei sit substantia vel accidens. . . . Explicit questio disputata per Mgrm. Angelū de Aretio* (ff. 261va-263vb).

A rather imposing list of works by Matthaëus de Eugubio was drawn up in Maier's study of *Cod. Ottobonianus latinus* 318.<sup>22</sup> Those of his works which are preserved in this codex are, from the point of view of form, of two types. One group (items 1-17 in the list following) is made up chiefly of *reportationes* or notes taken directly from the lectures or disputations in which Matthaëus must have been the officiating *magister*. The other group (items 18-22) comprises the *repetitiones* or reviews, by qualified *lectores*, of lectures or disputations previously held under Matthaëus. While the *reportatio* was an exercise common to most mediaeval universities, the *repetitio* was an exercise which was particularly prominent at the university of Bologna.<sup>23</sup> In addition to these 22 works, Maier in the same study pointed out others certainly or probably belonging to Matthaëus.

1. *Utrum intelligentia intelligat motum celi. . . . Explicit questio determinata per magistrum Matheum de Eugubio in Bononia. . . .* (ff. 1r-2r).

2. *Utrum actus intelligendi, quo intelligentia intelligit Deum, sit idem cum Deo. . . . Explicit questio disputata per magistrum Matheum de Eugubio in Bononia* (ff. 19v-20v).

3. *Utrum similitudo rei seu species sit eiusdem speciei seu essentie cum re ipsa. . . . Explicit questio disputata per magistrum Matheum de Eugubio in Bononia. . . .* (ff. 20v-22r).

4. *Utrum omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderent. . . . Explicit questio disputata per magistrum matheum de Eugubio in Bononia* (ff. 22r-22v).

5. *Utrum intellectus et voluntas intellectiva essentialiter sint idem. . . . Explicit questio disputata per magistrum Matheum de Eugubio in Bononia* (ff. 23r-23v).

6. *An in maiori quanto sint plures partes eiusdem proportionis. . . .*

<sup>21</sup> Maier, *Quellen und Forschungen*, XXXIII (1944), 148.

<sup>22</sup> Maier, *ibid.*, pp. 136-57. The *reportator* of several of the questions numbered 1-17 is a Magister Andreas de Regno Apulie. He

is not further identified.

<sup>23</sup> H. Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages* (2d ed. by F. M. Powicke and A. B. Emden, Oxford, 1936), I, pp. 249-50.

Explicit questio disputata per magistrum Matheum de Eugubio in Bononia (ff. 71r-72v).

7. Utrum infinitum possit dici maius aliquo. . . . Explicit questio disputata per magistrum Matheum de Eugubio in Bononia (ff. 73r-73v).

8. Utrum illud, quod intelligunt motores celorum seu orbium, sit unum et idem vel aliud et aliud, v. gr. ut quod intelligit motor solis sit aliud ab eo quod intelligit motor saturni. . . . Explicit questio disputata per magistrum Matheum de Eugubio in Bononia (ff. 95r-100v).

9. Utrum aliqua species possit imprimi in memoria. . . . Explicit questio disputata per magistrum Matheum de Eugubio (ff. 164r-165r).

10. Utrum actus intelligendi fiat in instanti. . . . Explicit questio disputata per magistrum Matheum de Eugubio (ff. 165v-167r).

11. Utrum cogitativa que ponitur virtus iudicativa et virtus que sillogizat de particularibus . . . sit reflexiva supra suam essentiam vel supra suum actum. . . . Explicit questio disputata per magistrum Matheum de Eugubio in Bononia (ff. 167r-168r).

12. Utrum sit dare intellectum agentem vel propter quid ponatur, si ponitur. . . . Questio magistri Mathei de Eugubio, quam non complevit (ff. 170v-173v).<sup>24</sup>

13. Utrum ignis ardeat sub terra. . . . Explicit questio disputata per magistrum Matheum de Eugubio super secundo Meteor., recollecta per Anselmum de Cumis (f. 181v).

14. Quia solet dici, quod unitas generis sumitur ab unitate apparentis . . . , ideo queritur qua unitate ipsum apparens . . . sit unum. . . . Explicit questio disputata per magistrum Matheum de Eugubio 1334 de mense Madii in Bononia (ff. 182r-183r).

15. Utrum intellectus possit intelligere plura simul ut plura. . . . Explicit questio disputata per magistrum Matheum de Eugubio in Bononia. . . . (ff. 183v-185r).

16. Utrum visio seu actus videndi fiat per extramissionem spirituum visualium vel per receptionem et intromissionem specierum et idolorum causatorum a re visa. . . . Explicit questio disputata et determinata per magistrum Matheum de Eugubio (ff. 187r-189r).

17. Utrum poli mundi sint mobiles vel omnino immobiles. . . . Explicit questio disputata et determinata per magistrum Matheum de Eugubio, recollecta per Anselmum de Cumis anno 1333 (ff. 189v-191v).

18. Utrum omnia eveniant de necessitate (ff. 88r-90r).

19. Utrum species et imago, que est organum mediante quo aliqua res cognoscitur, utrum etiam pro tunc illa species cognoscitur (ff. 161v-163r).<sup>25</sup>

20. Utrum lumen ponatur propter medium (ff. 163r-163v).

21. Utrum magnitudo sit sensibilis per se (f. 163v).

22. Utrum figura sit sensibilis per se (f. 164r).

23. Utrum accidens possit intelligi sine subiecto (*Cod. Vaticanus latinus* 3066, ff. 1v-2r).<sup>26</sup>

24. Utrum idem accidens numero possit remanere in generato et corrupto (*ibid.*, ff. 2v-3r).

25. Utrum propositio de praeterito fuerit prius vera de praesenti. . . . Explicit questio disputata per reverendum magistrum Matheum de Ugbio in civitate Bononiensi anno domini M.ccc.xli (*ibid.*, ff. 7v-8v).

<sup>24</sup> The views of Thaddaeus de Parma, *Questiones de anima*, are discussed in this question. Cf. A. Maier, *Quellen und Forschungen*, XXXIII (1944), 143, n. 2.

<sup>25</sup> This question contains a discussion of the views of Angelus de Aretio.

<sup>26</sup> Matthaeus de Eugubio is not named as

the author of this work, but Maier, *Die Vorläufer Galileis*, p. 257, n. 16, suggests him as its author since the subject and treatment are similar to those of item 24 which follows and of which Matthaeus is certainly the author.

26. Tractatus de modis significandi. Incipit: Incipiunt modos [?] significandi per partes principia. Quoniam de principiis in qualibet constructione quelibet pars [?] orationis sunt V per ordinem. . . . Expliciunt questiones Magistri Mathei bononiensis super modos significandi et super grammaticum, reportate per manus Jo . . . et sunt determinate omnes per Magistrum Matheum (Bamberg, Staatsbibliothek, Cod. H. J. V. 1, ff. 94v-101v).<sup>27</sup>

27. Scriptum et quaestiones mag. Mathei de Eugubio super Veteri logica. . . . Expliciunt dicta Mathei de Eugubio, Bononie commorantis, super Praedicamenta (Krakow, Jagellonische Universitätsbibliothek, Cod. 737, DD. I. 29).<sup>28</sup>

28. A commentary on the *Physics*.<sup>29</sup>

29. Utrum vapor elevatus a vino si condensetur, vertatur in naturam aquae vel vini (Cod. Ottobonianus latinus 318, f. 181r).<sup>30</sup>

30. Utrum quantitas sit per se divisibilis (*ibid.*, ff. 2r-4r).

Maier, on stylistic and procedural grounds, suggests Matthaeus de Eugubio as the author of this work.<sup>31</sup> The same question—in slightly different language, undoubtedly as another *reportatio*—appears in Cod. Vaticanus latinus 6768, where it seems to form part of a commentary on the *Metaphysics*:

Consequenter queritur circa capitulum de qualitate utrum quantitas secundum se et per se sit divisibilis. . . . Minor patet per philosophum quinto huius, capitulo de quanto, ubi dicebat quod quantum est illud quod est divisibile in ea que insunt. . . . (ff. 204rb-205rb).

The references, in the order in which they occur, are to *Metaphysics* V, 14, 1020a33-b25, and 13, 1020a8-9. Preceding and following the version found in Cod. Vaticanus latinus 6768 are other anonymous questions which seem to belong with it to a commentary on the *Metaphysics*:

a. Queritur utrum unum aliquid addat supra ens, scilicet reale (ff. 200ra-201va).

b. Consequenter queritur quia isto quarto philosophus dicit quod ad mathematicum spectat investigare primum principium complexum . . . , ideo queratur utrum primum principium sit illud: non contingit idem simul esse vel [!] non esse (ff. 201va-202ra).

c. Consequenter queritur utrum predicata, idest predicamenta sint decem sive plura sive pauciora (ff. 202ra-204rb).

d. Consequenter queritur circa capitulum de causa utrum finis habeat rationem causalitatis (ff. 205rb-206vb).

e. Consequenter queritur utrum in relatione sit dare unum primum genus (ff. 206vb-207rb).

Whether items (a) to (e) as well as item 30 belong to a commentary on the *Metaphysics* by Matthaeus de Eugubio cannot be decided here. There is fairly strong evidence, however, that this person is to be credited with such a work.

<sup>27</sup> Maier, *ibid.*, p. 257, n. 14 suggests that Matthaeus de Bononia may be identical with Matthaeus de Eugubio. This work by Matthaeus de Bononia was first noted by Grabmann, 'Die Entwicklung der mittelalterlichen Sprachlogik,' *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben I* (München, 1926), 138-39.

<sup>28</sup> Maier, *Die Vorläufer Galileis*, p. 257, n. 17, gives less complete data. The present entry is taken from Piana, *Antonianum*, XXIII (1948), 229 and n. 1.

<sup>29</sup> No copy of this has yet been found but Maier, *Die Vorläufer Galileis*, p. 261 and n. 27, points out that such a work is cited in the

margin of Cod. Ottobonianus latinus 318, ff. 22v and 44r.

<sup>30</sup> Maier, *Quellen und Forschungen*, XXIII (1944), 144, n. 1, suggests that this work belongs, with item 13 of the present list, to a commentary on *Meteorologica* by Matthaeus de Eugubio. Piana, *Antonianum*, XXIII (1948), 233-34, shows that the present item 29 is a *reportatio* of the 24th question and item 13 a *reportatio* of the 25th question of a commentary on *Meteorologica* by Matthaeus de Eugubio. Cf. *infra*, item 31.

<sup>31</sup> Maier, *Die Vorläufer Galileis*, p. 261.



From a 1481 inventory of the Biblioteca Capitolare in Bologna, Piana cites an entry which indicates that Matthaeus de Eugubio is the author of commentaries on *Metaphysica*, *De anima* and *Liber sex principiorum*:<sup>32</sup> *Quaestiones de anima et metaphisice et sex principiorum mag. Matei de Angubio . . .*

In his examination of Cod. I, III, 6 of the Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale at Florence, Grabmann noted the presence of four works attributed to a certain *Magister M. de A. (de ag., Agag, Aga)*.<sup>33</sup> Vanni Rovighi, transcribing this name as *Magister M. de Au (de Agu)*, suggests that the person so designated may be identical with Matthaeus de Eugubio.<sup>34</sup> The questions are as follows:

31. *Utrum universale sit subiectum in libro Porphyrii* (ff. 55r-55v).
32. *Utrum universale sit genus ad quinque praedicabilia* (ff. 55v-56r).
33. *Utrum universale reale sumptum formaliter habeat esse in re extra circumscripto opere intellectus* (ff. 56r-57v).
34. *Utrum situs et ubi realiter distinguantur* (ff. 125r-125v).

Vanni Rovighi's suggestion receives support from a new quarter. *Cod. Vaticanus latinus 6768* contains two questions attributed to a person whose name is given in forms which mediate between the cryptic *Magister M. de A.* (and its variants) and the fully written *Magister Matthaeus de Eugubio*. These questions are as follows:

35. *Queritur utrum conceptus speciei in sui essentia et formaliter sit compositus vel simplex. . . . Explicit questio disputata per magistrum mathaeum de ag.* (ff. 216ra-217vb).

36. *Queritur secundum quem modum habeat fieri ordo predicamentalis et gradualis, utrum fiat ex parte proprietatum vel quidditatum vel fundamentorum [?] vel apparentium. . . . Explicit questio disputata a magistro mathaeo de Agubio* (ff. 217vb-220rb).

According to marginal notes, item 35 contains statements of the opinions of persons very probably to be identified as two of the predecessors of Matthaeus de Eugubio at the university of Bologna. On f. 216va occurs the note *prima opinio, scilicet magistri Taddei* (Thaddaei de Parma?), while the note *alia opinio, scilicet magistri an.* (Angeli de Aretio?) occurs on f. 261vb. That this combination of names should occur certainly suggests that items 31-36 all belong to Matthaeus de Eugubio.

Piana's chief contribution to the history of this Bologna group is his discovery of a commentary on Aristotle's *Meteorologica* by Matthaeus de Eugubio:<sup>35</sup>

37. *Est dubitatio utrum de entibus methaurologicis, ut de terra, motu, pluvia et grandine sit scientia, et probatur quod non. . . .* (Florence, Biblioteca Laurenziana, *Cod. Fesulano* 161, ff. 73ra-84vb).

The beginning lines of the 51 questions which make up this work are listed by Piana. The same author feels that portions of the following work, in which certain opinions of Thaddaeus de Parma are cited, betray the style of Matthaeus de Eugubio:<sup>36</sup>

38. *Quaestiones super libro de anima. Incipit: Primo est dubitatio circa librum de anima utrum de ipsa possit esse scientia . . . ut ponit commentator in 22° Metaphysice et sic de ista quaestione sit dictum. Expliciunt quaestiones 3<sup>11</sup> libri de anima* (*ibid.*, ff. 84vb-103vb).

<sup>32</sup> Piana, *Antonianum*, XXIII (1948), 229 and n. 2

<sup>33</sup> Grabmann, *Mélanges Mandonnet*, II, pp. 334, 336.

<sup>34</sup> Vanni Rovighi (ed.), *Le Quaestiones de anima di Taddeo du Parma*, p. xxii.

<sup>35</sup> Piana, *Antonianum*, XXIII (1948), 225-36.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 235.

But, as Piana points out, Matthaeus cannot be the author of the entire work, since his own opinions are also cited (ff. 99vb-100ra). Whoever the author may be, it is almost certain that this work belongs to a member of the Bologna group. That Matthaeus de Eugubio is the author of a commentary on *De anima* is attested by an entry in a 1481 inventory of the Biblioteca Capitolare at Bologna.<sup>37</sup>

An entry in a 1451 inventory of the same library attributes to Matthaeus de Eugubio a commentary on *De memoria et reminiscentia*:<sup>38</sup>

39. Liber questionum mag. Mathei de Eugubio de memoria in pergamento mediocris voluminis; incipit "Forma est compositio" et finit "Non concludunt aliquid."

Matthaeus de Eugubio is the best known figure of this Bologna group from the point of view of the number of works already discovered. It is possible that some of the individual questions listed belong to one or the other of his larger works.

The following works by Anselmus de Cumis are cited in Maier's study of *Cod. Ottobonianus latinus 318* in the Vatican library:<sup>39</sup>

1. Gloss on Johannes de Janduno, *Utrum aeternis repugnet habere causam efficientem* (ff. 24r-26v [margin]).<sup>40</sup>

2. Gloss on Guilelmus de Alnwick, *Utrum potentiae animae sint eadem cum essentia animae realiter* (ff. 29r-31r [margin]).<sup>41</sup>

3. Gloss on Guilelmus de Alnwick, *Utrum asserere mundum fuisse ab aeterno fuerit de intentione Aristotelis* (ff. 42v-50v [margin]).<sup>42</sup>

4. Gloss on a question concerning "intensio et remissio formarum" (ff. 137v-141v).<sup>43</sup>

5. Gloss on Guilelmus de Alnwick, *Utrum scientia vel habitus sit in intellectu* (ff. 176v-178v).

6. Gloss on Matthaeus de Eugubio, *Utrum intellectus possit intelligere plura simul ut plura* (ff. 185v-186r).<sup>44</sup>

7. Quaestio an elementa maneat sub propriis formis in mixto. Incipit: Dico quod aliquid mixtum potest corrumpi. . . . Explicit quaestio determinata per magistrum Anselmum de Guittis de Cumis in Bononia 1335 (ff. 195r-205r).

8. Incipit quodlibet determinatum per magistrum Anselmum de Cumis 1335. Sicut vult Commentator tertio de anima comm. 37° omne ens est vel sensibile vel intelligibile. . . . Explicit quodlibet determinatum per magistrum Anselmum de Guittis de Cumis (ff. 205v-223r).

<sup>37</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 32.

<sup>38</sup> Piana, *Antonianum*, XXIII (1948), 229.

<sup>39</sup> Maier, *Quellen und Forschungen*, XXXIII (1944), 142-47.

<sup>40</sup> A copy of the work by Johannes de Janduno is contained on the same folios. Another copy appears in *Cod. Vaticanus latinus* 6768, ff. 230va-232ra.

<sup>41</sup> Anselmus de Cumis names himself as author on f. 30r. The work by Guilelmus de Alnwick is contained on ff. 28r-37r. Concerning the works of Guilelmus de Alnwick, who produced a number of *determinationes* at Bologna early in the third decade of the fourteenth century, cf. A. Maier, 'Wilhelm, von Alnwiks Bologneser Quaestionen gegen den Averroismus,' *Gregorianum*, XXX (1949), 265-308; A. Ledoux, O. F. M., (ed.), *Fr. Guillelmi Alnwick, O.F.M., Quaestiones disputatae de esse intelligibili et de Quodlibet* (*Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholasticae mediaevi* X, Ad Claras Aquas, Florentiae, 1937), xiv-lviii; V. Doucet, 'Descrip-

tio Codicis 172 Bibliothecae Communalis Assisiensis,' *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, XXV (1932), 257-74. *Cod. Vaticanus latinus* 6768 is not mentioned by Ledoux but contains copies of several of the 28 *determinationes* which he lists. The study by Doucet was not available.

<sup>42</sup> Maier, *Quellen und Forschungen*, XXXIII (1944), 146, n. 5, suggests that Anselmus de Cumis, who is named on f. 46v as the *reportator* responsible for the copy of the question by Guilelmus de Alnwick appearing along with the gloss, is also the author of the gloss. This question by Guilelmus de Alnwick is among those appearing in *Cod. Vaticanus latinus* 6768 (ff. 50va-54rb).

<sup>43</sup> Maier, *Die Vorläufer Galileis*, p. 262 and n. 30, indicates that it is not clear of which work this is a gloss, but that Anselmus names himself as author of the gloss (f. 140v) and that the influence of Petrus Aureoli is evident.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 40, item 15.

The introduction of this work states that the following five questions—the fourth of which is lacking in the present copy—are to be discussed:

- a. Quid sit principium individuationis in rebus compositis ex materia et forma.
- b. Utrum in conversione alimenti in nutritum acquiratur aliqua nova forma in materia alimenti.
- c. Utrum pars motus dum fit sit futura.
- d. Utrum motus reflexivus sit unus motus continuus.
- e. Utrum abstractio fantasmatum ab intellectu agente sit aliquid aut nihil.
9. Utrum solus intellectus agens producat actum intelligendi.<sup>45</sup>

Of works belonging to Zilfredus de Placentia, Cambiolus Bononiensis and Petrus de Bonifatiis, O. E. S. A., relatively few have so far been discovered.<sup>46</sup> Zilfredus de Placentia is represented by the following:

1. Utrum intellectus possibilis ad actum intellectionis eliciendum concurrat effective . . . fuit quaestio mgr<sup>i</sup> Zilfrodi de Placentia (*Cod. Ottobonianus latinus* 318, ff. 168r-170r).
2. Utrum dicendo homo est animal, animal in ista actuali praedicatione positum praedicetur adaequatum homini aut superius ad hominem. . . . Explicit quaestio determinata a magr<sup>o</sup> Zilfredo de Placentia (*Cod. Vaticanus latinus* 2141, ff. 122v-218r).
3. . . . Explicit quaestio determinata Bononiae anno Christi 1346 in diebus martii per Magistrum Zyffridum doctorem eximium et subtilissimum disputatorem (Krakow, Jagellonische Universitaetsbibliothek, *Cod.* 748, f. 9v).<sup>47</sup>

Items one and two of the following list are certainly by Cambiolus Bononiensis, while three to five are possibly to be attributed to him:

1. Utrum elementa maneant in mixto secundum proprias formas aut solum secundum esse virtuale. . . . Explicit quaestio determinata per mgr<sup>um</sup> Cambiolum Bononiensem in Bononia quam disputavit 1333 (*Cod. Ottobonianus latinus* 318, ff. 4v-8r).
2. Utrum virtus nutritiva sit semper in actu secundo. . . . Explicit quaestio disputata per mgr<sup>um</sup> Cambium Bononiensem (*ibid.*, ff. 24r-29r).
3. Utrum forma substantialis suspiciat magis et minus (*ibid.*, ff. 15v-19v).
4. Utrum de necessitate omnia eveniant, an sit aliquid casuale et fortuitum (*ibid.*, ff. 81r-88r).
5. Utrum omnia eveniant de necessitate aut aliqua sic et aliqua non (*ibid.*, ff. 91r-95r).

Petrus de Bonifatis, O. E. S. A., is represented by a single work:

Utrum caelum habeat materiam. . . . Explicit quaestio determinata per fratrem Petrum de Bonifatiis de ordine Heremitarum S. Augustini (*Cod. Ottobonianus latinus* 318, ff. 8r-12v).

This preliminary list of works belonging to professors at the university of Bologna in the early fourteenth century may be concluded with mention of two works discovered by Piana in *Cod. Fesulano* 161, in the Biblioteca Laurenziana in Florence. The first work is attributed explicitly to a Johannes de Parma. Piana suggests that the second work might, by reason of the similarity of its

<sup>45</sup> Known so far only through references in *Cod. Ottobonianus latinus* 318, ff. 213r, 220v and 223r.

<sup>46</sup> Maier, *Die Vorläufer Galileis*, pp. 263-65

<sup>47</sup> Only this much information is supplied

by Maier, *ibid.*, p. 264, n. 38. The catalogue by W. Wislocki, *Catalogus codicum manuscriptorum Bibliothecae Universitatis Jagellonicae Cracoviensis*, 2 vols., Cracow, 1877-1881, which Maier cites was not available.

method and structure to those of the first, also be attributed to Johannes de Parma:<sup>48</sup>

1. Utrum accidens in virtute propria producat substantiam. . . . Explicit quaestio disputata bononie per mag. Iohannem de Parma, anno domini M<sup>o</sup>CCC<sup>o</sup>XXXVII (ff. 108ra-111ra).

2. Utrum magis et minus in eadem forma differant specie (ff. 111ra-112vb).

Of the doctrinal content of the works which have been listed it will not be possible at present to conduct anything like a thorough analysis. The manner in which some of these works treat the most characteristically Averroistic theses has been examined in several of the studies cited. And the incipits of the works as listed afford ample illustration of the types of problems with which philosophy professors in early fourteenth century Bologna were concerned. In the following lines an attempt will be made to give a summary analysis of the discussions of two of these problems.

Included in the list of works by Thaddaeus de Parma is a question which asks through which cause scientific knowledge may best be acquired:<sup>49</sup>

Queritur per quam causam contingat magis scire, quia Philosophus dicit in principio tertii metaphysice quod res cum cognoscuntur per causam maxime cognoscuntur per causam formalem.

The passage in the *Metaphysics* which occasions this question has already been noted.<sup>50</sup> Taking this passage as a point of departure, Thaddaeus proceeds to elaborate a general theory of knowledge through causes. The question itself may be understood in two senses. It may be taken as asking through which genus of cause scientific knowledge is best acquired; or through which cause—proximate or remote—in any given genus such knowledge is best acquired. Both senses of the question are to be considered in the arguments which are presented:

Et quia questio potest habere duplicem intellectum: primum est per quid genus causae magis contingat scire, secundum est per quam causam in quacumque specie causae contingat magis scire, numquid per propinquam vel remotam; ideo arguitur ad utrumque intellectum.<sup>51</sup>

In the rather well ordered discussion which follows, Thaddaeus includes a summary of some of the answers given by others to this question. The first answer involves three suppositions. First, a scientific knowledge of things depends upon the same factors as those upon which the *esse* of things depends. Second, since all causes impart *esse* to a thing, they will all afford a scientific knowledge of a thing, with this qualification, that the cause which imparts *esse simpliciter* will be more apt to afford scientific knowledge *simpliciter*, while that which imparts a determinate sort of *esse* will be more apt to afford scientific knowledge of a determinate sort. Third, some causes are accidentally ordered and others are essentially ordered; the former are neither ordered to each other nor dependent upon each other, whereas the latter are both:

Ad evidentiam huius quaestionis oportet intelligere quod aliqui respondent ad quaestionem istam, et particulariter magis, et supponunt tria per ordinem. Primum est quod ex illis dependet res in sciri ex quibus dependent in esse, iuxta illud Philosophi secundo huius dicentis, sicut res se habent ad esse ita

<sup>48</sup> Piana, *Antonianum*, XXIII (1948), 225, 236-43.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> *Cod. Vaticanus latinus* 6768, f. 220rb.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. *supra* p. 37, item 8.

ad veritatem, ubi consequenter dicit quod eadem est dispositio rei in entitate et veritate et per consequens cognitione, licet non convertatur, quia multa faciunt ad cognitionem rei quae non dant esse illi rei. Secundo supponunt quod cum omnes causae dent esse rei, quod omnes faciant ad scire rei et quod causa faciens ad esse simpliciter magis facit ad scire simpliciter et dans esse determinatum magis faciat ad scire determinatum. Tertio supponunt illud quod dicitur a Philosopho in quinto huius et secundo Physicorum, quod causae sunt duplices, accidentales vel accidentaliter ordinatae et quaedam essentialiter ordinatae. Primae non habent ordinem nec una dependet ad aliam, sed secundae sunt habentes ordinem et una ad reliquam dependet.<sup>52</sup>

With these suppositions established, the answer is formed as follows. Causes essentially ordered are either in the same genus or in diverse genera. Those in the same genus are related as the proximate and remote. But those in diverse genera admit of a twofold procedure. One may begin with a consideration of matter and then proceed successively to form, efficient cause and final cause. This is called the *via imperfectionis*. Or one may proceed by the *via perfectionis*, beginning with a consideration of final cause and then proceeding successively to efficient cause, form and matter. The second procedure is based on the causal priority of end with respect to agent, of agent with respect to form and of form with respect to matter:

His visis dicunt ulterius quod istae causae essentialiter ordinatae possunt accipi dupliciter, quia vel sunt causae acceptae in eodem genere causae vel accipiuntur in diversis generibus causarum. Primo modo comparantur sicut causae propinquae et remotae. Sed in aliis causis talis est ordo: primo via imperfectionis incipimus a materia, deinde imus ad formam, postea ad efficientem, postea ad finem; sed via perfectionis primo incipimus a fine, deinde imus ad efficientem, postea ad formam, postea ad materiam, quia finis movet agens et agens formam quae postea introducit in materiam cui dat esse.<sup>53</sup>

The primary cause, whether in the same genus of cause or in diverse genera, always imparts *esse* in a higher degree than does a secondary cause, as far as *esse simpliciter* is concerned. But secondary causes impart a determinate sort of *esse*:

Et ulterius subdicunt quod causa primaria, ubicumque reperitur, vel in eodem genere causae vel in diversis generibus causarum, semper . . . magis dat esse quam causa secunda; quia ut dicit ille Avicenna, quod omnis primaria causa plus influit in effectum quam causa secunda. Et hoc est quantum ad esse simpliciter ipsius rei. Secundo dicunt quod causa secunda magis dat esse determinatum . . . , quia illa causa magis dat esse determinatum rei quae dat esse specificum ipsi rei. Sed causa secunda est huiusmodi. . . .<sup>54</sup>

The unenunciated conclusion is that scientific knowledge *simpliciter* can best be acquired through primary causes and scientific knowledge of a determinate sort through secondary causes. Within diverse genera of causes the final cause is the primary cause and the remaining causes are secondary causes; while within one and the same genus of cause the remote cause is primary and the proximate cause secondary.

Another answer outlined by Thaddaeus again takes account of the double meaning of the question. This answer agrees with the first in stating that within the same genus of cause scientific knowledge *simpliciter* is best acquired through the remote cause and scientific knowledge of a determinate sort through the

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 220va.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 220vb.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

proximate cause. But it contradicts this first answer by affirming that of the diverse genera of cause final cause best affords scientific knowledge of a determinate sort:

... sunt alii qui respondentes ad quaestionem dicunt duo. Primum est quod in eodem genere causae quantum ad scire simpliciter magis contingit scire per causam remotam, sed quantum ad scire determinatum magis contingit scire per causam propinquam et determinatum. Sed si quaestio quaerit quantum ad diversa genera causarum, magis contingit scire loquendo de scire determinato per causam finalem, ita quod isti in hoc contradicunt primis ...<sup>55</sup>

Thaddaeus prepares to give his own opinion by stating the points which he is conceding in the opinions just summarized. Some causes are essentially ordered, some accidentally ordered. Essentially ordered causes are located either in the same genus of cause or in diverse genera. If they are located in the same genus, then one cause is related to the other as remote to proximate. If essentially ordered causes are located in diverse genera, then — and here Thaddaeus adds a point omitted in the opinions just cited — they are all proximate. Agent, form, end and mater are all equally proximate with respect to their effect. Finally, in addition to these general suppositions, Thaddaeus cites Robert Grosseteste as distinguishing between a scientific knowledge acquired through definition and one acquired through demonstration:

... oportet praesupponere illud quod dictum est per alios, quod causae sunt duplices, quaedam enim sunt causae essentialiter ordinatae et quaedam sunt accidentaliter ordinatae. Item, essentialiter ordinatae aut reperiuntur in eodem genere causae aut in diversis generibus causarum. Si in eodem genere causae, una comparatur ad aliam ut remota ad propinquam, sed in diversis generibus causarum omnes dicuntur propincae. Sicut efficiens aequaliter est causa propinqua respectu effectus, sic forma, finis et materia, et sicut sit inconveniens in eodem genere dare plures primas et immediatas, tamen in diversis generibus nullum est inconveniens. Deinde oportet scire illud quod ponit Lincolnensis in principio secundi Posteriorum, scilicet quod scire est duplex, scilicet scire per definitionem et scire per demonstrationem.<sup>56</sup>

His own answer Thaddaeus forms by stating how, in terms of causes, science is best acquired through definition and how through demonstration. He concludes finally that the cause through which science is best acquired is, in the last analysis, the formal cause. Considering the case in which causes are in the same genus, science through definition will be best acquired through the proxi-

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 221ra. Cf. Robert Grosseteste, *Commentaria in libros Posteriorum Aristotelis* (Cum textu seriatim inserto; Venetiis: Bonetus Locatellus, 10 Novembris, 1494), f. 21ra: Ostensis in priori libro conditionibus demonstrationis superest investigare in hoc secundo an omnia scita sint per demonstrationem scita; et cum constet nobis quod tria de numero quatuor scitorum sciuntur per demonstrationem, tunc superest investigatio an quantum sit scitum per demonstrationem. Et postquam de eo posuit Aristoteles rationem ad utramque partem, ostendit nobis quod quartum, scilicet quod quid est, non scitur directe per demonstrationem, licet possibile sit ut eliciatur ex demonstratione sicut e converso ex ipso elicitur demonstratio. Cum igitur quod quid est non sciatur

per demonstrationem, et reliqua tria scita sciuntur per demonstrationem, et intentio Aristotelis sit hic complere artem qua omne dubitatum scibile fiat actu scitum, necesse est ut tradat nobis in hoc loco artem qua sciamus quod quid est, et haec est ars definiendi et inveniendi et stabiliendi rerum definibilium definitionem. . . . Et iterum praeter dictam causam est alia causa necessaria quare oportet in hoc libro tradere artem definiendi quid est, quia omnis demonstratio est per medium quod est definitio. Ad hoc igitur ut habeatur actu demonstratio oportet actu accipere definitionem rei quaesitae, quae si fuerit ignota non invenitur nisi per artem definiendi. Ut igitur sit completa ars demonstrativa oportet sicut partem eius interponere artem definiendi.

mate cause. This is the cause which best expresses the quiddity of a thing, for it expresses the *esse actuale* of a thing, whereas the remote cause expresses only the *esse possibile*. Considering the case in which causes are in diverse genera, science through definition will be best acquired through formal cause, for this cause best defines a thing:

. . . si nos loquimur de scire habito per definitionem in eodem genere causae, dixit magister quod magis contingit scire per causam propinquam quam per remotam . . . , nam per illam causam magis contingit scire definite per quam magis explicatur quidditas rei. Sed per causam propinquam magis explicatur esse quidditativum rei, quia per causam remotam solum explicatur esse possibile rei quod habet in illa, sed per propinquam explicatur esse actuale. . . . Sed si loquamur in diversis generibus causarum, et hoc maxime quantum ad scire habitum per definitionem, dico quod per causam formalem magis contingit scire, quia per illam causam maxime contingit scire quantum ad scire definitivum per quam magis contingit definire. Sed causa formalis est huiusmodi . . . , quoniam definitionis partes sunt forma [et materia], ut habetur a Commentatore in VII huius . . .<sup>57</sup>

Thus, when the choice is between proximate and remote causes—a choice presenting itself only within one and the same genus of cause—the proximate cause is to be used for purposes of definition. If the choice is among the diverse genera of causes—all of which are equally proximate with respect to their effects—the formal cause is to be used for purposes of defining. The reason for the choice of the proximate cause is that through it the *esse actuale* of a thing can be expressed. The reason for the choice of the formal cause is that precisely this cause is the one through which the quiddity of a thing can be expressed.

Regarding the cause through which demonstrative science is best acquired, Thaddaeus does not here consider the causes—proximate and remote—within one and the same genus, but only the diverse genera of causes. Of the diverse genera of causes, the final cause is the one through which demonstrative science is best acquired, for this cause provides a *propter quid* for all the other causes:

Sed loquendo de scire habito per demonstrationem, dicendum est quod per causam finalem magis contingit scire, quoniam per illam causam quae est causa causarum et propter quid datum ad omnem causam de qua fiat quaestio sive quaeratur, magis contingit scire demonstrative. Sed causa finalis est huiusmodi; quare, etc. . . .<sup>58</sup>

But although a thing may be known in these many ways, it is nevertheless best known through its form, since form provides quidditative knowledge while other causes provide only a knowledge of a thing's quality, quantity, etc. By way of clarifying the superior status of form for scientific knowledge, Thaddaeus draws an analogy between the knowledge of principles as compared with that of the conclusion in demonstration and the knowledge of a thing through other causes as compared with that through form. Demonstrative knowledge includes not only the conclusion but also the principles. But principles, although necessarily known first, imply only an imperfect and potential knowledge of the conclusion. Similarly, a knowledge of the efficient and final causes of a thing will not imply a knowledge of the quiddity of this thing. But a knowledge of the ultimate particle of the definition or of the ultimate form of a thing does imply a knowledge of the quiddity of this thing:

. . . si res cognoscitur multis modis, tamen magis cognoscitur per formam,

<sup>57</sup> Cod. Vaticanus latinus 6768, f. 221ra.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

quia per ipsam res cognoscitur quantum ad quid est, sed per alias causas res cognoscitur quantum ad quid est quanta vel qualis. Ad cuius evidentiam magister notabat primo quod in hoc videtur differre scire per definitionem et scire per demonstrationem, quia scire per demonstrationem cadit non solum super conclusionem sed etiam super principia. Sed tamen oportet primo scire principia, per principia autem nos non cognoscimus conclusionem nisi imperfecte et in potentia. Sed cognoscendo ultimam particulam definitionis aut cognoscendo ultimam formam rei nos cognoscimus quidditatem illius rei; et licet cognoscamus efficiens rei, nos non cognoscimus quid sit res. Iterum licet cognoscamus finem, scilicet operationem, non propterea cognoscimus illam rem quidditate.<sup>89</sup>

Another question included in the list of works attributed to Thaddaeus de Parma asks whether all things happen out of necessity. The beginning lines of this question suggest that it belongs, together with the two preceding it in the list, to a commentary on the *Metaphysics*:<sup>90</sup>

Consequenter queratur quia philosophus dicit in sexto huius quod si nullum esset ens per accidens, tunc omnia evenirent de necessitate, ideo queratur utrum omnia eveniant de necessitate.

Maier has reported the presence of no fewer than three distinct discussions of the same question in *Cod. Ottobonianus latinus* 318 and signaled their importance as a means of determining the mentality of the philosophers who were active at Bologna in the early fourteenth century.<sup>91</sup>

In the discussion by Thaddaeus, six *rationes affirmativae* are advanced immediately after the statement of the question. At present it will suffice to consider the sixth and longest one, for it adequately illustrates the type of argument adduced in such discussions. This sixth argument for universal necessity states that everything that is produced by a necessary cause or by something having a necessary cause occurs out of necessity. Since everything that is produced is produced by a necessary cause or by something having such a cause, it follows that everything that occurs does occur out of necessity:

... omne quod producitur a causa necessaria vel ab aliquo habente causam necessariam evenit de necessitate. Sed omne quod producitur, producitur aut a causa necessaria aut ab habente causam necessariam; quare, etc. Maior patet ex eo quod illud quod producitur a causa necessaria de necessitate producitur; et si producitur ab habente causam necessariam, de primo ad ultimum producitur a causa necessaria.<sup>92</sup>

The remainder of this argument consists of an explanation of the minor which states that everything that is produced is produced either by a necessary cause or by something having such a cause. This explanation is given in various steps, each one of which purports to show that fortuitous and chance effects are ultimately reducible to the influence of celestial bodies and hence to necessary causes.

Effects are either *per se* or *per accidens*, the latter being exemplified by

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 221rb. Cf. Sigerus de Brabantia *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* III, ed. C. A. Graiff, O.S.B., Louvain, 1948, pp. 97-8: . . . [haec] scientia est illa quae est considerata causae formalis, quia scientia suprema est illa per quam maxime contingit scire rem; sed causa formalis est illa quae magis facit scire rem; quare, etc. Probatio minoris: magis cognoscimus rem quando cognoscimus quia est et per formam, quam

quando cognoscimus quid non est, et ideo demonstratio affirmativa potior est negativa; . . . Item, magis scimus de re quando scimus quid est quam quando scimus qualis est.

<sup>90</sup> *Supra*, pp. 37-8, items 8-10.

<sup>91</sup> Maier, *Die Vorläufer Galileis*, pp. 260, 265, 272-78. Cf. *supra*, p. 40, item 18; p. 44, items 4 and 5.

<sup>92</sup> *Cod. Vaticanus latinus* 6763, f. 276ra.



fortuitous and chance effects. *Per accidens* effects result either from the indisposition of matter or from the impediment of a contrary agent. Effects resulting from the indisposition of matter are necessary because this indisposition itself results from the conditions of the air and these are in turn reducible to the influence of celestial bodies, which are necessary causes. Similarly, the impediment offered by a contrary agent is reducible to the influence of the heavenly bodies, for such an agent does not interfere unless subject to some new disposition which is traceable to conditions in the air and hence to celestial bodies:

. . . effectus aut sunt per se aut per accidens, sicut fortuiti et casuales. Tales effectus producantur propter impedimentum materiae aut propter contrarii agentis indispositionem. Sed utroque modo est necessarium, quia dispositio pervenit ab aliquo extrinseco, quia pervenit mutatione facta in aere. Sed ista dispositio in aere pervenit a corpore celesti, ipsum autem corpus celeste est causa necessaria; quare ille effectus habebit causam necessariam. Si autem perveniat istud impedimentum propter concursum contrarii agentis, et iterum illud agens contrarium non concurrat nisi facta aliqua nova dispositione in ipso. Sed illa dispositio oportet quod perveniat ab aere et per consequens a corpore celesti.<sup>63</sup>

This first step in the explanation of the minor enunciated in this sixth *ratio affirmativa* really summarizes the whole of the position which is being defended. But the remaining steps dealing with specific types of *per accidens* effects show how extreme is the physical determinism which is at the basis of this position. Fortuitous effects—those resulting from agents which act with deliberation and voluntarily—are also reduced to necessary causes and hence occur out of necessity. For example, if someone goes to the market place and there meets his debtor, these are effects which are reduced to necessary causes. For that someone should go to the market place and that his debtor should also arrive there are effects reducible to their respective wills which are in turn determined by bodily conditions ultimately traceable to the influence of the celestial bodies. Again in the case of voluntary effects, the only reason why one thing should be willed more at one time than at another is that the body becomes subject to dispositions which are traceable to the influence of celestial bodies:

Alii sunt effectus fortuiti, et isti perveniunt in agentibus a proposito et a voluntate. Modo si aliquis vadat ad forum et invenit debitorem suum, isti effectus reducuntur in causas necessarias, quia te ire reducitur in voluntatem et iterum advenire reducitur in voluntatem, quia oportet quod aliqua nova dispositio sit facta in corpore propter quam sit mutatio in voluntate. Sed illa talis dispositio fiat ab aliquo extrinseco, ut ab aere. Sed talis dispositio existens in aere pervenit a corpore celesti, nam omne quod est in intellectu nostro de novo de necessitate pervenit ab aliquo quod reducitur in corpus celeste. Iterum etiam sunt quidam effectus qui dicuntur voluntarii, et etiam isti effectus reducuntur in causam necessariam, quia . . . non possum nunc velle unam rem magis quam prius nisi quia in me facta est quaedam dispositio, et talis pervenit ab aliquo alio quousque reducitur in corpus celeste, et tale est causa necessaria. Ergo sequitur quod omnia eveniant de necessitate.<sup>64</sup>

The physical determinism defended in this sixth *ratio affirmativa* is clearly of the most extreme sort. Will and intellect are made subject to the dispositions of the body and these dispositions are in turn traced to the influence of the

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, ff 276ra-b.

heavenly bodies. No room is left for any initiative on the part of the willing and intelligent subject as such.<sup>65</sup>

Against this *ratio* and the preceding five, Thaddaeus adduces the classic texts of Aristotle and an argument taken from Averroes:

In oppositum videtur esse Philosophus II Physicorum et VI huius et in I Perihermeneias. Et probatur ratione sua in I Perihermeneias: quia si omnia evenirent de necessitate, tunc sequeretur quod frustra consiliaremus vel negotiaremur. Hoc autem est falsum. Consequentia probatur, nam propter negotiari nostrum et consiliari res tantum [?] evenit vel non evenit de necessitate. Iterum patet ratione Commentatoris: si omnia evenirent de necessitate, tunc sequeretur quod periret una de conditionibus universi. Hoc autem est falsum. Consequentia probatur, quoniam una de conditionibus universi est contingentia. Modo periret contingentia si omnia evenirent de necessitate.<sup>66</sup>

These opposing arguments approach the question both from the specifically psychological point of view and from the more general cosmological point of view. But perhaps most interesting in Thaddaeus' discussion is the ensuing summary of some of the principle solutions to the question. One such solution is that offered by the ancient astrologers who held that celestial motion is cyclic in nature and that consequently the same sets of events recur periodically according to a determinate order and are therefore necessary. The reason for this necessity is the unimpedibility of the motions of the celestial bodies:

De ista quaestione fuerunt opiniones, et primo fuit opinio quorundam astrologorum antiquorum ponentium quod omnia eveniant de necessitate. Et moventur propterea quia ponebant quod post XXX sex milia annorum corpora caelestia redibunt ad eandem dispositionem motuum et per consequens redibunt illimet effectus qui sunt modo. Et sicut modo sunt aliqui per accidens et aliqui necessarii, sic et tunc. Et sic oportet quod res illae habeant determinatum ordinem, nam si non haberent determinatum ordinem non redirent. Sed quae habent determinatum ordinem sunt necessaria; quare omnia erunt necessaria. Ad hoc autem ponendum movebantur ratione tali. Illa quae producuntur a causa non impedibili eveniunt de necessitate. Sed omnia quae producuntur sunt huiusmodi; quare, etc. Maior patet, nam dato quod illa causa sit impedibilis, et effectus, et sic non eveniet de necessitate. Minor patet, nam omne novum hic inferius evenit propter novum factum in caelo, ut dicitur VIII Physicorum. Sed tale novum non est aliud quam novitas motus. Sed motus corporis caelestis impediri non possunt; quare, etc.<sup>67</sup>

This opinion, Thaddaeus continues, has been adopted by certain *moderni*, with this difference, that instead of maintaining that numerically the same effects necessarily return periodically, they assert that the necessarily recurring effects are similar and in a similar disposition.<sup>68</sup> These same *moderni*, confronted by

<sup>65</sup> The position represented by this sixth *ratio affirmativa* includes many of the theses condemned by Stephen Tempier, Bishop of Paris, in 1277. Cf. the list of condemned theses as edited by P. Mandonnet, O.P., *Siger de Brabant et l'averroïsme latin au XIII<sup>m</sup> siècle II* (2<sup>m</sup> éd., Louvain, 1908), pp. 175-91.

<sup>66</sup> *Cod. Vaticanus latinus* 6768, f. 267rb The references to Aristotle, in the order in which they occur, are to *Physics* II, 5-6,

196b10-198a4; *Metaphysics* VI, 3, 1027a29-b16; and *On Interpretation*, 9, 18a28-19b4.

<sup>67</sup> *Cod. Vaticanus latinus* 6768, f. 276rb.

<sup>68</sup> This modified form of the theory of cyclic recurrence of events is said elsewhere —by another Bologna professor?—to be the form in which it was held by the ancient astrologers. Cf.: Una opinio fuit quorundam astrologorum antiqua, quae ponit quod in 36 millibus annis omnia entia quae nunc sunt simili modo revertentur et erunt in

certain arguments of Aristotle which seem to oppose any theory of universal necessity, undertake to answer these arguments—precisely because they have been advanced by Aristotle. It will suffice for the present to consider one such argument and the solution proposed by these *moderni*. It may be argued, for example, that if all things occurred out of necessity, there would be no virtue and vice, for virtue and vice are ordered to praise and blame which are assigned not in connection with those things which necessitate the agent but only in connection with those over which he has control:

Hanc autem opinionem sequuntur quidam moderni, diversificantur tamen a primis, quoniam isti non ponunt quod redeat idem effectus numero . . . sed . . . similes et in simili dispositione. . . Et cum dicitur, istae sunt rationes Philosophi, ideo conantur solvere eas. Sed primo adducamus eas . . . secunda ratio sumpta ab ipso IV Ethicorum est, quia si omnia evenirent de necessitate, tunc periret virtus et vitium. Hoc autem est falsum, quia de istis duobus est tota scientia moralis, et sic periret tota scientia moralis. Consequentia patet, nam virtus et vitium ordinantur in laudem et vituperium. Sed de rebus necessariis non laudamus vel vituperamus. Non enim vituperamus illum qui est turpis a natura, sed potius illum qui est turpis propter indebitum, sicut propter vitium quod est in eo. Et sic semper laudamus aliquem et vituperamus de rebus de quibus videtur dominus.<sup>69</sup>

The reply to this argument consists in making strictly natural—and hence necessary—inclinations the ultimate basis for assigning praise and blame. Voluntary agents are presented as being endowed with natural aptitudes for virtue and vice. Thus, that person is praised who exercises an act of virtue to which he has a natural aptitude, and that one is blamed who exercises the vicious act for which he has a natural aptitude. It is not primarily the act which is praised but rather the natural aptitude toward a virtuous act; often it happens that someone is praised not precisely because he is a philosopher but because he has a natural inclination to become a philosopher:

. . . respondent quod non periret virtus et vitium, quia dicunt quod nos laudamus illum qui exercet actum aliquem ad quem habet aptitudinem. Unde quia aliquis exercet actum virtutis ad quem habet aptitudinem, ideo laudamus eum; et sic vituperamus aliquem exercentem actum vitiosum ad quem habet inclinationem, sicut nos multotiens laudamus aliquem, non quia sit philosophus actu sed quia est natura philosophus, quia habet inclinationem ut sit actus ad scientiam. Ita et sic erunt virtus et vitium.<sup>70</sup>

Thaddaeus has an interesting remark to make concerning the doctrine of universal necessity based on the modified theory of the cyclic recurrence of events. Philosophically, he finds this theory attractive, but his faith and the preponderant authority of Aristotle and Averroes force him to reject it:

Et dixit magister quod si non esset propter Philosophum, qui videtur oppositum velle, et propter fidem, facilius esset tenere viam istam. Sed ista positio est falsa et est contra intentionem Philosophi et Commentatoris . . .<sup>71</sup>

simili dispositione, in qua nunc sunt . . . et per consequens secundum eos omnes effectus sunt necessarii. This passage, quoted without folio number by Maier, *Die Vorläufer Galileis*, p. 277, is from the question appearing in *Cod. Ottobonianus latinus* 318, ff. 91r-95r and has been tentatively ascribed to Cambiolus Bononiensis. Cf. *supra*, p. 44, item 5.

<sup>69</sup> *Cod. Vaticanus latinus* 6768, f. 276rb.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>71</sup> Literally the same remark is made elsewhere—by another Bologna professor?—concerning the same doctrine. Cf.: ista opinio est multum probabilis, et si non esset propter timorem fidei et propter auctoritatem Aristotelis contra hoc expresse multi declinarent. Sed ista opinio est falsa. This passage, quoted without folio number by Maier, *Die Vorläufer Galileis*, p. 278, is from the question appearing in *Cod. Otto-*

Naturally, such a statement, while ostensibly placing faith and the authority of Aristotle and Averroes first, in effect achieves the opposite result. Reason alone, it is implied, will lead to one conclusion, while faith and authority necessitate its contradictory. Interestingly enough, faith and Averroes seem to be practically equivalent. This fact suggests that the tendency labelled "Averroism" in time came to include not only the followers of the explicit doctrines of Averroes but also, and more generally, all philosophers who saw contradictions between conclusions arrived at through reason alone and those imposed by faith and authority. Averroes himself might become the victim of the tendency which his first students in the European universities had initiated.<sup>72</sup>

Another opinion reported by Thaddaeus is the "opinion of certain theologians" which states that an effect may be contingent with respect to one cause and necessary with respect to another:

. . . fuit opinio quorundam theologorum. Et dicunt quod aliquis effectus respectu unius causae est contingens, et respectu alterius causae est necessarium.<sup>73</sup>

This opinion is described at considerable length, but in Thaddaeus' eventual refutation of it one of the points with which he takes issue is the one just stated: that an effect may be contingent with respect to one cause and necessary with respect to another. This point he rejects because for him contingency and necessity are dispositions of being and are not such that they can in one respect be present and in another not present. What is necessary is absolutely necessary, so that if it is necessary with respect to one cause it cannot be contingent with respect to another.

Sed sine dubio ista opinio non bene stat cum philosophia Aristotelis et Commentatoris, scilicet quod unus effectus respectu unius causae sit contingens et respectu alterius sit necessarius. Nam si hoc esset, tunc sequeretur quod perirent dispositiones ipsarum rerum . . . , nam contingentia et necessitas sunt dispositiones rerum. . . . Modo illud quod est necessarium simpliciter est necessarium. Si ergo aliquis effectus respectu alicuius causae sit necessarius, tunc erit simpliciter necessarius, et sic tolleretur natura possibilitatis in tali effectu. Et hoc est simile ei quod dicit Commentator in I Caeli circa finem. Dicit enim quod si aliquid possibile posset perpetuari, tunc natura possibilis transiret in naturam aeternam . . .<sup>74</sup>

It is interesting to see how St. Thomas, even while holding that contingency and necessity are dispositions of being, found no difficulty in calling an effect contingent with respect to one cause and necessary with respect to another. An effect, while remaining contingent with respect to one cause, can be necessary with respect to another if the very contingency of the effect with respect to the

bonianus latinus 318, ff. 91r-95r, which has been tentatively ascribed to Cambiolus Bononiensis. Cf. *supra*, p. 44, item 5; pp. 51-2, n. 68.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben II*, p. 289, as quoted by Maier, *Die Vorläufer Galileis*, p. 252, n. 3: Ich verstehe unter dem lateinischen Averroismus nicht bloss die Lehren des Averroes, insofern sie auch in ihrem Gegensatz zur christlichen Weltanschauung von Professoren der Artistenfakultät festgehalten wurden, sondern ueberhaupt jenen an der Artistenfakultät vertretenen philosophischen Aristotelismus, der unter dem Einfluss der arabischen Philosophie alle Fragen auch weltanschaulicher

Tragweite lediglich secundum viam philosophorum, ohne praktische Ruecksichtnahme auf die Lehren des Glaubens und der kirchlichen Theologie zu behandeln und zu loesen versucht.

<sup>73</sup> *Cod. Vaticanus latinus* 6768, f. 276vb. The doctrine described in the succeeding lines of the manuscript seems in many respects to be identical with that of Thomas Aquinas, in *VI Metaphys.*, lect. 3; ed. M.-R. Cathala, O.P., Turin, 1935, nos. 1297-15; and Siger de Brabant, *Questions sur la Physique d'Aristote II*, qu. 16; ed. F. Delhaye, Louvain, 1941, pp. 106-12.

<sup>74</sup> *Cod. Vaticanus latinus* 6768, f. 276va.

one cause is a disposition necessitated by the other. Thus, it is Divine Providence that some beings should be contingent with respect to appropriately prepared causes. The necessity which such beings have with respect to Divine Providence is not another disposition which removes their contingency—as would be the case in Thaddaeus' terms—but is, according to Thomas Aquinas, the factor which ensures their very contingency.<sup>73</sup>

Thaddaeus' argument rests on a premise which, if examined a little more closely, might have led to a view similar to that of Thomas Aquinas. This premise is that the dispositions of necessity and contingency cannot be interchanged and for this reason do not permit comparisons with different orders of causes. The conclusion that Thaddaeus draws from this is that one and the same effect cannot be contingent in one respect and necessary in another. But another conclusion which might have been drawn from this premise is that, since the dispositions of necessity and contingency cannot thus replace each other, there is another sort of necessity involved which is not a disposition but rather a characteristic of the relation of a disposition to its subject. Thus, contingency, as a disposition of being, cannot itself be replaced by necessity; yet the fact that it cannot be replaced means that there is, after all, a sort of necessity prevailing even among contingent beings, a necessity which makes contingency to be a disposition of such beings. In this necessity Divine Providence is mirrored.

By way of concluding this study it will be appropriate to consider briefly the importance of *Cod. Vaticanus latinus* 6768 as one more source for the history of Latin Averroism. From this codex, which seems so far to have escaped notice and of which a more thorough description is being planned, important additions have been made to the lists of works of Thaddaeus de Parma, Angelus de Aretio and Matthaeus de Eugubio. The same codex also contains a large selection of other short works which concentrate on problems arising in connection with an Averroistic interpretation of Aristotle. Some of these works are by persons known to have played an important role in the development of Latin Averroism. For example, Antonius de Parma is represented by the following question:

Quaeritur utrum intellectus sit forma et actus corporis, simul sub ista quaestione copulando utrum numeretur numeratione corporis an non. . . . Et haec de unitate intellectus dicta sufficiant. Explicunt dubia et remotiones eorum circa intellectum possibilem et agentem enucleata et assumpta ex intentione Averrois a magistro Anthonio de Parma excellentissimo philosophorum (ff. 163ra-165rb).

Marsilius de Padua is named as the author of the following work:

Caius est universale. Hoc est sophisma propositum circa quod quaeritur primo de significatione termini concreti accidentalis utrum significet formam accidentalem tantum vel aggregatum ex subiecto et forma. . . . Explicit quaestio disputata per magistrum marsilium de padua (ff. 235vb-237va).<sup>74</sup>

<sup>73</sup> Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *In VI Metaphys.*, lect. 3; ed. Cathala, nos. 1220-22: . . . ens inquantum ens est, habet causam ipsum Deum: unde sicut divinae providentiae subditur ipsum ens, ita etiam omnia accidentia entis inquantum est ens, inter quae sunt necessarium et contingens. Ad divinam igitur providentiam pertinet non solum quod faciat hoc ens, sed quod det ei contingentiam vel necessitatem. Secundum enim quod unicuique dare voluit contingentiam vel necessitatem, praeparavit ei causas medias, ex quibus de necessitate

sequatur, vel contingenter . . . Unde non sequitur secundum rationem Aristotelis hic inductam, quod ex quo divina providentia est posita, quod omnes effectus sint necessarii; sed necessarium est effectus esse contingenter, vel de necessitate.

<sup>74</sup> It was not possible to establish whether these works by Antonius de Parma and Marsilius de Padua are otherwise known. De Wulf, *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale* II (6th ed., Louvain, 1936), pp. 198-99; III (6th ed., *ibid.*, 1947), pp. 139-43, does not mention them.

Johannes de Janduno is represented by the following works, in addition to those already noted:<sup>77</sup>

1. A commentary on the *Parva Naturalia* (ff. 100ra-159rb).
2. Quaeritur super septimum physicorum utrum genus sit una natura, et quia difficultas huius quaestionis specialiter provenit ex idemplitate vel diversitate formae generis ad formam speciei, ideo quaeratur sub hac forma, utrum forma generis sit eadem essentialiter secundum substantiam cum formis specierum aut diversarum [!]; verbi gratia, utrum Socrates per eandem formam sit homo et animal vel per aliam et aliam realiter et secundum se. Et similiter est de aliis, et praecipue in generibus et speciebus de praedicamento substantiae. . . . Explicit quaestio de diversitate et ordine formarum generis et speciei disputata per M. Johannem de ganduno (ff. 227ra-230va).
3. Sicut dicit philosophus in principio tertii metaphysice, inest autem bene investigare volentibus prae opere bene dubitare. Cum igitur quidam . . . 14 rationibus ostendisset quod species intelligibilis esset aliud ab actu realiter intelligere . . . (ff. 250ra-254va).<sup>78</sup>

Aegidius Romanus is the author of the following question:

Utrum in celo sit materia vel utrum celum sit corpus simplex ut posuit Commentator . . . (ff. 165va-168va).<sup>79</sup>

As for works by persons at the university of Bologna—other than Thaddaeus de Parma, Angelus de Aretio and Matthaeus de Eugubio—the presence, in this codex, of a number of questions by the Anti-Averroist Guilelmus de Alnwick has already been noted.<sup>80</sup> There are also works by persons who have not figured in modern studies of early fourteenth century Averroism at Bologna but who may possibly belong to this school. These persons are Italians, and the structure and subjects of their works are generally similar to those of the works of known members of this school. A certain Jordanus de Tridento is represented by the following two questions:

1. Questio proposita fuit utrum dimensiones sint eterne in materia. . . . Explicit sophisma determinatum per magistrum Jordanum de tridento (ff. 188ra-190va).
2. Questio fuit proposita utrum forma substantialis perficiens materiam sit corruptibilis (ff. 190va-193va).

Jordanus de Tridento is named as the author of only the first of these two questions, but certain factors which they have in common suggest that he is the author of both. Both exhibit the same style and structure. Perhaps more significant is the fact that both questions—in similar contexts which need not

<sup>77</sup> *Supra*, n. 14; n. 40.

<sup>78</sup> The same work appears in *Cod. Ottonianus latinus* 318, ff. 146ra-158ra, where it bears the superscript title *Tractatus Joannis de Janduno de specie intelligibili*. Possibly this is one of the works referred to by Thaddaeus de Parma in item two of the list of his works, *supra*, p. 36. At the end of the copy appearing in *Cod. Vaticanus latinus* 6768 a hand other than that of the scribe attributes the work to a *Doctor theologie*, a title used also, this time by the scribe, to designate the otherwise unnamed author of the question *Utrum ratione naturali possit evidenter ostendi quod anima*

*intellectiva sit forma substantialis corporis* (*ibid.*, ff. 257rb-61va). The author of the latter question is Guilelmus de Alnwick. Cf. Ledoux (ed.), *Fr. Guillelmi Alnwick Quaestiones*, p. xxvi.

<sup>79</sup> An incomplete copy, not listed by G. Bruni, 'Catalogo dei manoscritti egidiani romani,' *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica*, XXIII (1931), 440; *Le opere di Egidio Romano* (Florence, 1936), 265-66. A question on the same subject was composed by Petrus de de Bonifatiis, who belonged to the same religious order as Aegidius Romanus. Cf. *supra*, p. 44.

<sup>80</sup> *Supra*, nn. 41-2; 78.

be described at present—contain certain expressions which are unique enough to suggest one and the same author:

QUESTION 1

Ad rationem non dixit respondens iste propter clamores circumstantium (f. 188rb).

Nec est mirandum de isto dicto, quia dicit Commentator in duodecimo quod contingit videri homini existenti in disputatione mirabilia extranea a natura rei (f. 189ra).

QUESTION 2

Ad hoc voluit ipse respondere, sed pueri clamaverunt quod non potuit audiri (f. 190vb).

. . . etiam si dixerit tale respondens, non debet incredibile videri, quia Commentator dicit XII Metaphysicae quod qui est semper in disputatione, accidit sibi videre mirabilia et extranea a natura (f. 191rb).

The following question is attributed to a certain *Magister He* (*Hervaeus, Henricus?*):

Questio proponitur disputanda utrum magis et minus in eadem forma differant specie vel non. . . . Explicit questio disputata per magistrum He (ff. 263vb-267rb).

In the course of his discussion, *Magister He* considers the opinion *cuiusdam viri subtilis de florentia* (f. 264vb). In the adjacent margin, in a hand other than that in which the text is written, there appears the note *opinio magistri dini* [?].<sup>61</sup>

Finally, a certain Johannes de Tasso de Florentia is named as the author of the following question:

Queritur utrum omne accidens sit proprium. . . . Explicit questio disputata per magistrum Johannem de tasso de Florentia (ff. 279va-b).

No attempt can be made at present to decide what importance attaches to the authors of these isolated works. But perhaps their works, as well as some of the many anonymous works also contained in *Cod. Vaticanus latinus* 6768, will be incorporated into a broader context as more is learned about the development of Averroism in early fourteenth century Bologna. At all events, it is quite clear by now that a further study of doctrinal developments at this center should be very rewarding. Undoubtedly there existed in Bologna a tradition of speculation which was nourished by a great variety of sources. The preceding collation of manuscript discoveries in all probability gives only an inadequate picture of the interests which characterized this tradition.

<sup>61</sup> Is this perhaps Dinus de Florentia (Dino del Garbo)? This Dinus received his doctorate in Bologna about 1300 and then taught in Bologna, Sienna, Padua and Florence. Although known primarily as a physician,

he was quite familiar with the problems of scholastic philosophy. Cf. Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science* III, Part II (Baltimore, 1947), p 837.

# An Aspect of Averroes' Influence on St. Albert

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**N**OS autem dissentimus in paucis ab Averroee etc.<sup>1</sup> is a statement which might well be expected from a member of that mediaeval philosophical group known to-day as the Latin Averroists. The fact, however, is that it is found in the *De Anima* of St. Albert the Great written during the years 1256-7.<sup>2</sup> The text has to do with Averroes' doctrine on the nature and operation of the agent intellect. Regarding that doctrine, St. Albert insists that he accepts it all with the exception of one point, namely that the agent intellect is both a part and a power of the soul (*pars et potentia animae*)<sup>3</sup> — a doctrine which Aristotle himself, to Albert's way of thinking, taught.

Not once in his long career did St. Albert deviate from the position that the agent intellect is a part and power of the human soul. However, his original attitude to Averroes was subjected to some revision. Yet, the net result of this revision produced no appreciable alteration of Albert's continued dependence upon Averroes. These pages will deal with a few of the problems involved in the nature and functioning of the agent intellect in order to exemplify in some way the relation of St. Albert to Averroes. Their only aim is to clarify one small area of St. Albert's doctrine on the relations of the soul and its faculties. If St. Albert's unique impact on the history of Christian philosophy is to be accurately assessed, it will be the result of a synthesis of detailed explorations into specific aspects of Albert's own philosophy, studied in the light of those sources which he accepted as well as those which he rejected. We shall consider: (1) The understanding of Averroes which St. Albert had in his earliest *Summa*; (2) The objective reasons for such an understanding; (3) The transposition, into St. Albert's thought, of problems and solutions peculiar to Averroes' separate agent intelligence, despite St. Albert's revised reading of Averroes; (4) The basic philosophic position that permitted Albert to make that transposition.

## I.

St. Albert's depreciation of the philosophic difference between himself and Averroes, and the minimization of the one change he would affect in Averroes' position, should make students of Albert's thought—as well as students of St. Thomas's thought—chary about agreeing too quickly with Father Goncalo de Mattos O.S.B. when he writes: *nous dirons donc que, jusqu'à plus ample informé, saint Albert apparaît comme le grand novateur, l'initiateur de la "réforme thomiste"*.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> St. Albert, *De Anima* III, 3, 11; ed. Borgnet (Paris, 1890-1899), V, p. 385b. Unless otherwise noted, all references to St. Albert's writings will be from the Borgnet edition.

<sup>2</sup> For the chronology of St. Albert's works see Fr. Pelster, *Kritische Studien zum Leben und zu den Schriften Alberts des Grossen* (Freiburg, 1920), and Fr. Pelster, 'Die Datierung einiger Schriften Alberts des Grossen', *Zeitschrift für kath. Theol.*, XLVII (1923). The data may also be found summarized in Ulrich Dähnert, *Die Erkenntnislehre des Albertus Magnus* (Leipzig, 1933), pp. 1-8. See as well, O. Lottin, 'Notes sur les premiers ouvrages théologiques

d'Albert le Grand', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, IV (1932), 73-82.

<sup>3</sup> Nos autem in dictis istis nihil mutamus nisi hoc quod etiam Aristoteles mutasse videtur, quoniam dixit in omni natura in qua est patiens, est etiam agens: et ita oportet in anima esse has differentias: per hoc enim videtur nobis: nec de hoc dubitemus quin intellectus agens sit pars et potentia animae. St. Albert, *op. cit.*, III, 3, 11; p. 386a.

<sup>4</sup> G. de Mattos O.S.B., 'L'intellect agent personnel dans les premiers écrits d'Albert le Grand et de Thomas d'Aquin', *Revue néoscholastique de philosophie*, XLIII (1940), 161.



Because of St. Albert's use of another area of Averroes' doctrine, he is explicitly classed among the Latin Averroists by Professor Dino Bigongiari. To Aristotle, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes, St. Albert ascribes the proposition: *ab uno simplici non est nisi unum*.<sup>5</sup> Bruno Nardi in his *Saggi di Filosofia Dantesca* quotes Stephen Tempier's condemnation of that proposition and indicates that some Averroist in Paris must have defended it.<sup>6</sup> Professor Bigongiari has no hesitation in informing Nardi that "this mysterious Averroist will be found to be Albertus himself. For the author of the book *De Causis Universitatis*, which Mr. Nardi unquestionably assigns to Albertus, says (I, 1, 10): *a primo quod est necesse esse, immediate non potest esse nisi unum. Et in hoc quidam iam omnes consenserunt peripatetici, licet hoc quidem non intelligentes theologi negaverunt*. And he proceeds to support his statement with the authority of Dionysius."<sup>7</sup>

It is no light matter to consign someone to the ranks of the Latin Averroists. Nor is it a light matter to designate someone as *l'initiateur de la "réforme thomiste"*. Obviously one and the same person cannot be the proper subject of two such historical classifications as these. Perhaps it will be seen that St. Albert, in justice to the integrity of his own thought, as well as to that of Averroes and St. Thomas, cannot be assigned to either of those classifications.

Scholars have been totally deprived, till recently, of any critical edition of any of St. Albert's works. This lack is but one of the factors involved in the confused and contradictory interpretations of St. Albert's doctrines. It is by no means easy to know, at all times and on all problems, which of his historical sources Albert accepts and which he rejects. Nor is it easy to discover the relation of his doctrinal position at one time in his career to his position at another time. Again, neither is it in any sense easy to discern whether there are significant differences between the positions he seems to accept as his own in his paraphrases of the "Peripatetics", and the positions he proposes in his properly theological works. Nor, judging only from Albert's quotations of the "Peripatetics", can one grasp the peculiar ways in which he interprets those quotations. For example, did St. Albert use Averroes in precisely the way Averroes understood his own doctrine? What further stands in the way of an accurate understanding of Albert's position is his assurance, on numerous occasions, that while the Philosophers never actually said what Albert holds on a particular problem and while they even seem to say the contrary, yet they really *intended* to say what he holds. And so St. Albert feels free to quote them in his own favour.<sup>8</sup> Finally, it should be discovered whether St. Albert can justify by philosophical reasons each of the philosophical positions he maintains. For these and for many other reasons, some of them involving the human factor, almost all who have read St. Albert will be in sympathy with the eminent historian and philosopher, Etienne Gilson, when he writes: *Albert le Grand est beaucoup moins connu qu'il n'est célèbre*.<sup>9</sup>

In that brief but revealing statement from St. Albert's *De Anima*: *Nos autem dissentimus in paucis ab Averroee*, we have a significant clue to the solution of

<sup>5</sup> *Adhuc fortissime objicitur: quia ab uno simplici non est nisi unum. Haec autem propositio scribitur ab Aristotele in epistola quae est de principio universi esse, et ab Alfarabio et ab Avicenna et ab Averroee suscipitur et explanatur. St. Albert, Liber de Causis et Processu Universitatis I, 1, 6; X, p. 372b.*

<sup>6</sup> B. Nardi, *Saggi di Filosofia Dantesca* (Milan, 1930), p. 18.

<sup>7</sup> Dino Bigongiari, 'Reviews', *Speculum*, VII (1932), 151.

<sup>8</sup> *Ad id quod inducitur de Philosophorum solutione, dicendum quod hoc modo inducta est fallacia, sicut obijciendo probatum est:*

*tamen non ita dixerunt Philosophi, sed dicere intenderunt hoc quod dicitur in libro de Causis, quod primum est dives per se, et dives in omnibus aliis: sed in se et per se opus ejus est creatio: quod tamen nulli communicat: actus enim creationis nulli communicabilis est . . . St. Albert, Summa Theologiae II, 1, q. 3, m. 3, a. 1: XXXII, p. 27b. Also: Ad alia quatuor dicendum, quod bene improbant positionem sic intellectam: sed hoc non intenderunt Philosophi, op. cit., Ad alia: ibid., p. 28a.*

<sup>9</sup> E. Gilson, *L'Âme raisonnable chez Albert le Grand*, *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, XVIII (1943), 5.

some of the perplexing problems in St. Albert's writings. Averroes was a useful friend of Albert's philosophical youth. When Averroes was introduced to the Latin West through the Latin translations of Michael the Scot, one of the very first to meet him was St. Albert. And it was Albert who introduced many in his day to Averroes as to one who was by no means unacceptable. With the exception of at least one point of difference with Averroes — which point Albert writes off as almost inconsequential — his friendship for Averroes was lifelong.

It has been well established that Averroes' commentary on the *De Anima* of Aristotle was among many of the works of Averroes translated into Latin by Michael the Scot and his group at the Court of Sicily from 1227-30. These translated works were made available to a number of the universities by Frederick II in 1231.<sup>10</sup> This was approximately ten years before St. Albert wrote his first major *Summa*, the *Summa de Creaturis*, done likely at Paris during the years 1240-1.<sup>11</sup> Before 1230, as Father de Vaux has pointed out, Averroes exercised no influence on Christian thought. William of Auvergne and Philip the Chancellor are the first to borrow ever so slightly from Averroes. The first notable use of Averroes was made by St. Albert in 1240-1 in the *Summa de Creaturis* where approximately seventy precise quotations from Averroes appear.<sup>12</sup>

Albert's interpretation of Averroes in this early *Summa*, within the ambit of the nature and function of the agent intellect, will help us considerably in understanding (1) St. Albert's manner of using authorities, (2) the possible evolution of his thought, (3) to what extent exactly, if at all, St. Albert can be called *l'initiateur de la "réforme thomiste"*, and (4) to what extent exactly, if at all, Albert can be called an Averroist.

A complete article in the *Summa de Creaturis* is devoted to the question whether or not the agent intellect is a separate intelligence.<sup>13</sup> The documentation which Albert sets forth, both for and against, proves unmistakably that he correctly gauges the position of Alfarabi, Algazel and Avicenna on this question. In the *Sed contra*, where St. Albert marshalls authorities and arguments favorable to his own position, he quotes Aristotle<sup>14</sup> and Averroes<sup>15</sup> to the point that the agent intellect is *not* a separate substance. Also, in the replies to the objections, Albert quotes Averroes in support of his own position that the agent intellect is *not* a separate substance.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>10</sup> R. de Vaux O.P., 'La Première entrée d'Averroes chez les latins', *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, XXII (1933), 220-1 and 241-3.

<sup>11</sup> O. Lottin, *art. cit.*, 77; 82.

<sup>12</sup> de Vaux O.P., *art. cit.*, 237 for a table of the quotations.

<sup>13</sup> St. Albert, *Summa de Creaturis* II, q. 55, a. 3; XXXV, pp. 461a-469a.

<sup>14</sup> *Sed contra*: I. Dicit Aristoteles in III de Anima: "Quoniam autem sicut in omni natura aliquid est tamquam materia in unoquoque genere, hoc autem est potentia omnia illa, alterum est causa et efficiens quidem est, et omnia facit ut ars ad materiam sustinuit, necesse est et in anima habere differentias": ergo differentiae intellectus agentis et possibilis sunt in anima: ergo agens non est substantia et intelligentia separata. St. Albert, *op. cit.*, II, q. 55, a. 3, *Sed contra* I; XXXV, p. 464b-465a.

<sup>15</sup> Item Averroes: Omnis intellectus immobilis existens habet duas actiones. Quarum una est de generatione passionis, et est intelligere. Alia de genere actionis quae est abstrahere eas a materia, quod nihil aliud est quam facere eas intellectas in actu postquam erant intellectae in potentia. Cum ergo unus horum sit intellectus agens in

alterum possibilem, uterque istorum intellectum erit in nobis existens et non substantia separata. St. Albert, *op. cit.*, *Sed contra* 2; *ibid.*, p. 465a.

<sup>16</sup> Ad aliud dicendum, quod intellectus agens agit per suam substantiam, et non per aliquam speciem intelligibilem quam habeat apud se. Ad aliud autem quod contra obicitur, dicendum quod diversitas actionis intellectus agentis non est ex intellectu agente, sed ex phantasmate: et hoc est quod Averroes in commento super tertium de Anima dicit: "Manifestum est, quoniam quando omnia speculativa fuerunt in nobis existentia in potentia, tunc et agens continuatur nobis in potentia, quia non continuatur nobis nisi per illa: et cum fuerint existentia in nobis in actu, tunc et ipse continuatur nobis in actu: actio enim intellectus agentis determinatur ad phantasma, et sic determinata movet intellectum possibilem et educit eum in actu: sicut actio luminis determinatur ad colores, et sic determinata visum educit in actum." Et per hoc patet, quod intellectus agens non est substantia separata plena formis. *Op. cit.*, ad 14; *ibid.* 467a. For the sections in Averroes from which this quotation seems to have been compiled see *Averrois Cordubensis Com-*

It is well to note that, in this article, St. Albert is not expressly asking whether the agent intellect is a part of the soul. That question is answered affirmatively in the following article. He is only asking here, whether or not the agent intellect is a separate substance. However, he does anticipate his affirmative reply in Article 4 when he answers the first objection of Article 3 by saying that, although the agent intellect is a part of the intellectual soul, it is separate in that it is the act of no part of the body.<sup>17</sup>

Bearing in mind St. Albert's personal position on the agent intellect as a part and power of the soul, we shall now cite the entire *Solutio* of Article 3 so that Albert's initial use of Averroes may be textually appreciated:

Dicendum quod sapientes qui fuerunt ante nos, diversificati sunt in positione intellectus agentis, sicut partim supra tactum est. Quidam enim agentem omnino dixerunt non esse, sed tantum possibilem et speculativum. Et quidam dixerunt ipsum esse habitum, et illi diversificati sunt in tres opiniones. Quidam enim dixerunt eum esse habitum et speciem primae causae: quidam habitum principiorum: quidam autem habitum qui est in omnibus speciebus intelligibilibus. Alii vero dixerunt ipsum esse intelligentiam separatam agentem decimi ordinis: et cum intelligentiae moveant motae sicut desideratum moveat desiderantem et desiderium, dixerunt quod intelligentia agens mundi terreni movet intellectum possibilem humanae animae, si tale desideratum movet desiderantem, ita scilicet quod sicut anima coeli movet coelum, ita quod conformetur intelligentiae agenti, ita etiam intellectus humanus possibilis movet hominem ad quod conformetur intelligentiae decimi ordinis: et hoc modo fluunt bonitates ab intelligentia agente ad intellectum possibilem. Sed non nihil horum dicimus: sequentes enim Aristotelem et Averroem, dicimus coelum non habere animam praeter intelligentiam, ut supra in quaestione de *coelo* determinatum est. Similiter dicimus intellectum agentem humanum esse conjunctum animae humanae, et esse simplicem, et non habere intelligibilia, sed agere ipsa in intellectu possibili ex phantasmatibus, sicut expresse dicit Averroes in commento libri de Anima.<sup>18</sup>

## II.

Obviously, such a use of Averroes presents a problem. For, according to the philosophy of Averroes, (1) the possible intellect is unique and separate; there is but one for all men; (2) the agent intellect is unique and separate; there is but one for all men. Yet, the possible intellect is not a separate substance distinct from the agent intellect, despite the opinion prevalent among most thirteenth-century thinkers. For Averroes holds that the continuation or contact of the agent intellect with the imagination of the individual soul begets a receptibility regarding the intelligibles. This receptibility in fact is nothing but the material (possible) intellect becoming individualized in each human soul, just as the sun's light becomes individualized in each body it illuminates. But the light does not belong to any one body. Neither does a possible intellect belong to any one human soul.<sup>19</sup>

*mentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros III*, t. c. 36; ed. Crawford (Cambridge, 1953), p. 500, ll. 599-606; p. 501, ll. 631-9. All future references to Averroes will be from this edition.

<sup>17</sup> Ad primum dicendum, quod intellectus agens dicitur separatus, eo quod non est actus alicujus partis corporis, ut dictum est in objectione. Nihilominus tamen est pars animae intellectualis: quia anima intellectiva sic est actus corporis, quod non secundum quamlibet partem ejus se habet in organo . . . St. Albert, *op. cit.*, ad 1; *ibid.*, p. 466b.

<sup>18</sup> St. Albert, *op. cit.*; *ibid.*, p. 466a-466b. When St. Albert says, in this text, that the agent intellect is conjoined to the human soul he is not indicating that it is one substance joined to another substance, but he is using the very terms of the Latin translation of Averroes to indicate his own position (1) that there is somehow a distinction between the soul and its faculties and (2) that the agent intellect is always, by its very nature, conjoined to the soul as a part. Cf. St. Albert, *De Anima* III, 3, 11; V. p. 384a.

<sup>19</sup> E. Gilson, *La Philosophie au moyen âge* (Paris, 1944), ch. VI, p. 366.

St. Albert, in the text of the *Summa de Creaturis*, clearly considers Averroes to have taught that the agent intellect is a part and power of the soul and in the soul.<sup>20</sup> Excluding the possibility that there was deliberate disparity between what St. Albert understood Averroes to mean and what he quoted him as supporting, the serious problem arises, namely how could such a mistake in the interpretation and quotation of Averroes occur? Is this use of Averroes, by Albert, in any sense an Averroism and, since Albert is classed as a Latin, is it then a Latin Averroism?

Father Salman O.P. has seen the problem and proposes two points as an answer. First, such notions as Averroes really taught were foreign to the conceptions of the Latins, so that, after a first reading, they were not explicitly known and assimilated as understood by their author. Secondly, for Averroes the possible intellect and the agent intellect were equally separate, hence, Averroes often drew parallels between their properties.<sup>21</sup> Consequently, Father Salman insists, since St. Albert and the other Christians never dreamed at that time of a unique and separate possible intellect, the parallels in the texts of Averroes expressed to them a doctrine which made of the agent intellect a power of the soul.<sup>22</sup>

With respect to the first point in Father Salman's answer, it should be noted that the unicity and separateness of the agent intellect were in no sense foreign to one "Latin", namely St. Albert the Great. As we have seen from the *Solutio* of Article 3, Question 55 in Albert's earliest *Summa*, St. Albert was keenly aware of such a philosophical position. His proper use of verbatim quotations from Algazel, Avicenna and Alfarabi on this question testifies to his accurate awareness of this doctrine in Averroes' predecessors.

With respect to the second point in Father Salman's answer, it should be noted that only two questions later, namely in Question 57, Article 3, St. Albert asks the question: *Utrum unus et idem numero intellectus sit in omnibus animabus rationalibus?* His answer is a categorical negative.<sup>23</sup> It bears explicitly only on the uniqueness of the intellect. It would seem that, if there is an explanation of St. Albert's early use of Averroes, it is other than that offered by Father Salman.

There is, I think, an explanation, and that explanation is to be found in the very texts of Averroes which Albert had at his disposal. There can be little doubt that St. Albert had before his eyes the Latin translation of Michael the Scot in writing his *Summa de Creaturis*. The quotations Albert cites from Averroes' Commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima* are accurate, the paraphrases are precise and much of the terminological paraphernalia Albert adopts is peculiar to Averroes. These points will find their evidence as we proceed.

How could St. Albert have sincerely felt that Averroes taught an agent intellect as *pars animae*? The citation of but a few of the vast number of similar texts in Averroes' Commentary on the *De Anima* of Aristotle furnishes the objective basis for the answer. These are the texts from Averroes:

(1) Et ideo dicit Aristoteles post, quod necesse est ponere in anima rationali

<sup>20</sup>In addition to the texts already cited, there is another explicit expression of St. Albert's reading of Averroes: Item, Averroes ibidem dicit quod in anima est intellectus quo est omnia facere secundum Aristotelem, et intellectus possibilis quo est omnia fieri . . . St. Albert, *Summa de Creaturis* II, q. 55, a. 1, Sed contra ; XXXV, p. 454b.

<sup>21</sup>Dominique Salman O.P., "Note sur la première influence d'Averroes", *Revue néoscholastique de philosophie*, XL (1937), 205.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup>St. Albert, *Summa de Creaturis* II, q. 57, a. 3; XXXV, p. 492b-494a. St. Albert is, in

this article explicitly concerned with the *intellectus speculativus* which, in his doctrine, is merely the possible intellect in so far as it is in act. In no sense is it another intellect than the possible intellect:—cum autem distinguitur possibilis intellectus a speculativa, non distinguitur ex parte subiecti, sed ex parte potentiae et actus. Possibilis enim est, qui est in potentia: et speculativus est qui est in actu; et propter hoc a Philosophis potius dicitur gradus intellectus ipsius, quam alius intellectus. St. Albert, *op. cit.*, q. 57, a. 1, Sol.; *ibid.*, p. 438ab.

has duas differentias, scilicet virtutem actionis, et virtutem passionis, et dicit aperte quod utraque *pars eius* est neque generabilis, neque corruptibilis.<sup>24</sup>

(2) Et confirmaverunt hoc per quod propalavit Aristoteles quod intellectus agens existit *in anima* nobis, cum videmur denudare formas a materiis primo, deinde intelligere eas.<sup>25</sup>

(3) Et ideo opinandum est, quod iam apparuit nobis ex sermone Aristotelis, quod *in anima* sunt *duae partes* intellectus, quarum una est recipiens, cujus esse declaratum est hic, alia autem agens, et est illud quod facit intentiones quae sunt in virtute ymaginativa esse moventes intellectum in actu postquam erant moventes in potentia —.<sup>26</sup>

(4) Et non est sicut existimavit, sed opinandum est quod *in anima* sunt *tres partes* intellectus, quarum una est intellectus recipiens, secunda autem efficiens, tertia autem factum.<sup>27</sup>

(5) Et cum necesse est invenire *in parte anime* que dicitur intellectus istas tres differentias, necesse est ut in ea sit *pars* que dicitur intellectus secundum quod efficitur omne modo similitudinis et receptionis, et quod in ea sit etiam *secunda pars* que dicitur intellectus secundum quod facit istum intellectum qui est in potentia intelligere omne in actu —.<sup>28</sup>

(6) Deinde dixit: quasi lux, et. Modo dat modum ex quo oportuit ponere *in anima* intelligentiam agentem. Non enim possumus dicere quod proportio intellectus agentis in anima ad intellectum generatum est sicut proportio artificii ad artificiatum omnibus modis.<sup>29</sup>

(7) Dicamus igitur: quoniam autem intellectus *existens in nobis* habet duas actiones secundum quod attribuitur nobis, quarum una est de genere passionis (et est intelligere), et alia de genere actionis (et est extrahere formas et denudare eas a materiis —.<sup>30</sup>

(8) Quoniam, quia illud per quod agit aliquid suam propriam actionem est forma, nos autem agimus per intellectum agentem nostram actionem propriam, necesse est ut intellectus agens sit forma in nobis.<sup>31</sup>

While there are other texts in a similar vein,<sup>32</sup> these should suffice to indicate that St. Albert had no difficulty in finding in Averroes exactly what he said was there. It is beyond dispute that these texts state that the agent intellect is a part of the soul and that it is in the soul. No complex hypothesis is necessary once the literal content of Averroes' own words is noted. Evidently St. Albert at least read some, if not all, such texts and was honestly convinced that Averroes taught what his texts so baldly said.

The agent and the possible intellect was for Averroes a separate intelligence.<sup>33</sup> Consequently when he spoke of the agent and/or the possible intellect as being in the soul, he meant it only by way of operation and not as an intrinsic property or power. However, this is by no means immediately clear from the texts of Averroes. I am inclined to agree with Father Keeler S.J.—and even to the point of including the doctrine of the agent intellect—in his statement that "nothing is more obscure and more difficult than the doctrine of the material intellect, which Averroes sets forth in the Commentary on the *De Anima*."<sup>34</sup> Not a surprising judgment this, for the author himself, Averroes, forthrightly declares that this problem of the intellect is quite difficult (*magis difficilis valde*).<sup>35</sup> And, as if that is not strong enough, Averroes a little later shares what was and is

<sup>24</sup> Averroes, *op. cit.*, III, t. c. 5; p. 335, ll. 54-7.

<sup>25</sup> *Loc. cit.*; p. 390, ll. 98-101.

<sup>26</sup> *Loc. cit.*; p. 406, ll. 556-62.

<sup>27</sup> *Loc. cit.*; p. 406, ll. 569-71.

<sup>28</sup> *Op. cit.*, III, t. c. 18; p. 437, ll. 8-13.

<sup>29</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 433, ll. 35-8.

<sup>30</sup> *Op. cit.*, III, t. c. 36; p. 495, ll. 462-6.

<sup>31</sup> *Loc. cit.*; p. 499, l. 586-p. 500, l. 590.

<sup>32</sup> *Loc. cit.*; p. 496, ll. 488-90; t. c. 38; p. 503, l. 11-p. 504, l. 19.

<sup>33</sup> *Op. cit.*, III t. c. 18; p. 439, ll. 73-4.

<sup>34</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Tractatus de unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*; ed. Keeler (Rome, 1936), p. 40, n. 5.

<sup>35</sup> Averroes, *op. cit.*, III, t. c. 5; p. 392, l. 158.

likely no secret to any of his readers, namely that this problem is a thorny one (*maximam habet ambiguitatem*).<sup>36</sup>

We have seen that the eight texts quoted from Averroes are, from a literal point of view, obvious and positive sources for St. Albert's peculiar interpretation of Averroes. Further, it is conceivable that Albert simply did not read any precise text in which Averroes explicitly stated it as his own conviction that the agent intellect is separate and one for all men. It will be instructive to look at the clearest texts in Averroes' Commentary on the *De Anima* relating to the unicity and separateness of the agent and/or possible intellect. This will be done, not to excuse St. Albert, for he needs none from us, but as an aid in understanding his 1240-1 reading of Averroes. The texts in question are as follows:

- (1) Cum intellectus communi omnibus, cognito autem non.<sup>37</sup>
- (2) Hoc igitur est unum impossibile quod videntur contradicere huic opinioni, scilicet huic quod posuimus quod intellectus materialis est virtus non facta de novo. Existimatur enim quod impossibile est ymaginari quomodo intellecta erunt facta, et ista non erit facta; quando enim agens fuerit eternum et patiens fuerit eternum, necesse est ut factum sit eternum.<sup>38</sup>
- (3) Quoniam, si prima perfectio esset eadem omnium hominum, et non numerata per numerationem eorum —.<sup>39</sup>
- (4) — scilicet quod postrema perfectio in homine sit numerata per numerationem individuorum hominis, et prima perfectio sit una in numero omnibus.<sup>40</sup>
- (5) Questio autem secunda, dicens quomodo intellectus materialis est unus in numero in omnibus individuis hominum — haec quidem questio valde est difficilis, et maximam habet ambiguitatem.<sup>41</sup>
- (6) Et fuit necesse attribuere has duas actiones anime in nobis, scilicet recipere intellectum et facere eum, quamvis agens et recipiens sint substantie eterne —.<sup>42</sup>
- (7) Et universaliter existimatur quod impossibilia contingentia huic positioni contingunt huic quod ponimus quod intellectus qui est in habitu est unus in numero.<sup>43</sup>

The most explicit of these texts relate to the *intellectus materialis*. Nowhere in the Commentary have I been able to find the phrase *unus in numero in omnibus individuis hominum*, explicitly applied to the agent intellect, as being the position of Averroes.<sup>44</sup> However, the sixth text of Averroes, which has just been cited, clearly implies that eternal substance is properly predicated of the agent and the possible intellect. What St. Albert first understood by this, if it

<sup>36</sup> Loc. cit.; p. 402 l. 431.

<sup>37</sup> Op. cit., III, t. c. 1; p. 380, ll. 44-5.

<sup>38</sup> Op. cit., t. c. 5; p. 392, ll. 148-54.

<sup>39</sup> Loc. cit.; p. 393, ll. 177-9. Averroes in this section of his commentary is reciting the objections which are levelled at his position of one *prima perfectio hominis* for all men. Cf. loc. cit.; p. 392, l. 158—p. 393 l. 195.

<sup>40</sup> Loc. cit.; p. 399, l. 348-50.

<sup>41</sup> Loc. cit.; p. 401, l. 424—p. 402, l. 431.

<sup>42</sup> Op. cit., t. c. 18; p. 439, l. 71-4.

<sup>43</sup> Op. cit., t. c. 5; p. 404, ll. 494-7.

<sup>44</sup> I have been able to discover but one instance in Averroes' Commentary on the *De Anima* where the agent intellect is clearly spoken of as unique. In the section in which that instance is found, Averroes is not proposing his own position but is frowning upon the solution Avempace gave to the problems involved in the question of the

intellect's being one or many. It will be instructive to read that section in its entirety: *Modus autem per quem existimavit Avempace dissolvere questiones advenientes super hoc quod intellectus est unus aut multus, scilicet modus quem dedit in sua epistola intitulata Continuatio Intellectus cum Homine, non est modus conveniens ad dissolvendum istam questionem, alius est ab intellectu quem demonstrat etiam illic esse multa, cum intellectus quem demonstravit esse unum est intellectus agens inquantum est forma necessarius intellectus speculativus; intellectus vero quem demonstravit esse multum est ipse intellectus speculativus. Hoc autem nomen, scilicet intellectus, equivoco dicitur de speculativo et agentis. Averroes, in *Aristotelis De Anima* III, t. c. 5; p. 412, ll. 729-42.*

struck his attention at all, is not known. The case could be made that, even if Averroes did not explicitly use the phrase *unus in numero* of the agent intellect, nevertheless he made his position clear by adequately describing the agent intellect. In his description Averroes spoke of it as abstract, unmixed, impassible, a substance, etc. And yet St. Albert could easily read these characteristics as proper to a human soul. In fact, as we have seen, he did so. These characteristics were not, for him, so uniquely angelic that he interpreted them as exclusive denominators of separate angelic substances. The key reason why he did not is simply that the human soul, for St. Albert, considered *secundum esse quod habet in se*, differs from an angelic nature only by its inclination to animate its body.<sup>45</sup>

Even in Averroes' own day the complications of his presentation were the source of resistances among his hearers and readers. What puzzled Averroes is that everyone was willing to accept what he demonstrated about the agent intellect, yet they resisted those demonstrations when applied to the material (possible) intellect. As Averroes himself saw them, the demonstrations of the nature and properties of the agent intellect are indeed quite similar (*valde consimiles*) to those of the material intellect. Hence, Averroes felt strongly that anyone who accepted one set must accept the other.<sup>46</sup> What is really remarkable to us in this present discussion is that St. Albert knew of the doctrine of one possible intellect in the souls of all men,<sup>47</sup> and that he quotes Averroes in the objections of the article in which he opposes that doctrine. We have the curious situation of Averroes' consternation at people understanding and accepting his position on the agent intellect, but understanding and rejecting his position on the possible intellect. Whereas St. Albert partially understands and rejects Averroes' position on the possible intellect, but misunderstands and accepts that misunderstanding of Averroes' position on the agent intellect.

### III.

Having taken a position, as he thought, with Averroes on the agent intellect, St. Albert's mind was open to many of the subsidiary details involved in Averroes' elaboration of the functioning of such an agent intellect. Even though Albert later became aware that Averroes did not hold for the agent intellect as a part of the soul, many of the subsidiary details permanently remained part and parcel of his thought. Whether the agent intellect is a part of the soul or a separate substance makes little difference to the nature of the soul as St. Albert conceived it, and which he describes as having many of the powers in common with a separate intelligence, (*multas habet virtutes intelligentiae separatae convenientes*).<sup>48</sup>

Between the *Summa de Creaturis*, written in 1240-1, and the *De Anima*, written in 1256, St. Albert discovered that Averroes did teach (1) that the agent intellect is not a part of the soul, that is is separate and not joined to the soul, (2) that everything which is separate and then is conjoined must have

<sup>45</sup> Dicendum quod supra determinatum est de Angelis, quod substantialis differentia animae et Angeli est in hoc quod anima inclinatur ad corpus ut actus, Angelus autem non. St. Albert, *Summa de Creaturis* II, tr. 1, q. 4, a. 1, Sol; XXXV, p. 34a. No change in St. Albert's position throughout his career. His last work, the *Summa Theologiae* echoes his first *Summa*: Dicendum quod anima rationalis et Angelus et specie et genere differunt. Est enim rationalis anima intendens in delectabilia corporis: et sic differet genere. Differunt etiam specie: anima enim rationalis secundum seipsum et secundum totum affectum unibilis est corpori. *Summa Theologiae* II, tr 2, q. 9. Sol;

XXXII, p. 140b. By reason of its whole affection and inclination the soul is born toward its body as its act.

<sup>46</sup> Averroes, *op. cit.*, t. c. 19: p. 441, ll. 30-5: Que igitur est differentia inter has duas demonstrationes in considerando per eas? Sunt enim valde consimiles. Et mirum est quomodo omnes concedunt hanc demonstrationem esse veram, scilicet de intellectu agentis, et non conveniunt in demonstratione de intellectu materiali; et licet etiam sint valde consimiles, ita quod oportet concedentem alteram concedere aliam.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *supra*, note 23.

<sup>48</sup> St. Albert, *De Anima* III, 2, 12; V, p. 350a.

some cause to account for its being conjoined, (3) that one must discover what is the cause of the conjunction through which the agent intelligence is conjoined formally to the possible intellect.<sup>49</sup>

Averroes' position on these points is, in brief, that the agent intellect is one for all men, that it is a separate intelligence which efficiently produces knowledge in the individual souls of men by producing the intelligible forms in human souls. These forms are received in what the Latin translation of Averroes terms an *intellectus passivus*, that is, a disposition to receive the intelligible forms from the agent intellect. Averroes' other name for the passive intellect is imagination which, because not unmixed with the body, dies with the body. What Averroes calls the material intellect is the potentiality in the separate agent intellect. This potentiality exists simply because the intelligence is not pure act. When the agent intellect contacts, conjoins or connects with the imagination, there arises this intellect called *intellectus materialis* (what the Latins call the possible intellect), that is a potentiality for receiving intelligibles. This potentiality is, in the mind of Averroes, simply the individualizing of itself by the agent intellect; it is the individualizing of its own potentiality in individual human souls.<sup>50</sup>

According to Averroes an individual man was not actually understanding unless the separate agent intelligence somehow had an actual continuity, connection or conjunction with that man's soul.<sup>51</sup> Recognizing that there must be a cause of such a *continuatio*, Averroes finds it in the *intellecta speculativa*, in this sense that the agent intellect cannot be conjoined actually to us except by means of the *intellecta speculativa* residing in act in the material intellect.<sup>52</sup> That material intellect, as we have seen, is the potentiality of the agent intelligence individualized in each human soul.<sup>53</sup> But of this, more later.

<sup>49</sup> Cum omnibus enim aliis fere Philosophis convenit Averroes in hoc quod dicit intellectum agentem esse separatum et non conjunctum animae: et tunc supponit istam propositionem, quae etiam necessaria est, quod omne quod est separatum et efficitur conjunctum, habet aliquam causam suae conjunctionis: et tunc quaeritur quae sit illa causa conjunctionis per quam intelligentia agens formaliter conjungitur possibili ut sic anima efficiatur intelligens substantias separatas? Nos autem in dictis istis nihil mutamus nisi hoc quod: Aristoteles mutasse videtur . . . intellectus agens sit pars et potentia animae. St. Albert, *De Anima* III, 3, 11; V p. 385b- p. 386a. This is one of the most remarkable chapters or sections in any of St. Albert's works for getting the full flavour and feel of his admiration and emulation of Averroes. This will be best achieved by analyzing the chapter in function of Averroes, *op. cit.*, t. c. 36; p. 480-502.

<sup>50</sup> Averroes, *op. cit.*, III, t. c. 5; p. 401, ll. 405-9:—intentiones ymaginate non movent intellectum materiale nisi quando efficiuntur intellectu in actu postquam erant in potentia. Et propter hoc fuit necesse Aristoteli imponere intellectum agentem, —*Loc. cit.*, p. 409, l. 640: Et intendit per intellectum passivum virtutem ymaginativam, . . . *Loc. cit.*, p. 406, ll. 569-74: . . . sed opinandum est quod in anima sunt tres partes intellectus, quarum una est intellectus recipiens, secunda autem est efficiens, tertia autem factum. Et due istarum trium sunt eterne, scilicet agens et recipiens; tertia autem est generabilis et corruptibilis uno modo, eterna alio modo. *Loc. cit.*; p. 411, ll. 703-5: Et cum intellectus materialis fuerit copulatus secundum quod perficitur per intellectum agentem, tunc nos

sumus copulati cum intellectu agentis; . . . *Loc. cit.*, p. 404, l. 513—p. 405, l. 527: Et cum declaratum est ex predictis dubitationibus quod impossibile est ut intellectum copuletur cum unoquoque hominum et numeretur per numerationem eorum per partem quae est de eo quasi materia, scilicet intellectum materiale, remanet ut continuatio intellectuum cum nobis hominibus sit per continuationem intentionis intellecte cum nobis (et sunt intentiones ymagine), scilicet partis quae est in nobis de eis aliquo modo quasi forma.

<sup>51</sup> Dicamus igitur quod manifestum est quod homo non est intelligens in actu nisi propter continuationem intellecti cum eo in actu. Averroes, *loc. cit.*; p. 404, ll. 501-3.

<sup>52</sup> Et nullus modus est secundum quem generetur forma in nobis nisi iste. Quoniam cum intellecta speculative copulantur nobiscum per formas ymaginabiles, et intellectus agens copulatur cum intellectis speculativis (illud enim quod comprehendit ea est idem, scilicet intellectus materialis), necesse est ut intellectus agens copuletur nobiscum per continuationem intellectuum speculativorum. *Op. cit.*, t. c. 36; p. 500, ll. 591-7.

<sup>53</sup> . . . et est intellectus materialis cum fuerit acceptus simpliciter, non in respectu individui. Intellectus enim qui dicitur materialis, secundum quod diximus, non accidit ei ut quandoque intelligat et quandoque non nisi in respectu formarum ymaginationis existentium in unoquoque individuo, non in respectu speciei; v. 9. quod non accidit ei ut quandoque intelligat intellectum equi et quandoque non nisi in respectu Socratis et Platonis; simpliciter autem et respectu speciei semper intelligit hoc universale, nisi species humana deficiat omnino, quod est impossibile.—intellectus qui est in potentia, cum non fuerit acceptus



What we should now ask ourselves is this: what does the man whom Father de Mattos and others think of as *l'initiateur de la réforme thomiste* have to say about the three points he lists from the doctrine of Averroes? St. Albert seems to be a man of lasting loyalties. He is not one to part with a friend because of a slight difference in the number and location of agent intellects. Regarding those three points in Averroes' doctrine, St. Albert unhesitatingly admits that he will change only those points which are required to bring the doctrine in line with that of Aristotle. (*Nos autem in dictis istis nihil mutamus nisi hoc quod etiam Aristoteles mutasse videtur — intellectus agens sit pars et potentia animae*).<sup>54</sup>

Now St. Albert, while seeming to dismiss his difference with Averroes as inconsequential, holds for the agent intellect as a part and power of the soul. And since it is a part, Albert recognizes that it will always be joined to the soul as a part is joined to that of which it is a part. However, once that concession is made, St. Albert describes the nature and functioning of the agent intellect as if it were still subject to all the problems native to an Averroist separate agent intelligence.

Without developing here the ramifications of St. Albert's doctrine of the agent intellect, let us merely point out four areas where Albert feels he changes nothing in the position of Averroes. First, on the basis of Aristotle's position that an agent is more noble than the patient, Averroes comes to the conclusion that the agent intellect is of a greater dignity than the material intellect and therefore is of a higher degree of abstractness.<sup>55</sup> What Averroes was ascribing here to a separate agent intelligence, St. Albert applies to an agent intellect which is a part and a power of the soul. Likewise he maintains that it is more separate than the possible intellect.<sup>56</sup> It is notable that there is no problem regarding the relative degree of separateness of intellects in a philosophical position such as that of St. Thomas, where the agent and the possible intellect are separate in the same degree. They are equally separate because neither is the act of any corporal organ,<sup>57</sup> even though the intellect is the form of the body.

A second consequence of holding that the agent intellect, though part of the soul, is more separate than the possible intellect compels St. Albert to move along the path of the intrinsic necessities of Averroes' position, wherein the agent intellect is not a part of the soul. Thus St. Albert is forced to maintain, with Averroes, that since the separate is not conjoined unless there is a cause of its conjunction, a cause of the conjunction of the agent intellect with the possible intellect must be discovered. In this area, as in the others, Albert makes no furtive borrowings. With respect both to the mode as well as the cause of the *continuatio* or conjunction of the agent with the possible intellect, St. Albert

in respectu alicuius individui, sed fuerit acceptus simpliciter et in respectu cuiuslibet individui, tunc non inveniatur aliquando intelligens et aliquando non, sed semper inveniatur intelligens; quemadmodum intellectus agens, cum non fuerit acceptus in respectu alicuius individui, tunc non inveniatur quandoque intelligens et quandoque non intelligens, sed semper inveniatur intelligere cum acceptus fuerit simpliciter; idem enim est modus in actione duorum intellectuum. *Op. cit.*, t. c. 20; p. 448, l. 135-p. 449, l. 155.

<sup>54</sup> St. Albert, *De Anima* III, 3, 11; V. p. 385b-386a. This text is fully quoted in note 3 above.

<sup>55</sup> In the order of abstractness the material intellect is lower than that of the agent intellect, for Averroes. However Averroes points out that the material intellect is not different from the agent intellect except for this aspect of "undergoing" or of receptivity.

Cf. Averroes, *op. cit.*, III, t.c. 19; p. 442, l. 56: Et dixit: Agens enim semper est nobilior patiente. Idem, et iste semper est in sua substantia actio, et ille invenitur in utraque dispositione, et iam declaratum est proportio intellectus agentis ad intellectum patientem est sicut proportio principii moventis quoque modo ad materiam motam; agens autem semper est nobilior patiente, et principium nobilior materia. Et ideo opinandum est secundum Aristotelem quod ultimus intellectus abstractorum in ordine est iste intellectus materialis. Actio enim eius est diminuta ab actione illorum, cum actio eius magis videtur esse passio quam actio, non quia est aliud per quod differat iste intellectus ab intellectu agentis nisi per hanc intentionem tantum.

<sup>56</sup> St. Albert, *op. cit.*; V, p. 386a.

<sup>57</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, I, S.T. q. 79, a. 5, ad 1.

emphatically states that he is in total accord with Averroes. (*In causa autem quam inducimus et modo conveniemus in toto cum Averroee, etc.*).<sup>58</sup>

This total accord with Averroes, of which St. Albert speaks, may or may not be what Averroes himself understood as his own doctrine. To discover whether there is or is not such a total accord, we must try to see the doctrine of Averroes on these points as he himself saw it. We have already noted that, according to Averroes, an individual man is in possession of intellectual knowledge for this reason and for this reason alone—his individual soul is in contact with an intellect which is in act. This intellect in act is the separate agent intellect whose function it is to actualize its own potentiality, i.e. the *intellectus materialis* with which each soul has some continuity or contact (*continuatio*). This *continuatio* or conjunction occurs when the individual passive intellect, that is the imagination, is united with the agent intellect by means of the material (possible) intellect. Clearly *continuatio* is, within Averroes' philosophy, a real and a necessary problem. The modality and causality of the *continuatio*, as Averroes sees the problem, involve the intelligible, eternal forms, the *intellecta speculativa*.

It is important to realize how the *intellecta speculativa* are so involved. The agent intellect is as the form of the *intellecta speculativa* and they in turn are as matter. They are as matter because they need to be actualized in the material intellect. It is the light of the agent intellect which actualizes them, as a form actualizes its proper matter. Moreover, the agent intellect is as form since that through which or by means of which something performs its proper action is form. Now we individual humans perform our proper action when we generate the *intellecta speculativa* in us by means of the agent intellect, which actualizes them in us. Consequently, the agent intellect is, to that very necessary extent, united to us as form.<sup>59</sup> There is no other mode than this, Averroes maintains, by which the intelligible, eternal forms are generated in us. There is no other means than by the light of the agent intellect acting and actualizing, as a form, the *intellecta speculativa* in the material intellect conjoined to the imagination.

The cause of the agent intellect's contact or *continuatio* with the individual soul is, then, the forms in the material intellect, for the material intellect is the agent intellect's potentiality. Not being pure act, the agent intellect's potentiality (to intelligible forms) as particularized in human souls is the residence of the *intellecta speculativa in actu*. When the *intellecta speculativa* only existed in us in potency, the agent intellect was then conjoined to us only in potency. But when the *intellecta speculativa* exist in us in act, then the agent intellect is conjoined to us in act. For Averroes the *intellectus speculativus* is nothing but the perfection of the material intellect by the agent intellect. It is the material intellect in act, possessed of forms, possessed of the *intellecta speculativa*.<sup>60</sup> Since the agent intellect can only be conjoined *actually* to us through or by means of the *intellecta speculativa*, they are a cause of that conjunction.

This is the sequence of relations: (1) the *intellecta speculativa* in potency are conjoined with us through the forms of the imagination; (2) the *intellecta speculativa*, now actualized by the agent intellect, reside in the material intellect which in a sense is in us; (3) the agent intellect is conjoined with the material intellect and hence with all that is in it; (4) thus, through or by means of the

<sup>58</sup> St. Albert, *loc. cit.*; V. p. 386b.

<sup>59</sup> Averroes, *op. cit.*, III, l. c. 36; p. 499, l. 531-p. 500, l. 593: Quoniam hoc posito, continget necessario ut intellectus qui est in nobis in actu sit compositus ex intellectis qui speculativis et intellectu agenti ita quod intellectus agens sit quasi forma intellectuum speculativorum et intellecta speculativa sint quasi materia. Et per hunc modum poterimus generare intellecta cum voluerimus. Quoniam, quia illud per quod agit

aliquid suam propriam actionem est forma, nos autem agimus per intellectum agentem nostram actionem propriam, necesse est ut intellectus agens sit forma in nobis. Et nullus modus est secundum quem generetur forma in nobis nisi iste.

<sup>60</sup> . . . intellectus speculativus nichil aliud est nisi perfectio intellectus materialis per intellectum agentem. Averroes, *op. cit.*, III, p. 390, ll. 87-9.

contact of the agent intellect with the *intellecta speculativa*, which themselves are conjoined with us by means of the forms in the individual imagination, the agent intellect is thus joined to us, that is to each individual soul. It is conjoined as the efficient causal agent producing the forms in the imagination. It is likewise conjoined to us as form, for we humans perform our proper action, which is to generate the *intellecta* in us at our desire, by means of the agent intellect.<sup>61</sup>

I have set forth these aspects of Averroes' philosophy in order that we may observe the fidelity with which St. Albert transposes into his system the paraphernalia Averroes designed for a specific series of problems in his own philosophy. Albert can do this, not because he is an Averroist, which he is not, but because, in his philosophy, the soul, in itself a separate substance, is for all practical purposes by nature and operation most like a separate intelligence.<sup>62</sup>

St. Albert's fidelity to Averroes is notable here on the level of vocabulary and of the problems for which Averroes used that vocabulary. According to St. Albert the agent intellect is conjoined to us in three ways, although in itself and by its very essence it is separate. First, it is conjoined to us by nature, as a power of the soul. Secondly, it is conjoined to us as *efficiens* by producing the *intellecta speculata* in us. Albert is here, as he in effect tells us, a verbal echo of Averroes. Thirdly, even when these two types of conjunction are achieved, man is not perfect enough to perform what St. Albert calls an *opus divinum*, and consequently we must conclude that the agent intellect is conjoined to us as form. For St. Albert, echoing Averroes, the form is that through which or by means of which we perform the activity which is our proper activity in so far as we are men.<sup>63</sup> For Averroes man becomes like to God by somehow being, through knowledge, all things, that is, by acquiring all the *intellecta speculativa*. For St. Albert man becomes like to God by arriving at that intellectual eminence which is characterized by the acquisition of all the *intellecta speculata*. This is the activity which is proper to man as man. And since it is performed through conjunction with the agent intellect, the agent intellect, both for Averroes and St. Albert, is therefore conjoined to us as form.<sup>64</sup>

By a complicated verbal apparatus Averroes described his version of the causality of that conjunction. In brief, we saw a cause was the *intellecta speculativa*. St. Albert considered Averroes to be so correct on this point that he totally (*in toto*) agreed with him; namely that the medium or cause of the conjunction of the agent intellect to the possible intellect is the *intellecta speculata*.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>61</sup> Averroes, *op. cit.*, t. c. 18; p. 439, l. 76—p. 440, l. 85; p. 500, ll. 591-606.

<sup>62</sup> Haec igitur substantia habet quasdam virtutes ex ipsa fluentes quae sunt virtutes incorporeae; et hoc convenit ei ex hoc quod ipsa est inter omnes naturales formas propinquior et similior intelligentiae. St. Albert, *op. cit.*, III 2, 12; V p. 349b.

<sup>63</sup> Colligitur enim ex his, quod intellectus agens tribus modis conjungitur nobis, licet in se et secundum essentiam suam sit separat: a natura enim conjungitur ut potentia et virtus quaedam animae, sed faciendo intellecta speculata conjungitur ut efficiens; et ex his duabus conjunctionibus non est homo perfectus ut operetur opus divinum: tandem conjungitur ut forma, et causa conjunctionis ejus est intellectus speculativus: . . . St. Albert, *De Anima* III, 3, 11; *ibid.* p. 387a.

<sup>64</sup> The coincidences between St. Albert's *De Anima* III, 3, 11, and Averroes' *In Aristotelis De Anima* III, t. c. 36, are, as we implied above, in no sense merely figurative. In reference to these matters of the acquisition of all intelligible forms and the concurrent assimilation to God, cf. St. Albert,

*loc. cit.*; *ibid.*, p. 386b; p. 387b: . . . ei ideo in omnibus his accipit continue intellectus possibilis lumen agentis, et efficitur sibi similior de die in diem: et hoc vocatur a Philosophis moveri ad continuitatem et conjunctionem cum agente intellectu: et sic cum acceperit omnia intellecta, habet lumen agentis in formam sibi adhaerentem: . . . ; sic per eum enim homo fit similis quodammodo Deo, eo quod potest operari sic divina et largiri sibi et aliis intellectus divinos et accipere omnia intellecta quodammodo. Cf. Averroes, *op. cit.*, III t. c. 36; p. 500, ll. 601-6: Et cum omnia intellecta speculativa fuerint existentia in nobis in actu, erit ipse (intellectus agens) tunc copulatus nobis in actu. Et cum quaedam fuerint potentia et quaedam actu, tunc erit ipse copulatus secundum partem et secundum partem non; et tunc dicimur moveri ad continuationem. Also, Averroes, *loc. cit.*; p. 501 ll. 617-9: Homo igitur secundum hunc modum, ut dicit Themistius, assimilatur Deo in hoc quod est omnia entia quoque modo et sciens eo quoque modo; . . .

<sup>65</sup> Quod autem quaeritur, utrum intellecta maneant apud intellectum quando actu illa

We are not going to develop the thought of St. Albert on the diverse degrees of the intellect, as he variously adopts them from Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes. That is material for another article. But it will be seen that the soul, as described by St. Albert, is such that it is open to illumination by the Angelic substances and, of course, by God. The origin and appearance of the faculties of the soul so conceived is described at different times in different works as the result of diverse sets of principles. But the prime source of the faculties of the soul is the fact that it is an image of God (*imago Dei*). However, it was not of the *imago Dei* that Albert spoke when he elected to use Averroes on this philosophical problem. It was of the *imago intelligentiae separatae*.

A fourth area in which Albert shows the influence of Averroes is on the question of the origin of the agent and possible intellect. One of the reasons which St. Albert gives to prove the existence of both an agent intellect and a possible intellect in the human soul is the fact that, as Averroes says, in all separate intelligences there are these two intellects—in all, that is, except the First Cause. From Averroes Albert accepts the idea that it is proper to each separate intelligence to reflect intellectually upon itself. Such an activity could not happen, if there were only an agent intellect in each of them. Therefore, each separate intelligence must also have a receptive principle, a possible intellectual principle in its nature. Incorporeal substances have in their very nature that which is *agens universaliter* and that which is *possibile*, the agent and the possible intellects. After quoting Averroes on these points, it is worthwhile noting that St. Albert immediately adds: *therefore*, it must be said that the agent and the possible intellects are rooted in the soul. On this matter of the principles within incorporeal substances, St. Albert expresses his satisfaction with the position of Averroes: (*Et placet multum nobis hoc dictum Averrois etc.*).<sup>66</sup>

## IV.

The contrast between this method by which St. Albert arrives at the existence of an agent intellect and the method St. Thomas employs for the same purpose is as sharp as that between the basic positions in which each method is rooted. St. Thomas analyzes the proper object of human intellectual knowledge; such an object cannot be achieved except by a certain type of activity; such an activity can only be performed by a specific type of faculty;<sup>67</sup> and such a faculty can belong only to a certain type of soul, namely to an intellective soul, whose essence is to be the form of the body. Otherwise, intellection would not be the action of this individual man. The human intellective soul is, in St. Thomas' philosophy, such a substance-form that St. Thomas says of the intellect that it is the principle of intellectual operation and the form of the human body (*intellectus qui est intellectualis operationis principium sit humani corporis forma*).<sup>68</sup>

Such is the basic position of St. Thomas. It is in no way compatible with the basic position of his master, St. Albert. Nor did St. Albert, in contrast to some of his modern-day readers, ever think that it was. The basic position of St. Albert is (1) that the soul, while a form, is not a form by its essence, because from such a form there could never emerge a power which is not the act of a body, and (2) that whereas the soul is not essentially a form, it is in itself a

non considerat, sicut dicit Avicenna, per rationes superius inductas nos iudicamus esse verum: quia cum medium conjunctionis possibilis ad agentem sint speculata, oportet ipsa manere, aut extrema dividuntur: . . . St. Albert, *De Anima* III, 3, 11; V, p. 388a. See also note 62 above.

<sup>66</sup> Amplius autem in intelligentiis separatis sunt istae duae differentiae, sicut dixit Averroes et omnes alii Philosophi: quia nec aliter enumerari possunt, nec intelligibilia

habere, et non excipitur ab his duabus differentiis nisi sola prima causa quae nihil omnino intelligit extra seipsum. Dicendum igitur quod ista super duo radicantur in anima, quorum unum est sicut forma, et alterum sicut materia. St. Albert, *op. cit.*, III, 2, 18; *ibid.*, p. 365ab.

<sup>67</sup> St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* I, q. 79, a. 3, c., and *Questiones Disputatae de Anima*, q. 1, a. 4, c.

<sup>68</sup> St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I, q. 76, a. 1, c.

complete substance.<sup>69</sup> A soul, so conceived, cannot possibly have intellectual powers in any sense the same, except verbally, as that envisaged by St. Thomas.

Starting from basic positions so diametrically opposed, the intrinsic logic of philosophical ideas will never permit St. Albert and St. Thomas to maintain the same position on many dependent problems such as the nature of the agent and possible intellects, the proper object of the intellect, abstraction, illumination,<sup>70</sup> the soul's knowledge of itself, of Angels and of God, immortality. St. Albert the Great is not a *major Thomas*, nor even a *minor Thomas*. St. Thomas Aquinas is not a *major Albertus*, nor even a *minor Albertus*. Each is, philosophically, what he himself freely and deliberately chose to be. And each well knew what the other had chosen.

Nor is St. Albert an Averroist. For St. Albert was undeviating in holding for a personal intellectual soul possessed of its personal agent intellect and its personal possible intellect, and possessed likewise, of a personal immortality. That St. Albert borrowed copiously from Averroes is a fact which must be analyzed within the framework of each problem studied in his philosophy. That he did not

<sup>69</sup>Eodem modo dicendum est ad sequens, quod hoc omnino est verum de anima quae tantum est actus corporis, sed non de anima quae est actus et motor corporis ut nauta navis. Haec enim per substantiam et essentiam est extra corpus et distincta ab ipso, nec inest ei ut forma siue qualitas essentialis, sed inest ei ut influens ei potentias ad opera vitae, sicut nauta instrumentis navalibus potentias infundit ad opera nautica. St. Albert, *Summa Theologiae* II, tr. 12, q. 69, m.2, a. 2, ad 4; XXXIII, p. 166. St. Albert wrote his *Summa Theologiae* in 1274, a date when he could not have been ignorant of St. Thomas' position on the relation of the soul and body and the multiple aspects of the problem of knowledge. Certainly St. Thomas was one of those St. Albert was opposing in perhaps the most succinct expression of his own position. Written at the end of his life, this statement mirrors perfectly the stand St. Albert took in his first *Summa*. It was a stand from which he never wavered throughout his career. That text is as follows: Ad id quod ulterius quaeritur, dicendum quod bene data est definitio et convenit omni animae quae est actus corporis, et nihil habet nisi quod est actus corporis. Intellectus autem nullius corporis est actus: et propter hoc illi non convenit: et per consequens etiam substantiae animae rationalis non convenit. Quia impossibile est, quod a substantia quae tantum est actus corporis, fluat potentia quae nullius corporis est actus, cum potentia naturalis fluat de essentialibus substantiae illius cuius est potentia. Sed e converso a substantia separata quae motor est corporis, bene possunt fluere potentiae conjunctae corpori. Et huius ratio est: quia quidquid potest potentia inferior, potest superior excellenter, sed non e converso. St. Albert, *loc. cit.*, ad 10; *ibid.* p. 17 ab.

<sup>70</sup>It is not my purpose here to discuss at length what I will call the abstraction-illumination theory of St. Albert. However, it has been stated in a recent article that, for St. Albert, "Whether God is known through the things of nature, through grace or through glory, the intellect must be illuminated. It this illumination makes possible the knowledge of natural things through which God is known, it is a natural light which illuminates. (This light is given to the possible intellect and appears to be

the natural light of the agent intellect itself.)" By way of a conclusion, the author says: "There is no illumination theory on the natural level . . .". Rosemary Zita Lauer, 'St. Albert and the Theory of Abstraction', *The Thomist*, XVII (1954), 80-3. In the text of Albert from which Miss Lauer so concludes it seems evident, on the contrary, that St. Albert is saying that there is a natural light which is superimposed on the natural capacity of the agent intellect. It is superadded to that light which is the agent intellect's by its very nature. Cf. St. Albert, *Summa Theologiae* I, tr. 3, q. 16, m. 3, a. 3; XXXI, p. 110-111. It is Miss Lauer's contention that "if there were to be found anywhere in the writings of St. Albert any leaning toward an illumination theory of knowledge, certainly it would be found in the commentaries on Dionysius. It is impossible, however, to find any passage in these commentaries which is certainly indicative of a neo-Platonic or Augustinian theory of knowledge." R. J. Lauer, *art. cit.*, 80. Few statements could qualify as neo-Platonic so clearly as the following citation from St. Albert's Commentary on the *De Coelesti hierarchia* of Dionysius: Ad secundum dicendum quod cognitio hominis incipit a phantasmate, et terminatur ad intellectum: et secundum hanc viam potest etiam illuminari ab Angelis, cum non sufficiat ad abstractionem omnium specierum lumen intellectus agentis, nisi adjudgatur lumen angelicum vel divinum. St. Albert, *De Coelesti hierarchia*, cap. 9, 6, ad 2; XIV, p. 2383a. Finally, the problem of abstraction in St. Albert should never be discussed apart from his precise statement of position in the Commentary on the Sentences, P. I, d. 2, a. 3, sol.; XXV, p. 60a. In the solution Albert analyzes the required conditions for natural knowledge: a possible intellect, an agent intellect, objects to know and the principles of knowledge. Then he adds the key text, according to which all his other texts must be scrutinized: Unde quidam Philosophi dixerunt quod ista sufficient ad cognitionem veri quod est sub ratione. Sed aliter dicendum scilicet, quod lux intellectus agentis non sufficit per se, nisi per applicationem lucis increati, sicut applicatur radius solis ad radium stellae. St. Albert, *loc. cit.*

accept the basic Averroistic position is also a fact which is sometimes overlooked because of the subsidiary details which St. Albert did accept. The mere employment of Averroistic terminology does not make him an Averroist in any strict or proper sense of the term. Neither is he a Thomist merely because he employs verbal similarities and even verbal identities with St. Thomas. If St. Albert is *l'initiateur de la réforme thomiste* as Father de Mattos maintains, I submit that it is only as one whose peculiar and proximate position provided object material *on which* St. Thomas worked his *réforme thomiste*.

# Human Liberty and Free Will According to John Buridan

EDWARD J. MONAHAN

TO the majority of contemporary students of philosophy the name Buridan, if it signifies anything at all, brings to mind the tale of Buridan's ass and some connection more or less vague between it and a mediaeval doctrine of human liberty. To-day almost the sole reminder of the former greatness and widespread influence of John Buridan, Master of Arts in the University of Paris and twice Rector of the University,<sup>1</sup> is the story of the irresolute ass which, when placed equidistant from two bushels of oats of equal proportions, died of starvation in the midst of plenty from an inability to decide which one to eat. However, the justification for the linking of the reluctant ass with the name of Buridan is by no means clear, for neither the connection of Buridan with the story nor the proper meaning and significance of it has ever been established.

The legend has long been popularly associated with the name of Buridan by reason of its alleged relation to his doctrine of human liberty. But examination of all the known works of Buridan has failed to locate the story in his writings.<sup>2</sup> It has been variously suggested that the legend originated in a work of Buridan which is no longer extant; that it belongs to his oral tradition and never was recorded by him in writing; and even that the story is not Buridan's at all but an invention of his opponents intended to ridicule his doctrine of liberty.<sup>3</sup> Perhaps the truth of the matter may never be known. However, in the face of present uncertainties, it is well to point out, as did Schopenhauer as early as 1841, that the basic elements for the formulation of such a story are present in the *De Coelo* of Aristotle and were in fact so employed by Dante in his *Divine Comedy*, a work written immediately prior to the period of Buridan's writings.<sup>4</sup> Concomitant with the problem of the source of the legend of Buridan's ass is the enigma of its true meaning. Many different interpretations have been given it and probably the safest commentary on its meaning is one which admits that the tale is capable of varying, even contradictory, interpretations.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Tradition has designated Buridan, a secular priest, as a member of the Picard Nation of the University of Paris, born in Béthune in the diocese of Arras. Knowledge obtained from his writings, as well as from official university and papal documents, tends to corroborate this designation. The exact date of his birth is unknown. But the earliest document mentioning him, dated 1328, refers to him as the Rector of the University and from this the date of his birth has been fixed about 1290. Numerous documents of the next three decades testify to his high position and great renown, and in 1341 he is again Rector. The last recorded date in Buridan's life is July 12, 1358, and it is probable that he died later that same year. For the most complete biography of Buridan to date, see the work of Edmond Faral, 'Jean Buridan,' *Histoire Littéraire de la France*, XXXVIII (1948), 462-92. This work is also published separately under the title, *Jean Buridan, maître de l'Université de Paris* (Paris, 1950).

<sup>2</sup> For the results of an exhaustive but unsuccessful examination of Buridan's writings in search of this example, see Pierre Duhem, *Études sur Léonard de Vinci* (3<sup>e</sup> série, Paris, 1913), pp. 16-21.

<sup>3</sup> See M. De Wulf, *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale* III (6<sup>e</sup> éd., Louvain, Paris, 1937), p. 131; E. Faral, *art. cit.*, 491.

<sup>4</sup> A. Schopenhauer, *Preisschrift über die Freiheit des Willens* III; ed. A. Weichert *Samtliche Werke* V, (Berlin, 1847), pp. 225-6. See Aristotle, *De Coelo* II, 13, 259b29-35; Dante, *Divina Comedia*, *Paradiso* IV, ll. 1-3.

<sup>5</sup> Spinoza, *Ethica*, Pars II, Prop. XLIX, Scholium; ed. Van Vloten et Land, *Opera I* (Hagae Comitum, 1882), p. 120; 122, treats the example as an argument cited by the indeterminists in favour of human liberty, introducing it as an objection against his own theory of determinism. Leibniz, *Théodicée*, Pt. I, 49; ed. J. E. Erdmann, *Opera Philosophica I* (Berolini, 1840), p. 517, dismisses the example as something impossible of occurrence in nature. But he uses it to distinguish brute animals, which are thus determined, from man, who is self-determining and free. Pierre Bayle, *Dictionnaire historique et critique* IV (11<sup>e</sup> éd., Paris, 1820), pp. 260-2, declares his uncertainty as to the meaning of the tale, even suggesting that Buridan may have invented it as a sophism, something which could not be resolved without embarrassment either by the determinists or by the indeterminists.

While neither the problem of the source of the legend of Buridan's ass nor the problem of its real meaning is at present susceptible of definitive solution, both provide incentive to the study of Buridan's doctrine of liberty, a study of importance for the understanding of the history of this problem in late mediaeval philosophy. Although such questions have long invited a careful examination of Buridan's doctrine of liberty, little has been done to date. Moreover, what research has been done leads to conflicting interpretations of the doctrine. Edmond Faral, the author of the most complete work on Buridan at present available, states that Buridan's doctrine of liberty is inconsistent.<sup>6</sup> According to M. De Wulf, Buridan is a partisan of psychological determinism, a determinism which is rationally irrefutable and which can only be objected to on the grounds that it is not reconcilable with the Catholic faith.<sup>7</sup> In the eyes of Father Konstanty Michalski, whose writings on fourteenth-century philosophy are a major source for current knowledge of Buridan, Buridan is a fideist in his views on liberty, a thinker who transfers the problem of liberty from the domain of philosophy to that of faith.<sup>8</sup>

The present study, based upon Buridan's texts with special attention devoted to the *Quaestiones super decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nichomachum*,<sup>9</sup> indicates the necessity for some revision in these interpretations of Buridan's doctrine of liberty. It proposes to establish the consistency of Buridan's doctrine and to mitigate the judgment on his determinism, while reaffirming his fideism or philosophical skepticism.

#### I. THE WILL AS AN ACTIVE PRINCIPLE

Buridan's concern with the problem of human liberty is with the purely Buridan's term for this is *libertas oppositionis* or *libertas contradictionis*. According nature and with the exercise of liberty within the human act. His first task is to show that the human will is free. Hence, at the beginning of his formal treatment of the problem of human liberty in his *Ethics* Buridan asks whether it is possible, all other factors remaining constant, for the will to be determined now to one thing and now to another.<sup>10</sup> Buridan's affirmative answer to this question provides him with the starting point of his whole doctrine of liberty.

It should be noted that the liberty here under discussion is liberty of choice. Buridan's term for this is *libertas oppositionis* or *libertas contradictionis*. According to him, an agent possessing such liberty is able to act in contrary ways: to act by itself to cause one thing, not to cause it, or to cause its opposite. Such an agent is not necessitated by anything, save itself, to cause whatever it causes.<sup>11</sup>

It has even been proposed, *Larousse du XX<sup>e</sup> Siècle* I (Paris, 1928), p. 914, that the example was used by Buridan to demonstrate his liberty of indifference which even the ass possesses, since it would not permit itself to perish.

<sup>6</sup> E. Faral, *art. cit.*, 491-2.

<sup>7</sup> M. De Wulf, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

<sup>8</sup> Konstanty Michalski, 'La Problème de la volonté à Oxford et à Paris au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle,' *Commentarium Societatis Philosophorum Polonorum* II (Lemberg, 1937), 312-3; 325.

<sup>9</sup> The edition used in this study is that of Wolfgang Hopyl, dated Paris, July 14, 1489, because it is the earliest printed text. In order to provide a more accurate text, two manuscripts were obtained: *Ms. Mazarine* 3515 (unnumbered folio) *M*, and *Bibliothèque nationale* lat. 16129 (folio 1-248) *N*, and the text appearing in the notes is corrected in accordance with the readings of these two manuscripts. The work itself is unfinished,

terminating abruptly at the end of Question 5 of Book X. For this reason it is judged to be Buridan's final work and to have been left unfinished due to his death. Despite several vexing literary problems, at present unsolved, there is no question of its authenticity. For a discussion of these problems, see E. Faral, *art. cit.*, 577 ff. For an extensive list of the extant manuscripts and four printed editions of this work, see E. Faral, *ibid.*, and 'Jean Buridan, notes sur les manuscrits, les éditions et le contenu de ses ouvrages,' *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, XV (1946), 40-2.

<sup>10</sup> Buridan, *Ethics* III, 1; *ed. cit.*, fol. 46<sup>v</sup>. Circa tertium librum *Ethicorum* primo quaeritur: Utrum sit possibile quod voluntas, omnibus eodem modo se habentibus, determinetur aliquando ad unum oppositum aliquando ad aliud.

<sup>11</sup> *Op. cit.*, X, 2; fol. 255<sup>v</sup>. Sed libertate oppositionis agens dicitur agere libere, quia



Buridan acknowledges that the human will does not possess this kind of liberty with respect to its ultimate end. If, he says, the ultimate end were presented to the will under the aspect of universal good and with no semblance of evil attached to it, then the will would be inclined to it necessarily by nature and would will it.<sup>22</sup> Also, he maintains that the will is by nature directed to good and away from evil, and that it wills whatever it wills under the aspect of good.<sup>23</sup>

With respect to particular goods, however, Buridan holds that the will is free. Using the example of alternate routes for a proposed journey from Paris to Avignon, Buridan affirms a three-fold liberty of choice on the part of the will: the will is free to accept either route, to reject each route because of the hardships involved and abandon the original intention to make the journey, or to withhold its decision until reason has investigated further and decided which is the better route to take.<sup>24</sup>

For Buridan, the existence of such *libertas oppositionis* is plain from experience. Moreover, he argues that unless man were able freely to determine his actions none of them could be imputed to him and hence he could neither gain merit from them nor be culpable of them.<sup>25</sup> Each of these arguments is significant in its own way in helping to point out the real foundation of Buridan's doctrine. Recourse to experience to justify his position in this context is testimony to Buridan's acknowledged inability to demonstrate his conclusion. Such an argument from experience, in which experience signifies common opinion having a high degree of probability, is employed when apodictic proof is not considered possible. Recourse to experience in this way was a common practice among the *Nominales*, with whom Buridan must be ranked, and a parallel argument is to be found employed in the same context by William of Ockham.<sup>26</sup>

Buridan's argument based upon merit and culpability is also significant. For him it is the fact of man's responsibility for his actions which is the primary, if not the sole, reason in support of human liberty of choice. Were it not, he says, for the fact that man is responsible for his actions, he would not be any more free than are the brute animals.<sup>27</sup> It seems to be this preeminently ethical

cum agit aliquid non praenecessatur ad agendum illud per quodcumque aliud vel aliorum quorumcumque concursu sed, omnibus entibus eodem modo se habentibus sicut se habent quando incipit agere propter se ipsammet actionem et sic manentibus, possibile est ipsum non agere aut forte oppositum agere. Cf. also, *infra*, note 26; Buridan, *Quaestiones super octo libros Politicorum Aristotelis* VII, 6; ed. J. Petit (Paris, 1530), fol. 98<sup>rb</sup>.

<sup>22</sup> *Op. cit.*, III, 1; fol. 46<sup>va</sup>. Consideretur si ultimus finis sub ratione suae universalis bonitatis absque omni mali apparitione praesentatus fuerit voluntati quod ipsa voluntas per suam naturam necessario inclinatur in ipsum et velit ipsum.

<sup>23</sup> III, 4; fol. 54<sup>rb</sup>. Impossibile est voluntatem ferri in malum praesentatum sub ratione mali, quia objectum eius est bonum verum et apparens. Cf. also, III, 1; fol. 46<sup>rb</sup>.

<sup>24</sup> III, 1; fol. 46<sup>ra</sup>-b. Possibile est respectu ejusdem finis voliti duo vel plura esse media per quae finis potest attingi, impossibilia tamen: verbi gratia, quod de Parisius ad Avinionem possum ire vel per Lugdunum vel per Duonem quorum utrumque praesentatur voluntati sub ratione boni. Et voluntas quodcumque bonum sibi sub rationem boni praesentatum acceptare potest et non potest illa duo simul acceptare propter impossibilitatem. Ideo . . . voluntas,

absque alio quocumque determinante ipsam praeter ea quae dicta sunt, potest libere utramque viam refutare propter laborem, immo etiam totaliter ab eo discedere quod prius volebat, vel potest libere quamlibet viam acceptare, scilicet hanc vel illam, vel etiam potest hanc omnem determinationem in suspensio tenere donec ratio docuerit vel determinaverit quae melior et quae pejor sit.

<sup>25</sup> III, 1; fol. 46<sup>rb</sup>. Ista autem positio videtur primo patere per experientiam. . . . Item, si rebus stantibus ut nunc voluntas mea est determinata ad velle legere ita quod non possit nolle legere rebus sic stantibus, sequitur quod ex tali lectura nullo sum merito dignus. Et ita diceretur quod propter nullos actus vitiosos homo esset culpabilis, quia res sic stantibus oportet ipsum agere et non est in sui dominio non agere.

<sup>26</sup> William of Ockham, *Quodlibeta* I, 16; ed. Georg Husner (Argentine, 1491) unnumbered folio. On the matter of Buridan's Nominalism, see *infra*, note 74.

<sup>27</sup> X, 2; fol. 257<sup>rb</sup>-va. Si essemus in omnibus actibus nostris necessario praedeterminati, illi non essent nobis imputabiles ad meritum vel demeritum; quod non solum fidei nostrae sed etiam scientiis et principiis moralibus repugnat. Ideo illam libertatem nobis non attribuius plusquam brutis nisi ad salvan-

consideration, rather than anything based upon metaphysics or psychology, which causes Buridan to defend human liberty.

Buridan stands firmly opposed to determinism, but the basis for his certitude in this matter is not philosophical. He indicates that he is under no illusions concerning the ultimate conclusion of the deterministic arguments, stating that the only alternative to maintaining the free self-determination of the will is to hold that everything happens from necessity.<sup>18</sup> And such determinism he absolutely rejects as being contrary both to Aristotle and to the Parisian Condemnation of 1277.<sup>19</sup>

Yet, the real basis for Buridan's rejection of determinism lies in his religious faith and not in any philosophically demonstrable argument. He maintains with great conviction that the human will is free and that, all other factors remaining constant, the will has power over opposite acts. But he bases the certitude of this conclusion upon the tenets of faith rather than upon the results of philosophical speculation, thereby earning the designation of philosophical skeptic. Buridan cautions against rejection of a commonly held doctrine because of arguments against it which seem insoluble, particularly if the matter is one concerning faith or morals. And he justifies his recourse to faith in the matter of human free choice by arguing that so lofty a matter is beyond the scope of human reason, and thus it should not be surprising that rational arguments in favour of the position are not sufficient to demand assent.<sup>20</sup> This does not mean, however, that Buridan opposes faith and reason, but only that he considers reason insufficient either to demonstrate or to disprove the fact of human liberty of choice. Rational arguments both pro and con he considers to be merely probable.<sup>21</sup> Yet he is in favour of using such rational arguments as can be mustered in support of the doctrine, even though they are not conclusive. For they are a means of countering opposing rational arguments and of providing an occasion for the discovery of truth.<sup>22</sup>

This philosophical skepticism of Buridan in the matter of human free choice is plain from several texts. In Book III of the *Ethics* he states that he "firmly and absolutely believes" that the will determines itself freely and then goes on to say that rational arguments for this conclusion are not conclusive.<sup>23</sup> Later in this same work he again acknowledges his position, saying that there are few arguments opposing the necessitarian position that all things occur from necessity

dum quod bene vel male, meritorie vel demeritorie, et imputabiliter agamus. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Q. D. De Malo* VI, 1, Respondeo.

<sup>18</sup> III, 1; fol. 47<sup>ra</sup>. Vel oportet concedere quod ex praeexistentia rerum necessitati sumus ad volendum quaecumque volumus et necessitabimur ad volendum quaecumque volumus; quod concedere videtur incongruum et iniquum, vel oportet concedere quod, omnibus aliis eodem modo se habentibus, voluntas potest se determinare ad utrumque oppositum. Immo quod plus est, si non esset ita, videretur sequi quod omnia de necessitate evenirent.

<sup>19</sup> III, 1; fol. 47<sup>ra-b</sup>. See Aristotle, *Perihermeneias* I, 12, 21b11-15; *Meta.* VI, 3, 1027a30. *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* I, p. 545, n. 473.

<sup>20</sup> III, 1; fol. 48<sup>ra</sup>. Et ideo simpliciter et firmiter volo credere fide una cum aliqua experientia ex dictis sanctorum et philosophorum huic credulitate concordantibus et firmiter adhaerentibus quod voluntas, ceteris omnibus eodem modo se habentibus, potest in actus oppositos, sicut dicebatur prius. Et nullus debet de via communi re-

cedere propter rationes sibi insolubiles, specialiter in his quae fidem tangere possunt aut mores. Qui enim credit omnia scire et in nulla opinionum suarum decipi fatuus est. De festuca enim tibi sensibiliter praesentata formabuntur centum rationes vel quaestiones de quibus contrarie sapientissimi doctores opinabuntur, propter quod in qualibet harum deceptus erit alter ipsorum vel ambo. Ideo, non miror si in hoc altissima materia non possum per rationes et solutiones satisfacere mihi ipsi. Cf. also, *infra*, notes 24 and 25.

<sup>21</sup> Buridan, *Quaestiones in libris Aristotelis Metaphysicorum* VI, 5; ed. 1518, fol. 36<sup>ra</sup>. Nunc ergo, quia opinio [quod voluntas non est liberal] apparet esse contra Aristotelem, immo etiam contra fidem catholicam, videndum est quomodo possemus <evadere> sic opinantes et quomodo disputative possunt se defendere. *Evadere* is an emendation of the text *invadere*.

<sup>22</sup> *Ethics* III, 1; fol. 48<sup>ra</sup>. Expedit tamen ut consideremus qualiter possint rationes ad oppositum aliqualem evitari, . . . ut haec sit occasio ad inveniendum veritatem.

<sup>23</sup> See *supra*, note 20.

in men as well as in brute animals except those derived from the Catholic faith.<sup>24</sup> And in his earlier *Metaphysics*, Buridan concedes the same point. After distinguishing the rational from the sense appetite on the basis of the will's liberty of choice, he states that human liberty ought to be believed rather than held by reason, because it is not possible easily to demonstrate the difference between the free rational appetite and the wholly determined sense appetite.<sup>25</sup> Evidently then, Buridan is quite frank in the admission of his inability rationally to demonstrate human liberty.

While Buridan does not consider the will's liberty of choice capable of rational demonstration, he is vigorous and unequivocal in his defense of its reality. He maintains that man has power to perform opposite acts and that it is the will which is the active principle of these actions over which man is the master. But again, although its meaning is clear, his conclusion is prefaced by the significant "I believe," indicating that its basis is faith and not reason.<sup>26</sup> Indeed, Buridan is ever careful to preserve the will's liberty of self-determination in the act of choice against all possible infringements, stating that the will is not moved by necessity to will either by the object which is known, or by the act of knowing itself, or by the species of the object existing either in the intellect or in the will.<sup>27</sup> Liberty of choice belongs to man in so far as his will is an active principle able freely to determine itself to contraries.

## II. THE WILL AS A PASSIVE PRINCIPLE

Although Buridan grounds human liberty upon the free self-determination of the will, he does not consider the will to be solely an active power. He holds that the human soul by itself is not the sufficient active or passive principle of either intellection or volition. The first act of both intellect and will, he says, requires an object and subsequent acts require the first. Therefore, he concludes that intellect and will are both passive in some respect, in so far as each is receptive of an act; and then they are active, in so far as they are the active principles of their own proper acts.<sup>28</sup> Just as the intellect needs to be informed by the proper intelligible species before being able itself to proceed to the act

<sup>24</sup> X, 2; fol. 257<sup>rb</sup>-7<sup>a</sup>. Secundo, etiam suppono quod ex dictis aliqui sumpserunt opinionem quod ita in nobis omnia pervenirent ex praedeterminationibus sicut et in brutis, quia sicut de cane dicimus sic de nobis dicere possumus. Et ad hujusmodi opinionis reprobationem parvas rationes habemus nisi ex fide nostra catholica.

This important text has been frequently cited by modern commentators on Buridan (cf. Michalski, *art. cit.*, p. 323; De Wulf, *op. cit.*, p. 131), but with one major difference. The text as cited by these authors reads as follows: Et ad hujusmodi reprobationem nullas rationes habemus . . . All of the manuscripts consulted by me on this point (ed. Hopyl; Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 16128; 17831; and Mazarine 3515) clearly read *parvas* and not *nullas*. While certainty on the problem must await a critical edition of the text, this reading seems to be the correct one.

<sup>25</sup> *Quaestiones in Aristotelis libris Metaphysicorum* IX, 4; ed. 1518, fol. 58<sup>rb</sup>. Et sic, ut mihi videtur, magis fidei credendum est quam rationi naturali quod ista differentia libertatis et non-libertatis est inter voluntatem nostram et appetitum sensitivum canis, quia non esset bene facilliter possibile demonstrare quod voluntas nostra sit omnino indifferens et quod sine alio se magis determinare ad hoc vel ad illud quam appe-

titus ipsius canis.

<sup>26</sup> III, 2; fol. 48<sup>rb</sup>. Credo quod voluntas sit activa illorum quorum nos primo domini sumus et quod, ceteris omnibus eodem modo se habentibus, nos possumus in utrumque oppositorum, quoniam nulla videtur potentia animae quae sit magis libera et magis domina suorum actuum libertate et dominio oppositionis vel contradictionis, scilicet quibus possumus in opposita, quam voluntas. Sed libertas et dominium magis videtur attribuenda agenti quam patienti.

<sup>27</sup> III, 2; fol. 49<sup>rb</sup>. Et ita potest argui de retentione objecti et de omni actu modo eodem modo argueretur contra quoscunque qui dicerent quod objectum ut intellectum aut actus intelligendi vel species objecti existens in intellectu vel in voluntate aut intellectus informatus intellectione aut specie intelligibili moverent necessario voluntatem ad volendum. Ideo tales opiniones dimittuntur.

<sup>28</sup> III, 2; fol. 51<sup>rb</sup>. In substantia enim animae nostrae non est sufficiens passivum intellectionis et volitionis, cum ad primos actus requiratur objectum et ad posteriores actus requirantur primi necessario, nam necessario requisita ad actus primos et actus primi necessarii ad posteriores habent se ad actus illos quibus sunt necessarii vel passive vel active, aut principaliter aut dispositive.

of knowing, says Buridan, so too the will must be informed by a prior judgment of the intellect on the object before proceeding to the act of volition proper.<sup>29</sup> Buridan rejects the position that the will is a wholly active power. He maintains that the object must first be known in order to be willed and that such knowledge acts to help produce the act of volition.<sup>30</sup>

According to Buridan, the will must be acted upon by the object prior to volition proper and this action produces a necessary first act in the will itself. Informed by the intellect's judgment on the goodness or badness of the object to be willed, the will takes a certain pleasure or displeasure in the object. And this act of pleasure or displeasure is, in a certain way, an act of the will.<sup>31</sup> It is by means of this first act of the will that the will is then able to accept or to reject the object.<sup>32</sup> This second act, that of acceptance or rejection, is the act of volition proper, the act which is under the full control of the will.<sup>33</sup> For Buridan the will does not have control over its first act; it is wholly governed in this act by the intellect's judgment on the object. If the intellect presents the object to the will as good, then necessarily and immediately an act of pleasure is caused in the will; and if the object is presented to the will by the intellect as evil, an act of displeasure results.<sup>34</sup>

Against this doctrine of the will's necessary pleasure or displeasure in the object presented to it by the intellect, it is argued that such a position destroys the liberty of the will by destroying the will's mastery over its own acts. But Buridan denies the validity of this argument. He agrees that liberty belongs to an active principle as active; and yet he does not consider it unfitting or incompatible with this liberty that the will should be acted upon in its first act because, he says, the will still remains the master of its second act—the act of acceptance or rejection—and this is the act of volition proper. Merit or sin, therefore, are not attached to the acts of pleasure or displeasure—the first acts of the will—because these are necessary, but rather to the acts of acceptance or rejection, the second acts.<sup>35</sup>

This doctrine of the will's necessary pleasure or displeasure in the object,

<sup>29</sup> III, 3; fol. 52<sup>vb</sup>. Sicut oportet in intellectu tales species intelligibiles esse praevias actui intelligendi, ita est in voluntate; statim enim objecto voluntati praesentato species in ipsa imprimatur necessario praevia actui volendi vel nolendi.

<sup>30</sup> III, 2; fol. 51<sup>rb</sup>. Potest ergo dici ad dubitationem principalem quod voluntas sic in omni actu volendi patitur ab objecto, quia objectum oportet esse cognitum. Ejus autem cognitio agit ad actum volendi et aliquo modo immediate vel mediate agebatur ab aliquo exteriori objecto.

<sup>31</sup> III, 3; fol. 52<sup>rb</sup>-53<sup>ra</sup>. Sed si posuerimus, ut in sexto libro videbitur (VI, 3; fol. 149<sup>rb</sup>), quod intellectus et voluntas non sint ab invicem et ab anima diversae res, non videtur quod ad inclinationem voluntatis vel saltem ad ejus complacentiam in objecto alia ex parte objecti requiratur species aut representatio quam species objecti et iudicium de bonitate vel malitia rei volibilis in intellectu existens. Non enim esset grave dicere, sicut anima informata specie intelligibili potest transire in actum intelligendi sicut prius dictum fuit, quod ipsa ita informata iudicio de bonitate et malitia rei volibilis potest transire in objecti complacentiam quamdam vel displicentiam, quae iam videtur quidam actus voluntatis.

<sup>32</sup> See *infra*, note 36.

<sup>33</sup> III, 3; fol. 54<sup>ra</sup>. Actus simplicis compla-

centiae vel displicentiae non est actus volendi aut nolendi proprie, sed nolle aut velle, acceptare aut refutare.

<sup>34</sup> III, 3; fol. 53<sup>ra</sup>. Modo igitur diceretur quod si objectum fuerit voluntati praesentatum sub ratione boni, tunc statim causabitur necessario in ipsa voluntate dictus actus complacentiae. Et si fuerit sibi praesentatum sub ratione mali causabitur actus dictus displicentiae. Et si praesentatur simul sub ratione boni et mali causabuntur in ea simul utrique actus, scilicet complacentia in objecto illo et displicentia.

<sup>35</sup> III, 3; fol. 53<sup>rb</sup>-54<sup>ra</sup>. Cum igitur dictum fuerit prius quod voluntas non est actus sui primi actus sed passiva tantum et quod libertas non est conveniens passivo in quantum passivum est sed potius activo in quantum activum, non videtur inconveniens concedere quod voluntas non sit libera sive domina sui primi actus ita scilicet quod, ceteris eodem modo se habentibus sive existentibus, ipsa possit in ipsum et ipsius oppositum; sed ipsa libere est domina suae acceptationis aut refutationis consequentis. Et hoc sufficienter videtur, videlicet, quod voluntas sit illorum actuum domina in quibus existit meritum vel peccatum. Modo videtur quod in complacentia vel displicentia praedictis nec mereamur nec peccemus, sed in objecti totius acceptatione aut refutatione.

prior to and prerequisite for the act of volition proper, is a very significant element in Buridan's doctrine of human liberty. For it is the means by which he is able to maintain the essential liberty of the will's activity, while at the same time allowing room for it to be acted upon by the appetible object. Buridan acknowledges that the arguments in favour of such a position are only probable and his first argument in favour of it is the argument from experience.<sup>35</sup> However, there are several other arguments advanced by him in favour of this position—arguments that are significant not for their scientific nature, but rather for the insights they yield into the meaning of his doctrine.

One of these is based upon the purpose of liberty. Buridan affirms that *libertas oppositionis* has been given to man for the purpose of directing his life and of aiding him in the attainment of perfection. Because there are many things in man's life which *prima facie* appear to be good, but which in fact have hidden evils attached to them or consequent upon them, and many other things which appear to be bad but which are really good, it would be unfitting, perhaps even damnable, for man to accept what first appears to him to be good and reject what first appears evil.<sup>37</sup> Liberty of opposition has been given to man in order that he might avoid such unfortunate results. It has been given to man so that, prior to the acceptance or rejection of any object which appears good or evil, he might make enquiry concerning the totality of the goodness or evil belonging to the object, in order that he might finally choose that which is really the better and reject that which is the worse.<sup>38</sup> Buridan holds that such a purpose would be destroyed unless there was a necessary pleasure or displeasure first aroused in the will. For, he says, unless there were such a first act, there would be nothing to stimulate the will to enquire further concerning whether to accept or to reject the object presented; and this would have unfortunate results, because then man might never accept what is really good and reject what is evil.<sup>39</sup>

According to Buridan, then, man possesses liberty of choice (*libertas oppositionis*) because of two factors: the will's absolute determination to the ultimate good as such and consequent freedom with respect to all particular goods and, more significantly, the will's inability to distinguish real from apparent good. These two factors govern Buridan's conclusions on the limitations of human liberty of choice.

<sup>35</sup> III, 3; fol. 53<sup>ra</sup>-v<sup>o</sup>. Aliqui dicunt probabiliter sicut mihi videtur quod . . . iudicium vel anima informata iudicio de bonitate vel malitia objecti primo generat in ipsa voluntate complacentiam quamdam in objecto vel displicentiam in objecto, mediantibus quibus ipsa voluntas acceptare potest objectum vel refutare; . . . Quilibet homo experiri potest in se ipso. Multos namque video cum in aliquo turpi opere sibi ratio aliqua bonitatis apparuerit propter delectationem dicentes, "O utinam hoc esset tantae honestatis quantae est turpitudinis." Hoc autem non dicunt nisi propter complacentiam in apparenti delectatione et displicentiam in turpitudine.

Although Buridan expresses this as the position of "some men" it is really his own doctrine. This is a common practice with him in the *Ethics*, being part of his aim to present his doctrine as common and traditional. Cf. *infra*, note 65.

<sup>37</sup> III, 3; fol. 53<sup>ra</sup>-54<sup>ra</sup>. Alia igitur ratio videtur mihi probabilis, quae est: Si objectum sub ratione boni apprehensum fuerit et voluntas ex sua libertate posset in ea nullam habere complacentiam, sequeretur quod illa libertas non esset nobis auxilium sed potius magnum detrimentum . . . Ad cuius evidentiam est sciendum quod libertas secundum quam voluntas potest non accep-

tare quod sibi praesentatum est sub ratione boni vel non refutare quod praesentatum est sub ratione mali prodest valde nobis ad vitae directionem pro tanto, quia in multis in quibus prima facie sunt aliquae rationes bonitatis apparentes latent saepe multae malitiae vel annexae vel consequentes, propter quod acceptare illud quod apparet bonum esset nobis inconveniens et damnosum. Et sic etiam quod prima facie videtur esse malum habet aliquam bonitatem multam latentem, propter quod refutasse illud esset nobis malum.

<sup>38</sup> III, 3; fol. 53<sup>ra</sup>. Sed tamen illa potestas non acceptandi vel non refutandi . . . nobis prodest ut ante objecti acceptationem vel refutationem inquiramus de omni bonitate vel malitia quae illud objectum consequitur vel ei annectitur, ut tandem quod est melius simpliciter acceptemus et quod est peius simpliciter refutemus.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, loc. cit. Haec utilitas auferretur tota si voluntas in apparenti bono nullam haberet complacentiam vel in apparenti malo displicentiam. Ad quid enim ipsa imperaret de ampliori inquisitione circa tale objectum? Manifestum est quod totus noster impetus auferretur ad consiliandum de acceptandis aut refutandis, quod esset nobis damnosum valde.

## III. THE EXTENT OF THE WILL'S LIBERTY OF CHOICE

As previously noted, Buridan holds that the will is directed necessarily to the absolute good as such, and also that it wills whatever it wills under the aspect of good. However, two important considerations regarding the extent of the will's liberty of choice arise. These are the problem of the will's liberty to choose the lesser of two goods and the problem of the role of the intellectual judgment in governing the will's choice.<sup>40</sup>

In his discussion of the first problem Buridan considers two opposing positions before expressing his own. Some, he records, maintain that the will is free to choose the lesser of two goods, even after the intellect has taken all the factors into account and has judged it to be the lesser good.<sup>41</sup> Directly opposed to this is the position of those who maintain that the will must always choose the greater good. Defenders of this view argue that the will must always act in accordance with the judgment of the intellect, that the intellect would never judge that what it knows to be a lesser good should be sought while a greater good is dismissed, and hence that the will can never choose the lesser of two goods.<sup>42</sup>

Buridan's own position lies midway between these two. Against the second position, which he considers determinism, he argues that the intellect might present two impossible goods to the will, each of which has been judged conducive to the end willed. This fulfills the requirement of the intellect's prior judgment, but the will is still not necessitated to choose either one.<sup>43</sup> The first position, argues Buridan, is against the nature of the will. The object of the will is the good, whether real or apparent. But in this instance the lesser good is presented to the will as evil, in so far as it is compared unfavourably with the greater good. Hence the will cannot will it. Moreover, returning to his earlier statement concerning the purpose of liberty of choice, Buridan argues that this purpose would be vitiated if the will could choose the lesser good as such. For if the will were able so to choose, this power would come to it from its liberty of choice. But such a power would be incompatible with the purpose of this liberty, which is to enable man to do good and not evil.<sup>44</sup>

Buridan's own position, a compromise between these two, is stated in the form of three conclusions. First, the will cannot will (*non posse velle*) the lesser good

<sup>40</sup> III, 4; fol. 54<sup>rb</sup>. *Utrum propositis duobus per rationem, majori bono et minori bono, impossibilibus voluntas dimisso majori bono possit velle minus bonum.* III, 5; fol. 55<sup>va</sup>. *Utrum voluntas possit velle contra vel praeter iudicium rationis.*

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*; loc. cit. *Dicunt aliqui quod duobus bonis impossibilibus praesentatis per intellectum ipsi voluntati et stante iudicio rationis in universali et particulari quod unum est altero majus bonum, tamen voluntas tunc et pro tunc potest velle et acceptare minus bonum et dimittere majus bonum.*

<sup>42</sup> III, 4; fol. 54<sup>va-b</sup>. *Item, alii arguunt sic: Sicut voluntas nihil potest velle absolute nisi sit apprehensum, ipsa nihil potest prosequi vel fugere nisi iudicatum fuerit esse prosequendum vel fugiendum, quia non solum voluntas vel appetitus sed etiam intellectus movet ad prosecutionem vel fugam, tertio *De Anima* (III, 10, 433a18). Modo intellectus numquam iudicaret illud esse prosequendum quod scit esse minus bonum et hoc dimittendo majus bonum. Igitur, etc.*

<sup>43</sup> III, 4; fol. 54<sup>va</sup>. *Sed ad hoc responderetur quod intellectus potuit praesentare de fine quod est prosequendum, virtute cujus sententiae voluntas non solum in finis illius prosecutionem inclinari potest sed etiam in omne medium quod iudicatum*

*fuerit valere ad illam finem. Modo ambo bona impossibilia potuerunt voluntas ad hoc quod tendat in quolibet illorum mediorum non indiget alio praevio iudicio.*

<sup>44</sup> III, 4; fol. 54<sup>rb</sup>-55<sup>ra</sup>. *Item, si voluntas potest velle minus bonum hoc proveniret sibi ex sua libertate, quia si non esset libera tunc fortius objectum semper devinceret debilius objectum vel saltem non devinceretur ab objecto debiliore. Sed ex sua libertate non potest habere quod posset velle minus bonum. Probatur, quia illa libertas oppositionis quam habet voluntas non est sibi data sive a Deo sive a natura propter suum malum sed propter suum bonum, cum illa sit conditio pertimens ad nobilitatem et excellentiam, ut omnes concedunt, et cum Deus et natura nullas faciant in entibus dispositiones per se nisi ordinatas ad bonum ipsorum. Sed quaecumque dispositio per quam appetitus potest ferri in malum sub ratione mali vel in minus bonum sub ratione minoris boni et impossibilis cum majoris boni, dimittendo magis bonum, esset dispositio pejor et magis ad malum tendens quam illa dispositio per quam appetitus esset ad bonum vel ad magis bonum determinatus vel necessitatus. Igitur videtur quod libertas non det voluntati posse volendi malum vel minus bonum in casu proposito.*

at that moment. However, it can will such a good at another time, when the judgment of it as a lesser good no longer stands. Moreover, the will can order the intellect to cease consideration of the greater good and then it can will the lesser, i.e., that good which was the lesser.<sup>45</sup> Secondly, Buridan concludes that the will is not directed necessarily to will the greater good, although it cannot will the lesser. It can withhold volition in order to conduct a thorough investigation of all the factors surrounding this particular good. This, he adds in a very significant parenthesis, is a conclusion which is necessary in order to preserve the will's liberty of choice.<sup>46</sup> Buridan's final conclusion is that if the will must make a choice between the two goods presented to it, it must choose the greater good. This is because, compared to the greater good, the lesser good is evil and the will cannot choose evil.<sup>47</sup> Buridan's conception of the nature of the will and of the purpose of free choice prevents him from concluding that the will is absolutely free to choose the lesser good. For him, such a lesser good can only be chosen if the greater good is no longer under consideration. The will's liberty of choice permits it not to choose at all, or to have the greater good dismissed and then to choose the remaining good, but not to choose the lesser good as such.

In the matter of the role of the intellectual judgment in the will's choice Buridan's position is governed by his concept of the will as an intellectual appetite. Although the will as a cognitive appetite is free, it can only act if there has been some prior knowledge of its object.<sup>48</sup> Concerning the function of this prior knowledge, a prior intellectual judgment, Buridan makes three conclusions. First, he says that the will can not will (*posse non velle*) that which the intellect has judged to be good. Because of its mastery over its own acts, the will is not necessitated to will whatever is judged to be good; it can defer its act of volition. Similarly, the will can not not-will (*posse non nolle*) that which has been judged to be evil.<sup>49</sup>

Buridan's second conclusion is that the will can not will (*posse non velle*) that in which there is no apparent goodness. This is obvious because such an

<sup>45</sup> III, 4; fol. 55<sup>rb</sup>. Prima conclusio est quod voluntas, stante casu posito, non potest tunc et pro tunc velle minus bonum. Et dixi 'non potest tunc et pro tunc' quia tunc voluntas potest velle minus bonum pro alio tempore in qua non amplius stabit illud iudicium. Et est in potestate voluntatis imperare intellectui ut desistat a consideratione illius boni maioris et tunc poterit acceptare minus.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*; loc. cit. Secunda conclusio est casu posito quod voluntas non necessario fertur in prosecutionem maioris boni, sed potest differre actum volendi ut antea fiat inquisitio maior de his omnibus quae concomitari possunt vel insequi illud magis bonum. Nam si ipsum esset absque aliquo minori bono praesentatum voluntati ipsa posset secundum dicta prius differre actum volendi. Ergo multo magis hoc potest quando praesentatur cum altero impossibili bono. Et haec conclusio videtur necessaria ad salvandum voluntatis libertatem et dominium.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*; loc. cit. Tertia conclusio, si voluntas debeat eligere ipsa necessario eligit majus bonum, quia aut majus aut minus sed non potest minus pro tunc. Igitur oportet quod majus.

<sup>48</sup> I, 4; fol. 6<sup>rb</sup>. Appetitus autem intellectivus, quod vocatur proprie nomine volitio seu voluntas per volitionem accepta, est inclinatio in rem intellectam mediante iudicio intellectus de ejus bonitate vel malitia.

<sup>49</sup> III, 5; fol. 56<sup>ra</sup>. Prima [conclusio] est quod voluntas potest illud non velle quod per intellectum iudicatur esse bonum. Aliter enim non esset domina sui actus. Dictum enim fuit prius quod voluntas potest differre actum volendi ut antea fiat inquisitio bonitati apparenti fuerit aliqua malitia consequens vel annexa. Potest etiam illud non velle propter annexam tristitiam vel laborem. Et eodem modo dicendum est quod voluntas potest non nolle quod intellectus iudicat esse malum.

The proper translation of the terms *velle* and *nolle* has presented some difficulty, complicated by the necessity of finding a suitable translation for the term *non velle*, which in Buridan's writings cannot be equated with *nolle*. Buridan's peculiar doctrine of free choice, according to which the will's freedom lies to a great extent in its ability to defer action, is the real source of the difficulty. As has been stated, Buridan maintains a threefold liberty of choice in the will: to accept or reject the object and to withhold action. In accordance with this doctrine it seemed correct to translate the terms *velle*, *nolle*, and *non velle* as "to will", "to not-will" (i.e., to reject), and "not to will". In order to assist in maintaining this distinction these terms are followed by their latin equivalents in parentheses.

object is in no way presented to the will as a good. For the same reason the will cannot not-will (*non posse nolle*) that in which there is no apparent evil. It can, however, not will (*posse non velle*) such an object, that is, it need not will it, although it cannot reject (not-will) it. The will is still free to defer its act.<sup>50</sup> Finally, Buridan states that the will can will what has in some way been judged to be evil and reject (not-will) what has been judged to be good. Therefore, as to the will being bound by the prior judgment of the intellect, Buridan concludes that the will cannot act without this prior judgment, but it can partially reject it.<sup>51</sup>

Here again Buridan places limitations upon the will's liberty. As a rational appetite the will is directed to the good presented to it by the intellect. Dependent upon the prior action of the intellect, the will is determined by the intellect to the extent that it can only will what the intellect has judged to be good. But since the intellect may have doubts or may even err in its judgment, the will is not necessitated to will what the intellect judges to be good. It can defer its act of volition. And since the will can choose one good aspect of a particular object and reject others, even those by which the object properly is good, the will can choose freely contrary to the judgment of the intellect. However, the will can never choose what the intellect has judged to be evil, for this would contradict the very nature of the will.

#### IV. THE NATURE OF BEATITUDE

Further light is shed upon Buridan's doctrine of liberty by an examination of his teaching on the nature of beatitude. Plainly beatitude consists in God alone. And, while recognizing that beatitude consists in the perfect possession of God and acknowledging that such perfection is not possible without both knowledge and love of God, Buridan raises the question of whether beatitude consists essentially in the knowledge or in the love of God, in an act of the intellect or in an act of the will.<sup>52</sup>

Buridan accepts the Aristotelian doctrine that beatitude is the operation of man's highest power according to its highest perfection. And judging that such an operation is either of the intellect or of the will and that that power is the highest which is the most free, Buridan enquires as to which power, intellect or will, is the more free.<sup>53</sup> In resolving this question Buridan makes an important distinction between two different kinds of liberty. The one is the liberty of opposition (*libertas oppositionis*) previously noted; the other is what Buridan calls the liberty of final ordination (*libertas finalis ordinationis*).

According to Buridan, an agent possesses the liberty of final ordination if it acts for its own sake, if it is the principal end of its own actions. Conversely, an agent acts in a servile manner if it acts for the sake of something other than itself. God alone is wholly and absolutely free according to this type of liberty,

<sup>50</sup> III, 5; fol. 56<sup>rb</sup>. *Secunda conclusio est quod voluntas potest non velle illud in quo intellectui nulla apparet bonitatis ratio, quoniam tale nullo modo esset praesentatum intellectui seu voluntati sub ratione vobilis. Et eodem modo dicendum est quod voluntas non potest nolle, licet possit non velle, illud in quo nulla apparet intellectui ratio malitiae, quia tale nullo modo est praesentatum sub ratione fugibilis vel refutabilis, etc.*  
<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*; loc. cit. *Tertia conclusio est quod voluntas potest velle illud quod aliquo modo iudicatum esse malum et nolle illud quod aliquo modo iudicatum esse bonum. . . . Sic igitur patet quod voluntas potest velle contra partem iudicii sed non contra totum vel praeter totum.*

<sup>52</sup> I, 16; fol. 20<sup>ra</sup>. *Dicam ergo cum concessum fuerit quod in Dei contemplatione per-*

*fecta, quae non est sine Dei cognitione et ejus dilectione, consistat vera felicitas, tamen dubium relinquitur, an principaliter consistat in Dei cognitione vel in ejus dilectione, hoc est, an consistat in actu intellectus aut in actu voluntatis.*

<sup>53</sup> X, 1; fol. 252<sup>ra</sup>. *Et quia dicit Aristotelis (Nich. Eth. X, 7, 1177a11) quod ipsa felicitas est operatio optima potentiae secundum optimum ejus virtutem, ideo oportet inquirere quae sit optima virtus. Optima autem potentialium ponitur ab omnibus vel intellectus vel voluntas. Ideo necesse est inquirere de comparatione harum duarum potentialium ad invicem. Et quia statim videtur quod illa potentia sit excellentior quae est majus libera, ideo primo quaeritur, Utrum voluntas sit magis libera quam intellectus.*



because He alone is the primary and principal end of His own actions. He alone acts wholly for His own sake. However, a creature may possess such liberty of final ordination if it acts for its own sake, provided it acts more principally for itself than for anything else, its final end excepted. Thus man possesses such liberty when he acts for his own sake.<sup>64</sup>

This type of liberty, as its name suggests, bears upon final causality. The source of the notion seems to be Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, where the Stagirite compares man and the science of metaphysics and states that both are free in that they exist for their own sakes.<sup>65</sup> According to Buridan, who maintains his position consistently throughout his writings, man acts freely if he is the principal intention of his own acts, even though these acts are directed ultimately to God. Man is said to be free according to the liberty of final ordination if he acts in accordance with his nature, regulating his actions in view of his ultimate end.<sup>66</sup>

Moreover, Buridan subordinates the liberty of choice to the liberty of final ordination. As proof of this inferiority of liberty of choice he points to its purpose. Liberty of choice has been given man in order that he might will that which is wholly good and reject that which is wholly evil. Yet, when the intellect judges an object to be wholly good and the will wills it, both faculties are acting through themselves and for their own sakes, that is, acting freely according to the liberty of final ordination. Accordingly, therefore, liberty of opposition, which serves to enable the will finally to choose what is absolutely good, is ordained to the liberty of final ordination.<sup>67</sup> Also, while the will is not free according to the liberty of opposition to choose the absolute good when apprehended as such, since it can choose no other, it is free according to the liberty of final ordination.<sup>68</sup>

Because the liberty of opposition is ordained finally to the liberty of final ordination, the latter is the more perfect type of liberty. Consequently, says Buridan, the human soul is more free according to liberty of final ordination and produces its best act according to this type of liberty. The problem now is to discover whether the best act of the intellect is more noble and better than the best act of the will, for if it is then the intellect is more free than the will.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>64</sup> X, 2; fol. 255<sup>rb-vr</sup>. Libertate finalis ordinationis dicitur agens libere agere si agit sui ipsius gratia principali intentione, et serviliter si gratia alterius. Unde sic Deus agit simpliciter et omnino libere. Omnia autem alia agentia in ordine ad ipsum Deum agunt serviliter, quia omnia quae sunt agunt gratia ipsius Dei. . . . Et tamen, hoc non obstante, agens particulare dicitur agere libere si agit sui ipsius gratia magis principaliter quam gratia alicuius finis particularis quod non contineat ipsum finaliter secundum naturalem finem connexionem et ordinem. . . . Licet ergo agimus finaliter in ordine ad Deum, quia principaliter propter ipsum quam propter nos, tamen simpliciter loquendo dicimus agere libere si principaliter propter nos quam propter aliquod praeter Deum, qui finaliter continet nos.

<sup>65</sup> Aristotle, *Meta. I*, 2, 982b25.  
<sup>66</sup> Cf. Buridan, *Quaestiones super libros Politicorum Aristotelis VII*, 6; ed. cit., fol. 98<sup>rb</sup>; *Quaestiones in Aristotelis libris Metaphysicorum VI*, 5; ed. cit., 36<sup>va</sup>.

<sup>67</sup> X, 2; fol. 258<sup>rb</sup>. Libertas oppositionis ordinatur finaliter ad libertatem finalis ordinationis. Ista conclusio sic deducitur: . . . libertas oppositionis non a nobis data quod non acceptemus apparens bonum nec ad hoc quod acceptemus malum quod apparet bonum, quia sic ad nostrum malum esset

nobis data, quia ad non acceptandum aliquando acceptanda vel acceptandum aliquando non acceptanda. . . . Ergo intellectus et voluntas sic agunt libere libertate oppositionis, quae data est nobis finaliter ut tam secundum intellectum quam secundum voluntatem agamus libere libertate finalis ordinationis, scilicet, laudabiliter et bene ad nostram salutem et perfectionem.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*; loc. cit. Item, ad acceptationem finali boni perfecte et firmiter ostensi sub ratione purae bonitatis non se habet voluntas libere libertate oppositionis, . . . sed se habet ad eam libere libertate finalis ordinationis. Et tamen ad claram ostensionem illius finalis boni et ad ipsius acceptationem vel volitionem ordinantur finaliter omnes aliorum acceptationes et ostensiones et consilia et electiones circa quae habemus libertatem oppositionis. Ergo manifestum est quod omnes actus nostri liberi libertate oppositionis et ipsa libertas oppositionis sunt gratia actus libri libertate finalis ordinationis, ut sumus liberi.

<sup>69</sup> X, 2; fol. 258<sup>va</sup>. Si optimus actus intelligendi quem producit intellectus sit nobilior et melior quam optimus actus quem voluntas nostra producit, tunc simpliciter loquendo intellectus noster liberius producit actum intelligendi quam voluntas nostra actum volendi, et econtra.

Comparing intellect and will with respect to the liberty of opposition, Buridan concludes that the will is more free than the intellect. For the act of volition is an act which is free in itself, while the act of intellection is an act which is only freely ordered, that is to say, ordered by the will which is free.<sup>60</sup> However, with respect to the liberty of final ordination, the intellect is more free than the will. If, says Buridan, any comparison can be made between the relative liberty of intellect and will in the act of volition itself, the intellect is more free than the will according to the liberty of final ordination. The intellectual apprehension of the object is a more principal factor than the will's initial act of pleasure in producing the act of volition; therefore, the human soul produces the act of volition more principally, and hence more freely according to the liberty of final ordination, in so far as it is intellect than in so far as it is will.<sup>61</sup>

For Buridan, the intellect is more noble than the will and more free according to the liberty of final ordination. It is the intellect which establishes man's ultimate end and the will must accept it. To enquire, to discover, and to judge concerning the best means for the achievement of the end are likewise tasks of the intellect. And the will is able only to act upon the previous judgment of the intellect. Although the will can not will (*posse non velle*) the object judged by the intellect to be good, it cannot reject (*non posse nolle*) such an object. Being more noble and more perfect than the will, therefore, the intellect is more free according to the liberty of final ordination than is the will.

Buridan's judgment of the intellect as more perfect than the will governs his conclusion concerning the nature of human beatitude. According to him, beatitude consists in the perfect intellectual apprehension of God's essence. He agrees that man would not possess beatitude in the clear vision of God alone, unless this were accompanied by acts of love and delight; but he insists that beatitude consists essentially in an act of contemplation, an act of the intellect. He states that he holds such a view because it is more pleasing to him than the other view which maintains that beatitude consists in an act of the will.<sup>62</sup> He admits that the arguments adduced in favour of his own position are not demonstrative; but he says that they are *persuasiones*, equally as strong as those in support of the opposing view.<sup>63</sup>

## V. CONCLUSION

Careful examination of Buridan's texts on the doctrine of human liberty fails to substantiate the charge of his inconsistency. Frequent statements of his position in the *Ethics* and parallel passages in the *Metaphysics* and *Politics* provide abundant proof that Buridan's thought remained essentially the same throughout the period of these writings.<sup>64</sup> Any apparent inconsistencies are explicable in terms of Buridan's care to appear always orthodox and traditional

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*; *loc. cit.* Anima liberius producit actum volendi quam actum intelligendi, quia actum volendi primo et immediate producimus libere [libertate oppositionis] tamquam secundum se libere elicited. Actum autem intelligendi non producimus libere nisi consecutive tamquam libere imperatum.

<sup>61</sup> X, 3; fol. 259<sup>va-b</sup>. Videtur mihi quod, si sit in hoc aliqua comparatio, anima liberius se habet in producendo volitionem ea ratione qua dicitur intellectus quam ea ratione qua dicitur voluntas. Dico 'si sit in hoc aliqua comparatio' quia non videtur in hoc comparatio quoad libertatem oppositionis sed quoad libertatem principalitatis et finalis ordinationis. Si enim apprehensio se habeat principalius in producendo volitionem quam illam complacentiam, tunc anima principalius et per consequens liberius producit

illam volitionem ea ratione qua dicitur intellectus quam ea ratione qua dicitur voluntas. Sed ita est; ergo, etc.

<sup>62</sup> X, 5; fol. 264<sup>va-b</sup>. Manifestum est quod non restat nisi videre an felicitas consistit in illa perfecta Dei apprehensione vel in actu volendi et amandi consequenti. Et melius placet mihi ponere quod in apprehensione sive intellectione perfecta ipsius Dei consistit humana felicitas. Cf. also, X, 4; fol. 261<sup>a</sup>; *Quaest. super Pol. Ar.* VII, 5; *ed. cit.*, 97<sup>ff</sup>.

<sup>63</sup> X, 5; fol. 265<sup>ra</sup>. Et si istae rationes non sunt demonstrabiles, tamen sunt persuasiones aequae fortes sicut illae quae ad partem oppositam solent adduci.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. *supra*, notes 14, 18, 20, 21; *Meta.* IX, 4; *ed. cit.*, 58<sup>ra-b</sup>; *Pol.* VI, 1; *ed. cit.*, 86<sup>vb</sup> and VII, 5; 98<sup>va</sup>.

and in terms of the essentially non-philosophical basis of the doctrine. Efforts to make his presentation as inoffensive as possible occasionally lead him to shift emphasis on a central point in the doctrine in order to make it appear less novel, and this may account partially for the judgment that he is not consistent.<sup>66</sup> Moreover, the probabilism with which he invests the rational arguments in favour of his position can sometimes create ambiguity as to the real meaning of his position. Yet, at bottom the doctrine is consistent and uniform.

The problem of Buridan's psychological determinism is not so easily resolved. Because he is opposed to the strict necessitarianism, according to which all things happen from necessity, and maintains that the will is able to determine itself with respect to opposites in the act of choice, it would clearly seem that Buridan is not a determinist. But the problem is not that simple. Very few, if any, philosophers themselves admit to being determinists; but many are accused of being such by their fellows. Thus, for example, Thomas Aquinas, who argues strongly against determinism, is criticized by Duns Scotus for this very fault, because allegedly he provides insufficient safeguards for the will's freedom and autonomy.<sup>67</sup>

Any discussion of Buridan's alleged determinism must be conducted with reference to the opposing positions of intellectualism and voluntarism. According to the voluntarists, the will is a wholly active power and any doctrine which posits the will as being acted upon in any way smacks of determinism, as tending to compromise the will's essential autonomy. Although just as vehement in their denunciation of determinism, the intellectualists allow that the will is a passive power as well as an active one. While holding that the will's liberty lies in its active power of self-determination, they recognize that the will must be specified by a prior intellectual judgment and in this act of specification they hold the will to be passive.

Buridan's doctrine of human liberty of choice belongs to this intellectualist tradition. The necessity of the will to will the absolute good when presented with it as such, the will's inability to choose the lesser good as such, the will's final acceptance of the object in accordance with the judgment of the practical intellect, the subordination of the liberty of opposition to the liberty of final ordination, and the intellectual act in which beatitude consists: all these are clear marks of Buridan's intellectualism. Although such a doctrine would constitute determinism to a voluntarist, by rejecting the validity of the voluntarist position it can be said justly that Buridan is no determinist.

The fact of Buridan's philosophical skepticism or fideism is, however, plain; and it is the most important single element in his doctrine. Although convinced that the human will possesses liberty of choice, Buridan is equally convinced that human reason cannot demonstrate this fact. Therefore, he bases the certitude of his conviction in this matter upon the rock of faith. As has been shown above, this skepticism is explicit both in the *Ethics* and the *Metaphysics*.<sup>67</sup> Moreover, this is not the only point of his doctrine which he grounds in the certitude of faith. Not only is the doctrine of the will's free self-determination considered by Buridan to be held certainly by faith, but also the doctrines of the will as an active power, as both active and passive, as moved first by the intellect, and as necessitated to will the ultimate end are held on the same basis. In short, the majority of conclusions which Buridan draws with respect to the

<sup>66</sup> Buridan is very cautious always to clothe his doctrine in the robes of orthodoxy and tradition. He is very careful to note his agreement with the Parisian Condemnation of 1277 (see *supra*, note 19; III, 2; fol. 49<sup>vb</sup>), and in general his attitude is characterized by his remark in the Preface of this work: In hoc autem opusculo,

propter meam inexperientiam et ineptitudinem mei iudicii, sententiis et auctoritatibus doctorum antiquorum magis quam novis rationibus . . . adhaerebo. *Proemium*; fol. 2<sup>ra-b</sup>.

<sup>67</sup> Duns Scotus, *Opus Oxoniense* II, 25, 1; ed. Garcia, n. 755, pp. 689-91.

<sup>67</sup> See *supra*, notes 20, 24, 25.

nature and basis of the will's liberty are rooted in the certitude of faith, rather than in any philosophical tenets, and, by implication, are incapable of rational demonstration. Rational arguments in favour of such conclusions are considered not to be apodictic, but to yield only probability. Buridan does not infer from this that faith and reason are contradictory, but only that reason, unlike faith, frequently is unable to yield certitude. In defense of his attitude, he says that a person should not expect apodictic arguments in favour of every conclusion, especially in so lofty a matter as this.<sup>68</sup> And elsewhere he declares that it is not necessary always to employ demonstrative arguments in the moral sciences, that sometimes dialectical ones are sufficient.<sup>69</sup>

From these and other remarks it is evident that Buridan considers the incidence of demonstrative arguments to be low. He clearly distinguishes science from opinion, recognizing that science judges its object with certitude while opinion achieves only probability.<sup>70</sup> But experience shows him, he says, how really difficult it is to attain certitude. Often, even after lengthy consideration, the intellect remains faced with probable arguments favouring opposing sides of a proposition and, not being able to make a decision in favour of one side or the other, it remains in suspension.<sup>71</sup> And even if the intellect firmly grasps and assents necessarily to the very principles of its own knowledge, it is still possible for its certitude to be diminished by the advent of sophistical arguments and for doubts to arise. Such doubts can arise, Buridan says, even concerning the first principles.<sup>72</sup>

Notions of this kind concerning the inadequacies of purely rational enquiry mark Buridan as a typical representative of fourteenth-century thought, an era distinguished by the rapid advance of philosophical skepticism. During this century the retreat from reason is steady; principles and doctrines long held to be scientific and rationally demonstrable are reduced from the realm of science to that of opinion, the arguments in favour of them are reduced from the level of scientific certitude to that of mere probability, and the basis of certitude shifts from reason to faith.<sup>73</sup>

Viewed in the context of fourteenth-century philosophical developments, therefore, Buridan's thought becomes more readily explicable, though not any more justifiable philosophically. What is most significant about his doctrine of liberty is the fact that he employs almost all the notions used by his predecessors of the late thirteenth century and yet, unlike them, he does not consider his conclusions to be demonstrable by reason. Moreover, his doctrine lacks the comprehension and depth of penetration which mark those of his predecessors, such as Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus. Absent from his doctrine are any of the precisions concerning the interaction of intellect and will in the act of volition and also any apparent recognition of the metaphysical and psychological bases underlying the matter of the will's liberty.

<sup>68</sup> See *supra*, note 20.

<sup>69</sup> *Eth.* V, 28; fol. 144<sup>rb</sup>. Ad hoc dicendum est quod nec in moralibus scientiis nec in naturalibus oportet semper uti rationibus demonstratis, sed aliquando licet uti probationibus persuasibilibus.

<sup>70</sup> VI, 6; fol. 153<sup>rb</sup>. Scientia autem differt ab opinione quia licet utraque vere possit judicare in absentia rerum intelligibilium, tamen opinio non judicat cum certitudine sed cum formidine. Scientia autem judicat cum certitudine et sine formidine.

<sup>71</sup> VII, 6; fol. 179<sup>rb</sup>. . . . saepe, ut mihi videtur, expertus sum quod cum rationes viderem ad utramque partem probabiles, tamen ad neutram partem iudicii determinabam me, etiam neque novis rationibus ad unam partem vel ad aliam supervenientibus, sed in

suspensio tenebam.

<sup>72</sup> VI, 11; fol. 160<sup>ra-b</sup>. Sic igitur opinandum quod cum nobis proponuntur principia firmissima, licet eis dissentiare; tamen aliquando per sophisticationes in oppositum occurrentes contingit adhaesionem debilitari et tandem quamdam formidinem generari. Et hoc expertus sum de primo principio, ut mihi videtur.

<sup>73</sup> For an account of some of the factors involved in the development of fourteenth-century philosophical skepticism and the role assigned to probability, see K. Michalski, 'Le Criticisme et le scepticisme dans la philosophie du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle,' *Bulletin International de l'Académie Polonaise des Sciences et des Lettres*, (1925), 41-123; esp. 55-71.

Just how far these shortcomings are to due to Buridan's Nominalism can, in the absence of thorough research, only be conjectured. However, the influence of Nominalism is probably considerable. Buridan is generally considered to belong to the *Nominales* and several important elements of his teaching, among them his philosophical skepticism, are evidence in support of this claim.<sup>74</sup> However, Buridan is definitely not a slavish follower of the teachings of Ockham, a fact evident from a comparison of their respective doctrines of liberty. Both hold that the will is free and that its liberty cannot be demonstrated by reason. But thereafter there is sharp divergence. For Ockham, the will is absolutely free; it is able to reject the absolute good even when it is presented with it as such, and it is able to will evil as such.<sup>75</sup> Buridan denies both conclusions. Buridan's doctrine is also opposed to that of John of Jandun, a contemporary in the Faculty of Arts. John holds, with the voluntarists, that the will is able to will the lesser good as such, although he grants that the basis for his position is faith and that Aristotle taught the converse.<sup>76</sup> Another of Buridan's contemporaries, the Cistercian Peter of Ceffons, who taught in the Faculty of Theology, also holds that the rational arguments in favour of the will's liberty are inconclusive and resorts to faith as the basis for asserting human liberty.<sup>77</sup> Further investigation of the works of these authors and others of Buridan's Parisian contemporaries is necessary if proper affinities are to be established.

The influence of Buridan's doctrine on late mediaeval thought has likewise yet to be understood adequately. Judging from the popularity of his writings Buridan's influence was considerable, but its exact measure is unknown.<sup>78</sup> The doctrine itself has been traced in the writings of Marsilius of Inghen, a pupil of Buridan, and in those of Gabriel Biel, one of the masters of Martin Luther.<sup>79</sup> But here again the exact nature and extent of this influence can only be determined by further study. The present grave lack of research into the philosophical currents of the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries renders impossible any definitive evaluation of Buridan's doctrinal and historical importance. The purpose of the present study has been to examine at first hand Buridan's doctrine of human liberty in order to obtain a clearer and more accurate description of the doctrine; but it is hoped that it may also serve as a stimulus for further enquiry into the doctrinal and historical significance of John Buridan, who stands as an important secondary figure in later mediaeval thought.

<sup>74</sup> Buridan has long been classified among the *Nominales*. His works were included in the Royal Edict of Confiscation issued by King Louis XI in 1471 and directed against Nominalism. A document of the University of Louvain, dated 1427, places Buridan among the proscribed authors; anyone admitted to the Regency of the University was required to take an oath never to teach the doctrines of Buridan, Ockham, Marsilius or their followers. Legend also has Buridan founding the University of Vienna after being driven from Paris for his Nominalism. However, while Buridan was serving his second term as Rector of the University of Paris in 1340, he signed a decree strongly condemning Ockham and the *Nominales*, and Michalski, 'Le Problème de la volonté,' 258, n. 2, has settled the dispute concerning the actual state of Buridan's own mind on this matter by pointing out that Buridan has incorporated a portion of the text of this decree in his own *Summa logica*, inferring that he was personally opposed to the doctrines condemned in the decree. Certainly, Buridan has some affinity with the

*Nominales*, but the exact nature and extent of this affinity remain unknown to the present.

<sup>75</sup> Ockham, *In I Sent.* I, 6; ed. Lyons, 1495, P-T; *In III Sent.* 13, S; *In IV Sent.* 14.

<sup>76</sup> John of Jandun, *Quaestiones Joannis de Gandavo super tres libros De Anima Aristotelis* III, 41 (Florentini, 1507), fol. 97<sup>a</sup>.

<sup>77</sup> Peter of Ceffons, *In I Sent.* 1; Ms. Troyes 62, fol. 3<sup>v</sup>. Cited by Michalski, *art. cit.*, Appendix 8, 359-61.

<sup>78</sup> Buridan's fame spread rapidly over Europe within a short time of his death. He enjoyed his greatest popularity in the newly founded universities of eastern Europe where he was introduced by his two most famous disciples, Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Inghen. At Prague and Cologne several of his works became prescribed texts. Although tied to the fluctuating fortunes of the *Nominales*, Buridan's renown remained high in Paris and was undiminished in the early sixteenth century when many of his works were edited and reprinted.

<sup>79</sup> See Michalski, *art. cit.*, 325-6.

# The Augustinian Axiom: *Nulli Sacramento Injuria Facienda Est.*

N. M. HARING S.A.C.

THERE was complete agreement in the primitive Church that, within the Catholic communion, the sacrament of Baptism could never be received twice by the same person. This conviction was based, first of all, on St. Paul's *unum baptisma* in Eph. iv, 5 and, to an almost equal degree, on Our Lord's remark to St. Peter in John xiii, 10: *Qui lotus est, non indiget ut lavet.*<sup>1</sup> When the first controversies regarding rebaptism of heretics arose at the end of the second century, it soon became evident that both texts were inconclusive and open to conflicting interpretations because of an uncertainty concerning the requirements for true or valid Baptism. Yet even those who maintained that heretics could not baptize validly agreed with their opponents that, once validly baptized in the Church, heretics who returned were not in fact rebaptized.<sup>2</sup> It was pointed out to, and reluctantly admitted by, St. Cyprian that entire communities had left the Church and returned later without undergoing a second Baptism.<sup>3</sup> His critics claimed that, because it was customary in the Church, the readmission without rebaptism proved that their Baptism was not affected by their separation.<sup>4</sup> Since no clear Scriptural text was available to prove or disprove either position, the traditional custom of the Church and the doctrinal implications of this procedure appeared to be decisive factors in the gradual process of clarification. Such a custom was of even greater importance with regard to the non-repetition of other sacred rites.

## I

Although, in his struggle with the Donatists, St. Augustine referred again and again to a universal and ancient custom of receiving those baptized in heresy without rebaptism,<sup>5</sup> he kept a keen eye on points of doctrine on which both Catholics and Donatists agreed. His able adversary, Parmenian, had made the concession: *Baptismus quidem non amittit qui recedit ab ecclesia, sed jus dandi tamen amittit.*<sup>6</sup> In other words, Parmenian conceded that 'Baptism' is not lost by separation from the Church. After all, the Donatists had also allowed dissenters to return without rebaptism.<sup>7</sup> At the same time, Parmenian contended that separation from the Church cancels the right to administer Baptism. This right to baptize, as St. Augustine admits, is given through Ordination. According to

<sup>1</sup> I have shown the significance of this text in the article 'Historical Notes on the Interpretation of John 13:10', *The Cath. Bibl. Quarterly*, XIII (1951), 355-80.

<sup>2</sup> The question whether pagans or unbaptized persons could baptize validly remained unsolved for many centuries. Cf. N. M. Haring, 'A Brief Historical Comment on St. Thomas, *Summa theol.* III, q. 67, a. 5', *Mediaeval Studies*, XIV (1952), 153-9.

<sup>3</sup> Cyprian, *Epp.* LXXI, 2 and LXXIII, 23; CSEL 3, 2, 772 and 796. Tertullian, St. Cyprian and all those who adopted their views in both the Latin and Greek Church understood *unum baptisma* as one Baptism which cannot be repeated if administered in the true Church. Hence they would not admit that by 'rebaptizing' heretics they reiterated Baptism. Thus the Donatist Petilian indignantly rejects the Catholic accusation of rebaptism: *Bis baptisma nobis obijciunt . . . Nos bis baptismum facere dicitis . . . Non bis baptismum facimus. . . Unum nos profitemur. Nam certum est eos*

*qui duo existimant insanire.* He simply denied the existence of Baptism among Catholics: *Nos autem quod in vobis nondum est baptizamus.* Cf. Augustine, *Contra litt. Petil.* II 2, 4, II, 23, 51, II, 27, 62; II, 37, 85, CSEL 52, 24; 49; 50; 57, 70. See also Cyprian, *Ep.* LXXI, 1; CSEL 3, 2, 77, f.

<sup>4</sup> To dispel all fear of introducing novel opinions, St. Cyprian reassures Magnus: *Sententiam nostram non novam prominus sed jam pridem ab antecessoribus nostris statutam et a nobis observatam.* *Ep.* LXX, 1, CSEL 3, 2, 767. He knew that his opponents appealed to an ancient tradition (*dicunt se veterem consuetudinem sequi*), but he preferred to follow the rule laid down by the Council of Agrippinus. *Epp.* LXXI, 2; 4 and LXXIII, 3; CSEL 3, 2, 772; 774; 780.

<sup>5</sup> He considered the custom to be Apostolic in origin. *De Bapt.* VI, 6, 9; CSEL 51, 232.

<sup>6</sup> *Contra ep. Parmeniani* II, 13, 30; CSEL 51, 79.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *De Bapt.* II, 11, 16; CSEL 51, 192.

Parmenian it is lost through separation and can only be restored through reordination. But St. Augustine brands this assertion as illogical: 'Nobody doubts', he replies, that Baptism and Holy Orders are sacraments. If one *sacramentum* remains, why should the other *sacramentum* be lost? *Neutri sacramento injuria facienda est.*<sup>9</sup> Both, he explains, are given with a certain consecration and for that reason may not be repeated in the Catholic Church.<sup>9</sup>

The idea that we do injury to a sacrament by repeating it occurs again in St. Augustine's more elaborate refutation of Donatism, i.e., in *The Seven Books on Baptism*. He concludes an almost identical argument with the words: *Nulli enim sacramento injuria facienda est.*<sup>10</sup> In his *Letter to the Catholics*, written in 401, he makes a similar statement on the non-repetition of Baptism: *Nec . . . sacramento quod habent (haeretici) ulla injuria facienda est.*<sup>11</sup> He means the same when he refuses rebaptism with the words: *Non faciam injuriam characteri imperatoris,*<sup>12</sup> though in this particular case the Saint's thought is focused on the inviolable trinitarian form of Baptism. In this sense, he writes later against Petilian: *Ipsi nomini non facimus injuriam.*<sup>13</sup>

It is obvious that the difficulty of understanding and interpreting St. Augustine's argument lies mainly in the word *sacramentum* which he uses in so many different meanings. Moreover, St. Augustine changed his mind concerning the application of the principle to the imposition of hands on clerics returning to the Church. He first opposed an imposition of hands precisely because the *sacramentum* would be violated: *ne . . . ipsi sacramento fiat injuria.*<sup>14</sup> Yet only a few years later he considered it a penitential rite and approved of it with the statement: *Manus autem impositio non sicut baptismus repeti non potest. Quid est enim aliud nisi oratio super hominem?*<sup>15</sup> In other words, this imposition of hands is no *sacramentum* but only a prayer which, unlike Baptism, can be repeated. There was no uncertainty in St. Augustine's mind with regard to rebaptism and reordination. He places them on an equal level and opposes them, 'lest we do injury to the *sacramentum*.' But if we raise the question whether, according to St. Augustine, any *sacramentum* can be repeated, the answer would seem to be negative: *Nulli enim sacramento injuria facienda est.*

To see the subsequent history of this Augustinian injunction in its proper light and perspective, we must keep in mind, first of all, that St. Augustine dealt principally with the non-repetition of Baptism and Ordination, but did not enlarge on the non-repetition of Confirmation or try to reconcile his universal statement with the repetition of other sacraments; secondly, that he proposed numerous other arguments against rebaptism by a skilful interpretation of the Bible; finally, that Greek theology impressed Latin writers with some additional reasons against a second Baptism. It will slowly become evident that his anti-Donatist works remained long unknown or at least unused and that this fact deprived theology of St. Augustine's most forceful exposition of sacramental principles, especially in their application to Holy Orders which he rarely discusses in his other works. In the meantime, a latent Cyprianic current will time and again come to the surface in the evaluation of heretical sacraments

<sup>9</sup> *Contra ep. Parm.* II, 13, 30; CSEL 51, 81.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* II, 13, 28; p. 79: *Utrumque enim sacramentum est et quadam consecratione utrumque homini datur: illud cum baptizatur, illud cum ordinatur. Ideoque in catholica utrumque non licet iterari.* The fact that St. Augustine uses the word *sacramentum* very often to designate a lasting consecration in the recipient was completely missed by C. Courturier, '*Sacramentum et mysterium*' dans l'oeuvre de Saint Augustin', *Etudes Augustiniennes* (Aubier, 1953), pp. 161-332.

<sup>11</sup> *De Bapt.* I, 1, 2; CSEL 51, 146. Cf. IV, 21, 28; p. 255: *Nec ideo tamen sacramento baptismatis . . . facimus injuriam.*

<sup>12</sup> *Ep. ad Catholicos*, 21, 60; CSEL 52, 308.

<sup>13</sup> *Ep. CLXXXV*, 10, 43; CSEL 51, 37. See also *Ep. LXXXVII*, 9, CSEL 44, 1, 405: *Nam sacramenta quae non mutastis, sicut habetis, approbantur a nobis, ne forte . . . illis mysteriis Christi . . . sacrilegam faciamus injuriam.* *De Unico bapt.*, 8, 13, CSEL 53, 15; *ne tantis donis Dei fiat injuria.*

<sup>14</sup> *Contra litt. Petil.* II, 81, 180; CSEL 52, 112.

<sup>15</sup> *Contra ep. Parm.* II, 13, 28; CSEL 51, 79.

<sup>16</sup> *De Bapt.* III, 16, 21; CSEL 51, 213. Cf. *De Bapt.* V, 33, 33; p. 290: *Manus autem impositio si non adhiberetur ab haeresi venienti, tamquam extra omnem culpam esse judicaretur.*

with the exception of Baptism whose repetition was not even contemplated by those who failed to see an intrinsic reason for its non-repetition.

St. Augustine, I repeat, used many other arguments to defeat his opponents. St. Cyprian had already noted that the fear of 'rebaptism'—which he thought was not the right word—was so deeply rooted that it threatened to retard the conversion of heretics to whom the prospect of another Baptism was a scandal and a crime.<sup>16</sup> In St. Augustine's time, this *horror hominum de iterata tinctione* was still so strong and universal that he attributed it to divine inspiration.<sup>17</sup> Apart from this psychological argument, he told his readers on two occasions that the raven which left Noe's Ark failed to return and perished miserably, because it allowed itself to be 'rebaptized' in the waters of the Deluge.<sup>18</sup> He also pointed out that, just as circumcision cannot be repeated, the sacrament of Baptism cannot be given twice.<sup>19</sup> In interpreting the Gospel of St. John, he compared natural birth to the supernatural birth in Baptism and concluded that, just like natural birth, baptismal regeneration cannot be repeated.<sup>20</sup> This analogy was soon taken up<sup>21</sup> and became a particularly popular argument against rebaptism through Bede who added to it a passage from the *Liber ecclesiasticorum dogmatum* of Gennadius in which rebaptism is rejected, 'lest we appear to annul the confession or invocation of so great a name' (*ne confessio vel invocatio tanti nominis videatur annullari*.)<sup>22</sup>

In this combination or in the form proposed by Gennadius, the argument enjoyed a dominant position for many centuries and the reason against rebaptism given by Gennadius was even extended to other sacraments. To name some authors, the argument is quoted by Alcuin and Pseudo-Bede,<sup>23</sup> by Smaragdus,<sup>24</sup> Paulus diaconus,<sup>25</sup> Hrabanus Maurus,<sup>26</sup> Walafried Strabo,<sup>27</sup> Haimo,<sup>28</sup> Hincmar of Rheims,<sup>29</sup> Burchard of Worms,<sup>30</sup> St. Peter Damian,<sup>31</sup> the school of Laon,<sup>32</sup> Ivo of Chartres,<sup>33</sup> Alger of Liège,<sup>34</sup> Abelard,<sup>35</sup> the *Summa sententiarum*,<sup>36</sup> Gratian,<sup>37</sup> Gan-

<sup>16</sup> Ep. LXXXIII, 24; CSEL 3, 2, 797.

<sup>17</sup> De Bapt. V, 5, 6, and V, 6, 7, CSEL 51, 267 f.

<sup>18</sup> Contra Faustum XII, 20; CSEL 25, 348. In Joh. Tract. VI, 9; PL 35, 1434.

<sup>19</sup> Quest. in Pentat. VI, 6; CSEL 28, 3, 423. Cf. Isidore, In Jos. VI, 1, PL 83, 373B; Glossa ord.; PL 113, 509.

<sup>20</sup> In Joh. Tract. XII, 2; PL 35, 1484: Sed sicut ad nativitatem carnalem valent muliebria viscera ad semel parientium, sic ad nativitatem spiritualem valent viscera ecclesiae, ut semel quisque baptizetur. Cf. Tract. XI, 62; PL 35, 1478: Quomodo uterus non potest repeti sic nec baptismus.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Caesarius of Arles, Serm. CLXXV, 4; ed. G. Morin (Maredsous, 1937), p. 671.

<sup>22</sup> Bede, Hom. XII; PL 94, 198B: Notandum autem quia quod de carnali dixit, hoc etiam de spirituali est generatione sentiendum: nequaquam videlicet eam, postquam semel expleta fuerit, posse repeti. Sive enim haereticus sive schismaticus sive facinorosus quisque in confessione sanctae Trinitatis baptizetur, non valet ille, qui ita baptizatus est, a bonis catholicis rebaptizari, ne confessio vel invocatio tanti nominis videatur annullari. Gennadius, Lib. eccl. dogmatum, 21; ed. C. H. Turner, Journal of Theol. Studies, VII (1905/6), 93.

<sup>23</sup> In Joh. II (V, 4); PL 100, 779A. Pseudo-Bede, In Joh. v, 4; PL 92, 668C. Cf. Alcuin (?), Confessio fidei III, 27; PL 101, 1073B: Baptizatos autem, si post acceptam baptismi gratiam lapsi fuerint, rebaptizari debere nequaquam dicimus, ne invocatio vel confessio sanctae Trinitatis annulletur.

<sup>24</sup> Collectiones; PL 102, 340B (Bede).

<sup>25</sup> Hom. CLVII; PL 95, 1358B (Bede).

<sup>26</sup> Hom. II, 72; PL 110, 283A (Bede).

<sup>27</sup> De Reb. eccl., 26; PL 114, 958B: Celebratur autem ipsum baptismus verum non nisi in nomine summae Trinitatis, quod et Dominus ipse ostendit et Canones Apostolorum docent. Unde quicumque vel ab haereticis in Trinitate baptizantibus vel ab alio quolibet homine sub appellatione legitima ejusdem sanctae Trinitatis fuerit baptizatus, rebaptizari non debet, ne invocatio summae dignitatis annullari videatur.

<sup>28</sup> Hom. de temp. CVIII; PL 118, 580BC (Bede's text slightly altered).

<sup>29</sup> De Cav. vitis, 10; PL 125, 924CD (Beginning with: Sive enim haereticus).

<sup>30</sup> Decr. IV, 39; PL 140, 734B: Ex concilio Rhotomag., cap. 3. The entire chapter is copied from Gennadius and is actually found as can. 5 of a Council of Rouen; Mansi 10, 1200D; Hefele-Leclercq, Histoire des Conciles III, 1, pp. 287 ff.

<sup>31</sup> Lib. grat., 5; MGH Lib. 1, 23: Sicut canonica testatur auctoritas, ideoque prohibetur rebaptizatio fieri, ne sanctae Trinitatis nomen, in quo baptizatum est, videatur annullari. Copied by Alger, De Mis. I, 52; PL 180, 880B.

<sup>32</sup> O. Lottin, 'Nouveaux fragments', RTAM, XI (1939), 253: Duae sunt nativitates: una ex masculo et femina, alia ex Deo et ecclesia. Neutra repeti potest. Quicumque haereticus baptizetur in confessione sanctae Trinitatis, non potest baptizatus a catholicis rebaptizari, ne confessio vel invocatio tanti nominis videatur annihilari.

<sup>33</sup> Decr. I, 173 and Pan. I, 85; PL 161, 103D and 1064B: Beda in libro homiliarum, hom. XXXVI, in cap. III Johannis.

<sup>34</sup> De Mis. I, 52; PL 180, 880B (Peter Damian), De Sacram. III, 13; PL 180, 851A: Unde Augustinus de ecclesiasticis regulis (i.e.,



dulphus,<sup>38</sup> the Abelardian *Ysagoge*,<sup>39</sup> Peter Lombard,<sup>40</sup> Simon of Tournai,<sup>41</sup> Peter Manducator<sup>42</sup> and Martin of Leon.<sup>43</sup>

Such an impressive list of writers indicates the peculiar development of the Augustinian heritage. Post-Augustinian authors reveal a marked preference for St. Augustine's interpretation of certain Scripture texts even after the gradual arrival of the entire corpus of St. Augustine's anti-Donatist works. They will often quote *Hic est qui baptizat* (*John* i, 33), as St. Augustine had done so frequently, to show that, being an action of Christ, Baptism is above human interference and moral weakness.<sup>44</sup> This led to the distinction between the visible and invisible priest in Baptism introduced by Alcuin<sup>45</sup> and adopted by Hincmar.<sup>46</sup> The latter, like Paschasius, extended the Augustinian exegesis of *Hic est qui baptizat* to *Ipse est qui consecrat*.<sup>47</sup> In the form of *Hic est qui sanctificat*, it is later transferred by Auxilius<sup>48</sup> from the Eucharist to Holy Orders and, in the following century, St. Peter Damian objects to the reordination of simoniacs with the argument: *Sicut unus est qui baptizat, ita procul dubio unus idemque qui consecrat*.<sup>49</sup>

This gradual process of widening the Augustinian principle constitutes an interesting example of a judicious use of analogy in sacramental theology, especially since the process of analogy between Baptism and other sacraments proved to be an indispensable necessity. St. Augustine also interpreted *Gal.* iii, 27 (*induere Christum*), as contrary to rebaptism, although St. Cyprian had refuted the very thought of it on several occasions.<sup>50</sup> The interpretation occurs in Ildefonsus and Hrabanus Maurus,<sup>51</sup> the *Glossa ordinaria*,<sup>52</sup> Lombard's commentary on St. Paul<sup>53</sup> and in a number of canonical collections, including Gratian's *Decretum*.<sup>54</sup> When Lombard incorporated it in the *Sentences*,<sup>55</sup> it began to influence the numerous commentators.<sup>56</sup>

St. Augustine was not at all anxious to hold *Eph.* iv, 5, against his opposition, because he knew too well that, from the days of Tertullian and St. Cyprian, St. Paul's *unum baptisma* has been the battle cry of the rebaptizers. Of course, he refuted their interpretation and used *John* xiii, 10, just as sparingly, though with

Gennadius): Si qui apud illos haereticos baptizati sunt, qui in sanctae Trinitatis confessione baptizant, et veniunt ad catholicam ecclesiam, recipiantur ut baptizati, ne sanctae Trinitatis invocatio vel confessio annulletur.

<sup>38</sup> *Sic et Non*, 110; PL 173, 1504C: Beda in libro I homil. XXXVIII.

<sup>39</sup> *Summa Sententiarum* V, 8; PL 176, 134AB: Beda.

<sup>40</sup> *Decr.* D. 4, c. 51, de cons. (Ivo of Chartres).

<sup>41</sup> *Sent.* IV, 63; ed. J. von Walter (Wien, 1924), p. 425.

<sup>42</sup> Ed. A. Landgraf (Louvain, 1934), p. 192.

<sup>43</sup> *Sent.* IV, 6, 2; ed. Quaracchi (1916), p. 177.

<sup>44</sup> *Summa*; Ms. Paris, B. N. lat. 1483, fol. 55v.

<sup>45</sup> *Sent. de sacramentis*; ed. R. M. Martin (as appendix) in H. Weisweiler, *Maître Simon et son groupe De Sacramentis* (Louvain, 1937), p. 21. See also *Hist. schol.*; PL 193, 1560B: Cumque miraretur Nico-demus, quomodo posset homo secundo nasci, cum nonnisi carnalem nativitatem sciret, edoctus est a Domino de spiritali quae fit ex aqua et Spiritu, quarum neutra iterari potest.

<sup>46</sup> *Serm.* IV, 30; PL 208, 454A.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. N. M. Haring, 'St. Augustine's Use of the Word *character*', *Mediaeval Studies*, XIV (1952), 96. Cf. Isidore, *De Eccl. officiis* II, 25, 2; PL 83, 820BC. Bede, *Hom.* XIV; PL

94, 72A. Alcuin, *In Joh.* I; PL 1200, 757BC. A detailed outline of the influence of this text on sacramental theology would demand a separate study.

<sup>48</sup> *Ep.* CXIII; MGH *Epp.* 4, 164.

<sup>49</sup> *Ep.* XVIII; PL 126, 105.

<sup>50</sup> *De Cav. vitis*, 10; PL 125, 924D. Cf. Paschasius, *De Corp. et s. Domini*, 12, 1; PL 120, 1310C.

<sup>51</sup> *In def. s. ordinationis*, 9; ed. E. Duemmler, *Auxilius und Vulgarius* (Leipzig, 1866), p. 69.

<sup>52</sup> *Lib. grat.* 6; MGH *Lib.* 1, 24.

<sup>53</sup> *De Bapt.* V, 24, 34; CSEL 51, 290 f. *Enarr.* in Ps. xxv, 4; PL 36, 1084. *Serm.* XXXVII, 11, 16; PL 38, 228 f. Cf. Marius Afer, *In Gal.* iii, 27; PL 8, 1173B. St. Cyprian, *Epp.* LXXIV, 5 and LXXV, 12; CSEL 3, 2, 803 and 818.

<sup>54</sup> *Enarr.* in *Epp. Pauli* XV, 3; PL 112, 308B. Cf. Ildefonsus (?), *De Cognitione baptismi*; PL 96, 171C. Pseudo-Prospers, *Liber de prom.* IV, 14; PL 51, 848D.

<sup>55</sup> *In Gal.* iii, 27; PL 114, 577D.

<sup>56</sup> *In Gal.* iii, 27; PL 192, 133A.

<sup>57</sup> *Decr.* D. 4, c. 91 de cons.; *Coll. Anselmi* IX, 38; *Polycarpus* III, 10, 51; *Caesaraug.* XIII, 20.

<sup>58</sup> *Sent.* IV, 4, 3; ed. Quaracchi (1916), p. 765. Cf. *Summa Sent.* V, 5; PL 176, 131B; *Ysagoge* II; ed. Landgraf, p. 185.

<sup>59</sup> Pseudo-Alexander of Hales, *Summa theol.* IV, q. 8, a. 1, n. 2 ad 3, derives the existence of baptismal character from this text.

more lasting effect on later history.<sup>57</sup> However, he did not exploit *Heb.* vi, 4-6, to reject rebaptism as a mockery of Christ's death. The view that this Pauline text opposes the reiteration of Baptism appeared first in the Greek Church. While St. Cyril of Jerusalem interprets *Eph.* iv, 5, in the Cyprianic sense,<sup>58</sup> St. Athanasius uses the same text to substantiate his interpretation of *Heb.* vi, 4-6, as opposed to any repetition of true (not heretical) Baptism.<sup>59</sup> St. Basil followed a similar line of argument to explain that there is but *one Baptism*, because Christ died but once as it pointed out in *Rom.* vi, 3-13.<sup>60</sup> He tells us that 'we know but *one saving Baptism*, as there is but one death for the world and one resurrection from the dead'.<sup>61</sup> In passing, we may note St. Basil's theory why true Baptism is not repeated after the Holy Spirit is lost by sin: 'Somehow He seems to stay with the once baptized, waiting for their conversion'.<sup>62</sup>

The Greek interpretations of *Heb.* vi, 4-6, and *Rom.* vi, 3-13, against rebaptism were soon imitated by Latin writers. St. Ambrose, as we shall see, was the first to make use of them against Novatian and he did so mainly in dependence on St. Basil. But St. John Chrysostom's *Homilies on the Epistle to the Hebrews* inspired Latin thought on rebaptism more lastingly than any other Greek contribution to this point of doctrine. At the request of Cassiodorus, Martianus translated them into Latin and, being the first Latin author to use the translation (without acknowledgment), Alcuin introduced St. John Chrysostom's powerful exegesis into Latin literature. Its dominant thought is that, on the strength of *Heb.* vi, 4-6, a second Baptism is not just unfitting but strictly impossible, because it is impossible to crucify the Son of God a second time.<sup>63</sup>

This mystical approach to the root of Christian opposition to rebaptism must have been known to St. Augustine through St. Ambrose who leads us to St. Paul's *unum baptisma* by an analysis of *Rom.* vi, 4, and *Eph.* iv, 23. There Baptism is described as our burial, renewal and resurrection with Christ.<sup>64</sup> From St. Paul's remark that, in Baptism, we have been crucified with Christ who cannot die again (*Rom.* vi, 5 ff.), St. Ambrose passes to *Heb.* vi, 6, with the conclusion: *Semel autem crucifixus est Christus, semel peccato mortuus. Et ideo unum non plura baptismata*.<sup>65</sup> It should be noted here that St. Ambrose established an analogy between Baptism and Public Penance. This analogy was to play an important role in later discussion on the sacrament of Penance: *Sicut unum baptisma, ita una poenitentia, quae tamen publice agitur*.<sup>66</sup>

The idea of deriving the non-repetition of Baptism from the mystical death, burial and resurrection with Christ was not favorable to a recognition of heretical Baptism. It is therefore understandable that even St. Ambrose and St. Jerome are obscure and uncertain in this regard and that St. Augustine avoided this argument.<sup>67</sup> But it was still strengthened in St. Augustine's own time through

<sup>57</sup> Needless to stress, Post-Augustinian theologians were not nearly as creative as St. Augustine in using Scripture texts against rebaptism. Very interesting, however, is the interpretation of *Matth.* x, 17, (*Vos estis sal terrae*) in the *Breviarium fidei adversus Arianos* of Caesarius who explains that salt comes of water and, if it is cast back into water, dissolves and vanishes. So also he who has once been baptized of water becomes salt, but if he allows himself to be baptized again, he vanishes into nothingness and is punished with eternal death (PL 13, 670C). The author comments on *1 Cor.* x, 17, (*The one bread makes us one body*) as follows: Water and fire are required to bake bread. Likewise water and the fire of the Holy Ghost are needed in Baptism according to *John* iii, 5. But bread, baked once, cannot be baked again. If someone puts it in water to knead and bake it anew, it loses its former 'dignity' and turns into black earth.

The same thing happens to all who allow the repetition of their Baptism (PL 13, 671A). These skilful pieces of exegesis aimed at the less educated masses, no doubt, and were plain enough to be understood. They are found again in Benedict of Aniane, *Op. I*; PL 103, 1398B-1399B, but left no other trace.

<sup>58</sup> *Procat.*, 7; PG 33, 355A.

<sup>59</sup> *Ep.* iv, 10 and 13; PG 26, 650C and 655A.

<sup>60</sup> *De Bapt.* II, 1, 2; PG 31, 1579C.

<sup>61</sup> *De Spiritu sancto* XV, 35; PG 32, 130BC. Cf. *Serm.* III, 2 and *Ep.* CCXXVI, 3; PG 32 1151A and 846C.

<sup>62</sup> *De Spiritu sancto* XVI, 40; PG 32, 142CD.

<sup>63</sup> In *Heb.* vi, 1 ff; *hom.* IX; PG 63, 300. Alcuin, in *Heb.* vi, 4-6, and *Comm. brevis*; PL 100, 1057B and 1085B.

<sup>64</sup> *De Poenitentia* II, 2, 8; PL 16, 519B.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.* II, 2, 10; PL 16, 520A.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.* II, 10, 95; PL 16, 541B.

<sup>67</sup> In the *Sermo de Rusticiano subdiacono*, (CSEL 53, 284), wrongly attributed to

Pelagius whose commentaries on St. Paul later enjoyed great popularity under the name of St. Jerome. He sees in *Rom.* vi, 9, a prohibition of rebaptism and, in dependence on Origen, interprets *Heb.* vi, 4, in the same sense.<sup>68</sup>

## II

It may seem that we have strayed a long way from the initial issue and its broader scope. But the post-Augustinian development will remain a puzzle, unless we take into account the numerous currents of thought which converge on the focal point of our problem: the non-repetition of Baptism. The almost complete silence of our sources on the non-repetition of other sacraments may be discouraging, but we cannot ignore that fact that St. Augustine alone had blazed a path from Baptism to Ordination. The picture would still remain incomplete, if we omitted reference to the papal position. It is well known that Pope Stephen failed to impress St. Cyprian with the argument that the power of the divine name accounts sufficiently for the validity of heretical Baptism.<sup>1</sup> Rome also warned him not to act against the Apostle's *unum baptisma*.<sup>2</sup> There is, however, no evidence that Rome took exception to St. Cyprian's view on reordination. In fact, the attitude later expressed by Pope Innocent I when he refused to receive Arian clerics with the concession: *Solum baptisma ratum esse permittimus*<sup>3</sup> is by no means Augustinian. Whatever be the reason that led Innocent to grant this 'permission', the famous chapter, which begins with the words *Ventum est*, in his decretal to Rufus was often quoted to prove the invalidity of heretical Ordinations. It strongly reminds us of St. Cyprian's language when we read: *Eum qui honorem amisit, honorem dare non posse; nec illum aliquid accepisse, quia nihil in dante erat quod ille posset accipere . . . Quod non habuit, dare non potuit*.<sup>4</sup>

Augustinian influences are apparent in the writings of St. Leo I<sup>o</sup> to whom we owe the official rule of conduct to be followed in the universal Church: *Ut lavacrum semel initum nulla iteratione violetur, dicente Apostolo: Unus Dominus, una fides, unum baptisma*.<sup>5</sup> Yet his decretal to the emperor Leo<sup>o</sup> served Hincmar, Humbert and others in confirming their errors on reordination.<sup>6</sup> Of great historical importance was also Leo's ruling on doubtful Baptism: *Quod non ostenditur gestum, ratio non sinit ut videatur iteratum*.<sup>7</sup>

When Pope Anastasius II (496-498) placed Baptism and Holy Orders on an equal level in order to defend the validity of sacraments administered by Acacius, he was clearly inspired by St. Augustine, but experienced remarkable resistance.<sup>8</sup> In defending the *inviolabile sacramentum* outside the Church and in distinguishing it from the unworthy minister who harms no one but himself, Anastasius took an important, and at the time courageous, step in favour of St. Augustine's teaching. But the attitude of Pope Pelagius I (556-561) in the case of Paulinus shows that the opposition was not dead.<sup>9</sup>

The final answer depended on an application of principles derived from the sacrament of Baptism. In this sense, St. Gregory made the momentous decision: *Sicut enim baptizatus semel baptizari iterum non debet, ita qui consecratus est*

St. Augustine, we find the following paraphrase of *Heb.* vi, 4: *quid est enim aliud christianum rebaptizare quam Dominum iterum punire?*

<sup>68</sup> In *Rom.* vi, 9; ed. A. Souter, *Pelagius' Exposition of Thirteen Epistles of St. Paul* (Cambridge, 1922), pp. 50 f. In *De Vita christiana*, 13, (PL 50, 399A), the text is understood of post-baptismal penance.

<sup>1</sup> *Epp.* LXXIII, 16 and LXXV, 18; CSEL 3, 2, 789 and 822.

<sup>2</sup> *Ep.* II (appendix); CSEL 3, 3, 272.

<sup>3</sup> *Ep.* XXIV, 3, 4; PL 20, 550A. Cf. L. Saltet, *Les reordinations* (Paris, 1907), p. 71.

<sup>4</sup> *Ep.* XVII, 3, 7; PL 20, 530C and 531A.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Ep.* CLIX, 7; PL 54, 1139A.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* Cf. *Epp.* CXVI, 2 and CLXVII, 18; PL 54 1194B and 1209A.

<sup>7</sup> *Ep.* CLVI, 5; PL 54, 1151A.

<sup>8</sup> *Ep.* CLXXXIV; MGH *Epp.* 8, 1, 180 ff. Humbert, *Adv. Simoniacos* I, 2; MGH *Lib.* 1, 105.

<sup>9</sup> *Ep.* CLXVII, 16; PL 54, 1208B.

<sup>10</sup> *Ep.* I, 7, 8; ed. Thiel (Braunsberg, 1868), pp. 621 f. Cf. A. Schebler, *Die Reordinationen* (Bonn, 1936), pp. 96 ff.

<sup>11</sup> See A. Schebler, pp. 112 ff.

*semel in eodem ordine iterum non valet consecrari.*<sup>12</sup> Rigorously applied, the analogy would imply a recognition of Holy Orders received in heresy; Gregory's stand in the case of Maximus, who had been ordained by excommunicated bishops, weakens this assumption: *Quam rem nos consecrationem dicere nullo modo possumus, quia ab excommunicatis hominibus est celebrata.*<sup>13</sup>

When some two centuries later, the non-iteration of Confirmation needed to be stressed, the Council of Châlon (813) also proceeded by way of analogy with Baptism: *Nobis visum est eandem confirmationem sicut nec baptismum iterari minime debere.*<sup>14</sup> Although a formal decision to this effect had previously been issued by Pope Gregory II (715-731) in a reply to St. Boniface,<sup>15</sup> the question remained still to be clarified whether the same rule applied to Confirmation conferred by excommunicated, schismatic or heretical ministers. The lack of an authoritative pronouncement explains why later generations kept following opposite trends.

St. Augustine, as previously indicated, failed to bring about a unity of thought mainly because the principal works in which he deals with such problems were buried and lost in a few libraries. It took some seven hundred years before the entire corpus of his anti-Donatist writings became known through actual text quotations in theological or canonical literature and some four hundred years before we find the first traces of it.<sup>16</sup> In the meantime, theologians and Bible commentators passed on scanty bits of information gathered first of all from his ever popular *Sermons on St. John* in which only Baptism and the Eucharist receive an extensive treatment. Especially did St. Augustine's concept of *sacramentum* as lasting consecration in the recipient disappear almost completely for four centuries.<sup>17</sup> Students of history may detect it in the doctrine of Fulgentius of Ruspa (d. 532) that the heretic receives an *integrum sacramentum* without grace.<sup>18</sup> They may read in Ildefonsus of Spain: *Habet et baptismum Christi haereticus,*<sup>19</sup> or may find the expression *haereticum . . . habentem baptismatis sacramentum* in the works of the Venerable Bede.<sup>20</sup> They may come across the sentence: *Inest tamen homini baptizato baptismum etiam extra ecclesiam baptizato*, copied not even from Augustine but from Fulgentius,<sup>21</sup> or may meet the statement: *Habent enim haeretici quaedam sacramenta.*<sup>22</sup>

Yet the full meaning and significance of such truly Augustinian terminology was lost, and attempts to apply it to other sacraments were extremely rare. Most writers during the four centuries after St. Augustine take a firm stand only against rebaptism and pass over the non-repetition of other sacraments in complete silence. If we consult St. Isidore, the great teacher of the Carolingian age, we read that 'if there is one God and *one faith*, there must of necessity be but *one Baptism*, since there is one death of Christ for us with whom we are buried and raised.'<sup>23</sup> Although he agrees with St. Augustine that the *sacramentum* of Baptism is so holy that not even a murderer is able to defile it,<sup>24</sup> he does not suggest anywhere that the same principle may hold in judging the validity of other sacraments.

<sup>12</sup> *Reg. Epp.* II, 45; *MGH Epp.* I, 145.

<sup>13</sup> *Reg. Epp.* IV, 20; *MGH Epp.* I, 255.

<sup>14</sup> *Can.* 27; *MGH LL Conc.* 2, 1, 270. Cf. Benedict Levita, *Cap. Add.* III, 52; *MGH LL* 2, 2, 141. Burchard, *Decr.* IV, 50; *PL* 140, 736D.

<sup>15</sup> *MGH Epp.* 3, 276.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. N. M. Haring, 'St. Augustine's Use of the word *character*', *Med. Studies*, XIV (1952), 97, note 35.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. N. M. Haring, 'Berengar's Definitions of *sacramentum*', *Med. Studies*, X (1948), 121 ff.

<sup>18</sup> *De Fide*, 3, 41; *PL* 65, 692 BC.

<sup>19</sup> *De Cognitione baptismi*, 121; *PL* 96, 161D.

Authenticity doubtful.

<sup>20</sup> *In I Pet.* iii; *PL* 93, 60AB.

<sup>21</sup> Heterius and Beatus, *Ep. ad Elipandum*, 2, 33; *PL* 96, 927C. Fulgentius, *De Fide*, 36, 77; *PL* 65, 703C.

<sup>22</sup> Hrabanus Maurus, *In Reg.* iv, 17; *PL* 109, 151C.

<sup>23</sup> *De Eccl. officiis* II, 25, 6; *PL* 83, 821C. Cf. St. Basil, *De Spiritu sancto* XV, 35 (PG 32, 130B) and St. Ambrose, *De Spiritu sancto* I, 3, 45; (PL 16, 744A) or *De Paenitentia* II, 2, 10 (PL 16, 520A).

<sup>24</sup> *De Eccl. officiis* II, 25, 10; *PL* 83, 822. Augustine. *In Joh. Tract.* V. 19; *PL* 35, 142A.

We may add that the baptismal principle itself began to suffer a temporary set-back in Isidore's century, when penitential canons spread the theory that Baptism conferred by an unbaptized minister must be repeated.<sup>25</sup> And it is not surprising that Ordination was treated with still greater severity: *Si quis ab heretico ordinatus fuerit, iterum debet ordinari*.<sup>26</sup> When Theodore of Canterbury, in 669, reordained Ceadda of Lastingham<sup>27</sup> and, almost exactly a century later, the Council of Rome (767) decided that the Ordination of Constantinus should be repeated,<sup>28</sup> the ground was well prepared for Hincmar's declaration, in 866, that the Holy Orders conferred by Ebo of Rheims were invalid.<sup>29</sup> In such cases, it was occasionally insisted upon that Baptism was not included in the decision, because its non-iteration was too firmly established. It is true that Pope Nicholas I disagreed with Hincmar, but only to a certain extent: only deposed and not excommunicated, Ebo had not been outside the Church when he ordained. With the argument: *Nihil autem habuit, nihil dedit*, the same Pope refused to recognize the Ordinations of Photius who had been ordained by the schismatic bishop Gregory Asbestas.<sup>30</sup> Pope Hadrian II (867-872) confirmed the decision and added the same reason: *Nihil habuit, nihil dedit*.<sup>31</sup>

### III

With very few exceptions, the Carolingian theologians were not prepared for a penetrating study of our problem. When they were called upon by Charlemagne to submit a summary on Baptism, they relied mainly on Isidore and Alcuin. Theodulf of Orléans (d. 821) declared: *Idcirco autem baptismus non iteratur, quia et Christus non amplius quam semel moritur*.<sup>1</sup> The statement was later copied by Smaragdus.<sup>2</sup> Magnus of Sens and Jesse of Amiens do not even refer to repetition of Baptism, though one manuscript of Magnus' treatise contains an addition from St. Augustine's *De Baptismo* containing the sentence: *Nulli enim sacramento injuria facienda est*.<sup>3</sup> But the extract omits St. Augustine's reference to Holy Orders. Leidrad of Lyons copied a text from an Augustinian sermon to defend the validity of heretical Baptism: *Sic habent baptismum haeretici quomodo desertor habet characterem*.<sup>4</sup> He also used Augustine's *De Peccatorum meritis*,<sup>5</sup> but no anti-Donatist work. His successor, Agobard, was apparently the first writer to make use of the *De Baptismo*. That accounts for his conclusion: *Nullo modo igitur, sicut beatus Augustinus docet, sacramentum Christi in bonis ministris approbandum est et in malis respuendum*.<sup>6</sup>

In Paschasius Radbertus we can easily discover a systematic attempt to apply the principles of Baptism to the Eucharist. He points out that just as we are not baptized by the minister's but by Christ's power, so the Eucharist is consecrated by the power of the divine not human words.<sup>7</sup> An entire chapter is devoted to the daily reiteration of the Mass<sup>8</sup> and it is quite possible that, after reading St. Augustine's treatise on Baptism, Paschasius felt the necessity of justifying its daily repetition. Although he adopts and discusses Isidore's definition of *sacramentum*,<sup>9</sup> he uses the word in a different sense when he writes: *Sacramentum*

<sup>25</sup> Cf. N. M. Haring, 'A Brief Historical Comment', *Med. Studies* XIV (1952), 155 ff.

<sup>26</sup> P. W. Finsterwalder, *Die Kanones Theodorici Cant. und ihre Überlieferungsformen* (Weimar, 1929), p. 295.

<sup>27</sup> A. Schebler, *Die Reordinationen*, p. 138.

<sup>28</sup> A. Schebler, p. 170.

<sup>29</sup> A. Schebler, p. 177.

<sup>30</sup> A. Schebler, pp. 145 ff.

<sup>31</sup> MGH Epp. 6, 751.

<sup>1</sup> *Liber de ordine baptismi*, 13; PL 105,2 33B.

<sup>2</sup> In Act. Apost. xix: PL 102, 331A.

<sup>3</sup> *Libellus*: PL 102, 984C; Augustine, *De Bapt.* I, 1, 2; CSEL 51, 146.

<sup>4</sup> *Lib. de sacramento baptismatis*, 6; PL 99,

863B; Augustine, *De Symbol.* 8; PL 40, 636.

<sup>5</sup> *Lib. de sacr. baptismatis*, 9; PL 99, 666D; Augustine, *De Peccatorum meritis* I, 24, 34; CSEL 40, 1, 33.

<sup>6</sup> *De Priv. et jure sacerdotii*, 15; PL 104, 143A; Augustine, *De Bapt.* IV, 20, 27; CSEL 251, 45 f.

<sup>7</sup> *De Corp. et s. Domini*, 15, 1; 120, 1321B.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*: 9, 1-6; PL 120, 1293C-1298A. Cf. *Ep. ad Frudegardum*; PL 120, 1355A. Parts of this teaching are found in Alger, *De Sacr.* I, 16 (PL 180, 786B), Gaudulphus, *Sent.* IV, 29 (ed. J. Walter, p. 456), Lombard, *Sent.* IV, 12, 6 (ed. Quaracchi, p. 814), Gratian, *Decr.* D. 2, c. 21 de cons.

<sup>9</sup> *De Corpore* 3, 1 ff; PL 120, 1275 ff.

*enim consecrandi est quod habet qui ordinatur*,<sup>10</sup> which is in turn a skilful adaptation of St. Augustine's *Sacramentum dandi baptismi est quod habet qui ordinatur*.<sup>11</sup> After quoting the passage in which St. Augustine refutes reordination on the ground that Holy Orders and Baptism constitute analogous cases,<sup>12</sup> Paschasius continues: *Manet igitur in eis sacramenti virtus*.<sup>13</sup> A later hand added to this the significant conclusion: *Et ideo non reordinantur haeretici etiam sacerdotes vel criminosi quique depositi, quia sicut nonnisi unum baptismum ita nonnisi unum sacerdotium*.<sup>14</sup> Paschasius' opponent, Ratramnus, did not use Augustinian works to the same degree, but he deserves to be mentioned here for his introduction of the Augustinian distinction between *sacramentum* and *res* a distinction which will play an important role in later developments.<sup>15</sup>

While the numerous Carolingian exegetes touch on the question of rebaptism on many occasions, they are silent on the repetition or non-repetition of other sacraments. Thus Hrabanus Maurus knows the Augustinian story why the raven did not return to the Ark;<sup>16</sup> the Augustinian exegesis of *John* iii, 5, joined by Bede to the axiom of Gennadius;<sup>17</sup> the interpretation of *Rom.* vi, 9, in conjunction with *Heb.* vi, 4, as proposed by Pelagius;<sup>18</sup> Chrysostom's exposition of *Heb.* vi, 4, with the respective commentary by Alcuin;<sup>19</sup> the various Scripture texts which Bede had turned to the defense of *one Baptism*.<sup>20</sup> His most frequent argument against rebaptism is *Eph.* iv, 5.<sup>21</sup>

Haimo adapts Bede's famous compilation of Augustine and Gennadius<sup>22</sup> and adds *Eph.* iv, 5, to the current interpretation of *Heb.* vi, 2 ff.<sup>23</sup> The oneness of Baptism is safeguarded in the oneness of Christ who reserved to Himself the power to forgive sins in Baptism.<sup>24</sup> Elsewhere the oneness of Christ's death is given as the ultimate reason for its non-repetition.<sup>25</sup> Angelomus of Luxeuil condemns rebaptism as unlawful<sup>26</sup> and Strabo expresses a similar view in an adaptation of Bede's popular argument.<sup>27</sup> Sedulius Scottus teaches that the impossibility of a second crucifixion of Christ and of a second spiritual birth makes rebaptism impossible.<sup>28</sup> Finally, Atto of Vercelli states on one occasion that we must not be rebaptized and declares later that another Baptism is strictly impossible.<sup>29</sup> As far as I could gather, these exegetes say nothing on the non-repetition of other sacraments.

In order to trace the gradual discovery of St. Augustine's sacramentology, we should return to the most learned theologian of the Carolingian era, Hincmar, archbishop of Rheims. An eminent canonist, he considered rebaptism a crime against the sacred canons and the decrees of the Roman Pontiffs.<sup>30</sup> We learn from him that the fear of rebaptism had even begun to inspire opposition to the

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 12, 3; PL 120, 1313A.

<sup>11</sup> *De Bapt.* I, 1, 2; CSEL 51, 146.

<sup>12</sup> *De Corpore*, 12, 3; PL 120, 1313A.

<sup>13</sup> *De Corpore*, 12, 3; PL 120, 1313B.

<sup>14</sup> PL 120, 1313D.

<sup>15</sup> *De Corpore et s. Domini*, 36; PL 121, 142B. His consideration is based on Augustine, *Ep.* XCVIII, 9; CSEL 34, 2, 530. He also offers an Augustinian text which distinguishes between *signum* and *res*. PL 121, 161B: Augustine, *In Joh. Tract.* XXVI, 12; PL 35, 1612. Amalarius, *Liber Officialis* III, 23, 17; ed. J. M. Hanssens, *Studi e Testi* 139 (Vatican, 1948), p. 334, quotes for the first time the definition: *sacramentum i.e. sacrum signum* from *De civ. Dei* X, 5; CSEL 40, 1, 452.

<sup>16</sup> *In Gen.* ii, 8; PL 107, 522C copied from Pseudo-Bede, *Quaest. super Gen.*; PL 93, 296B.

<sup>17</sup> *Hom.* II, 72; PL 110, 283A: Pseudo-Bede, *In Joh.* iii (PL 92, 668C) or Alcuin, *In Joh.* II, v, 4; PL 100, 779A.

<sup>18</sup> *Hom.* II, 113; PL 110, 358C: Pelagius, *In*

*Rom.* vi, 9; ed. Souter, p. 50. Cf. Pseudo-Primasius, *In Rom.* vi, 9; PL 63, 445A.

<sup>19</sup> *Enarr. in Heb.* XXVII, 6; PL 112, 746.

<sup>20</sup> See, for instance, *In Reg.* III, 4 and 7 and Bede, *De Templo*, 20; PL 109, 445B; 446B; 475D; 476D and PL 91, 795D and 797A.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *Ep.* XXX, 6; *MGH Epp.* 5, 452 f. or PL 110, 1193C. *In Lev.* iv, 6; PL 108, 393D copied from Hesychius, *In Lev.* iv, 14; PG 93, 954A.

<sup>22</sup> *Hom. de temp. CVIII*; PL 118, 580BC.

<sup>23</sup> PL 117, 859C. Cf. *Hom. de temp. XXXIII*; PL 118, 219A.

<sup>24</sup> *In I Cor.* i, 12 and iii, 6; PL 117, 513C and 524A. Cf. Augustine, *In Joh. Tract.* VI, 6; PL 35, 122B.

<sup>25</sup> *In Heb.* x, 26; PL 117, 895B. Cf. *In Rom.* vi, 3 ff.; PL 117, 414C.

<sup>26</sup> *In Reg.* i, 14; PL 115, 302B.

<sup>27</sup> *De Reb. ecclesiasticis*, 26; PL 114, 958B.

<sup>28</sup> *In Heb.* vi, 4; PL 103, 259A.

<sup>29</sup> *In Rom.* vi, 6 and *In Heb.* vi, 4 and x, 12; PL 134, 194A; 758C; 791B.

<sup>30</sup> *Ep.* XXXI, 5; PL 126, 213.

Germanic custom of ordeal by water.<sup>31</sup> Although Hincmar tries to dispel the fear, he does not tell us the factors which would constitute a case of rebaptism. In general, his references to the non-repetition of Baptism are the traditional ones,<sup>32</sup> but of considerable importance is his extension of the Augustinian exegesis of *Hic est qui baptizatus Ipse est qui consecratur* in the Sacrifice to the Mass.<sup>33</sup> Equally important is his intensive study of such Augustinian works as *De Nuptiis et concupiscentia*, *De Adulterinis conjugis* and *De Bono conjugali* which he uses with great skill to censure Lothair's divorce and defend the lasting sacramentum of the marriage bond as described by St. Augustine. Thus he protects the indissoluble bond of marriage by analogy with the sacramentum received in Baptism.<sup>34</sup> He also compares it to the sacramentum of Ordination, as St. Augustine had done.<sup>35</sup> Realizing the force of analogy, he adopts St. Leo's prohibition of rebaptism to illustrate how, after sin, the purity of marriage can be restored.<sup>36</sup> The stability of marriage, he reasons accordingly, is as unaffected by sin as the stability of Baptism: hence neither of them is repeated.<sup>37</sup> Hincmar concludes: *Sicut ut semel acceptum baptismi sacramentum . . . nulla interveniente causa amittitur, sic et vinculum conjugale*.<sup>38</sup> There is no doubt that Hincmar was able to make good use of Augustinian doctrines, if he wished to do so.

But when Hincmar reached the conclusion that, with the exception of Baptism, the sacraments administered by the deposed Ebo were invalid, he invoked such decretals as *Ventum est* rather than the teaching of St. Augustine. And his fellow bishops agreed with him. Some thirty years later, the Synod of Rome (897) reached the same conclusion with regard to the Ordinations conferred by Pope Formosus (891-896).<sup>39</sup> In both cases, the administration of sacraments such as Holy Orders was condemned as contrary to law and therefore null and void.

The decision of the Roman Synod (897) was not accepted by Auxilius and Vulgarius whose own Orders were at stake. Auxilius, who claims St. Augustine as his foremost patristic authority, concludes his refutation with the words: 'You have now heard it clearly enough that an Ordination performed by pseudo-bishops can exist validly. You also have heard that, just as a person must not be baptized again, he cannot be consecrated again in the same Order.'<sup>40</sup> In another work, he urges the reader to study St. Augustine and affirms: *Veraciter scio quod ejusdem praevaricationis sit iterata consecratio, cujus praevaricationis sunt haeretici qui rebaptizare audent*.<sup>41</sup> The analogy between rebaptism and reordination is also contained in a statement attributed to St. Jerome: *Sicut hic est qui baptizatus, ita hic est qui consecratur*.<sup>42</sup>

Vulgarius, who never quotes Augustine, puts equal stress on this analogy, but concentrates on the human minister who may be deprived of the exercise of priestly acts, yet never of the power itself.<sup>43</sup> He insists that, just as Baptism, Ordination is given only once by one and the same Spirit, for there is but one Holy Spirit, one Lord, one faith, one Baptism, one priesthood.<sup>44</sup> If Baptism cannot be taken away, undoubtedly the priesthood cannot be taken away either. Just

<sup>31</sup> Ep. XXV; PL 126, 170C.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *De Cavendis vitii*, 10; PL 125, 924CD (Bede). *De Una et non trina deitate*, 10; PL 125, 55AC.

<sup>33</sup> *De Cav. vitii*, 10; PL 125, 924D.

<sup>34</sup> *De Div. Loth., Interrog.*, 21; PL 125, 734C; Augustine, *De Nuptiis* I, 10, 11; CSEL 42, 222.

<sup>35</sup> PL 125, 735BC; Augustine, *De Bono conjugali*, 24, 32; CSEL 41, 226.

<sup>36</sup> Ep. XXII; PL 126, 145B; Leo I, Ep. CLIX, 7.

<sup>37</sup> Ep. XXII; PL 126, 146BD; Augustine, *De Adulterinis conjugis* II, 4, 4, (CSEL 41, 385), *De Nuptiis* I, 33, 38; CSEL 42, 250.

<sup>38</sup> Ep. XXII; PL 126, 147B.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. A. Schebler, *Die Reordinationen*,

p. 201.

<sup>40</sup> *De Ordinationibus*, 24; PL 129, 1069B; Gregory I, *Reg. Epp.* II, 45; MGH *Epp.* I, 145.

<sup>41</sup> *Dialogus*, 6; PL 129, 1082C.

<sup>42</sup> *In def. s. ordinationis*, 9; ed. E. Duemmler, *Auxilius und Vulgarius* (Leipzig), 1866) p. 69. Cf. *Decretum Wiberti*; MGH *Lib.* I, 625. It may be noted here that Auxilius was later criticized by Humbert, as has been shown convincingly by J. Joseph Ryan, 'Cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida and Auxilius', *Med. Studies*, XIII (1951), 218-2.

<sup>43</sup> *De Causa et negotio Form.*; PL 129, 1107D.

<sup>44</sup> PL 129, 1108C. Cf. Paschasius, *De Corp. et sang. Domini*, 12, 3; PL 120, 1313D.

as one baptized is baptized forever, so a priest is a priest forever. Hence it is clear that, just as the baptized cannot be rebaptized, the ordained cannot in any way be reordained.<sup>45</sup> The reason lies in their inseparability from the recipient: *Quocirca necesse est, ut concedas sacerdotium ab accepto inseparabile sicut baptismum.*<sup>46</sup>

Of course, his opponents did not deny this inseparability. They just denied that Holy Orders had ever been truly received. It is against this mentality that Vulgarius offers the typically Augustinian argument: If those baptized by Judas were not rebaptized, why then should those ordained by Formosus be ordained again?<sup>47</sup> Although Vulgarius does not directly deal with heretical Orders—Pope Formosus was no heretic—he considers it illogical to be merciless regarding heretical Orders and indulgent with regard to their Baptism.<sup>48</sup>

## IV

The doctrinal controversies of the Gregorian reform movement in the next century prove that many chose to be illogical. The appeal of the Cyprianic ideology with its heavy emphasis on the minister's worthiness was still stronger than the still dimly known principles advocated by St. Augustine who, far from underrating the importance of grace in the administration of sacraments, maintained that the validity of sacraments was not dependent on the minister's personal merits and grace. Otherwise it would be necessary to rebaptize and reordain even within the Church, if the minister's personal unworthiness became known. In the case of Baptism it was now commonly admitted that the minister's personal merits and grace did not affect its validity, excepting some uncertainty concerning the pagan minister.

Despite the strong Cyprianic mentality which we have encountered, there had been an undisputed custom not to repeat Confirmation and Holy Orders *within* the Church. In this matter, the guiding rule was very well put by Braulio of Saragossa (631-651): *Quia in catholica actum est, necesse iterari non est.*<sup>1</sup> We have shown that the explicit justification of the non-repetition of Confirmation and Ordination was based on an analogy with Baptism.<sup>2</sup> Serious disagreements began with the evaluation of Holy Orders or Confirmation received and conferred by heretical, schismatic or even deposed ministers. As a rule, neither those who affirmed nor those who denied their validity argued about sacramental matter, form and intention, as they did in determining valid Baptism.<sup>3</sup> They would rather affirm or deny that such ministers had something they could give to the recipient. In other words, while they all agreed that nobody can give what he does not possess, they proved or disproved that the link with the source of all sacramental power, the Church, was not broken.

Although there is a great deal of obscurity in distinguishing the various impositions of hands practised in the early Church,<sup>4</sup> it seems that Confirmation in case of return to the Church was actually more often repeated than Ordination. During the period we are about to consider, the repetition of heretical Confirmation was in fact openly demanded by several reformers. A recognition of valid Baptism outside the Church did not necessarily imply that the *virtus sacramenti* was also recognized.<sup>5</sup> An imposition of hands was therefore often deemed

<sup>45</sup> PL 129, 1108C.

<sup>46</sup> PL 129, 1108D.

<sup>47</sup> *De Causa Formosiana*, 1; ed. Duemmler, pp. 120 f.

<sup>48</sup> *De Causa et negotio*; PL 129, 1112A. His interpretation of the decretal *Ventum est* is summed up as follows: Quod (Innocentius) dixit de haereticis, non est eotenus de catholicis accipiendum. *De Causa Formosiana*, 11; ed. Duemmler, p. 127.

<sup>1</sup> Ep. II, 4; MGH AA, 14, 285 or PL 87, 408A. Cf. St. Bernard, Ep. CCCLIII; PL 182, 556B:

Si (sacramentum ordinis) in ecclesia suscipitur non est periculum.

<sup>2</sup> Gregory I, *Reg. Epp.* II, 45, MGH *Epp.* v, 145. Council of Chalon, can. 27; MGH *LL Conc.* 2, 1, 279.

<sup>3</sup> An interesting exception is the case found in Braulio, *Epp.* I and II; MGH *AA*, 14, 283 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Fr. De Saint-Palais d'Aussac, *La Réconciliation des hérétiques dans l'Eglise latine* (Paris, 1943), pp. 65 ff.

<sup>5</sup> See Bernold, *De Reordinatione vitanda et*



necessary to bestow the Holy Spirit whom the Church alone could impart.<sup>6</sup> A similar rule was accordingly proposed for the imposition of hands in bestowing the power of the priesthood. Those who demanded reconfirmation or reordination simply denied the very existence of these sacraments in the persons involved. Hence they intended, at least, to confirm and ordain, not to reconfirm and reordain. Thus basically they, too, held the doctrine that, once validly received, Confirmation and Holy Orders could not be repeated.

For that reason, Cardinal Humbert, who ardently advocated the repetition of simoniac Orders, refuted his accusers with the words: *Quis dicit aut sentit denuo aliquem in eodem ordine consecrari posse? Absit a nobis sic sapere.*<sup>7</sup> One can hardly imagine the innumerable doubts stirred up in the hearts of such men as St. Peter Damian whose own consecration was open to the reformers' accusation of invalidity.<sup>8</sup> In defending his cause, St. Peter Damian betrays an Augustinianism derived from the *Sermons on St. John* as developed by the Carolingian Paschasius.

Peter's starting point is Paschasius' extension of the Augustinian exegesis of *Hic est qui baptizat* to *Hic est qui consecrat* in the Eucharist<sup>9</sup> which he applies to Ordination<sup>10</sup> as Auxilius had done.<sup>11</sup> In both Baptism and Ordination, he argues, the invisible 'auctor' is one and the same Spirit of Christ<sup>12</sup> who reserved the power to consecrate to Himself and transferred the right to consecrate to no one else.<sup>13</sup> The human ministry does not affect the action of Him who truly baptizes and of Him who truly consecrates.<sup>14</sup> 'Since this is so,' Peter Damian claims, 'I fail to see why he who is baptized by a heretic is not rebaptized and why he who is ordained by a so-called simoniac is deposed or ordained again.'<sup>15</sup> There is but one Baptism whose repetition is prohibited by canonical authority 'lest we annul the name of the Trinity'.<sup>16</sup> This rule must be applied to the simoniac who, a heretic because of his trafficking, but a Catholic by faith, not only consecrates in the name of the Trinity but also observes the entire rite of Catholic Ordination.<sup>17</sup> These two elements, viz., the Catholic or ecclesiastical administration and the invocation of the divine name, are sufficient for valid Orders.<sup>18</sup> Their administration by imposition of hands and invocation of the divine name is Catholic, if conferred in the Catholic Church, i.e., in the unity of orthodox faith.<sup>19</sup> Arian Ordinations were invalid precisely because the orthodoxy of faith was lacking.<sup>20</sup> Rebaptism and reordination are an equal crime: *Sicut enim rebaptizatus Christum, quem induerat, exuisse convincitur, ita nimirum et reconsecratus Spiritum sanctum, quem acceperat, evidenter probatur amisisse.*<sup>21</sup> Both crimes constitute a violation of the authority of Pope Gregory I.<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, the decretal *Ventum est*, repeated *ad nauseam*, only barred trinitarian heretics from further promotions and prohibited their reordination.<sup>23</sup>

Peter Damian believes that, in order to avoid so much confusion, we should

*de salute parvulorum qui ab excommunicatis baptizati sunt*; MGH Lib. 2, 150-8.

<sup>6</sup> See Leo I, Ep. CLIX, 7, PL 54, 1138: Qui baptismum ab haereticis acceperunt . . . sola invocatione Spiritus sancti per impositionem manuum confirmandi sunt, quia formam tantum baptismi sine sanctificationis virtute sumpserunt.

<sup>7</sup> Adv. Simoniacos I, 7; MGH Lib. 1, 110.

<sup>8</sup> A. Schebler, *Die Reordinationen*, p. 223.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Paschasius, *De Corpore et s. Domini*, 12, 1; PL 120, 1310C: Sicut hic est qui baptizat ita ipse est qui per Spiritum sanctum hanc suam efficit carnem et transfundit vinum in sanguinem. Alger of Liège, *De Sacr.* III, 8 and *De Mis.* I, 56 (PL 180, 841A and 882D) attributes the text to Augustine. See also *Sent. divinitatis*; ed. B. Geyer, *Beiträge*, VII (1909), 141\*.

<sup>10</sup> *Liber gratissimus*, 5 ff.; MGH Lib. 1, 22 and 24. Cf. St. Bernard, Ep. CCCLIII; PL 182, 556B: Qui baptizat, ipse et consecrat.

<sup>11</sup> Auxilius, *In def. s. ordinationis*, 9; ed. Duemmler, p. 69.

<sup>12</sup> *Lib. grat.*, 2 f.; MGH Lib. 1, 20 f. Cf. Ep. II, 1; PL 144, 256B.

<sup>13</sup> *Lib. grat.*, 12; MGH Lib. 1, 34. Damian applies here to Holy Orders what St. Augustine had taught of Baptism.

<sup>14</sup> *Lib. grat.*, 4; p. 22.

<sup>15</sup> *Lib. grat.*, 5; p. 22.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*; pp. 22 f.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*; p. 23.

<sup>18</sup> *Lib. grat.*, 6; p. 24.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*; pp. 23 f.

<sup>20</sup> *Lib. grat.*, 22; p. 50.

<sup>21</sup> *Lib. grat.*, 32; p. 63. Cf. Pope Felix, Ep. XIII, 2; ed. Thiel (Braunsberg, 1868), pp. 259 f. *Decret. Pseudo - Isidorianae*; ed. P. Hinschius (Leipzig, 1863), p. 633. *Dionysio-Hadriana*; PL 61, 323D.

<sup>22</sup> *Lib. grat.*, 33; p. 65: Gregory I, *Reg. Epp.* II, 45; MGH Epp. 1, 145.

<sup>23</sup> *Lib. grat.*, 31; pp. 62 f.

not look at the minister but at his office and should distinguish between the sacrament and its grace.<sup>24</sup> To sum up, Peter sees the root of the non-repetition of Baptism and Holy Orders in Christ who baptizes and ordains or consecrates. His work deeply impressed Bernold,<sup>25</sup> while Alger of Liège felt that Damian made concessions to simoniac sacraments which were incompatible with the teaching of the Church.<sup>26</sup> Peter does not use the term *sacramentum* in the Augustinian manner, but he does attribute to Baptism and Ordination a consecratory effect from which simoniac sacraments are not barred.<sup>27</sup>

Cardinal Humbert, however, rejects the very idea of a lasting consecration through Baptism received outside the Church: *Quod certe non propter aliquam sanctitatem sui vel reverentiam catholici non iterare censuerunt.*<sup>28</sup> He contends that the Catholics recognize heretical Baptism only out of prudence, to avoid the scandal of the unruly and ignorant masses and to lead as many as possible back to Christ.<sup>29</sup> To make up for its imperfections, heretics have to submit to an imposition of hands and are barred from Holy Orders.<sup>30</sup> Gregory's decretal to John of Ravenna<sup>31</sup> should not be invoked because it is not to the point, since the deposition referred to by Gregory was unjust.<sup>32</sup> Innocent's decretal *Ventum est* really tolls the death bell to all simoniacs who are worse than the worst Arians.<sup>33</sup> Yet it is a base calumny to raise the accusation of reordinations, because in the Catholic Church there is but one Ordination, while all heretical impositions of hands are null and void.<sup>34</sup>

Humbert either ignored the teaching of St. Augustine<sup>35</sup> in this matter or was not sufficiently familiar with it. The fact that the *Diversorum sententiae Patrum* which is now attributed to him contains no Augustinian text may be explained in the same manner.<sup>36</sup> He was more familiar with St. Cyprian with whom he shares the view that, being inseparable, sacraments cannot exist without grace.<sup>37</sup>

The collection attributed to Cardinal Humbert made history by originating a period of research into the patristic sources which prepared the tools for the ensuing controversies and determined the course of theology for many generations. Of course, the proper choice of texts was all-important at a time when the ordinary scholar had to rely on such compilations rather than the original works. At the request of Pope Gregory VII, Anselm of Lucca published a *Collectio canonum* (1181-1186) which shows a remarkable amount of Augustinian texts. The ninth book deals with the sacraments, i.e., the Eucharist, Baptism and Confirmation.<sup>38</sup>

After quoting St. Augustine on the power of the name of Christ at the moment of Baptism,<sup>39</sup> he deals with Confirmation and we learn that, on the authority of

<sup>24</sup> *Lib. grat.*, 9 and 11; pp. 27 and 32. Cf. Paschasius, *De Corpore et s. Domini*, 12, 4; PL 120, 1315A.

<sup>25</sup> Bernold, *De Excomm. vitandis*; MGH Lib. 2, 119, calls Peter Alter Ieronimus in nostro tempore and approves of his work in *De Sac. excommunicatorum*, (ibid.; 92 f.).

<sup>26</sup> Alger, *De Mis.* III, 39 ff.; PL 180, 949B.

<sup>27</sup> Alger seems to think that, according to Peter Damian, simoniac sacraments are not only valid but also profitable. He agrees with Peter only on their validity; Quae nos quidem ita ut upse (i.e., Damian) approbamus: vera quidem quantum ad formam, sed tamen inania quantum ad spirituale gratiam. *De Mis.* III, 50; PL 180, 954C.

<sup>28</sup> *Adv. Simoniacos* I, 2; MGH Lib. 1, 105.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Innocent I, *Ep.* XVII, 4, 8; PL 20, 531A.

<sup>31</sup> *Reg. Epp.* II, 45; MGH *Epp.* I, 145.

<sup>32</sup> *Adv. Sim.* I, 7; p. 110.

<sup>33</sup> *Adv. Sim.* I, 7 and 12; pp. 111 and 118.

<sup>34</sup> *Adv. Sim.* I, 8; p. 113: Si autem catholicus post haereticum (ordinat), recta et una

habetur haec ordinatio et ideo non reordinatio sed unica purgatio.

<sup>35</sup> His quotations from Augustine's *Tractatus* are not related to sacramental validity.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. A. Michel, *Die Sentenzen des Kardinals Humbert, das erste Rechtsbuch der päpstlichen Reform*, MGH *Schriften*, 7 (1952), pp. 93 ff.

<sup>37</sup> *Adv. Sim.* I, 15; p. 125. D. Van Den Eynde, *Les Définitions des Sacraments* (Rome, 1950), p. 9, credits Humbert with a doctrine which affirms 'avec une netteté surprenante l'élément d'efficacité dans les sacrements'. But Humbert's mistaken and exaggerated concept of sacramental efficacy is at least as old as St. Cyprian's and the principal root of both St. Cyprian's and Humbert's errors. See, for instance, *Adv. Sim.* II, 40; p. 189: Sic signa sunt ut res quoque essentialiter et vere sint.

<sup>38</sup> F. Thaner, *Anselmi episcopi Lucensis collectio canonum* (Innsbruck, 1906), pp. 459 ff.

<sup>39</sup> *Coll. can.* IX, 18; ed. Thaner, p. 464: *De Bapt.* IV, 11, 17; CSEL 51, 242.

St. Augustine, the imposition of hands can be repeated.<sup>40</sup> The compiler then offers texts related to heretical Baptism and, with the exception of two Leonine passages, cites only texts from St. Augustine which reflect the following line of thought: Even apostates can administer Baptism, though they cannot possess or give *caritas*.<sup>41</sup> Accordingly, both the good and wicked, not excluding the excommunicated, can administer sacraments.<sup>42</sup> These are not to be violated: *Nulli sacramento injuria facienda est*.<sup>43</sup> The sacraments are everywhere *integra* and *recta*,<sup>44</sup> but only Christ remits sin, not the heretic who cannot give the *effectus* of the sacrament.<sup>45</sup>

Anselm tells us nothing on Augustine's stand against reordination, but elsewhere he quotes from Gregory's decretal to John of Ravenna.<sup>46</sup> At the same time, he points out that St. Cyprian denied episcopal power and honor to an apostate bishop,<sup>47</sup> that according to St. Leo a bishop loses the right to ordain (*ordinationis jus*) by ordaining an unworthy priest<sup>48</sup> and that in the matter of simony St. Gregory wrote: *Sacerdotium illic subsistere non arbitror*.<sup>49</sup> Naturally, he does not omit Innocent's decretal *Ventum est* with its well known sentence: *Quod non habuerit quis, dare non potuit*.<sup>50</sup>

About the same time, Cardinal Deusdedit composed a *Liber canonum* for a similar purpose. In his choice of texts, he progresses with St. Augustine from the sacraments of bad Catholics within the Church<sup>51</sup> to those of heretics and schismatics.<sup>52</sup> Their Baptism is recognized as valid, though without sin-remitting power.<sup>53</sup>

While we may look in vain for information on other sacraments, we learn more about the compiler's attitude in his work *Against the Invaders*. Since heretical sacrifices are abhorred by God,<sup>54</sup> it is 'most obvious' to Deusdedit that both priesthood and Sacrifice (i.e., the Mass) of simoniacs are invalid (*irrita*).<sup>55</sup> The imposition of hands on baptized converts from heresy proves that they do not have the fulness of the Holy Spirit.<sup>56</sup> The contention that to heretical Baptism and Sacrifice the same rule should be applied, is not acceptable to Deusdedit<sup>57</sup> who, by shifting the argument to the Eucharist, tries to escape St. Augustine's teaching that the sacraments of heretics and schismatics are 'holy' and not to be repeated.<sup>58</sup> He is convinced that this contradictory opinion cannot be justly attributed to Augustine, because (as far as Deusdedit can recall) he dealt only in a general way with Donatist sacraments, not with their Sacrifice, except in some letters which must be understood of unworthy priests and not of heretics.<sup>59</sup> Although a sacrament, the Sacrifice (of the Mass) is transitory and therefore daily repeated.<sup>60</sup> The other sacraments—such as Baptism, chrism, the symbolum, the Gospel, the Lord's prayer—are permanent and consequently not repeated within or without the Church,<sup>61</sup> because St. Augustine teaches: *Nulli sacramento injuria facienda est*.<sup>62</sup>

<sup>40</sup> Coll. can. IX, 26; p. 467: *De Bapt.* III, 16, 21; CSEL 51, 213.

<sup>41</sup> Coll. can. IX, 29-31; pp. 468 f.; *De Bapt.* I, 1, 2; III, 16, 21; CSEL 51, 145; 212.

<sup>42</sup> Coll. can. IX, 32; p. 469.

<sup>43</sup> Coll. can. IX, 33; p. 470: *De Bapt.* I, 1, 2; CSEL 51, 145.

<sup>44</sup> Coll. can. IX, 34; pp. 470 ff.; *De Bapt.* III, 15, 20; V, 20, 27; CSEL 51, 211; 285.

<sup>45</sup> Coll. can. IX, 35 ff.; pp. 471 ff.; *De Bapt.* III, 18, 23; IV, 4, 5; CSEL 51, 215 f.; 226.

<sup>46</sup> Coll. can. VII, 87; p. 400: Gregory, *Reg. Epp.* II, 45; MGH *Epp.* I, 145.

<sup>47</sup> Coll. can. VI, 57; p. 296: Cyprian, *Ep.* LV, 24; CSEL 3, 2, 642.

<sup>48</sup> Coll. can. VI, 64; p. 299.

<sup>49</sup> Coll. can. VI, 67; p. 300: Gregory, *Reg. Epp.* IX, 213; MGH *Epp.* 2, 198.

<sup>50</sup> Coll. can. VI, 70; p. 303: Innocent, *Ep.* XVII, 3.

<sup>51</sup> *Lib. can.* IV, 227; ed. V. W. von Glanvell, *Die Kanonensammlung des Kard. Deusdedit* (Paderborn, 1905), p. 526.

<sup>52</sup> *Lib. can.* IV, 229 ff.; ed. Glanvell, p. 526: *In Joh. Tract.* V, 8; 11; 13; 18; PL 35, 1418 ff.

<sup>53</sup> *Lib. can.* IV, 230; p. 527: *De Bapt.* IV, 4, 5; CSEL 51, 226.

<sup>54</sup> *Lib. can.* IV, 242-4; pp. 531 f.

<sup>55</sup> *Contra Invasores* II, 4; MGH *Lib.* 2, 322.

<sup>56</sup> *Contra Inv.* II, 5; p. 323.

<sup>57</sup> *Contra Inv.* II, 4; p. 322.

<sup>58</sup> He refers to *De Bapt.* IV, 12, 18 (CSEL 51, 244), *Ep.* XCHII, 11, 46 (CSEL 34, 2, 488) and *Ep.* LXXXVII, 9 (CSEL 34, 2, 405).

<sup>59</sup> *Contra Inv.* II, 7; p. 325. He mentions the letters to Glorius, Emeritus and Eleusius.

<sup>60</sup> *Contra Inv.* II, 7; p. 325.

<sup>61</sup> *Contra Inv.* II, 7, p. 325.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*

The other Fathers, we learn, agree with St. Augustine on this matter, but they disagree with his (alleged) statement: *Manus impositio iteranda non est sicut nec baptismus*.<sup>63</sup> If Pope Gregory and the Council of Carthage prohibited reordinations,<sup>64</sup> it should be understood of those who were validly ordained and later deposed. If Arian churches were reconsecrated, the consecration of their priests may likewise be repeated.<sup>65</sup> In fact, Pope Stephen III (752-757) and Sergius III (904-911) ordered reordinations and yet they lived after St. Augustine.<sup>66</sup> Deusdedit concedes that some cases in history are open to debate, but he is sure that a simoniac priest is no priest at all and, being a heretic, can never be ordained, for such ordinations are prohibited by Innocent, Leo and the Fathers.<sup>67</sup>

Deusdedit argues from effect to cause: If a priest's Mass is null and void, it is because the power was never received. He objects to reordination on legal grounds and avoids the term 'reordination'. In this sense, the papal legate, Amatus, decreed in 1078: *Non enim his fit reiteratio sed ipsa consecratio*.<sup>68</sup> Others went as far as to claim that even the power of once validly received Orders could be lost, not directly by simony, but through a public sentence of annulment.<sup>69</sup> This met with opposition based on the then well-known doctrine that the invocation of the Trinity cannot be annulled. The answer was that the reconsecration of churches also involved another invocation of the Trinity.<sup>70</sup> The real reason for the non-repetition of Baptism, we are told, is not the trinitarian invocation but the Apostolic precept: *unum baptisma*.<sup>71</sup> Similarly, according to Apostolic (i.e., papal) legislation, heretical Orders are recognized or repeated, though, strictly speaking, such a reiteration is a first Ordination.<sup>72</sup>

The fact that this doctrine was at variance with the teaching of St. Augustine was no longer ignored<sup>73</sup> and the need to study it more thoroughly became more urgent when it was discovered that the 'decretal of Pope Paschal', more forceful than *Ventum est*, was spurious.<sup>74</sup> Bernold of Constance maintained that, if properly understood, the Fathers agree with St. Augustine, provided we pay more attention to the sacrament itself, whose validity they recognize, and grace (*effectus*) which they all denied.<sup>75</sup> Holy Orders, received outside the Church, must not be repeated because St. Augustine writes: *Nulli sacramento injuria facienda est*.<sup>76</sup> Bernold warns his readers not to misunderstand and confuse the canons that speak of imposition of hands on clerics. Such an imposition may be *ordinatoria* or *reconciliatoria* and since the latter is only a prayer it can be repeated.<sup>77</sup> Among the numerous impositions of hands, two must be classed as *sacramentum* and cannot be reiterated, viz., Confirmation and Ordination.<sup>78</sup>

On a later occasion, Bernold urges his readers to study St. Augustine's works against the Donatists<sup>79</sup> and again quotes the passage: *Nulli sacramento injuria facienda est*.<sup>80</sup> His contemporary, Pope Urban II (1088-1099), also proposed St. Augustine as guide, but he did so only in the evaluation of sacraments conferred by unworthy ministers in the Church.<sup>81</sup> The case of Daibert proves, however, that

<sup>63</sup> *Contra Inv.* 9; p. 326. St. Augustine, *De Bapt.* III, 16, 21 (CSEL 51, 213) stated the very contrary: *Manus autem impositio NON sicut baptismus repeti non potest*. The text is quoted accurately in Anselm of Lucca, *Coll. can.* IX, 29; ed. Thaner, p. 467.

<sup>64</sup> Gregory, *Reg. Ep.* II, 45; MGH *Ep.* 1, 145. Third Council of Carthage, can. 38.

<sup>65</sup> *Contra inv.* II, 9; p. 326.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*; p. 327.

<sup>67</sup> *Contra Inv.* II, 10; p. 328.

<sup>68</sup> Council of Girone, can. 11; Mansi 20, 520A.

<sup>69</sup> Bernold of St. Blase, *Ep.* II, 35; MGH *Lib.* 2, 43.

<sup>70</sup> Bernold and Adalbert, *Ep.* III, 26; MGH *Lib.* 2, 56.

<sup>71</sup> *Ep.* III, 27; p. 56.

<sup>72</sup> *Ep.* III, 28; p. 57.

<sup>73</sup> Cf. *Ep.* III, 30; p. 58: Augustine, *De Bono*

*conjugali*, 24, 32; CSEL 41, 226. The text refers to Orders received in the Church.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. MGH *Lib.* 1, 1-11 and Bernold, *De Sac. excomm.*, 7; MGH *Lib.* 2, 92. It is now attributed to Humbert.

<sup>75</sup> *De Sac. excomm.*, 4; p. 90.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 7; p. 92: Augustine, *De Bapt.* I 1, 2; CSEL 51, 146. See also Bernold's remark on p. 93: *Ne juxta Augustinum divinis mysteriis faciamus injuriam*. It is derived from Augustine, *Ep.* LXXXVII, 9 (CSEL 44, 1, 405), quoted in *De Record. vitanda*, 9; MGH *Lib.* 2, 153.

<sup>77</sup> *De Excomm. vitandis*, 16; MGH *Lib.* 2, 118: Augustine, *De Bapt.* III, 16, 21.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 17; p. 118 f.

<sup>79</sup> *De Reord. vitanda*, 8; MGH *Lib.* 2, 155.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, 4; p. 153.

<sup>81</sup> *Ep. ad Lucium*; PL 151, 531C.

he rejected all impositions of hands as invalid, if performed by heretics: *Quia nihil habuit, dare nihil potuit*. Part of this decision was copied by his contemporary, Ivo of Chartres, under the heading: *Redeunt ab haereticis sunt reordinandi*<sup>82</sup> and Gratian did the same in *Decretum* C. 1, q. 7, c. 24.

Bonizo of Sutri also praises St. Augustine emphatically as *difficilium quaesitionum enodator* and quotes the passage: *Nulli tamen sacramento, ut iteretur, injuria facienda est*.<sup>83</sup> He goes as far as to recognize valid *chrisma* outside the Church—*Non iterandum propter vim sacramenti*—and rejects reordinations for canonical reasons.<sup>84</sup>

Bruno of Segni, however, advocates the repetition of heretical Confirmation<sup>85</sup> despite his explicit recognition of St. Augustine's teaching: *quod nulli sacramento injuria facienda sit*.<sup>86</sup> On this point, Bruno asserts, Augustine seems to differ widely from the others, for what is *injuria sacramenti* if not the repetition of it? And yet we have an abundance of examples and authorities to prove that certain sacraments are indeed reiterated: 'I say certain sacraments, because the reiteration of Baptism and Holy Orders is not allowed.'<sup>87</sup> On this matter, Bruno insists, the entire Church agrees and no disagreement is found 'among the Saints'. Then, like Deusdedit, he quotes St. Augustine (wrongly) to show that the imposition of hands in Ordination must not be repeated.<sup>88</sup> At the same time, the repetition of some sacraments is a frequent occurrence. Thus we witness every day that consecrations of churches are repeated, not only of necessity, but also of the bishop's free will.<sup>89</sup> The reconsecration of an Arian church by Gregory I so pleased God that he approved of it by miracles.<sup>90</sup> How then can it be true: *quod nulli sacramento injuria facienda sit*? In fact, it can be shown historically that the *consignatio* of chrism on heretics has to be repeated.<sup>91</sup> St. Augustine himself is not quite consistent because he approves of a repeated imposition of hands on heretics which he defines as *oratio super hominem*.<sup>92</sup> So Bruno concludes: *Si igitur ejusdem sacramenti oratio iteratur super hominem, et ipsa manus impositio iteratur*. Not quite convinced of the strength of his own argument, Bruno assures us that this prayer is not to be repeated in those sacraments which we are not allowed to reiterate.<sup>93</sup>

This first explicit and detailed criticism of St. Augustine's axiom reveals strikingly that the conflict with the repetition of Confirmation received outside the Church was partly caused by Augustine's failure to clarify the question.

## V

There were, of course, several other reasons for the confusion. First of all, it is obvious that the meaning of the word 'sacrament' was still too vague which accounts for such arguments as the reconsecration of churches to justify reordinations. As a logical result, the number of sacraments was not yet determined. In addition, the relationship between sacrament and grace or between the material and formal elements was still controversial. Accordingly, the question of sacramental validity and repetition or non-repetition remained widely obscure with the exception of Baptism. The reason why heretical Baptism should be recognized was not clearly seen by all. Cardinal Humbert, as we have seen,

<sup>82</sup> *Panormia* III, 81; PL 161, 448C.

<sup>83</sup> *Lib. de vita christiana* I, 43; ed E. Perels (Berlin, 1930), p. 32. See also the excerpt in II, 17 (p. 53) from *De Baptismo* I, 1, 2 (CSEL 51, 146) including the passage: *Nulli sacramento injuria facienda est*.

<sup>84</sup> *Lib. de vita christ.* II, 55 and I, 44; pp. 63 and 33.

<sup>85</sup> *Libellus de simoniacis*, 11; MGH *Lib.* 2, 556. Cf. *In Joh.* II, 10; PL 165, 533A: *Ecclesiae sacramenta dare possunt . . . nihil reiteratur in eis. Nulli enim sacramento injuria facienda est. Quidam tamen sanc-*

*tur, a catholicis debere confirmari quia haeretici dare non possunt spiritum sanctum.*

<sup>86</sup> *De Bapt.* I, 1, 2; CSEL 51, 146.

<sup>87</sup> *Libellus*, 11; p. 556.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*; p. 557. See Deusdedit, *Contra Inv.* II, 9; MGH *Lib.* 2, 326.

<sup>89</sup> *Libellus*, 12; p. 557. Cf. Burchard, *Decr.* III, 11; PL 140, 675D.

<sup>90</sup> *Libellus*, 12; p. 557. cf. Deusdedit, *Contra Inv.* II, 9; p. 326.

<sup>91</sup> *Libellus*, 12; p. 557.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.* p. 558. Cf. *De Bapt.* III, 16, 21.

<sup>93</sup> *Libellus*, 12; p. 559.

considered the acceptance of heretical Baptism an act of prudence, while Bernard of St. Blaise held that the Church tolerated it as a sort of *fait accompli*.<sup>1</sup> Pope Urban II suggested that Baptism deserves a consideration different from that of other sacraments because it precedes them in both order and necessity.<sup>2</sup> Bruno of Segni expressed the much more commonly accepted view that the Roman Pontiffs decreed 'with admirable providence' not to rebaptize heretics because of the *forma* they had received without its *virtus*.<sup>3</sup> Although the distinction between *forma* and *virtus*, inspired by Leo I but of Augustinian origin, was very popular and well known throughout the Gregorian controversies, the precise meaning of *forma* was left undefined.

The task of unification did not become easier when Ivo of Chartres compiled his famous canonical collections. If we open the *Decretum*, we meet the first reference to the non-iteration of Baptism in chapter 36 of the first book, copied from Fulgentius, though attributed to Augustine.<sup>4</sup> St. Leo's decretal takes us back to the official Roman interpretation of Eph. iv, 5, and through an excerpt from Hrabanus Maurus we return to the commentary of Jerome on this text.<sup>5</sup> A chapter from Gennadius, attributed (by Burchard) to a Council of Rouen, prohibits the annulment of the trinitarian invocation by rebaptism<sup>6</sup> and an extract from Bede confirms the theory.<sup>7</sup> Numerous other canons testify to the long struggle of the Church for clarification, while the uncertainty concerning the validity of pagan Baptism lingers on.<sup>8</sup> The repetition of Confirmation is rejected on the authority of Pope Gregory II<sup>9</sup> and a 'Council of Tarragona'.<sup>10</sup>

Ivo offers a compilation from Augustine's *De Baptismo*<sup>11</sup> and numerous other extracts, including the text: *Nulli sacramento injuria facienda est*.<sup>12</sup> He seems to be the first author to cite the passage which contains the sentence: *Neutri sacramento injuria facienda est*<sup>13</sup> and was apparently the first writer to make use of Augustine's *Contra Cresconium*.<sup>14</sup> Ivo's correspondence shows that he knew how to put theoretical knowledge to practical use. When, in 1094, he was asked whether a monk who had received the blessing from another monk was obliged to have it repeated by the abbot, Ivo replied that he was free to choose. This is his explanation: *Monachi enim benedictio non est manus impositio vel alicujus sacramenti ex apostolica traditione celebratio. Nec aliam vim habere mihi videtur quam super paenitentem absolutio*.<sup>15</sup> He leaves it to the abbot's discretion to repeat such blessings *quia non est hoc ecclesiastica sacramenta iterando violare*.<sup>16</sup> If, however, the blessing of a monk were a consecration, its reiteration could not be considered by any means.<sup>17</sup> For that reason, supposing a *consecratio virginum* which is reserved to the bishop were usurped by priests, no bishop would repeat it because of the *sacramentum* of Christ and the Church which is contained in it.<sup>18</sup>

Ivo's position is clearly based on the premise that, wherever we are confronted with a *sacramentum* or *consecratio* qualifiable as Apostolic (in a wide sense), no reiteration can take place. Hence his decision is dominated by two very

<sup>1</sup> Ep. II, 23; MGH Lib. 2, 43.

<sup>2</sup> PL 151, 533A.

<sup>3</sup> Libellus, II; MGH Lib. 2, 556.

<sup>4</sup> Decr. I, 36; PL 161, 75D; Fulgentius, *De Fide*, 36, 77; PL 65, 703BD.

<sup>5</sup> Decr. I, 48 and 131; PL 161, 79D and 91B; Leo I, Ep. CLXVI, 1 and Jerome, *In Eph.* II; PL 26, 528B.

<sup>6</sup> Decr. I, 233; PL 161, 115C; Burchard, *Decr.* IV, 39. Gennadius, *Lib. eccl. dogmatum*, 21; ed Turner, p. 93. The text occurs in Decr. I, 160 (PL 161, 96B) under the name of Augustine. Cf. *Pan.* I, 85 (PL 161, 1064B) and Alger of Liège, *De Sacr.* III, 13; PL 180, 851A.

<sup>7</sup> Decr. I, 173; PL 161, 173D.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. N. M. Haring, 'A Brief Hist. Comment' *Med. Studies*, XIV (1952), 158.

<sup>9</sup> Decr. I, 303; PL 161, 132A; Gregory II,

Ep. XXVI; MGH Epp. 3, 276.

<sup>10</sup> Decr. I, 244; PL 161, 118B; Burchard, *Decr.* IV, 50.

<sup>11</sup> Decr. I, 115-7; PL 161, 88C-89B.

<sup>12</sup> Decr. I, 162; PL 161, 97D.

<sup>13</sup> Decr. II, 97; PL 161, 185C; *Contra ep. Parm.* II, 13, 30; CSEL 51, 81.

<sup>14</sup> Decr. I, 160; PL 161, 97AD; *Contra Cresconium* II, 20, 25 and II, 20 31 36 CSEL 5 384 f.

<sup>15</sup> Ep. XLI to Geoffrey; ed. J. Leclercq, *Yves de Chartres: Correspondance I* (Paris, 1949), p. 164 or PL 162, 52B.

<sup>16</sup> Leclercq, p. 166 or PL 162, 53A.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* Cf. Decr. VI, 82 and *Pan.* III, 76; PL 161, 463A and 1147A; Gregory, *Reg. Epp.* II, 425; MGH Epp. I, 145.

<sup>18</sup> Leclercq, p. 168 or PL 162, 53B. Cf. *Pan.* III, 188 and 196; PL 161, 1175 f.

remarkable considerations: first of all, a sacrament must have the stamp of Apostolicity, at least in the wide sense which includes papal pronouncements; secondly, a *sacramentum* of this kind cannot be repeated. Could a deposed bishop ever become an abbot? The difficulty, proposed to Ivo, rested on the *benedictio* to be given before the installation. Ivo replies that the blessing can take place, because it would not be the repetition of a *sacramentum*. The wording of his reply betrays his dependence on St. Augustine: *Nulla episcopali sacramento nobis fieri videtur injuria, cum abbatis benedictio nulla sit sacramenti repetitio*.<sup>19</sup>

In Ivo's opinion, the Anointing of the sick is no exception to the general rule that no *sacramentum* can be repeated, as we learn from his letter to Raoul.<sup>20</sup> Referring again to sacraments of Christ and the Church, he declares: *Qui autem sacramenta Christi et ecclesiae repetit, injuriam ipsis sacramentis ingerit*. Moreover, he argues that the Anointing of the sick is the sacrament of Public Penance which, according to Augustine and Ambrose is, just as Baptism, not to be repeated.<sup>21</sup>

We may rightly assume that Ivo held the same view on Holy Orders. This, we may gather from a collection of texts against reordinations<sup>22</sup> in which, however, we meet not only Augustine's *Neutri sacramento injuria facienda est*,<sup>23</sup> but also part of Urban's decretal under the heading: *Redeuntes ab haereticis sunt reordinandi*. In one of his earlier letters, Ivo deals with the case of a bishop who had obtained his consecration and episcopal see by simony and violence. He proves with an impressive array of authorities (including St. Cyprian, but not St. Augustine) that the intruder was neither a bishop nor a priest.<sup>24</sup>

Ivo's study of and penetration into St. Augustine's teaching was more extensive than that of any previous writer and its effect will soon be felt in theological literature. He offers the first evidence of St. Augustine's *Contra litt. Petiliani*<sup>25</sup> and, in our present study, it is of interest to note an extract from an Augustinian letter in his *Collectio tripartita* which contains a sentence, later copied by Gratian: *Non faciam injuriam characteri imperatoris*.<sup>26</sup>

While Ivo's opposition to a repetition of the Anointing of the sick was principally based on the *injuria sacramenti*, Geoffrey of Vendôme stresses the idea that a repetition would reflect unfavorably on the previous reception. He establishes first that the Apostolic See calls the Anointing of the sick a *sacramentum* and that, as a consequence, it must not be repeated.<sup>27</sup> We repeat a *sacramentum* if we administer it in the belief that we can give again what was previously given: *Ibi reiteratur sacramentum ubi idipsum datur, quasi quod prius datum est postea posse dari credatur*.<sup>28</sup> Not the act in itself but the intention is decisive and such a reiteration of sacraments is prohibited to guard them against abuse and contempt.<sup>29</sup>

It seems that abbot Theobald was quite impressed by this theory, but Peter the Venerable disagreed with him.<sup>30</sup> He insists that we should consider not only the fact of sacramental repetition but also its reason and purpose. Baptism, as Peter claims, is not repeated, because it suffices to give it once: *Semel factum*

<sup>19</sup> Ep. LXXXVIII; PL 162, 109C.

<sup>20</sup> Ep. CCL; PL 162, 260C. Cf. Innocent I, Ep. XXV, 8.

<sup>21</sup> PL 162, 260C: Augustine, Ep. CLIII, 3, 7 (CSEL 44, 401) and Ambrose, *De Paenit.* II, 10, 95; PL 16, 541A. Concerning the repetition of Extreme Unction in this period see H. Weisweiler, 'Das Sakrament der letzten Ölung', *Scholastik*, VII (1932), 524 ff.

<sup>22</sup> Pan. III, 76 ff; PL 161, 1147A. The decretal *Ventum est* is found in Decr. VI, 591. Cf. Pan. III, 130; PL 161, 457BC and 1159A.

<sup>23</sup> Pan. III, 76 and Decr. II, 97 (PL 161, 1147AC and 185AC) epitomized from *Contra ep. Parm.* II, 13, 28-30.

<sup>24</sup> Ep. XXVII to Eudes; ed. Leclercq, pp. 110-6 or PL 162, 39.

<sup>25</sup> Ep. LXXIII; PL 162, 93BC: *Contra litt. Petil.* II, 104, 239; CSEL 52, 154.

<sup>26</sup> Decr. C, 23, q. 1, c. 4: Augustine, Ep. CLXXXV, 10, 43; CSEL 57, 37.

<sup>27</sup> Ep. II, 19; PL 157, 87D: Innocent I, Ep. XXV, 8; PL 20, 559C. Cf. Ivo, Ep. CCLV; PL 162, 260.

<sup>28</sup> *Opusc.* IX; PL 157, 226D. Cf. Bruno, *De Sacramentis ecclesiae*; PL 165, 1102C: *Hoc sacramentum (confirmationis) non iteratur, siquidem propter aliud et aliud datur. Ibi enim reiteratur sacramentum, ubi idipsum datur propter idem ipsum.*

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> Peter the Venerable, Ep. V, 7; PL 189, 392A.

sufficit. The same holds for Confirmation.<sup>31</sup> Furthermore, we do not anoint the priest's hands or the bishop's head again, because they can never lose the *sacramentum* by suspension or deposition.<sup>32</sup> The common and public practice of the Church confirms this and we may say almost the same with regard to inanimate objects such as churches and church vessels.<sup>33</sup> Yet with regard to the infirm: *Alia lex, alia ratio*. The Anointing of the sick must be repeated, because the remission of sins for which it is given must be repeated. In addition, the Apostle puts no numerical restrictions on us.<sup>34</sup>

Before examining other attempts to reconcile theory and practice in this matter, we should consult Peter's confrere, Alger of Liège. He adopted and generalized a principle which had been first formulated by Gennadius in connection with Baptism. Alger distinguishes between sacraments of necessity and sacraments of dignity which follow different rules.<sup>35</sup> He concludes his defence of the validity of pagan Baptism<sup>36</sup> with a text copied from Peter Damian: *Ex canonica auctoritate idcirco prohibetur rebaptizatio fieri, ne sanctae Trinitatis nomen in quo baptizatum est videatur annullari*.<sup>37</sup> This rule, we read later, applies to all sacraments by whomsoever they may be administered in the name of the Trinity: they are valid outside the Church but without grace.<sup>38</sup> At first, Alger excepted from this rule the Sacrifice of the Mass celebrated outside the Catholic communion.<sup>39</sup> At a later date, however, he changed his doctrine by a strict and general application of the principle that the invocation of the Trinity cannot be annulled through any human sinfulness, including heresy. Thus even heretics are somehow within the Church.<sup>40</sup>

Alger quotes St. Augustine frequently and was familiar with the text: *Ne non homini sed ipsi sacramento fiat injuria*.<sup>41</sup> On principle, he seems to agree with the Augustinian axiom: *Nulli sacramento injuria facienda est*, though he does not invoke it. It is also possible that he avoided the Augustinian rule to escape the consequences which Ivo of Chartres had drawn from it. At any rate, he does not discuss the application of his own rule to the Anointing of the sick and the sacrament of Penance.

Despite the warning: *Cave, ne sacramentis facias injuriam*, Gerhoh of Reichersberg (1093-1169) disagreed with Alger's final doctrine on the Mass,<sup>42</sup> because a heretic cannot have a 'Catholic intention'.<sup>43</sup> Otherwise Gerhoh considers heretical sacraments as valid and believes that, for that reason, the Roman authorities teach that heretical sacraments are not to be repeated but only to be 'confirmed' or ratified by an imposition of hands and the invocation of the Holy Spirit.<sup>44</sup> He proposes a novel distinction between a passive sacramental effect, found outside the Church, and an active effect which is found only inside.<sup>45</sup> Although Gerhoh was convinced that most people read St. Augustine too carelessly to understand him,<sup>46</sup> he offers little evidence to prove his superiority over such scholars as Anselm, Abelard, Gilbert of Poitiers and Peter Lombard all of whom he accused of numerous errors.

These first representatives of early scholasticism originated a more systematic approach which gradually cleared the ground for the final solution. Its beginning was modest enough. The school of Laon tells us that there is but *one Baptism*

<sup>31</sup> PL 189, 392AB.

<sup>32</sup> PL 189, 393B.

<sup>33</sup> PL 189, 393C.

<sup>34</sup> PL 189, 393D-394B.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. *De Mis.* III, 55; PL 180, 956D.

<sup>36</sup> *De Mis.* I, 52; PL 180, 879D.

<sup>37</sup> *De Mis.* I, 52; PL 180, 880B; Damian, *Lib. Grat.*, 5, MGH *Lib.* I, 23. In the case of Baptism, the principle is also corroborated by *Eph.* iv, 5 in *De Mis.* III, 3; PL 180, 835D.

<sup>38</sup> *De Mis.* III, 2; PL 180, 932B.

<sup>39</sup> *De Mis.* I, 56 f.; PL 180, 882B-883B. Cf. *De Mis.* III, 23; PL 180, 942AB. I suspect that

he was influenced by Paschasius, *De Corp. et s. Domini*, 12, 1; PL 120, 1310BC.

<sup>40</sup> *De Sacr.* III, 2 and 9; PL 180, 833B, and 842B. See also his *Prologue*; PL 180, 740C.

<sup>41</sup> *De Mis.* III, 83; PL 180, 965D; *Contra ep. Parm.* II, 13, 23; CSEL 51, 79 f. Cf. *De Sacr.* III, 10; PL 180, 843D.

<sup>42</sup> *Ep. ad Innocentium papam*; MGH *Lib.* 3, 216.

<sup>43</sup> MGH *Lib.* 3, 222 f.

<sup>44</sup> *Lib. de simoniacis*; MGH *Lib.* 3, 257.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*; p. 258.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.* p. 257.



the essential element of which is the trinitarian invocation.<sup>47</sup> This is one reason for its non-iteration, 'lest it be annulled'. Another reason is the supernatural birth in Baptism which, like a natural birth, cannot be repeated.<sup>48</sup> We are also told: *Baptismus non iteratur quia semper est Domini*.<sup>49</sup> We encounter the Augustinian *injuria sacramenti* in the doctrine on Holy Orders: *Sacros ordines et sacramenta Dei in omnibus et ubique esse verenda nec eis ulla injuriam esse faciendam*.<sup>50</sup> Some masters taught that neither the sacrament of Holy Orders nor the power to consecrate can ever be lost, because St. Augustine writes: *Nulli sacramento facienda est injuria*.<sup>51</sup> Attempts to narrow Augustine's principle down to Baptism alone were rejected as futile.<sup>52</sup> We read that the sacrament of Penance is but one<sup>53</sup> and that some theologians extended this doctrine from Public Penance to the sacrament of Penance for daily sins: *Hoc sacramentum quidam dicunt non esse iterandum. Quod hac auctoritate confirmant: Non est locus secundae paenitentiae*. The contrary opinion was based on a comparison with the daily necessity of the Eucharist.<sup>54</sup>

A little more information is found in the *Sentences* of Robert Pulleyn who considers one Baptism a fitting likeness of the one death, burial and resurrection of Christ: *Nam sicut mors, sepultura, resurrectio Christi una est, unum quoque decet esse sacramentum quod harum rerum in similitudinem sumitur*.<sup>55</sup> And since Baptism is never repeated, Confirmation should not be repeated either, because it too suffices if received once.<sup>56</sup> Though we are not allowed to repeat certain sacraments, because once received they suffice for all time, there are some that we must receive more frequently. Hence we often repeat Confession and the Eucharist.<sup>57</sup> Robert points to such reasons as our daily sins and our need of daily spiritual food, but his ultimate reason is the 'authority of the Christian law': *Ergo christianae legis auctoritatem amplectamur, dum quodque sancit aut semel fieri aut repeti*.<sup>58</sup> Robert is closer to St. Augustine where he remarks that it is not permissible to reordain because the *sacramentum impositum*, like that of Baptism, perseveres through life.<sup>59</sup>

Robert's contemporary, Rupert of Deutz, heavily stresses the idea of Christ the priest<sup>60</sup> and holds that heresy cannot invalidate the invocation of the divine name, least of all in Baptism.<sup>61</sup> He condemns rebaptism as a mockery of the Crucified Son of God<sup>62</sup> but does not enlarge on other sacraments. Herveus of Bourg-Dieu (d. 1150) likewise derives the non-repetition of Baptism mainly from Eph. iv, 5, and Heb. vi, 2 ff., but is silent on the repetition or non-repetition of the other sacraments.<sup>63</sup>

Both the great variety of arguments against rebaptism and the lack of suggestions concerning the other sacraments called for a more intensive study of the intrinsic reason for sacramental repetition or non-repetition. Abelard (d. 1141) did very little to promote it, though in his *Sic et Non* we meet the

<sup>47</sup> *Sent. div. paginae*; ed. F. Bliemetzrieder, *Beiträge*, XVIII (1919), 44.

<sup>48</sup> Text quoted by O. Lottin in *Rech. de théol. anc. et méd.*, (abbreviated RTAM) XI (1939), 253. Cf. Augustine, *De Bapt.* I, 10, 14 (CSEL 51, 160) and *Glossa ord. in Joh.* iii, 3; PL 114, 366BC.

<sup>49</sup> *Sent. Atrebatenses*; ed. O. Lottin, RTAM, X (1938), 348. *Glossa ord. in Joh.* i, 32. Augustine, *In Joh. Tract.* V, 5; PL 35, 1424. Cf. Ivo, *Decr.* I, 159; PL 161, 96D. Robert of Melun, *Quaest. de div. paginae*; ed. Martin (Louvain, 1932), p. 42.

<sup>50</sup> *Sent. Anselmi*; ed. Bliemetzrieder, p. 97. See also O. Lottin in RTAM, XIII (1946), 215, n. 305.

<sup>51</sup> H. Weisweiler, *Die Wirksamkeit der Sakramente nach Hugo von St. Viktor* (Freiburg, 1932), pp. 86 f.

<sup>52</sup> H. Weisweiler, p. 86.

<sup>53</sup> *Sent. Anselmi*; ed. Bliemetzrieder, p. 115.

Cf. Ambrose, *De Paen.* II, 10, 95; PL 16, 541B.

<sup>54</sup> See H. Weisweiler in RTAM, IV (1932), 256 and O. Lottin in RTAM, XII (1940), 210, n. 284.

<sup>55</sup> *Sent.* V, 21; PL 186, 846B. Cf. *Sent.* V, 22 and 27; PL 186, 846C and 849C.

<sup>56</sup> *Sent.* V, 22; PL 186, 846CD.

<sup>57</sup> *Sent.* V, 24; PL 186, 847C.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> *Sent.* VII, 14; PL 186, 927CD.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. *In Joh.* II; PL 169, 251B and 252C. *De Spiritu* s. II, 24 and *In Num.* I, 16; PL 167, 1595BC and 853A.

<sup>61</sup> *In Joh.* III; PL 169, 307C. Cf. *De Spiritu* s. II, 14; PL 167, 1655A.

<sup>62</sup> *In Lev.* I, 18; PL 167, 763B; *Heb.* vi, 5. Cf. *De Spiritu* s. IV, 23 and *In Heb.* VIII, 5; PL 167, 1698BD and 1787BC.

<sup>63</sup> *In Eph.* iv, 5 and *In Heb.* vi, 2; PL 181, 1242D and 1570AC.

sentence: *Nulli sacramento injuria facienda est.*<sup>64</sup> The *Epitome*, which belongs to his school, presents the idea that it is Christ who baptizes<sup>65</sup> and deals with the reiteration of sacraments more extensively in the chapter on the 'sacrament of anointing' in Baptism, Confirmation and death (*in exitu*). Without explaining his terms, the author advises us to distinguish between *res* and *efficacia* and goes on to state that, regarding the repetition of Extreme Unction, the custom of the Church should be followed, for St. James does not seem to forbid its repetition. In the same manner he declares that about the *sacramenta majora* (Baptism, Confirmation, Eucharist) it has been said: no sacrament must be repeated. Without further ado he adds that the same host is not consecrated twice, although the same Eucharistic Body may be received frequently by the same person.<sup>66</sup> The author has nothing to say on reordination.

The *Sententiae Parisienses* and *Florianenses*,<sup>67</sup> both of the same school, show no signs of progress and the Abelardian *Commentarius Cantabrigiensis* (1141-1152) uses *Heb.* vi, 4, to object to sacramental repetition with the remark: *Quae solent duplicari, efficiuntur viliora.*<sup>68</sup>

We have seen occasional attempts to clarify the question: what do we mean by sacramental repetition? The answer, as we shall see, depended on the reply to the question: what do we mean by *sacramentum*? One important answer is supplied by the author of the *Summa Sententiarum* who deals with the reiteration of Baptism at unusual length<sup>69</sup> and concludes that it does not matter who baptizes, because the *sacramentum* is received as long as the trinitarian form is used.<sup>70</sup> While he is silent on the repetition of Confirmation, he is anxious to point out that, despite the two species, the Eucharist is only one sacrament and for that reason the priest does not reiterate it by consuming the two sacred species.<sup>71</sup> The author rightly restricts the Ambrosian *una paenitentia* to Public Penance to which, as he adds, some churches still adhere 'out of reverence for the sacrament'.<sup>72</sup>

Later on we read that in some churches there is a custom of repeating Extreme Unction despite the teaching of St. Augustine that a *sacramentum* should not be reiterated and no injury should be done to any sacrament.<sup>73</sup> The writer then offers the objection that the Eucharist is often received by the same person and registers the fact that some theologians restrict the *dictum* to Baptism and Ordination which must never be reiterated. However, he prefers to adopt the Augustinian principle as a general rule in the sense that, when we say a *sacramentum* must not be repeated, it should not be understood of a part but of the whole sacrament. If, for example, a person is baptized, the water is blessed by the invocation of the Trinity. If another person is baptized in the same water, the same trinitarian blessing of the water is repeated. Yet *we do not say* that Baptism is repeated, because by the reiteration of a part the sacrament itself is not reiterated. We would do injury to the *sacramentum* only if the sanctification of the water were performed twice with the same person. This also applies to the sacrament of the Altar and Anointing. Although a repetition takes place with regard to the recipient, the sacrament itself is not repeated, because neither the same Host nor the same oil are consecrated again. If for this partial reiteration the sacraments are said to be repeated, Baptism is also repeated for the same reason, since there is a reiteration of its part, i.e., of the sanctification which the water receives by the invocation of the Trinity.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>64</sup> *Sic et Non*, 110; PL 178, 1504D: Augustine, *De Bapt.* I, 1, 2; CSEL 51, 146.

<sup>65</sup> *Epitome*, 28; PL 178, 1739C.

<sup>66</sup> *Epitome*, 30; PL 178, 1744D.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. *Sent. Parisienses*; ed. A. Landgraf, *Écrits théol. de l'école d'Abélard* (Louvain, 1934), p. 48. *Sent. Florianenses*, 57; ed. H. Ostlender (Bonn, 1929), p. 28.

<sup>68</sup> *Comm. Cantab. in Heb.* vi, 6; ed. A.

Landgraf (Notre Dame, Ind., 1945), p. 734.

<sup>69</sup> *Summa sent.* V, 8; PL 176, 133D.

<sup>70</sup> PL 176, 134D.

<sup>71</sup> *Summa sent.* VI, 6; PL 176, 143B.

<sup>72</sup> *Summa sent.* VI, 12; PL 176, 1499D: Ambrose, *De Paen.* II, 10, 95; PL 16, 541B.

<sup>73</sup> *Summa sent.* VI, 15; PL 176, 154A.

<sup>74</sup> *Summa sent.* VI, 15; PL 176, 154AB.

The solution is not as subtle as it may sound. The scholar who proposed it to safeguard the universality of the Augustinian principle was not aware of the different meanings of the word *sacramentum* which, like his contemporaries, he used indiscriminately to designate the liturgical rite or the consecrated element or the lasting reality in the recipient or a combination of these parts. On the strength of this theory, it would be hard to see why Confirmation could not be repeated as long as the chrism was not consecrated again. The fact that the solution enjoyed great popularity betrays the great uncertainty caused by arguments in which the terms were not sufficiently defined. The *Sententiae Divinitatis* prove the confusion in a very striking manner.<sup>75</sup>

The teaching of the *Summa Sententiarum* is found in the Abelardian *Ysagoge* (1148-1152). Its author also notes the conflict between the custom of reiterating Extreme Unction and the Augustinian rule that no *injuria* must be done to any sacrament.<sup>76</sup> We read again that, in view of the Blessed Eucharist, some theologians restricted the principle to Baptism and Ordination. The author does not accept the restriction and adopts the explanation of the *Summa Sententiarum* that the Augustinian axiom is universally valid if properly interpreted.<sup>77</sup> With regard to the sacrament of Penance he proposes the same solution as the *Summa Sententiarum*.<sup>78</sup>

It seems that Hugh of St. Victor was not yet familiar with the theory of total and partial repetition. In the chapter on the Anointing of the sick he advanced a different theory. Some people wonder, he writes, whether the Anointing of the sick can be repeated, while Baptism, Confirmation and some other sacraments, once received, are not reiterated.<sup>79</sup> He had previously affirmed that, like Baptism, the sacrament of the imposition of hands must not be repeated for any reason.<sup>80</sup> The Anointing, he claims, aims at the remission of sins and the alleviation of illness. We may relapse into sin and illness, yet we can never lose the *sacramentum* of the Christian name (Baptism). And if we relapse, we should again use the spiritual medicine. If we cannot repeat the Anointing, we cannot repeat the prayers either.<sup>81</sup> To substantiate his reasons, Hugh makes the following comparisons: Take such sacraments as the sprinkling with water. Who will say it cannot be done again? Or the Blessed Eucharist which is received repeatedly. If you reply that the same blessing is not repeated over the water or the consecrated Host, we can say the same with regard to the oil.<sup>82</sup>

The solutions offered in the *Summa Sententiarum* and in Hugh's *De Sacramentis* account for two distinct trends among theologians in the middle of the twelfth century: the first group considers the Augustinian principle a universal rule which applies only to total repetition and in this sense agrees that no sacrament can be repeated. The second group restricts the principle to certain sacraments. In this group some scholars held that St. Augustine had only Baptism and Ordination in mind, while others maintained that Augustine referred only to Baptism and Confirmation.<sup>83</sup> Both solutions were designed to reconcile sacramental theory and practice either by stressing the theory or appealing to actual custom. The final result was the same.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. *Sent. divinitatis: Ein Sentenzenbuch der Gilbertschen Schule*; ed. B. Geyer, *Beiträge*, VII (1909), 117\*, 122\*.

<sup>76</sup> *Ysagoge in theologiam*; ed. A. Landgraf (Louvain, 1934), p. 200.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.* The *Summa sent.* is copied almost verbatim.

<sup>78</sup> Landgraf, p. 208: *Summa sent.* VI, 12; PL 176, 150B.

<sup>79</sup> *De Sacramentis* II, 15, 2; PL 176, 150B.

<sup>80</sup> *De Sacr.* II, 15, 3; PL 176, 426A.

<sup>81</sup> *De Sacr.* II, 15, 3; PL 176, 578B-579B.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*; PL 176, 5280AB.

<sup>83</sup> Cf. *De Eccl. officiis*, 27; PL 177, 396C. The author of the *Quaestiones* in *Ms. Vat. Reg. lat.* 135, fol. 104<sup>v</sup> goes as far as to say that no *auctoritas* states a reason why Baptism, Confirmation and Ordination are not repeated: *Consuetudo autem modo loquendi dixit iterationem sacramenti injuriam quia, si repetetur, tale esset ac si diceretur: 'Non valuit' vel 'non sufficit prius'*. Quoted by A. Landgraf, in *Div. Thomas*, XXIX (1951), 264.

## VI

Master Simon (fl. 1145-1160) refused to compromise. He rigorously stresses the rule: *Nulli sacramento injuria facienda est* and echoes earlier suggestions when he claims that he does injury to a *sacramentum* who dares to reiterate it, because he does not believe that the first reception sufficed for his purification.<sup>1</sup> As a consequence, Simon contends that, because they are sacraments, both Solemn Penance and the Solemn Anointing of the sick are in no way to be repeated, lest we do injury to the *sacramentum*.<sup>2</sup> He knows a *paenitentia familiaris*, but insists that only Solemn Penance may be called 'sacrament' and, as such, cannot or must not be repeated at any time.<sup>3</sup> To fit St. Ambrose into his theory, he offers the interpolated text: *Sicut unum est baptisma, sic unum est paenitentiae sacramentum*.<sup>4</sup> No injury must be done to the Solemn Anointing of the dying despite the contrary opinion of those who hold that, like some other sacraments, it can be repeated.<sup>5</sup> In view of the diversity of sacraments, Simon admits that divers reiterations can be made. If, for instance, the water of Baptism is blessed again, the sacrament is not repeated because it consists in the ablution with water sanctified by the 'word'.<sup>6</sup> If the Blessed Eucharist is consecrated again, it is indeed a reiteration even if nobody ever receives it. Like Baptism, the Anointing is a sacrament only if received. Consequently, the Anointing is repeated if the infirm person is anointed twice or more often, but not if the oil is consecrated twice. Again, the sacrament is not the blessing of the oil but the Solemn Anointing with the blessed oil.<sup>7</sup>

Simon's reaction makes it obvious that the various theories had strong repercussions on the concept and definition of the word 'sacrament' in general and its particular application to the various rites. Simon did not fully realize that he used the term *sacramentum* in different meanings and, while he objects to reordination lest injury be done to the *sacramentum*,<sup>8</sup> he does not apply this rule to Confirmation received in heresy.<sup>9</sup> Simon's view on Solemn Penance and Solemn Anointing was shared by the author of the *Tractatus de septem sacramentis* both of whom used a source still unknown. The author is anxious to inform us that other forms of Penance should rather be called 'reconciliations' and may be repeated. In other words, he too does not wish to class private Penance as *sacramentum*.<sup>10</sup>

The tendency to apply the Augustinian rule rigorously to all sacraments was mainly inspired by Ivo of Chartres and, in a different way, by Alger of Liège.

<sup>1</sup> H. Weisweiler, *Maitre Simon* (Louvain, 1937), p. 2. H. Weisweiler (pp. LXXVIII ff.) believes that Master Simon, preoccupied by his concept of sacramental causality, weakens the importance of the external *signum* when he declares in his introduction (p. 2): *De signante vero interim diferentes, de signato loquimur*. With some modification, D. Van Den Eynde, *Les Définitions des sacrements* (Rome, 1950), pp. 24 ff., subscribes to Fr. Weisweiler's explanation and affirms that Master Simon generalizes a principle developed in connection with the Eucharist. However, the reason for Simon's apparently strange attitude lies in the Augustinian *sacramentum manens* which he sees in all sacraments: *His praelibatis, generaliter de omnibus sciendum est quod, ut beatus ait Augustinus, nulli sacramento facienda est injuria*. On the strength of this rule, he had obviously reached the conclusion that the *sacramentum* in the proper sense was the permanent internal reality which would suffer injury by repetition of any sacrament. In other words, he deals with the *sacramentum* as *passio*, to use a

slightly later terminology. It was neither the preoccupation with sacramental causality nor 'une généralisation maladroite' (Van Den Eynde) from the Eucharist but the constant conflict between contradictory usages of the word *sacramentum* that caused Master Simon and his 'colleague' (Weisweiler, p. 82) to define the sacraments as *res signatae*. The fact that both authors hold on to the *sacrae-rei-signum* definition and thus appear to confuse their terms, should not surprise us in a period when such confusion was universal.

<sup>2</sup> Weisweiler, pp. 2 f. Against rebaptism he also cites the rule: *Ne fides vel invocatio sanctae Trinitatis annihiları videatur*. Weisweiler, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup> Weisweiler, p. 22.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Ambrose, *De Paen.* II, 10, 95; PL 16, 541B. Previously (p. 3) he quoted it accurately.

<sup>5</sup> Weisweiler, p. 43.

<sup>6</sup> Weisweiler, p. 6.

<sup>7</sup> Weisweiler, p. 44.

<sup>8</sup> Weisweiler, pp. 69 f and 78 ff.

<sup>9</sup> Weisweiler, p. 7.

Their influence is very pronounced in the school of Bologna. In dependence on Alger, Gratian holds that sacraments of necessity for salvation cannot be repeated or lost or taken away.<sup>11</sup> Baptism enjoys such an extraordinary position that it cannot even be repeated when given by a pagan.<sup>12</sup> The fact that Innocent I decreed the reiteration of the imposition of hands performed by heretics proves to Gratian that the imposition of hands is not a *sacramentum*.<sup>13</sup> He felt that he was in complete harmony with St. Augustine,<sup>14</sup> although he also knew that, according to St. Augustine, sacraments conferred by heretics (*in forma ecclesiae*) must not be repeated, *ne non homini sed sacramento videatur injuria fieri*.<sup>15</sup> Gratian restricts this statement to 'a mystical anointing' and Baptism<sup>16</sup> and asserts that St. Augustine recognized the validity of Holy Orders in apostates only if they received them in the Church.<sup>17</sup> It may suffice here to note Gratian's numerous canons against rebaptism and those against the repetition of Confirmation.<sup>18</sup> He does not touch the repetition of Extreme Unction and relates that Solemn Penance is not repeated in certain churches.<sup>19</sup>

Rolandus Bandinelli, later Pope Alexander III, seems to reflect the teaching of Bologna in opposing the repetition of the Anointing of the sick with the argument: *Quod not debet reiterari, inde probatur quia nulli sacramento injuria faciendum est. Fit autem ei injuria, cum reiteratur. Numquam ergo est reiterandum*.<sup>20</sup> He knows the contrary custom and the theory that it is no total reiteration, because the oil is not consecrated twice, just as the daily reception of the Eucharist is no repetition of, or injury to, the sacrament as long as we do not consecrate it twice. If this were true, Rolandus argues, a boy could be baptized again, provided the water were not sanctified again. But this is entirely false, because the sacrament of Baptism does not consist in the sanctification of the water, which imparts no efficacy to Baptism, but in the washing and the triple immersion.<sup>21</sup>

Gandulphus (fl. 1170), on the other hand, defines the water as *sacramentum*<sup>22</sup> and later poses the apparently strange question whether this (material) *sacramentum* ceases to exist after the actual administration of Baptism. He denies it and, to escape an awkward consequence, declares that the same Baptism is not received by another person baptized in the same water, because we do not use (numerically) the same form.<sup>23</sup> Gandulphus cites two canons against the repetition of Confirmation<sup>24</sup> and voices the rather peculiar opinion that, if a person were not given a name at Baptism or Confirmation, these sacraments ought to be administered again.<sup>25</sup> We learn from the *Glossa ordinaria* on *Decretum* D. 4, c. 32 de cons., that he placed true Orders on a level with Baptism.<sup>26</sup>

In the *Summa decretorum* (1157-1159) of Rufinus we meet a strictly canonical work in which the notion of *sacramentum* appears to be synonymous with non-repetition. He is not certain whether heretical Confirmation is valid and attributes to St. Augustine a contradictory view on the reiteration of the imposition of hands.<sup>27</sup> To eliminate the contradiction, Rufinus distinguishes five forms of the

<sup>10</sup> Weisweiler, pp. 85 and 89 f.

<sup>11</sup> Compare *Decr.* C. 1, q. 1 c. 39 dictum and Alger, *De Mis.* III, 55; PL 180, 956D.

<sup>12</sup> *Decr.* C. 1, q. 1 c. 58 dictum. Cf. Alger, *De Mis.* I, 52; PL 180, 879D.

<sup>13</sup> *Decr.* C. 1, q. 1, c. 73 dictum: *Ex eo autem quod manus impositio iterari praecipitur, sacramentum non esse ostenditur.*

<sup>14</sup> *Decr.* C. 1, q. 1, c. 73: Augustine, *De Bapt.* II, 16, 21.

<sup>15</sup> *Decr.* C. 1, q. 7, c. 23 dictum: *Contra ep. Parm.* II, 13, 28; CSEL 51, 80. Cf. *Decr.* C. 1, q. 1, c. 97.

<sup>16</sup> *Decr.* C. 1, q. 7, c. 23 dictum.

<sup>17</sup> *Decr.* C. 1, q. 1, c. 97 dictum. Regarding Gratian's doctrine on Holy Orders, compare the interpretations of L. Saltet, *Les Réordinations*, pp. 289 ff., and A. Schebler, *Die Reor-*

*dinationen*, pp. 281 ff.

<sup>18</sup> See *Decr.* D. 4 and D. 5 de cons.

<sup>19</sup> *Decr.* D. 3, c. 49 de paen.

<sup>20</sup> A. M. Gietl, *Die Sentenzen Rolands nachmals Papstes Alexanders III* (Freiburg, 1891) pp. 262 f. Approximate date: 1150.

<sup>21</sup> Gietl, pp. 263 f.

<sup>22</sup> *Sent.* IV, 30; ed. J. von Walter, *Magistri Gandulphi Bononiensis Sententiarum libri quatuor* (Wein, 1924), p. 402.

<sup>23</sup> *Sent.* IV, 46; p. 414.

<sup>24</sup> *Sent.* IV, 84; p. 422: Gratian, *Decr.* D. 5, c. 8, de cons.

<sup>25</sup> *Sent.* IV, 85; p. 434.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. F. Gillmann, 'Der sakr. Charakter bei den Glossatoren', *Der Kath.*, XC (1910), 215.

<sup>27</sup> In *Decr.* C. 1, q. 1, c. 30 and c. 74; ed. H. Singer, *Die Summa Decretorum des Mag.*

imposition of hands: *consecratio, chrismatio, cujuslibet ordinis traditio, daemonum adjuratio* and *extensio super paenitentem*. In determining their repetition, the concept of *sacramentum* plays the decisive role: "The first, second and third are not repeated, because they are sacraments; the fourth is repeated; the fifth is not repeated, if it is public, because it is a sacrament; if it is private, it can be repeated."<sup>28</sup> On a later occasion, Rufinus formulates the general principle: *Quia sacramenta, ideo inreiterabilia* for which he claims the authority of St. Augustine: *Sacramentis non est facienda injuria*.<sup>29</sup> Of course, the principle does not hold where there is no *sacramentum* to be violated as in the case of heretics who had not received the last imposition of hands in the Church.<sup>30</sup> In such cases Rufinus demands reordination which may account for the reordinations under Lucius III (1181-1185) and Urban III (1185-1187).<sup>31</sup>

Stephen of Tournai (d. 1203) defends a similar proposition with the remark: *Non dicitur sacramentum reiterari quod rite datum non est*.<sup>32</sup> He relates that Rolandus opposed the reiteration of Minor Orders on the principle: *Nulli enim sacramento injuria facienda est*.<sup>33</sup> Perhaps less exclusively than Rufinus, Stephen associates non-repetition with the very essence of sacrament. Thus, being a *sacramentum*, Baptism is not repeated at any time.<sup>34</sup> Neither Confirmation nor true Ordinations are reiterated,<sup>35</sup> i.e., only the *impositio manus confirmatoria* and *ordinatoria* are of a sacramental nature and cannot be repeated for that reason,<sup>36</sup> while other impositions of hands may be given a thousand times.<sup>37</sup> In fact, there are some *sacramenta* that are repeated, as Stephen points out in his criticism of Gratian's conclusion that the imposition of hands cannot be classed as sacrament because it can be repeated: *Nam quaedam sacramenta reiterantur ut unctio infirmorum, dedicatio ecclesiarum . . . Quedam non iterantur ut baptismus, consecratio virginum, ordinatio sacerdotum*.<sup>38</sup>

The author of the *Summa Parisiensis* who wrote shortly after Rufinus and Stephen without using their works<sup>39</sup> leans towards the teaching of the theologians in Paris. He notes some conflicting opinions we have met in theological works: *Manus impositio, qua aliquis promovetur, est sacramentum. Sed manus impositio, quam recipiunt paenitentes, quae et iteratur, non est sacramentum. Quod autem dicitur sacramentum non iterari, videtur falsum propter corpus Christi quod quotidie conficitur. Quidam dicunt quod quaedam sacramenta iterantur. Vel possumus dicere quia corpus Christi non iteratur quia non in eadem forma panis iterum consecratur*.<sup>40</sup> Very significant is the singular case in the sentence: *dicatur sacramentum non iterari* instead of *sacramenta* which neatly reflects the related opinion that a sacrament as sacrament is synonymous with non-repetition.

We have occasionally noted that the question of sacramental repetition was intimately connected with the definition of *sacramentum* and, in dependence on it, with the septenary number of sacraments. The word had long been used to designate not only visible sacred things, words or actions, but also invisible effects such as the lasting consecration in Baptism and Ordination or Christ's

Rufinus (Paderborn, 1902), pp. 211 and 215.

<sup>28</sup> *In Decr. C. 1, q. 1, c. 75*; ed. Singer, p. 216: *Prima ergo et secunda, quia sunt sacramenta, non reiterantur; quarta repetitur; quinta, si sit publica, non reiteratur, quia est sacramentum; si fuerit privata, reiterari potest*.

<sup>29</sup> Singer, p. 538.

<sup>30</sup> *In Decr. C. 1, q. 1, c. 17*; ed. Singer, p. 206.

<sup>31</sup> See L. Saltet, *Les Réordinations*, p. 329.  
<sup>32</sup> *In Decr. C. 1, p. 7, c. 23*; ed. Fr. von Schulte, *Die Summa des Stephanus Tornacensis über das Decretum Gratiani* (Giessen, 1891), p. 157.

<sup>33</sup> *In Decr. C. 1, q. 7, c. 23 dictum*; ed.

Schulte, p. 157.

<sup>34</sup> *In Decr. C. 1, c. 1, c. 35*; ed. Schulte, p. 130.

<sup>35</sup> *In Decr. C. 1, q. 1, c. 74* and *c. 97*; ed. Schulte, pp. 134 and 139.

<sup>36</sup> *In Decr. C. 1, q. 1, c. 73*; ed. Schulte, p. 134.

<sup>37</sup> *In Decr. D. 50 c. 63*; ed. Schulte, pp. 75 f.

<sup>38</sup> *In Decr. C. 1, q. 1, c. 73 dictum*; ed. Schulte, p. 134.

<sup>39</sup> Terence P. McLaughlin, *The Summa Parisiensis on the Decretum Gratiani* (Toronto, 1952), pp. XXVII f.

<sup>40</sup> *In Decr. C. 1, q. 1, c. 74*; ed. McLaughlin, p. 85.

presence in the Eucharist. A similar confusing ambiguity had been prevalent in the use of such words as *baptismus*, *ordo*, *ordinatio*, *confirmatio*, *unctio*, *paenitentia*, all of which had remained equally ill-defined.

An echo of the pertinent debates, which began shortly after the appearance of Lombard's *Sentences*, is found in the canonical *Summa* of Sichard of Cremona, composed before 1181. Sichard does not wish to enter into such arguments: *Tamen utrum baptismus sit actio vel passio vel ipsum elementum vel character vel si quid aliud, disputantium conflictui derelinguo*.<sup>41</sup> The author of the *Summa Lipsiensis* took the same attitude<sup>42</sup> and another canonist complained: *Quid autem sit ordo, difficile et forte impossibile est explicare. Tamen dicitur esse signaculum vel character i.e., quoddam secretum*.<sup>43</sup> On the question of repetition, Sichard follows Rufinus when he writes: *Et nota quod tantum confirmatoria et consecratoria (impositio) sunt proprie sacramenta: ideoque nequeunt iterari*.<sup>44</sup> However, the disputes which Sichard chose to leave to the others could not remain without fruit.

The most voluminous canonist of the century, Huguccio, who completed his *Summa* about the year 1188, continued to use the word *sacramentum* in a wide sense and, at the same time, adopted certain substitutes to clarify its meaning. In Baptism, he points out, three things must be distinguished each of which is a *sacramentum* and called 'Baptism', namely the water or visible *sacramentum*, the external ablution accompanied by the baptismal form as instituted by Christ, and finally a certain *character dominicus*.<sup>45</sup> While the first two *sacramenta* pass, the mark or seal produced by God inheres inseparably and forever. If therefore a heretic returns to the Church, Baptism is not administered again, because it (i.e. Baptism) never left him.<sup>46</sup> Since this mark is a *sacramentum*, it enables Huguccio to object to the reiteration of Baptism, Confirmation and Holy Orders by quoting: *Neutri sacramento injuria facienda est*.<sup>47</sup> Apart from its legitimate extension to Confirmation, this example constitutes a perfect revival of Augustinianism in both terminology and meaning.

The permanence of this third *sacramentum* lasts beyond death in all sacraments which confer grace: *Remanet ergo post mortem sacramentum baptismi. Id dico de quolibet sacramento in quo confertur gratia ut de ordine, de unctione chrismatis et de omnibus quae habentur gratia animae*.<sup>48</sup> An exception is the *sacramentum* of matrimony which lasts only until death. Although Huguccio upholds a lasting *sacramentum* in every sacrament, he uses the substitute 'character' only in speaking of Baptism, Confirmation, Holy Orders and Extreme Unction.<sup>49</sup>

It is, however, not surprising that the canonical *Glossa ordinaria*<sup>50</sup> speaks of a *character matrimonii*.<sup>51</sup> In the same source we read that Penance is repeated, 'although it is a *sacramentum*',<sup>52</sup> and at the same time we learn that the imposition of hands on penitents is a *sacramentum*, if public, 'and therefore not repeated'; it is not a *sacramentum*, if private, and as such is repeated.<sup>53</sup> It is also admitted that the Anointing is repeated 'in certain churches'<sup>54</sup> and then it is stated that

<sup>41</sup> See F. Gillmann, in *Der Kath.*, XC (1910), 216.

<sup>42</sup> See A. Landgraf, in *Gregorianum*, XXVII (1946), 359.

<sup>43</sup> F. Gillmann, p. 217.

<sup>44</sup> See A. Teetaert, *La Confession aux laïques* (Bruges, 1926), p. 218.

<sup>45</sup> In *Decr. D. 4 c. 1 de cons.* All texts from Huguccio are quoted by F. Gillmann, pp. 304 ff. which I have collated with *Ms. Paris, B.N. lat. 3892*. Huguccio found the expression *character dominicus* in *Decr. D. 4, c. 41 de cons. (De Bapt. VI, 1, 1)*.

<sup>46</sup> Gillmann, p. 306.

<sup>47</sup> Gillmann, p. 306.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, note 2.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 306 ff.

<sup>50</sup> See the *casus* to C. 1, q. 1, c. 97 dictum; ed. Lyons (1560), fol. 541.

<sup>51</sup> More examples will be found in the articles by F. Gillmann in the *Arch. f. Kath. Kirchenrecht*, CIV (1924), 251 ff. and *Der Kath.*, XCIII (1913), 76.

<sup>52</sup> In *Decr. D. 4, c. 32 de cons.*; ed. Lyons (1560), fol. 1943.

<sup>53</sup> In *Decr. C. 1, q. 1, c. 74*; ed. Lyons, fol. 528.

<sup>54</sup> In *Decr. D. 4, c. 32 de cons.*; ed. Lyons, fol. 1943.

it is not a *sacramentum* in the proper sense, 'especially according to those who hold that it can be repeated,' because a *sacramentum* is not repeated.<sup>66</sup>

Before returning to the theologians, we may conclude that the canonists were rigorous in their application of the Augustinian axiom: *Nulli sacramento injuria facienda est*. Although they do not always invoke the principle, they were guided by it to such a degree that they were strongly inclined to deny the word 'sacrament', in the proper sense, to any sacramental rites which were received more than once. This is the reason why some of them hesitated to accept Extreme Unction and Penance as sacraments in the proper sense. There is no denying that their reasoning was logical in the light of the Augustinian axiom. St. Augustine's authority was too great to be contradicted.

## VII

The theologians in general tried to interpret the Augustinian rule in the light of established customs. Moreover, they had a certain right to claim that St. Augustine had spoken only of Baptism and Ordination, though they could not and would not argue away the fact that he had written: *NULLI sacramento injuria facienda est*. While the canonists used this statement to modify liturgical traditions and the very concept of *sacramentum*, the theologians used established liturgical facts to modify the Augustinian rule.

Peter Lombard, for instance, devotes an entire chapter on the repetition of Extreme Unction to expound the theory on sacramental reiteration, as various other authors had done before him. He begins his argument as follows: *Augustinus dicit sacramentum non iterandum et sacramento faciendam non esse injuriam*.<sup>1</sup> Then he affirms that Augustine said this only in connection with the sacraments of Baptism and Ordination. Accordingly, he believes that his statement should be restricted to Baptism, Confirmation and Ordination: *quae nullatenus repetenda sunt, quia semel, non saepius, datur baptismus, confirmatio et ordinatio*. Thus he derives the law of non-iteration from the fact that these three sacraments are given only once. He proceeds with another factual remark: *Sacramentum vero Altaris et paenitentiae et conjugii saepe iterari videtur*.<sup>2</sup> For the repetition of the Anointing he literally adopts the explanation given by Hugh of St. Victor<sup>3</sup> and then relates the theory of total and partial repetition which was still unknown to Hugh. Without rejecting it, he refers to a criticism we found in Rolandus who argued that on the strength of such a theory we could baptize a person frequently, provided the same water be not blessed again. Lombard even knows the answer given by the defenders of the total-repetition theory. They retorted that the blessing of water was accidental in Baptism, while the blessing of the Eucharistic bread and of the oil entered into the very essence of those sacraments.<sup>4</sup> Even the marriage blessing, Lombard adds, is given but once, not frequently.<sup>5</sup>

Lombard proposes the following solution: the Augustinian principle is universal in relation to the sanctification of the matter by which a sacrament is completed; it is not universal in relation to the reception of sacraments, because some are received only once, others frequently, as is the case in Anointing 'which is repeated in almost every church'.<sup>6</sup> The solution is plain and factual.

In dealing with the repetition and non-repetition of Penance, both Hugh of St. Victor and Lombard refer to the custom of the Church without citing the Augustinian axiom.<sup>7</sup> The *Summa Sententiarum* had already dealt with the

<sup>66</sup> *In Decr.* D. 5, c. 1 de cons.; ed. Lyons, fol. 1990.

<sup>1</sup> *Sent.* IV, 23, 4; ed. Quaracchi (1916), p. 890.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*; p. 891.

<sup>3</sup> *De Sacramentis* II, 15, 3; PL 176, 578B.

<sup>4</sup> This very significant distinction shows

how theologians gradually advanced in dividing accidental ceremonies from essential parts of the sacraments.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*; p. 891.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*; p. 892.

<sup>7</sup> *Sent.* IV, 14, 3; pp. 824 f.



difficulty that by receiving the two species in the Eucharist one might be thought to repeat a sacrament.<sup>8</sup> Lombard accepts the solution that they constitute but one sacrament and the same species is not consecrated twice.<sup>9</sup> Concerning the repetition of Confirmation Hugh makes the terse statement: *De sacramento impositionis manuum definitum est ut nulla ratione iteretur sicut nec baptismus.*<sup>10</sup> Although, as we have seen, this was historically accurate, Lombard appeals to the Augustinian rule: *Nec debet iterari sicut nec baptismus. Nulli enim sacramento injuria facienda est: quod fieri putatur quando non-iterandum iteratur.*<sup>11</sup>

The reordination of heretics is too complicated a question for Lombard. He just lists the various opinions.<sup>12</sup> After the solution of this question, the problem of the validity of Confirmation by heretics, about which Lombard has nothing to say, would soon be near its solution. Faithful to tradition, Lombard also lists a number of other reasons against rebaptism,<sup>13</sup> though his general proposition on the non-repetition of three sacraments is firmly based on the rule: *Sacramento non facienda est injuria*. It still remained to be seen what was meant by the word *sacramentum* in those sacraments.

The early glossators and commentators of the *Sentences* slowly realized the necessity of examining its meaning more closely. Bandinus contributes very little to this process.<sup>14</sup> He simply states that Augustine recognized heretical sacraments *ne fiat injuria sacramento*.<sup>15</sup> The theory that only total repetition constitutes a real sacramental reiteration still appealed to a number of glossators,<sup>16</sup> some of whom revive the idea that injury to the sacrament means that he who receives it frequently seems to cheapen the previous reception.<sup>17</sup> The argument had generally been used against a repetition of Public Penance.<sup>18</sup>

At the same time, the early glossators speak of a new terminology which was destined to replace the lasting *sacramentum*. They distinguish between Baptism as *actio* and *passio* or between sacrament in the active and passive sense. To a certain Master Paganus of Corbeil they attribute the introduction of the term *character*<sup>19</sup> and it is quite significant that this development started with the sacrament of Baptism and was then extended to other sacraments.<sup>20</sup> It is equally important to note that the same first witnesses to this new nomenclature do not link it to the Augustinian use of the term.

There is good reason to assume that the new terminology entered the sacramental vocabulary about the years 1175-1180. Peter Manducator still relies on the famous excerpt from the Venerable Bede and on some Augustinian texts to oppose rebaptism.<sup>21</sup> In addition, he still claims that, just as Baptism and Orders, Confirmation must not be repeated because St. Augustine says: *Nulli sacramento facienda est injuria*.<sup>22</sup> He is even supposed to have expressed the opinion that the non-repetition of those three sacraments was instituted by the primitive Church, 'because they were considered to be worthier than the others'.<sup>23</sup>

Peter of Poitiers who succeeded Manducator in 1169 and composed his

<sup>8</sup> *Summa sent.* VI, 6; PL 176, 143B.

<sup>9</sup> *Sent.* IV, 11, 4; ed. Quaracchi, p. 806. Cf. E. Dumoutet, 'La non-réitération des sacrements et le problème du moment précis de la transsubstantiation', *Rech. des sc. rel.*, XXVIII (1938), 580-5.

<sup>10</sup> *De Sacramentis* II, 7, 5; PL 176, 461C.

<sup>11</sup> *Sent.* IV, 7, 5; p. 787. He then quotes *Contra ep. Parm.* II, 13, 28; CSEL 51, 79.

<sup>12</sup> *Sent.* IV, 25, 1; pp. 904 ff.

<sup>13</sup> *Sent.* IV, 6, 2; pp. 777 ff. Cf. *In Eph.* iv, 5 and *Heb.* vi, 2; PL 192, 197D; 440C; 442D; 443A.

<sup>14</sup> *Sent.* IV, 23, 4; p. 890.

<sup>15</sup> *Sent.* IV, 24; PL 192, 1105C.

<sup>16</sup> A. Landgraf, 'Zur Frage der Wiederholbarkeit der Sakramente', *Div. Thomas*, XXIX (1951), 260 ff.

<sup>17</sup> A. Landgraf p. 259.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Robert of Melun, *Quaest. de epp.*

*Pauli*; ed. R. M. Martin (Louvain, 1938), p. 309.

<sup>19</sup> H. Weisweiler, 'Eine neue frühe Glosse', *Beiträge*, Suppl. III (1935), 368 f., quotes *Ms. Munich (C1m)* 22,238, fol. 83v; *Ms. Vat. lat.* 10,754, fol. 33; *Ms. Paris, B.N. lat.* 14,423, fol. 94. See also A. Landgraf, 'Die frühchol. Def. der Taufe', *Gregorianum*, XVII, (1946), 354.

<sup>20</sup> Paganus himself applied it to confirmation. Cf. H. Weisweiler, 'Das Sakrament der Firmung in den syst. Werken der Frühcholastik', *Scholastik*, VIII (1933), 506.

<sup>21</sup> *De Sacramentis*; ed. R. M. Martin (Louvain, 1937), p. 21.

<sup>22</sup> Martin, p. 31. Cf. Lombard, *Sent.* IV, 7, 5; ed. Quaracchi (1916), p. 787.

<sup>23</sup> H. Weisweiler, 'Eine neue frühe Glosse', 386.

*Sentences* before 1176 follows an entirely different, though ancient, tradition in his doctrine: *Qui enim bis baptizatur, putare videtur quod unica mors Christi non sufficiat ad salutem hominum, cum baptismus mortem repraesentet. Quod falsum est quia non oportet Christum mori amplius qui semel pro peccatis nostris mortuus est.*<sup>24</sup>

Simon of Tournai, who taught at Paris from 1174-1178, still professes the theory that only total repetition means sacramental reiteration: *Sacramentum quoque poenitentiae non iteratur: nam nec remissio de eodem nec satisfactio pro eodem. Sic quoque hoc sacramentum extremae unctionis non iteratur, quia oleum non denuo consecratur, quamvis consecrato oleo pluries quis inungatur.*<sup>25</sup>

Alanus ab Insulis combines two now familiar elements in the statement: 'We also say that Baptism, Confirmation and Orders cannot be reiterated, because Baptism represents Christ's Passion. Just as He has been offered once for all and suffered but once, the representation of His Passion must not be repeated because of its dignity. Similarly, Holy Orders, which is a sacrament of dignity, must not be repeated on account of its dignity. So also the sacrament of Confirmation.'<sup>26</sup> Alanus defends the repetition of Extreme Unction as a probable opinion and ranks it as sacrament of necessity.<sup>27</sup> He also appeals to the Augustinian axiom in connection with Baptism: *Ablutio aquae, qua fit peccati remissio in baptismo, iterari non debet, quia significat Passionem Christi et mortem, quae iteranda non est. Nec sacramento baptismi debet fieri injuria.*<sup>28</sup> A second Baptism is without effect: *Baptizato autem non confert (aliquid) baptismus, ne, si iterato fiat, fiat injuria sacramento.*<sup>29</sup>

In the works attributed to Alanus, the frequency of the word *character* is very remarkable<sup>30</sup> and it is interesting to see how it coexists with the Augustinian rule: *Cum virtus baptismi baptizato characterem imprimat christianum, qui nullo modo potest obliterari reatu incurrente criminis rediivo, supervacuus esset baptismus iteratus. Nam actum agere esset si, quod habet christianus, iterum conferretur et sic injuria fieret sacramento.*<sup>31</sup>

Alanus' contemporary, Peter Cantor (d. 1197) is the first theologian to present a doctrine in which *character* is definitely and formally established as the reason for the non-repetition of three sacraments. In his *Summa*, written about 1190, he tells us that, among other definitions, some theologians proposed the definition of Baptism as a certain character. Personally, he modifies this teaching and holds that Baptism is something resulting from four elements: water, form, intention and immersion. This something, he suggests tentatively, is a passing quality in the recipient but imprints a lasting character.<sup>32</sup>

Cantor's allusion to discussions on the nature of this something, namely whether it is a substance or accident etc., indicates clearly that he did not originate the doctrine but only tried to modify it in order to distinguish the transitory rite of Baptism from its lasting effect. He posits a passing or transitory quality as the proximate cause of the lasting imprint. Huguccio, who wrote about the same time, carefully classes the water as *substantia*, the external ablution as *passio philosophica* and the character itself as (lasting) *qualitas dominica* which

<sup>24</sup> *Sent.* V, 8; PL 211, 1239D. Cf. Peter of Celle (d. 1183), *Liber de panibus*, 4; PL 202, 947B: *Semel namque susceptus baptismus non reiteratur, quia Christus semel pro peccatis nostris mortuus est, semel resurrexit, et jam non moritur, mors illi ultra non dominabitur. Rursus autem Christum crucifigit qui rebaptizare instituit.* Walter of St. Blase (d. 1174), *Defl. ss. Patrum*; PL 157, 1098C: *Salvator meus natus est semel, in utero bajulatus est semel, crucifixus est semel et resurrexit a mortuis semel: unus Deus, una fides, unum baptismum* (Eph. iv, 5).

<sup>25</sup> *Institutiones theol.*; Ms. Paris, B. N. lat.

14,886, fol. 64<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>26</sup> *Contra haereticos* I, 48; PL 210, 353C.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* I, 60; PL 210, 396C: *Tantae est dignitatis (confirmatio), quod iterari non debet.* Date: ca. 1180.

<sup>28</sup> *Theol. regulae*; PL 210, 681A.

<sup>29</sup> *Contra haereticos* IV, 10; PL 210, 426D.

<sup>30</sup> *De Art. cath. fidei* IV, 9; PL 210, 616A. Authenticity is controversial.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. *Sermo V; Distinctiones* and *Contra Haereticos* II, 22; PL 210, 211D; 737D; 396D.

<sup>32</sup> *De Art. cath. fidei* IV, 5; PL 210, 614BC.

<sup>33</sup> See text in A. Landgraf, 'Sentenzen-glossen', *RTAM*, (1938), 41 f.

is imprinted by God on the occasion of Baptism.<sup>33</sup> Although Cantor was not unknown to him, it is beyond reasonable doubt that his distinctions reflect the same sort of discussions which were being carried on at the same time in Paris and Bologna. Hence, it is not at all accidental that the doctrine appears with slight variations at the same time in both these centres of learning.

A great deal of work still remained to be done in defining the nature of this imprint, but the Augustinian *injuria sacramenti* outlived all later developments in the peculiar terminology which designates character as *sacramentum et res*.<sup>34</sup> The conflict which existed between canonists and theologians was gradually settled in favor of the doctrine that *sacramentum* is not synonymous with non-repetition. In this sense, we must concede that Augustine's axiom, as interpreted by a long tradition, did not prevail against the liturgical or sacramental practices of the Church. St. Augustine would not have objected to this restriction, because an established and recognized custom was one of his most cherished arguments against rebaptism. The attempts to reconcile his general rule with the actual repetition of some sacraments are eloquent proof of a sincere effort to accept the universality of his statement, though it may be said again that St. Augustine had only Baptism and Ordination in mind when he made a general assertion which was to have such lasting repercussions on numerous aspects of sacramentology.

The final settlement, however, was not an unmixed blessing because it tended to obscure a number of considerations which were very dear to St. Augustine and to the centuries in which his doctrines struggled against the idealistic appeal of Cyprianic ideology. Such was the case with what we can justly call the basic tenet of St. Augustine's doctrine on Baptism expressed in the short phrase: It is Christ who baptizes. No human being must interfere with the consecration, holiness or *sacramentum* of which He is the author through human ministry. It was a logical step, inspired by St. Augustine and actually taken by later generations, to widen this in the form: It is Christ who ordains.

Obscured also was Augustine's argument based on the spiritual birth in Baptism. This many generations of writers had copied as eagerly as they had the originally Greek contribution to Latin theology that the recipient of Baptism cannot die and rise with Christ a second time through rebaptism. To add to a multiplicity of reasons, the twelfth century conceived the entirely new idea that Baptism is not repeated because it was principally instituted for the remission of original sin, which is not contracted a second time by relapse into actual sin.<sup>35</sup>

St. Thomas, we should admit, gives a masterly review of the entire tradition and was keenly aware of the fact that St. Paul's *unum baptisma* was the Scriptural cornerstone of the doctrine against rebaptism.<sup>36</sup> But he failed to remind us of St. Augustine's most repeated claim: It is Christ who baptizes.

However, when St. Thomas and others affirmed that the doctrine of character was of recent origin, we can only agree with them as far as the terminology is concerned. In point of doctrine, the concept of a lasting and inviolable consecration in Baptism and Ordination had been clearly elaborated by St. Augustine who, as we have seen, used the common term *sacramentum* to defeat the Donatist opposition. And since the inviolable 'trinitarian invocation' plays such an important part in his arguments, it is quite understandable that similar considerations were emphasized throughout the period of history we have just described.

In summing up the main findings of this study, we cannot overstress the deplorable disappearance of St. Augustine's anti-Donatist works or the even more deplorable carelessness of those who possessed but did not use them. If

<sup>33</sup> F. Gillman, *Der Kath.*, XC (1910), 305. It would be an interesting study to trace the origin of this Aristotelian terminology which was unknown in the sacramental vocabulary of the previous centuries.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. N. M. Haring, 'Berengar's Definitions', *Med. Studies*, X (1942), 133 ff.

<sup>35</sup> A. Landgraf, 'Zur Frage der Wiederholbarkeit der Sakramente', 264.

<sup>36</sup> *Summa theol.* II, 66, 9.

the accusation of neglect can be made at all, it should be raised primarily against compilers of *florilegia* on which most of our writers had to rely. And who knows how many of those collectors had access to the entire corpus or even part of it? The more plausible explanation is an extraordinary scarcity of known or available copies of the complete works. Even the well known *Excerpta ex operibus s. Augustini* by Eugippius contain only passages from *De Baptismo*.<sup>37</sup>

The doctrinal fluctuations and doubts, which stirred and divided the minds through many generations, were not caused by a deliberate resistance to the most brilliant thinker they knew, but by an entirely insufficient knowledge of his teaching. In the meantime, doctrinal currents were kept alive which, as St. Augustine had proven so convincingly, would destroy the sacramental order in the Church. In its final analysis, the doctrine of his beloved St. Cyprian undermined the peace of the Church for which he had died. And while the principal works which contain Augustine's teaching on Baptism and especially on Holy Orders were resting undisturbed, presumably in some library of Southern France, the pages of history were filled with accounts of controversies over reordination or reconfirmation.

When his doctrine gradually emerged, Berengar impressed theology with a number of definitions of *sacramentum* which restricted its meaning to the external visible sign. It was bound to run into difficulties with the much wider Augustinian usage of which the *injuria sacramenti* became an almost notorious example, because it does not aim at an external sacramental rite but at a lasting, internal effect. Even before this was clearly perceived, the theologians and canonists went different ways: the former stressed the individual nature and purpose of each sacrament, as manifested by ecclesiastical custom; the latter chose the logical consequences of the Augustinian axiom. We know today that the teaching of Bologna died a quiet death because it was not in close enough touch with the living sacramental organism of the Church.

<sup>37</sup> CSEL 9, 655 ff. Concerning the first appearance and actual use of the anti-Donatist corpus in theological literature (not including such collections as the scriptural *florilegia* of Bede and Florus), I may refer the reader to the article 'St. Augustine's Use of the Word *character*', *Med. Studies*, XIV (1952), 97, note 35. While Agobard of Lyons (d. 814-841) may have used the original *De Baptismo* (Definitely not Eugippius), there is reason to assume that Auxilius, *De Ordinatio*, 21 (PL 129, 1067CD) copied *Contra ep. Parm.* II, 11, 24 (CSEL 51, 74) from the Italian collection preserved in Ms. Rome, Bibl. Vallicell. T 18 whose author favours the validity of Holy Orders conferred by Formosus. In addition to first quotations from anti-Donatist works, we have also noted some other Augustinian

writings, which play a role in sacramental doctrines. The *Tractatus in Joh.* were already used by Isidore of Spain, *De Eccl. officiis* II, 25, 10; PL 83, 822. Leidrad of Lyons, as we have seen, quoted from *De Peccatorum meritis* (I, 24, 34; CSEL 40, 1, 33), which is, to the best of my knowledge, the first literary use of this work. I also hold that Hincmar was the first author to make use of St. Augustine's *De Nuptiis et concupiscentia*, *De Adulterinis conjugis* and *De Bono conjugali*, though he was anxious to obtain Bede's collection of Augustinian texts to increase his source material which was obviously limited. Cf. A. Wilmart, 'La collection de Bède', *Rev. Bén.*, XXXVIII (1926), 18. The work of Florus shows that Lyons must have possessed a particularly good Augustinian library.

# The Subject of Metaphysics for Peter of Auvergne

ARTHUR P. MONAHAN

PETER OF AUVERGNE,<sup>1</sup> whose life spans the second half of the thirteenth century, is a representative of one of the most remarkable eras in the history of philosophical speculation. However, as one of many minor philosophers of that era, his writings have hitherto escaped extensive study. This fact is not too surprising, in view of the research still necessary to make the thought of the truly great thirteenth-century philosophers adequately available to modern times. The need for more research on these men, nevertheless, does not preclude the advantages of examining a lesser figure of the same period; for the work of minor figures in any age serves to throw into bolder relief the doctrines of more renowned contemporaries, and is an excellent gauge of the influence exercised by the more important thinkers on their own time.

The writings of Peter of Auvergne are a valuable case in point, particularly with reference to St. Thomas Aquinas. A secular cleric prominent in the University of Paris during the last quarter of the thirteenth century, Peter was recognized in his own day as a "great philosopher", and actually completed some of St. Thomas' unfinished Aristotelian commentaries. Aquinas' contemporary biographer, Ptolemy of Lucca, calls Peter St. Thomas' "most faithful disciple".<sup>2</sup>

Monsignor Grabmann was one of the first modern scholars of mediaeval philosophy to call attention to Peter of Auvergne's importance, both as a continuer of St. Thomas and as a philosopher and theologian in his own right.<sup>3</sup> In the early 1930's, Father Edgar Hocedez responded to the need for making Peter's thought better known, publishing several valuable studies on his life, works and doctrine.<sup>4</sup> Since that time, however, little or nothing has been done to further Father Hocedez's researches. No adequate estimate of Peter's thought has yet been made, and his writings, with one minor exception,<sup>5</sup> still exist only in manuscript form.

The present article proposes to continue investigation of this early "disciple"

<sup>1</sup>The most recent and most complete biography of Peter of Auvergne is that by Father Edgar Hocedez, 'La Vie et les oeuvres de Pierre d'Auvergne', *Gregorianum*, XIV (1933), 4-36.

<sup>2</sup>Ptolemy of Lucca, *Historia Ecclesiastica* XXIII, 11, in Muratori, *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores* XI (Milan, 1727), col. 1170. Hoc etiam tempore [Gregorii X, Thomas] scripsit etiam super Philosophiam, videlicet *De Caelo*, et *De Generatione*, sed non complevit; et similiter *Politica*. Sed hos libros complevit Magister Petrus de Alvernia, fidelissimus discipulus ejus, Magister in Theologia, et magnus philosophus, et demum Episcopus Claromontensis.

For a summary of Peter's work as a completer of St. Thomas' writings, see Hocedez, *art. cit.*

<sup>3</sup>M. Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben* I (München, 1926), pp. 241, 248, 398, 400, 425.

<sup>4</sup>E. Hocedez, 'La Théologie de Pierre d'Auvergne', *Gregorianum*, XI (1930), 526-552; 'Les *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* de Pierre d'Auvergne', *Archives de Philosophie*, IX 3 (1932), 179-234; 'La Vie et les oeuvres de Pierre d'Auvergne', *Gregorianum*, XIV

(1933), 4-36; 'La Philosophie des *Quodlibets* de Pierre d'Auvergne', *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters*, Suppl. III, h. 2 (1935), 779-791; 'Une Question inédite de Pierre d'Auvergne sur l'individuation', *Revue Néoscholastique de Philosophie*, XXXVI (1934), 355-386.

<sup>5</sup>Hocedez has published Peter's *Quodlibet* II, 5, dealing with the problem of individuation, and the main body of a companion text from the *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* VII, 25; Hocedez, 'Une Question inédite . . .'. I have prepared a critical edition of selected Questions from the *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, which is scheduled for publication in a volume marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. Texts cited in this article are from this critical edition made from the seven known extant manuscripts of the *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*; Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale 16158; Bibliothèque Mazarienne 3498 and 3481; Rome, Bibliotheca Vaticana Ottobonianus 1145; Vienna, National Bibliothek 2330; Cambridge, Peterhouse 152; Rome, Bibliotheca Vaticana 845.

of St. Thomas through a consideration of his ideas concerning the subject of the science of metaphysics, an aspect of Peter's thought which serves well to illustrate his position in the intellectual currents of the late thirteenth century.<sup>6</sup> An effort will be made primarily to expose the doctrine of Peter himself, and secondarily to draw some conclusions on the subordinate but related problem of his position as Aquinas' "most faithful disciple". It must be realized in this latter regard, however, that no criticism need be implied in a judgment that our author is not a very faithful follower of St. Thomas, since in point of fact, as far as is known, Peter never claimed to be a disciple of Aquinas; and the single statement of testimony to this effect by Ptolemy of Lucca need not be taken in its strictest sense. Any conclusion, then, concerning doctrinal differences between them will not be intended to condemn Peter for failure to adhere to his reputation as a follower of St. Thomas, but rather to reflect the minimal influence the most basic elements of Aquinas' philosophy exercised on his contemporaries. Abstracting completely from the individual importance or non-importance of Peter of Auvergne, a conclusion of this kind is significant for the history of mediaeval thought.

An examination of Peter's notion of the subject of metaphysics ought naturally to begin where he himself introduces the problem. He raises it at the very outset of his *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, and its treatment forms a kind of introduction to this work. His discussion of the problem has three divisions: 1) a general introduction dealing with the nature of the first science and its subject—Prologue; 2) a determination of the subject of metaphysics—Book I, Questions 1-3; 3) a further examination of the nature of the first science and the things it treats—Book I, Questions 4-5. Our purpose makes it necessary to examine in detail the first two of these divisions.

The Prologue to Peter's *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* has the dual purpose of showing the necessity of a first science, and listing the names and characteristics of this science. Its necessity is shown in the following way. There is a first science, because in any genus there must be a first which is most perfect in that genus and the measure of all other things in it.<sup>7</sup> The first in the genus "science", then, is the perfect science and, as such, is unique; it is also the measure of all other sciences. And from the fact that it is first, it is the cause of all other sciences, since what is first is the cause of everything that follows it.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup>Peter's views on this subject are taken entirely from the *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, the only one of his writings containing an explicit treatment of the science of metaphysics.

<sup>7</sup>Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, Prooemium: Sicut dicit Philosophus in decimo *Metaphysicae* suae, in omni genere est aliquid unum quod est principium et metrum omnium eorum quae sunt in genere illo: puta in genere colorum principium et metrum omnium aliorum est color albus; in genere autem ponderum uncia. Et ratio est quoniam in omni genere oportet esse aliquid unum perfectissimum; unde et eorum quae sunt sub eodem genere unum est perfectius alio. Cujus ratio est; nam genus dividitur in differentias contrarias. Contrariorum autem unum est perfectius altero, quia unum se habet in ratione habitus, alterum autem in ratione privationis; et ideo in omni genere est aliquid quod est perfectius alio.

Peter's proof here appears somewhat dialectical. However, it should be noted that the argument, though less concretely expressed, involves the same principles as St. Thomas' fourth "way" of proving the exist-

tence of God. See St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, 2, 3. In both cases, the necessity for positing a first is the fact of the existence of others less perfect than the first. In Book IV, Question 1, Peter employs the same argument proving the necessity of a first science more effectively. He establishes the existence of a science of being as being, preexistent to any particular science, from the existence of particular sciences dealing with particular being: Intelligendum quod, si de aliquo ente particulari debeat haberi perfecta cognitio, necesse est aliquam scientiam esse quae considerat de ente secundum quod ens, quia cognitio cujuslibet entis particularis dependet ex cognitione entis in generali; hoc enim est quod primo cadit in cognitione intellectuali uniuscujusque. Si igitur in quacumque scientia particulari tradatur perfecta cognitio de ente particulari, necesse est praexistere scientiam aliquam quae sit de ente secundum quod ens; et hoc est quod Philosophus probat hic.

<sup>8</sup>Prooemium: In omni ergo genere est unum perfectissimum; quod perfectissimum est in aliquo genere principium est omnium eorum quae sunt in genere illo. Et ex hoc

Having established the necessity of a first science, the Prologue proceeds to describe the characteristics of its subject. A science takes its formal nature (*ratio*) and species from its subject, since a science is related to its subject as a power to its object.<sup>9</sup> Accordingly, the first science is first and the measure of all sciences because its subject is first and the measure of all things. Now things which are first known, "first knowables", are first and the measure of all other knowable things. First knowables, therefore, are the subject of the first science.<sup>10</sup>

Peter goes on to describe what he understands by the term "first knowables". Using the principle that the universal is *per se* intelligible, a comparison of the more universal with the less universal yields the conclusion that first knowables as most intelligible are most universal. From the notion that a thing is known insofar as it is in act, one can conclude that first knowables, as being most known, are in act in the highest degree. Moreover, a comparison of cause and effect also demonstrates the principle that a thing is known according as it is in act, since an effect is known through its cause. Therefore, first knowables, as most knowable in themselves, are most properly causes, namely first causes, because what most truly possesses the nature of a cause is most truly knowable in itself. The nature of first knowables may also be determined from the nature of the object of the intellect. The object of the intellect is immaterial and separate, since the intellect is an immaterial, separate power. Therefore, first knowables, as the highest objects of the intellect, are most immaterial and most separate from matter. First knowables, then, are the most universal things, maximum acts, first causes and the things most immaterial and separate from matter.<sup>11</sup>

Moreover, the four types of things described as first knowables all pertain to the same science. Peter's basis for this assertion is the principle that it pertains to the same science to consider both a genus and the first things in that genus.<sup>12</sup>

quod principium est, etiam metrum; nam illud est metrum per appropinquationem ad quod, vel remotionem a quo, entia illius generis dicuntur magis et minus perfecta. In omni ergo genere est aliquid unum quod est principium et metrum omnium eorum quae sunt postea. Et ex hoc quod est principium est etiam causa; nam primum est causa omnium posteriorum, ut dicitur secundo hujus. Et ideo in genere scientiarum est ponere aliquam scientiam unam quae est prima et metrum omnium aliarum.

<sup>9</sup>When speaking of the subject of a science, Peter uses *subjectum* and *objectum* interchangeably.

<sup>10</sup>Prooemium: Illa scientia dicitur esse prima et mensura omnium aliarum quae considerat prima scibilia et prima intelligibilia, quae etiam sunt mensura omnium aliorum scibilium. Et ratio hujus est quoniam scientia rationem et speciem habet ex objecto; sic enim se habet scientia ad subjectum sicut potentia ad actum. Nunc autem potentia speciem habet ex actu sive objecto; et ideo scientia speciem et rationem sortitur ex subjecto. Propter quod ex objecto habet quae consequuntur ipsam speciem, ut esse primum et metrum. Et ideo scientia illa metrum et mensura est aliarum quae talia considerat, quae sunt prima et mensura omnium aliorum scibilium.

<sup>11</sup>Prooemium: Quae autem sunt prima scibilia potest manifestari tripliciter: Primo ex comparatione magis universalis ad minus. Universale enim est per se intelligibile; sensus enim est singularium, intellectus vero universalium; et ideo magis universale magis intelligibile, et maxime universale maxime intelligibile. Illa ergo quae maxime sunt intelligibilia et maxime scibilia

sunt maxime universalis.

Secundo hoc apparet; nam omne quod intelligitur, intelligitur secundum quod ens actu; ex hoc enim unumquodque intelligitur, quod rationem entis habet. Quod ergo magis habet rationem entis magis est intelligibile, et quod maxime maxime. Quae ergo sunt actus, illa sunt maxime intelligibilia et scibilia. Haec autem sunt maxime universalis; ideo et cetera. Iterum hoc ostenditur ex comparatione effectus ad causam; effectus enim habet cognosci a sua causa. Quod ergo magis est causa, magis est secundum se cognoscibile. Quae ergo sunt causae primae simpliciter entium, maxime secundum naturam suam sunt intelligibilia, et per consequens prima scibilia.

Hoc etiam tertio ostenditur ex objecto intellectus. Objectum autem intellectus est immateriale et separatum; nam intellectus virtus talis est, scilicet immaterialis et separata. Quae ergo maxime immaterialia et separata sunt, maxime sunt intelligibilia. Illa ergo sunt prima scibilia quae sunt maxime universalis, maxime entia, causae primae simpliciter entium, immaterialia et separata. Et si ista sunt prima, manifestum est quod sunt mensura aliorum scibilium. Scientia igitur illa est prima et metrum omnium aliarum quae considerat maxime entia, maxime universalis, maxime separata et causas entium simpliciter primas.

<sup>12</sup>This is not a literal statement of the Aristotelian text whose authority Peter invokes here. The Stagirate says that "science deals chiefly with that which is primary and on which the other things depend, and in virtue of which they get their names;" Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, 2, 1003b16-18.

Accordingly, the same science studies being, the genus under which all things in the first science are considered, as will be seen later, and the first causes of being, universal and separate causes.<sup>13</sup>

Four names are attributed to the first science. It is properly called Wisdom; for it is an ordering science in that it considers the final cause as one of the first causes, and to order is the proper task of the wise man, a task he achieves by a consideration of the end. The first science may be called First Philosophy, because it considers first beings. The term Metaphysics also denotes the first science, since it considers what is most universal and most abstract, according to both being and definition, and maximum universals are objects higher than the things considered in Physics, whose objects have sensible matter in their nature. Finally, the first science is called Theology, since it considers immaterial substances, which are called divine.<sup>14</sup>

Subsequently, Peter ascribes six characteristics to the first science. It is first among the sciences, because it has the most noble subject. It is supreme in dignity, since it considers first knowables, which are the cause of knowability in all other things. The necessity of the first science follows from the same argumentation.<sup>15</sup> Its perfection derives from its most perfect object, first being. A second reason substantiating the perfection of this science is that man, by considering the things determined in the first science, attains the end most proper to his nature and attainable in this life.<sup>16</sup> The first science's sufficiency is another characteristic Peter demonstrates in two ways. In the first place, its perfection makes metaphysics most sufficient. Secondly, this, the science of the wise man, is most sufficient, because the wise man can possess wisdom completely

<sup>13</sup> Prooemium: *Ista autem quattuor pertinent ad eandem scientiam; ad eandem enim scientiam pertinet considerare genus aliquid et primum in genere illo, ut vult Philosophus quarto hujus. Et ideo ad unam scientiam pertinet considerare ens secundum quod hujusmodi et causas primas entium, causas iterum universales et separatas.*

<sup>14</sup> Prooemium: *Unde et scientia quae habet omnia considerare nominatur sapientia, prima philosophia, metaphysica et theologia. Dicitur autem sapientia quia considerat causas simpliciter primas, nam sapientis est ordinare; haec enim est una descriptio sapientis quam Philosophus ponit in prooemio hujus. Ordo autem sumitur ex ratione finis; et ideo qui ordinat aliquid, ex comparatione finis considerat. Ex hoc ergo quod aliqua scientia considerat finem dicitur sapientia. Et manifestum est quod causa finalis est prima causarum et dicitur causa causarum. Ex hoc ergo scientia aliqua considerat causam primam sub ratione causae primae dicitur esse sapientia.*

*Ex hoc autem quod considerat prima entia et entium principia dicitur prima philosophia; haec enim est cognitio entis secundum se et etiam primorum entium. Ex hoc autem quod considerat entia maxime universalis dicitur metaphysica. Naturalis enim ea considerat quae minus sunt universalis et minus abstracta, talia scilicet quae in sua ratione accipiunt materiam sensibilem. Mathematica autem transcendit scientiam naturalem, quia illa quae ibi considerantur magis sunt universalis et abstracta; nam secundum rationem abstrahunt a materia sensibili, licet non secundum esse. Illa igitur quae considerat maxime universalis, quae abstracta sunt et secundum esse et secundum rationem, recte dicitur metaphysica, id est, transcendens physicam, id*

*est, naturalem scientiam. Ex his ergo patet quod est aliqua scientia una quae est prima et metrum sive mensura omnium aliarum, et haec est illa quae considerat universalis maxime et etiam separata et immaterialia. Unde et pro tanto dicitur divina, quia immateriales substantias sive divinas considerat.*

<sup>15</sup> Prooemium: *Ex his autem apparet tria, scilicet ordo hujus scientia ad alias, dignitas et necessitas. Primum apparet sic. Si enim scientia rationem habet ex objecto, illa ergo scientia quae est de primo et nobilissimo objecto est prima inter alias. Haec autem est scientia ista; propter quod inter alias prima est ordine perfectionis, sed non ordine doctrinae. Ex hoc etiam apparet dignitas hujus scientiae, iterum et necessitas; sapientis enim considerat prima intelligibilia et scibilia.*

<sup>16</sup> Prooemium: *Ex his autem ulterius tria sequuntur, videlicet quod haec scientia est perfectissima, sufficientissima et delectabilissima inter omnes. Primum patet; nam scientia de primis entibus considerat propter quod, et ejus consideratio perfectissima est. Et hoc probatur sic; nam perfectio theoriae est ex perfectione objecti; perfectissima ergo theoria ex perfectissimo objecto. Objectum autem perfectissimum est ens primum; quare, cum de isto ente fuerit haec scientia, sequitur quod sit perfectissima. Hoc etiam apparet ex alio, quia perfectissimum est quod attingit proprio fini. Sed homo considerando ea quae determinantur in illa scientia attingit ad finem sibi proprium, saltem qui est finis hominis secundum naturam suam et quem potest habere in hac vita; quare et cetera.*

Note here that Peter asserts that man has an end proper to his nature and attainable in this life, a kind of natural beatitude.



when he has only the necessities of life, while the just man and liberal man, for example, need means other than the bare necessities of life for the exercise of their virtues of justice and liberality.<sup>17</sup> Finally, the first science offers the greatest delight, since delight follows operation, and the most perfect human operation in this life lies in a consideration of some of the things studied in this science.<sup>18</sup>

The sections of Peter's Prologue dealing with the characteristics of the subject of the first science and the names of this science show a direct and frequently an almost literal dependence on St. Thomas' Prologue to his *Commentary on the Metaphysics*.<sup>19</sup> Peter, like Aquinas, gives several descriptions of first knowables, the subject of the first science. For Peter, first knowables are the most universal things, maximum acts, first causes and the most immaterial and separate things; for Aquinas, they are first causes, the most universal things and the most separate things. The arguments used by the two writers to establish that the most universal things are considered in the first science are identical; and those identifying first knowables with first causes are similar. On the other hand, the two men employ different reasons to show that the first science considers most immaterial and separate things; and Peter's demonstration that metaphysics studies things most perfectly in act is not in St. Thomas' Prologue.

The four names attributed by Peter to the first science are all found in the Prologue of St. Thomas. Peter successively names the first science Wisdom, First Philosophy, Metaphysics and Theology. St. Thomas, giving a threefold description of the subject of the first science, names the science First Philosophy, Metaphysics and Theology. And at the beginning of his Prologue, Aquinas calls the first science Wisdom. The justifications given by the two authors for applying these names to the first science are almost identical in substance and literary form. On the discount side of this comparison it should be noted, however, that Peter's enumeration of the six characteristics of the first science is not to be found in St. Thomas' Prologue; nor is the reason given by Peter for the assertion that the four named sciences are in reality one the same as that adduced by St. Thomas in his Prologue, although the latter asserts the same conclusion.<sup>20</sup>

It is only after this introduction to the nature and subject of the first science that Peter resolves the question: what is the subject of metaphysics? The resolution, which extends over the first three Questions of Book I, clearly reflects in order and content the opening chapters of Avicenna's *Metaphysics*. Book I, Question 1 asks: whether the separate substances (or God) are the subject of metaphysics?<sup>21</sup> Before answering this question, Peter enumerates four require-

<sup>17</sup> Prooemium: Iterum est sufficientissima, quia omne perfectum sufficiens; et ideo perfectissimum est sufficientissimum. Haec autem est scientia ista; quare et cetera. Iterum hoc declaratur: omnes enim indigent necessariis ad vitam. Unde sapiens et prudens indiget necessariis ad vitam, ut dicitur quarto *Ethicorum*. Sed largitis necessariis ad vitam, sapiens per se speculari potest. Non sic autem justus vel liberalis; justus enim, etsi habeat necessaria ad vitam, indiget tamen aliis per quae exerceat opera iustitiae; liberalis autem per quae exerceat opera liberalitatis. Sed inventis solum necessariis ad vitam, sapientia perfectissime haberi potest et acquiri, ut patet ex prooemio hujus; est enim inventa pra-existentibus ad vitam. Consideratio ergo hujus scientiae sufficientissima est.

<sup>18</sup> Prooemium: Iterum est delectabilissima; nam delectatio consequitur operationem; quare perfectissima delectatio perfectissimam operationem. Non tamen operationem consequitur delectatio absolute, sed prout

comprehensa est, et aliis se sentit unire principio illius operationis; comprehensio enim unionis convenientis cum convenienti causa est delectationis. Perfectissima autem operatio hominis in hac vita est secundum aliqua quae considerantur hic; quare consideratio hujus scientiae est homini delectabilissima.

When Peter refers here to "some of the things" (*aliqua*), he doubtless has in mind the highest thing considered in the first science, God.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. St. Thomas, *In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio*; Prooemium; ed. Cathala-Spiazzi (Turin, 1950), pp. 1-2.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> An analysis of this question shows clearly that Peter develops his material as though the question were: Whether God is the subject of metaphysics? In fact, one manuscript, containing Peter's remark that he is borrowing the order of the following three questions from Avicenna, does read

ments of the subject of any science: 1) The subject of a science is that under whose formal nature (*ratio*) all the things in the science are considered. The demonstration of this conclusion is based on the principle that the subject of a science relates to the science in the same way as the object of a habit or power relates to the power.<sup>22</sup> 2) The subject of a science is the first thing in the science to be grasped by the intellect; for the subject of a science is that under whose formal nature all things are considered in the science. Therefore, if the subject did not first move the intellect, all the things in the science would not be considered under the formal nature which is the subject, but under the formal nature which first moves the intellect; and this is absurd.<sup>23</sup> 3) The subject of a science is what is most manifest in the science, because that under whose formal nature all the things are known must itself be most known.<sup>24</sup> 4) One proceeds in knowledge from what is more known to what is less known. Therefore, since the subject of a science is what is most known in the science, one proceeds in a science from knowledge of its subject. And since this is so, it is evident that what is known about the subject of a science, its existence and nature (*si est* and *quid est*), must be known previously.<sup>25</sup>

This preliminary clarification made, Peter goes on to deny that the separate substances (or God) are the subject of metaphysics. He adduces five reasons to substantiate his position, four of them deriving from the requirements of the subject of a science, and presupposing that the subject of the first science possesses these requirements in a preeminent degree.<sup>26</sup> All four of these argu-

"God" and not "separate substances" in the statement of the Question (*Ms. Bibl. Mazarienne 3481, fol. 133<sup>ra</sup>*). The explanation for the interchangeability of these two terms is doubtless twofold. The influence of Avicenna on Peter accounts for his denial, in Book I, Question 1, that God is the subject of the first science. Secondly, while stating his doctrine in Avicennian terms, he wishes to counter directly the Averroistic position that separate substances are the subject of metaphysics; and this intention explains the phrasing of the question.

<sup>22</sup>I. 1: Considerandum ergo primo quid dicimus subiectum in scientia; iuxta quod sciendum quod subiectum in scientia quatuor requiritur condiciones. Subiectum enim in scientia est illud sub cuius ratione considerantur omnia quae considerantur in scientia illa. Iterum, ipsum est quod primo inter alia quae considerantur occurrit intellectui nostro. Iterum, oportet quod subiectum de his quae considerantur in scientia manifestissimum sit intellectui. Quarto requiritur quod sit tale ex cuius cognitione procedatur ad cognitionem omnium aliorum.

Declaratio primi est: Subiectum se habet ad scientiam sicut obiectum ad habitum vel potentiam. Obiectum autem alicujus potentiae est sub cuius ratione cadunt omnia alia quae movent potentiam illam, sicut obiectum visus est illud sub cuius ratione videntur quae videntur a virtute visiva, puta si illud sit coloratum vel luminosum. Similiter visio, quae est actus per quem aliquis videt, determinatur per illud primum in cuius virtute movetur potentia visiva.

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*: Item, hoc apparet in aliis scientiis. Quicquid enim consideratur in scientia naturali, consideratur sub ratione mobilis vel motus. Unde omnia naturalia accipiunt motum in ratione sua. Et ex hoc sequitur secundum, quia, si omnia quae considerantur

in scientia considerantur sub ratione objecti, tunc illud quod primo movet intellectum erit ratio illius objecti. Da enim contrarium, scilicet quod ipsum non primo moveat intellectum, sequitur tunc quod non omnia cadebant sub scientia sub ratione objecti, sed sub ratione illius quod primo movet intellectum. Hoc autem est inconveniens. Quare manifestum est quod subiectum in scientia primo notum est intellectui, si sub ratione ejus considerantur ea quae in scientia determinari habent.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*: Ex his sequitur tertium, quod subiectum est notissimum; illud enim oportet esse notissimum, sub cuius ratione comprehenduntur omnia quae comprehenduntur in scientia. Tale autem est subiectum, ut prius ostensum est; quare notissimum est.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*: Et quia a notissimis universaliter procedendum est, ideo sequitur quartum, quod scilicet ex cognitione subjecti procedendum est ad cognitionem aliorum determinantium in scientia. Et ex his sequitur quod de subjecto quicquid pertinet ad cognitionem ejus in se oportet supponere; et ideo de subjecto oportet praecognoscere si est et quid est. Cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 2, 1-3, 89b2-91a12; St. Thomas, *In II Posteriores Analytica*, 1. Siger of Brabant makes the same point in the same context; the existence (*si est*) and nature (*quid est*) of a science's subject must be presupposed; Siger of Brabant, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, Introd., 1; ed. Graiff (Louvain, 1948), p. 3, ll. 28-29.

<sup>26</sup>I. 1: Ex his autem ad propositum dico quod Deus non est subiectum in scientia ista. Et hoc patet primo ex ultimo; nam subiectum est ex cuius cognitione proceditur ad cognitionem aliorum. Sed in scientia ista non proceditur ex cognitione Dei ad cognitionem aliorum; ideo Deus non potest esse hic subiectum. Item, hoc declaratur ex penultimo. Illud enim est subiectum in

ments insist on the universal nature of the science of metaphysics. Their cogency stems from the concept of a transcendent God, a Being consequently Who is not the first thing grasped by the intellect, nor what is most known by the intellect, Who is not that from which one proceeds in knowing the things considered in metaphysics, nor that under whose formal nature all things are considered in the first science. It is because of his insistence on the transcendent nature of God that Peter of Auvergne agrees with Avicenna and his own mediaeval contemporaries that God is not the subject of metaphysics.<sup>27</sup>

Peter's final argument that God is not the subject of metaphysics is borrowed expressly from Avicenna.<sup>28</sup> No science proves the existence of its subject. But the existence of God is proven in metaphysics; therefore, God is not the subject of this science. The assertion that God's existence is demonstrated in metaphysics rests on the following argument. God's existence is not proven in any particular science, since they deal with determinate being, and do not seem able to prove anything of being itself. God, however, as neither unknowable nor *per se* knowable, must have His existence demonstrated. Therefore, God's existence must be proven in metaphysics, the most perfect science.<sup>29</sup>

Again the cogency of Peter's argument derives from his concept of a transcendent God. Peter insists that metaphysics and not any particular science demonstrates the existence of God, because it is the most perfect of sciences, and superior to any particular science. However, he carefully avoids stating either that God is not a determinate being, or that God is identifiable with being as being. Peter's concern is to show that the existence of God, the supreme and transcendent Being, is demonstrated in the most perfect of all sciences. His care not to identify God with being as being, the subject of the most perfect science, springs from the necessity of maintaining God's transcendence.

Peter reflects not only mediaeval Christians' preference for the Avicennian conception of metaphysics, but also their reaction to Averroes on this point. After supporting the view that God is not the subject of metaphysics by reference to Avicenna, he mentions Averroes' opposition to the Avicennian position, and goes on to devote the remaining portion of Book I, Question 1 to a refutation of Averroes. He finds Averroes in error on three counts: 1) Averroes erred in denying that metaphysics demonstrated the existence of separate substances; 2) The Commentator contradicted Aristotle by stating that God's existence is not proven in metaphysics; for Aristotle proved the existence of God in the *Metaphysics*, from the relation of God to creatures as threefold cause, efficient,

scientia quod notissimum est intellectui. Sed Deus non est hoc quod notissimum est intellectui. Quamvis enim Deus sit maxime scibilis et intelligibilis secundum naturam suam, nobis tamen minime, ut patet secundo *Metaphysicae*. Sicut enim oculus vespertilionis se habet ad lucem solis, sic intellectus noster se habet ad ea quae sunt manifestissima in natura; quare Deus non est hic subjectum. Item, hoc apparet ex secundo; subjectum enim scientiae est quod primo occurrit intellectui. Sed Deus non est quod primo occurrit intellectui in scientia ista, immo ens; quare Deus non est hic subjectum. Item, hoc patet ex primo; non enim sub ratione Dei considerantur omnia quae considerantur in scientia ista, sed sub ratione entis; ideo et cetera.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Avicenna, *Metaphysica* (Venice, 1508), 1, 1, B, fol. 70<sup>ra</sup>. Cf. J. Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics: A Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought* (Toronto, 1951), pp. 4-5.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Avicenna, *Meta.*, 1, 1, B-C, fol. 70<sup>ra-b</sup>.

<sup>29</sup> I, 1: Avicenna autem aliam rationem sumit ad hoc. Illud de quo quaeritur in scientia ista non est subjectum in ea, quia nulla scientia probat subjectum esse; esset enim aliquod manifestius eo. Sed Deum esse probatur hic. Et quaeritur quod probatur sic; vel enim Deum esse probatur hic vel non. Si sic, habetur propositum; si non, vel est concessum in scientia et probatum in alia, vel nec est concessum in ista nec etiam probatum in alia. Primum non potest stare, quoniam aliae scientiae considerant entia determinata et effectus et passiones eorum. Ex his autem quae consequuntur ens determinatum non videtur simpliciter probari de ente; quare videtur quod nulla alia scientia probat Deum esse. Iterum, secundum non potest esse verum, quia hoc non esset nisi quia 'Deum esse' vel esset per se notum vel desperatum cognosci; quorum neutrum verum. Quare Deum esse probatur hic; quare et cetera.

formal and final;<sup>30</sup> 3) Averroes wrongly held separate substances to be the subject of the first science.<sup>31</sup>

An interesting aspect of Peter's attack on Averroes is his repeated statement that metaphysics demonstrates the existence of God. With Avicenna, he develops a proof for the existence of God based on the nature of the possible and the necessary.<sup>32</sup> Metaphysics considers some things which are effects of the First Being, and which clearly exist only as possible and not as necessary. Therefore, one can demonstrate the existence of God in the science of metaphysics, arguing to the existence of the one Necessary Being from the existence of His effects, which are only possible beings. For Peter, the Avicennian proof of God's existence based on the nature of the possible is a metaphysical demonstration, and is superior to any proof from physics.<sup>33</sup>

Peter also rejects the idea that first causes are the subject of metaphysics in Book I, Question 2. The text of this Question makes a preliminary distinction. First causes may be understood in three ways: according to a more universal nature, as having being; according to their proper nature, i.e. as causes; according to their determinate nature as causes, i.e. as this cause or that cause: e.g. efficient, final, etc.<sup>34</sup> Three arguments are set forth to demonstrate that first causes as causes are not the subject of metaphysics: 1) If causes as causes were

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Meta.* II, 2, 994<sup>a</sup>6; XII, 9, 1075<sup>a</sup>10 (also II, 2, 994<sup>a</sup>11-19); XII, 8, 1074<sup>a</sup>36.

<sup>31</sup> I, 1: Sed intelligendum quod Averroes, fine primi *Physicorum*, invehitur contra Avicennam dicens: Peccat qui dicit quod entia separata esse declaratur in scientia divina, quoniam sunt subjectum in illa. Et supra secundum *Physicorum* dicit quod entia separata esse determinatur in scientia naturali. Et ideo dixit Avicennam peccasse, qui dixit Deum esse probari in scientia ista. Sed iste non minus reprehensibilis est quam Avicenna; peccavit enim in tribus.

Primo quia dicit quod separata esse non declaratur in scientia illa, quoniam universaliter ex effectu causae alicuius, si fuerit notior, potest demonstrari causa illa esse, quia effectus non est nisi ex causa. . . . Item, peccat Averroes, quia contradicit Philosopho. Probat enim hic Philosophus Deum esse. Cum enim Deus se habeat ad alia entia in triplici genere causae, scilicet causae efficientis, formalis et finalis, Philosophus in secundo hujus probat ipsum esse in genere causae efficientis; secundo hujus in genere etiam causae formalis, in duodecimo hujus; et iterum, in ratione causae finalis, in fine duodecimi, ubi probat ipsum esse bonum. Tertio peccat Averroes, dicens substantias universales esse subjectum in ista scientia, ut ostensum est prius.

I am of the opinion that the section of this text dealing with the references to Aristotle's threefold proof of God's existence is faulty.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Avicenna, *Meta.*, I, 7, fol. 73<sup>ra</sup>-va.

<sup>33</sup> I, 1: Sed in scientia ista considerantur aliqua quae sunt effectus primi et quae manifestum est esse ut possibile in entibus. Quare in ista scientia ex aliquo effectu primi magis manifeste potest declarari Deum esse. Et ad hoc Avicenna respexit quando ex natura possibilis declaravit necesse esse. Item, arguitur quod essentialius et verius potest probari Deum esse in scientia ista quam in scientia naturali, quoniam quando per plura media contingit ostendere aliquam conclusionem,

per illud medium quod est affinius, proportionalius et propinquius conclusioni verius probatur conclusio; media enim et extrema in eodem genere debent esse, ut dicitur in *Posterioribus*. Sed Deum esse demonstratur in scientia naturali per motum; in scientia autem ista demonstratur ex natura possibilis. Illud autem est propinquius conclusioni quae est Deum esse. Motus autem est effectus remotior; effectus enim proximus primi non est motus, immo dare esse mobili. Quare etsi in utraque scientia, scilicet naturali et divina, probetur Deum esse, essentialius tamen in scientia divina.

Note that Peter does admit the validity of proofs of God's existence within the science of physics, citing a proof from motion as an example of one such demonstration. Where he explicitly demonstrates the existence of a First principle (XII, 6), Peter utilizes the Aristotelian proof of the necessity of a first mover to establish the existence of a First Principle. In Book XII, Question 6, he uses five ways of demonstrating the existence of a First Principle, the five ways of St. Thomas (cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, 2, 3), but in a different order. Peter's choice, however, as the most compelling method of proving God's existence is the "metaphysical" proof of Avicenna. This preference is clear in Book I, Question 1, and again in Book XII, Question 6, where he declares: "Avicenna, however, adduces another argument to prove that there is a First Principle among beings, an argument derived from the nature of the possible and the necessary. And this proof is proper to the science of metaphysics, whatever the Commentator says to the contrary."

<sup>34</sup> I, 2: Causae enim primae possunt tripliciter considerari: vel secundum rationem universalisorem, videlicet secundum hoc quod habent esse; vel secundum quod causae sunt, et hoc est secundum rationem propriam; vel secundum rationes determinatas, ut secundum quod haec causa vel illa.

the subject of the first science, the attributes considered in metaphysics would be attributes of causes as causes. This, however, is simply not true of such attributes as "before", "after", "whole", "part", etc; they are considered in metaphysics and are attributes, not of causes, but of being. 2) Moreover, the subject of a science is not demonstrated in that science. But metaphysics demonstrates the existence of first causes, from caused being, since it is not clear in the beginning whether or not some things have a cause and, hence, whether there is such a thing as a cause. Therefore, first causes are not the subject of metaphysics. 3) Finally, if first causes were the subject of metaphysics, any cause would be considered in the first science according to its proper causality. This, however, is not the case with matter, which is considered in metaphysics, not as the subject of change, but as substance. Accordingly, first causes are not the subject of the first science. Further, if causes as causes are not the subject of metaphysics, neither, by the same token, are causes as determinate causes. Therefore, first causes as determinate causes are not the subject of metaphysics. Peter then concludes: Causes are the subject of the first science only as they have being, that is, only according to the universal nature of being which they possess. Hence, being is the subject of metaphysics.<sup>35</sup>

Avicenna is the direct source for almost all of Book I, Question 2. The three-fold manner of distinguishing causes, Peter's first two arguments denying causes as causes to be the subject of metaphysics, and the concluding remark that causes are the subject of the first science only when considered as being, are all borrowed directly from the first chapter of Avicenna's *Metaphysics*.<sup>36</sup> Two of Peter's arguments, however, the one based on the specific nature of material cause, and that drawn from the determinate nature of any cause, are not in this text of Avicenna.

Peter of Auvergne held that being as being is the subject of the first science. He maintained this position in two distinct Questions of the *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*. Book I, Question 3 contains Peter's first definitive statement on the matter; and Book IV, Question 1 repeats the doctrine, in the context of Aristotle's assertion that there is a universal science whose subject is being as being.<sup>37</sup> In Book I, Question 3, Peter cites five ways of demonstrating that being as being is the subject of metaphysics. As might be expected, he relies heavily here on the four requirements of the subject of a science enumerated previously:<sup>38</sup> 1) Being is the subject of the first science because it is the formal nature under which all things in this science are considered; eg. matter, negation, privation. 2) Being is the subject of metaphysics, since it is what is first grasped by the intellect, as Avicenna and anyone who has experienced it attest.<sup>39</sup> 3)

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid*: Causae autem secundum quod causae non sunt subiectum in hac scientia, quoniam si sic, tunc accidentia et passiones quae considerantur essent passiones causarum secundum quod causae sunt. Quid tamen non est verum; accidentia enim quae quaeruntur hic sunt particulare, universale, prius, posterius, totum et pars. Haec autem sunt passiones entis; ideo et cetera.

Item, nihil quod declaratur esse hic est subiectum in scientia ista. Sed causas primas esse declaratur hic ex esse causati. Statim enim in principio doctrinae non est manifestum utrum aliqua habeant causae, et sic non manifestum est causam esse. Propter quod ulterius procedit ad declarandum causam esse; quare et cetera.

Praeterea, si causa secundum quod causa esset subiectum in hac scientia, tunc quaelibet causa secundum propriam causalitatem consideraretur hic. Quod tamen non est

verum de materia, ut Commentator dicit super septimum hujus; non enim consideratur hic materia nisi secundum quod substantia, non autem quod subiectum transmutationis; sic autem rationem causalitatis habet.

Item, nec causa secundum propriam et determinatam rationem est hic subiectum, puta causa agens secundum quod agens, finis secundum quod finis et sic de aliis. Si enim non sunt subiectum hic consideratae secundum quod quod causa absolute, multo fortius nec secundum quod haec causa. Si igitur causae sint hic subiectum, hoc erit secundum quod ens sunt, et tunc non est aliud ponere nisi ens hic esse subiectum.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Avicenna, *Meta.*, 1, 1, D-E, fol. 70<sup>rb-va</sup>.

<sup>37</sup> Aristotle, *Meta.* IV 1, 1003<sup>a</sup>20.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. *supra*, pp. 122-3.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Avicenna, *Meta.*, 1, 6, A, fol. 72<sup>rb</sup>.

Being is also what is most knowable, for the same reason; and therefore it is the subject of the first science. 4) Since one proceeds in metaphysics from a knowledge of being to a knowledge of all other things, being is the subject of this science.<sup>40</sup> 5) The fifth demonstration is taken from Aristotle.<sup>41</sup> Any particular science considers determinate being, and not being as being. However, since being is universally present in the nature of all particular being, it must be considered in the first, most universal science. Otherwise, what is present in the subject of all other sciences would itself be unconsidered; and this is absurd.<sup>42</sup>

The emphasis in Book IV, Question 1 is a little different than that in Book I, Question 3. Peter's concern in the later Question is to stress the universal and primary nature of the science of metaphysics and its subject, and to show that there is a science of being as being. The argumentation is again based directly on Aristotle.<sup>43</sup> Universal being is what the intellect first considers; therefore, knowledge of any particular being depends on knowledge of universal being. Consequently, if there is a perfect knowledge of any particular being (and there is), there must be a science of being as being. Moreover, the science of being as being cannot be a particular science, since the subject of a particular science, what it primarily and principally considers, is particular being. Since the nature, species and order of a science are taken from its subject, the nature of the science whose subject is universal will be universal. Therefore, there is a universal science of universal being, being as being.<sup>44</sup> The science with this subject is a truly universal science and, as such, is first among the sciences.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>40</sup> I, 3: *Intelligendum quod ens secundum quod ens est subiectum in hac scientia, et hoc declaratur sic. Subiectum in scientia est sub cuius ratione considerantur omnia quae cadunt in scientia illa, et cuius ratio primo occurrit intellectui, et quod est notissimum intellectui, et ex cuius cognitione proceditur ad cognitionem aliorum in scientia. Sed hoc est ens universaliter. Quicquid enim consideratur in scientia ista, consideratur secundum quod ens, ut privatio, negatio, materia. Item, ens primo occurrit intellectui, ut dicit Avicenna, et quilibet in se experitur. Item, ex cognitione entis proceditur in cognitionem aliorum. Unde et principia simpliciter prima formantur in terminis entis; quare et cetera.*

<sup>41</sup> Aristotle, *Meta.* VI, 1, 1025<sup>b</sup>7-9. Cf. Avicenna, *Meta.*, 1, 1, A, fol. 70<sup>a</sup>.

<sup>42</sup> I, 3: *Hoc etiam patet ratione Philosophi sexto huius, et ratione Avicennae quae in idem redit. Quaelibet scientia particularis considerat ens aliquod determinatum, ut medicina corpus sanabile secundum quod sanabile, et nihil considerat de sanabili secundum quod ens. Similiter naturalis considerat de ente mobili secundum quod mobile, non secundum quod ens; ita quod nulla scientia particularis considerat de ente secundum quod ens. Ens autem universaliter cadit in ratione omnium entium particularium. Si ergo ens universaliter non consideretur hic, remanebit inconsideratum; et sic illud remanebit inconsideratum quod cadit in subiectis omnium aliarum scientiarum. Hoc autem est inconveniens. Oportet ergo quod consideretur in aliqua scientia, non nisi in ista quae maxime universalis est; quare et cetera.*

<sup>43</sup> Aristotle, *Meta.* IV, 1, 1003<sup>a</sup>22-32.

<sup>44</sup> IV, 1: *Intelligendum quod, si de aliquo ente particulari debeat haberi perfecta cognitio, necesse est aliquam scientiam esse quae considerat de ente secundum quod ens,*

*quia cognitio cuiuslibet entis particularis dependet ex cognitione entis in generali; hoc enim est quod primo cadit in cognitione intellectuali uniuscuiusque. Si igitur in quacumque scientia particulari tradatur perfecta cognitio de ente particulari, necesse est praexistere scientiam aliquam quae sit de ente secundum quod ens; et hoc est quod Philosophus probat hic.*

*Ista autem scientia quae considerat ens simpliciter non potest esse scientia particularis; illud enim quod primo et principaliter considerat scientia particularis est suum subiectum proprium. Subiectum autem proprium, subiectum suum, est ens particulare; ergo scientia particularis non considerat nisi ens particulare. Ens ergo universaliter necessario determinabitur in aliqua scientia alia a scientia quacumque particulari. Et quia ratio scientiae et species et ordo est ex ratione subiecti, ut ratio habitus ex ratione objecti illius habitus, ideo ratio scientiae quae est de ente universaliter erit ex ratione entis universaliter secundum quod ens. Et ideo, si ens secundum quod ens sit ens universaliter, et non est aliquod particulare ens, oportet scientiam quae est de tali ente esse universalem. Et istud est quod Philosophus probat secundo.*

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*: *Ex hoc etiam quod talis scientia universalis est de ente secundum quod ens, sequitur quod ipsa est prima et principalis inter omnes. Scientia enim quae est de eo quod primo occurrit intellectui nostro est prima; nam, cum scientia sit habitus intellectus, non est de aliquo nisi secundum quod apprehensum est ab intellectu. Et ideo scientia quae est de tali aliquo quod primo apprehensum est ab intellectu, et in quod intellectus primo fertur, videtur esse prima. Sed scientia universalis quae considerat ens secundum quod ens est de eo quod primo occurrit intellectui nostro; nam ens secundum quod ens primo cognitum est ab intel-*

Nevertheless, as noted in the Prologue, being as being is not the only thing considered in the first science.<sup>46</sup> Metaphysics studies being as being for its subject; it also studies God and the separate substances as the highest beings and the first causes of being. It is significant, however, that for Peter of Auvergne these "first causes of being" are not the causes of being as being. According to him, being as being has no cause or principle, either of its being or of its being known. Three arguments support this position: 1) Since being as being is most knowable, and its existence is not demonstrated in any science prior to that science of which it is the subject, it cannot have any causes. If what is in itself first, as the subject of the first science, had any cause, there would be a process to infinity of firsts, since its cause would be prior to it. 2) If there were causes of being as being, there would be causes of every being. This, however, is impossible (the Supreme Being is uncaused).<sup>47</sup> 3) If there were any cause of being as being, being would be the cause of itself, since the cause of being would itself be being. This, however, is false.<sup>48</sup>

Peter's position that being as being has no causes is Avicennian in origin, and represents a very different view than that held by St. Thomas Aquinas.<sup>49</sup> For St. Thomas, the subject of metaphysics is *ens commune*;<sup>50</sup> and he identifies *ens commune* with *ens creatum*.<sup>51</sup> Accordingly, he asserted that being as being did have a cause, namely God.<sup>52</sup> Peter repudiated the identification of being as being with created being, stating explicitly that created being is a part of being as such; and went on naturally to deny any causes of being as such.<sup>53</sup> For Peter, metaphysics studies universal being as its subject, and God is somehow contained within the extension of this subject. For Aquinas, however, metaphysics studies being as being (i.e. created being) as its subject, and the principles of all beings (God and the angels), divine things, as principles of the

lectu nostro. Quare illa scientia dicitur esse prima inter alias. Est igitur aliqua scientia quae considerat ens secundum quod ens, et haec est et universalis et est ista quae nunc quaeritur.

<sup>46</sup> *Supra*, note 13.

<sup>47</sup> IV, 1, ad 1: Ad primam rationem cum arguitur, ejus quod consideratur in scientia oportet esse causas et principia, dico quod hoc non est universaliter verum; nam non de eo quod consideratur ut subjectum in scientia universalis; ejus enim non oportet esse causas vel principia nec in essendo nec in cognoscendo. Si autem subjectum in scientia fuerit tale quod ipsum sit maxime cognitum secundum rationem suam in scientia, ita etiam ut principia complexa immediata fiant ex complexione rationis subjecti, ideo ipsum etiam non demonstretur in aliqua scientia priori, talis subjecti non sunt aliquaes causae et principia; esset enim tunc procedere in infinitum. Ens autem secundum quod ens ipsum est quod non est aliquid prius in essendo vel in cognoscendo; et ideo ejus non sunt principia.

Et iterum, si respectu entis secundum quod ens essent causae et principia, tunc et cujuslibet entis. Hoc autem est falsum. Non igitur universaliter est verum quod ejus quod consideratur in scientia sunt causae et principia, sed solum hoc habet veritatem de eo quod consideratur tamquam subjectum in scientia particulari; tale enim habet aliquid prius tam secundum cognitionem quam secundum esse. Et tu dicis quod Aristoteles vult quod entis secundum quod ens sint principia et causae; dicendum quod non intendit per hoc nisi quod in ente secundum

quod ens inveniuntur prima principia eorum quae sunt prima principia in entibus, non quod entis secundum quod ens sint principia. Principia autem eorum quae primo principia sunt in entibus vocat Philosophus hic principia simpliciter.

Regarding the second of these arguments, cf. *infra*, note 48.

<sup>48</sup> I, 4: Dico quod entis secundum quod ens non sunt aliqua principia, quia si sit, tunc cujuslibet entis essent aliqua principia. Hoc autem falsum est. Item, si sit, tunc idem esset sui causa. Quia, si entis sint causae, illa erunt entia, et sic idem erit sui causa. Sed verum est quod entis causati sunt aliqua principia. Ens autem causatum continetur sub ente secundum quod ens. Nunc autem ens secundum quod ens est subjectum in scientia ista. Quare, quamvis entis secundum quod ens non sint causae, manifestum tamen quod prima causa in entibus est aliquid eorum quae cadunt sub subjecto doctrinae.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Avicenna, *Meta.*, 1, 2, D, fol. 70vb-71ra. The same doctrine is asserted by Peter's contemporary, Siger of Brabant. Siger employs Peter's second argument. If there were a principle of being as being, then every being would have a principle; Siger, *Quaest. in Meta.*, Intro., 2; p. 5, ll. 18-20.

<sup>50</sup> St. Thomas, *In Meta.*, Prooemium; p. 2a.  
<sup>51</sup> St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, 66, 5, ad 4; also cf. *In Librum Boethii De Trinitate Quaestiones Quinta et Sexta* V, 4; ed. Wyser, (Fribourg, 1948), p. 48, l. 7-p. 49, l. 18; *Summa theologiae* 1, 3, 4, ad 1; I, 105, 5.

<sup>52</sup> St. Thomas, *ibid.*, I-II, 66, 5, ad 4; also cf. *ibid.*, I, 8, 1; I, 45, 5; *In De Trin.*, loc. cit.

<sup>53</sup> *Supra*, note 48.

subject; divine things are the subject of the science of theology.<sup>54</sup> Clearly, Peter's understanding of the nature of universal being is not that of St. Thomas.

Another aspect of Peter's doctrine that finds no counterpart in the thought of St. Thomas is his division of the first science into two parts. He asserts this view of the dual nature of metaphysics when faced with the problem of whether it is the first science. Peter states that a thing may be said to be "first" in two ways, according to generation or according to perfection. If a thing is first according to generation, it is what first comes to mind. Later in the same text he speaks of this type of primacy as primacy in the order of learning. What is first according to perfection is most perfect in itself. Metaphysics is first according to perfection, because it considers the most perfect and most noble things known.<sup>55</sup>

When speaking of what is first according to generation, one must understand that the first science treats of two things: 1) being, the nature of being and the first principles, which are formulated in common terms, and without which nothing is understood; and 2) immaterial causes, separate substances. Insofar as it considers being and what is convertible with being, metaphysics is prior to all other sciences according to generation or learning; for it deals with immaterial substances, to which the knowledge of being and of all determinate beings is ordered. Metaphysics, then, as dealing with being, should be taught prior to all other sciences. Yet, while metaphysics is first according to generation in that it considers being and the first principles of being, absolutely speaking this science should be called posterior, since it considers immaterial substances. Peter invokes the authority of Avicenna to support his view that metaphysics is posterior to all sciences.<sup>56</sup>

The argumentation here is a little obscure. Peter's justifications for the two types of primacy enjoyed by metaphysics are both based on that science's study of the separate substances.<sup>57</sup> Although as a Christian he was bound to distinguish the subject of metaphysics from the separate substances, the more he examines the nature of the first science, the more he asserts the importance of its treatment

<sup>54</sup> St. Thomas, *In De Trin.*, loc. cit. There is some ambiguity as to whether St. Thomas held that angels are actually within the subject of metaphysics. From this text it seems that they are considered in metaphysics only as causes, albeit as secondary causes of the subject (*op. cit.*, ad 3, p. 50). He states that the separate things are considered in metaphysics only as the causes of beings, and in theology as subjects. However, it is clear from his identification of *ens commune* with *ens creatum* that angels, as created beings, are within the subject of the first science (cf. *supra*, note 50). Further, St. Thomas clearly states that theology does not consider angels as its subject, but only as means of clarifying the nature of its subject, in the way in which it treats of all other creatures. And angels are considered there, inasmuch as they are secondary causes of things (*op. cit.*, ad 3, p. 50).

<sup>55</sup> I, 5; Intelligendum quod primum est idem quod principium; principium autem est causa pro eodem accipiantur. Causa autem quadrupliciter accipitur; materialis, formalis, finalis, efficiens, quarum tres in unam coincident, ut forma, finis et efficiens. Propter quod principaliter duae sunt causae, materia et forma. Et ideo aliquid est prius natura materiae vel natura formae. Materia autem prior est via generationis; et ideo quod est prius secundum generationem est

prius secundum naturam materiae. Forma autem est perfectio rei; et ideo prius secundum substantiam et perfectionem est prius natura formae.

Tunc ad quaestionem dico quod, loquendo de primo secundum perfectionem, sic dico quod haec est prima inter alias; nam perfectissima et nobilissima intelligibilia considerat.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*: Si autem quaeratur de primo secundum generationem, sic est intelligendum quod haec scientia versatur circa duo, scilicet circa ens et rationem entis, circa principia prima quae formantur in terminis communibus sine quibus nihil intelligitur, iterum, circa causas immateriales. Et ideo, si consideremus scientiam istam quantum ad hoc quae considerat de ente et de his quae convertuntur cum ente, credo quod sic haec scientia debet esse prior aliis secundum viam doctrinae vel generationis. Scientia enim ista versatur circa substantias immateriales ad quas ordinatur cognitio entis et quorumcumque aliorum determinatorum; et sic ista secundum viam doctrinae prior est.

Sed quia ad istam scientiam necesse est quod pertineat considerare de ente et de primis principis entis, ideo, quamvis haec sit prior via doctrinae secundum quod de ente considerat, tamen simpliciter dici debet posterior propter substantias immateriales quas considerat; et hoc dicit Avicenna.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. *supra*, note 56.



of the separate substances. In this, of course, he was but following Aristotle.<sup>58</sup> However, the question can be raised whether this attitude might not have as its only adequate basis Aristotle's tendency to identify being as being with the separate substances.<sup>59</sup> There are other indications that Peter's doctrine of being can be interpreted completely only in this light.<sup>60</sup> Difficulties in doctrinal foundation notwithstanding, however, it is clear that Peter conceived of metaphysics as having two distinct parts, one which studies being as being, the other which studies immaterial substances and particularly God. In this, as well as in the matter of the lack of causes of being as being, Peter's conception of being differs directly from that of St. Thomas.

The foregoing analysis has shown that, for Peter of Auvergne, being is the most common of all perfections, since it is present in all things. It is the subject of metaphysics, but is directly studied only in the part of the first science dealing with what is most common to all things. Because of its treatment of these most common elements of things, this division of metaphysics is first in the order of learning; i.e. it should be the first science learned. On the other hand, the second part of metaphysics, that dealing with the separate substances, should be the last science taught; for a knowledge of the most perfect beings, namely the separate substances or God, is only acquired after a study of all less perfect things. Peter adopted Aristotle's statement in Book IV of the *Metaphysics*, that being as being is the subject of the first science, and developed it with material borrowed from other commentaries on Aristotle's work, particularly those of Avicenna, Averroes and St. Thomas.<sup>61</sup>

With regard to his relation to St. Thomas, it seems that Peter's doctrine of being as the subject of metaphysics took no cognizance of Aquinas' fundamental view that being is primarily the act of existing.<sup>62</sup> Inasmuch as it failed to incorporate this radical innovation of Thomistic metaphysics, Peter's position is a clear historical indication of the singular lack of favour St. Thomas' doctrine held among his immediate successors. Even the man who received the title of his "most faithful disciple" did not reflect the most basic tenet of Aquinas' metaphysics. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which Peter of Auvergne can be called a follower of Aquinas. As Hocedez points out, it is almost certain that Peter wrote the *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* with a copy of St. Thomas' *Commentary on the Metaphysics* beside him, and that he even seems in some instances to presuppose a knowledge of it.<sup>63</sup> Peter is that type of "disciple" whose thought would not have been what it was without having been influenced by the writings of St. Thomas, who nevertheless, corresponds doctrinally with the position of his master only where the master's tendencies coincide with his own.<sup>64</sup> Faithful in general to Aquinas' *Commentary on the Metaphysics*, Peter gives no indication of accepting the properly Thomistic doctrine of being.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Meta.* VI, 1, 1026a20-33; XII, 7, 1064a33-38; St. Thomas, *In Meta.* IV, 1, n. 1526; XI, 7, nn. 2259-67.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Owens, *op. cit.*, pp. 289-300.

<sup>60</sup> Peter's doctrine of the predication of being is based exclusively on the Aristotelian doctrine of predication by reference, which Peter designates as analogy of attribution (IV, 2; V, 3). Nowhere does he even allude to the Thomistic doctrine of the analogy of proper proportionality. Peter also tends, in the *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, to deny any real distinction between the essence and the existence of created beings (V, 11; IX, 3).

Both of these aspects of Peter's thought, however, require a further elaboration which lies, strictly speaking, beyond the scope of

the present article.

<sup>61</sup> Peter's doctrinal relation to Avicenna is seemingly extensive. However, further study will be required before its extent can be accurately assessed.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. St. Thomas, *De Potentia*, I, 2, ad 9; *De Anima*, 6; *Summa theologiae* I, 8, 1, ad 4; *De Veritate*, I, 1, ad 3; *In Meta.* IV, 2, n. 558.

<sup>63</sup> Hocedez, 'La Philosophie des Quodlibets . . .', 780.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. E. Gilson, 'La Philosophie au moyen âge des origines patristiques à la fin du XIV<sup>e</sup> me siècle (2nd éd., Paris, 1947)', pp. 545-546.

<sup>65</sup> A projected examination of Peter's conception of the distinction between essence and existence will offer further demonstration of this conclusion.

# Chaucer's Great Britain

FRANCIS P. MAGOUN, JR.

## FOREWORD

A YEAR ago I published here (Vol. XV [1953], 107-36) a paper entitled "Chaucer's Ancient and Biblical World" in which I set forth the range of Chaucer's knowledge and ignorance, as the case might be, of those parts of the ancient world which he has occasion to mention in the course of his writings. With the ancient and biblical world disposed of, so to speak (see Addenda pp. 152-6, below), there remain two other blocks of names: mediaeval (vs. ancient) names on the Continent with a few in the Near East, and the names in Great Britain, mainly England. It is with British names that the present paper is concerned.

The general scheme is the same as in the preceding paper. The names are entered alphabetically and notice is taken of allusions to places by other than their proper names, e.g. *toun*, *cit  *, and the like. To ignore such references, as well as incidental features and architectural monuments, would be often to leave the total picture somewhat out of focus. The discussion of "London" has been carried out on a "mediaeval" basis, that is to say that under *Londoun* are included only those parts of the present borough type metropolis which lie within the old city, essentially the "City" of today (postal regions E.C.1-4), including such streets and public buildings as Chaucer mentions. Other immediately surrounding localities, now included in the metropolitan district (the "London area"), are treated under their own names, e.g. Bow, Deptford, and Greenwich; I have given their present postal regions as an aid to quick orientation. In the case of names in England and in London I have, where possible, given references to the appropriate Muirhead "Blue Guides;" such references often furnish interesting background details, tend to give an air of immediacy and reality, and in a most practical fashion will make it easy for visitors from the Commonwealth and America, also for foreigners, to visit the localities in question as part of a "Chaucer pilgrimage." A few names not mentioned directly by Chaucer are given as main entries and are cited in the text, always in square brackets.

In the case of the ancient and biblical names I gave no or almost no etymologies since a large portion would have been uncertain or very controversial and in any event would often have involved early Near Eastern languages of which I, in common I suppose with most readers of Chaucer, know nothing and have no control over. To have attempted such etymologies would have been a mere display of pedantry at its worst. In the case of the present names the situation seems to me quite different. In the first place many students of Chaucer have some knowledge of the Old-English (Anglo-Saxon) language whence most of the names derive. Furthermore, students of English literature tend to be interested in the background of English place-names, of which so many have been transplanted, at times most incongruously, to Anglo-Saxon North America. Where an etymology is unquestioned, I have not ordinarily given a supporting reference though I have usually referred to the volumes of the English Place-Name Society because of interesting information they furnish quite apart from discussion of etymologies.

Place-names along the route of the Canterbury pilgrimage are entered alphabetically in the usual way, but the reader is urged to consider these also within the more general framework set up under the entry *Caunterbury Wey*.

In connection with English place-names Chaucer seems to chalk up for

himself two "firsts:" his appears to be the first certain reference to the Dunmow flitch custom, unless tied with *Piers Plowman* C XI, 276, in a photo finish, and he seems to be the first to refer to now world-famous Sheffield steel.

The abbreviated titles for Chaucer's own writings are those of John Strong Perry Tatlock and Arthur G. Kennedy, *A Concordance to the Complete Works of Geoffrey Chaucer* (Washington, 1927).

The following is a list of abbreviations used for titles cited more than once:

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- Berks Berkshire.  
 Bowden Muriel Bowden, *A Commentary on the General Prologue to the Canterbury Tales* (New York: Macmillan, 1949).  
 C Cambridgeshire.  
 Cowley J. M. C(owley), 'Chaucer's Bob-Up-and-Down,' *The Athenaeum, Journal of Literature, Science and the Fine Arts*, July to December 1868, p. 886 (26 December 1868); reprinted in Furnivall 32-34, Littlehales 36-38.  
 D Devonshire.  
 Darby Harry Clifford Darby, ed., *An Historical Geography of England before A.D. 1800* (Cambridge, 1936).  
 DEPN Eilert Ekwall, *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Place-Names* (3rd ed., Oxford, 1947).  
 DNB *The Dictionary of National Biography*, original issue Oxford 1885-90, reprinted 1921-22. Cited by volume and page.  
 ERN Eilert Ekwall, *English River-Names* (Oxford, 1928).  
 Ess Essex.  
 Furnivall Frederick J. Furnivall, *Tempoprarry Preface to the Six-Text Edition of Chaucer's Canterbury Tales*, Part I (Chaucer Society Publ., Second Ser. 3, London, 1868).  
 Gl Gloucestershire.  
 Herts Hertfordshire.  
 Jerrold Walter C. Jerrold, *Highways and Byways in Kent* (London, 1907).  
 K Kent.  
 Lawrence William Witherle Lawrence, *Chaucer and the Canterbury Tales* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950).  
 Littlehales Henry Littlehales, *Some Notes on the Road from London to Canterbury in the Middle Ages* (Chaucer Society Publ., Second Ser. 30, London, 1898).  
 Manly John M. Manly, *Canterbury Tales by Geoffrey Chaucer* (New York, 1928).  
 MR John M. Manly and Edith Rickert, *The Text of the Canterbury Tales studied on the Basis of All Known Manuscripts* (Chicago, 1940), printed from reduced photographic plates of typewritten pages. Cited by volume and page, primarily from Vols. V-VIII, the Corpus of Variants.  
 Muirhead England L. Russel Muirhead, ed., *England* ("The Blue Guides"), 5th ed., London: Benn, 1950.  
 Muirhead London Findlay Muirhead, *London and its Environs* (3rd ed., London, 1927).  
 Mx Middlesex.  
 NED *A New (alias Oxford) English Dictionary*, etc. (Oxford, 1888-1928). Cited by words.  
 Nf Norfolk.  
 O Oxfordshire.  
 Owen Charles A. Owen, Jr., 'The Plan of the Canterbury Pilgrimage,' *Publications of the Modern Language Ass'n of America*, LXVI (1951), 820-26.

- PN English Place-Name Society, publications (Cambridge, 1925 ff.), with volume number, followed by the appropriate county abbreviation.
- Pratt Robert A. Pratt, 'The Order of the Canterbury Tales,' *Publications of the Modern Language Ass'n of America*, LXVI (1951), 1141-67.
- Robinson Fred Norris Robinson, ed., *The Complete Works of Geoffrey Chaucer* (in later printings *The Poetical Works of Chaucer*), 1st ed., Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1933; 2nd ed. in active preparation.
- Sa Shropshire.
- Sf Suffolk.
- Skeat Walter W. Skeat, ed., *The Complete Works of Geoffrey Chaucer I-VII* (Oxford, 1894-97). Cited by volume and page.
- Skeat PPL *idem.*, ed., *The Vision of William concerning Piers the Plowman . . . together with Richard the Redeless*, 2 vols, Oxford, 1886. Cited by volume and page.
- So Somersetshire.
- Sr Surrey.
- YER Yorkshire, East Riding.
- YNR Yorkshire, North Riding.
- YWR Yorkshire, West Riding.
- Tatlock John S. P. Tatlock, 'The Duration of the Canterbury Pilgrimage,' *Publications of the Modern Language Ass'n of America*, XXI (1906), 478-85.

#### A

ALBYON, Albion, literary-poetical designation of Britain, here specifically England, is mentioned in *Purse* 22 as the realm of a conqueror who "by lyne and free eleccion" (*Purse* 23) won the country in question. The words defining this ruler's position (*conqueror*) and his claim (by lineage and free election) can only refer to Henry IV (*regn.* 1399-1413) who instituted for himself or for whom was instituted a sort of threefold hold or claim on popular allegiance. See "Henry IV," *DNB* IX, 487, col. 1 at top.

On the name "Albion" being used for all Britain or even just for England vs its later restricted application to Scotland see Eilert Ekwall, *Antiquity*, IV (1930), 149-50. Celt. \**Albion* means "white country" (cognate with Lat. *albus*), presumably from the white cliffs of the coast.

#### B

BALDESWELLE (var. MR V, 58), Bawdeswell in northern Nf, is mentioned in CT A 620 as the town near which the bailiff or Reve Oswald lived: the village is 3 m. SW of Reepham-with-Kerdiston (Nf). Muirhead *England* 603; Manly 532; Bowden 254-55.

The name looks back to OE *Beald-heres wielle* "Beald-here's spring."

(*biside*) BATHE, (near, juxta) Bath (So) on the Avon, is always mentioned to identify the widow Alice (*Alys*, *Alisoun*), the Wife, of the Canterbury and many other pilgrimages. In CT A 445 she is referred to as "of biside Bathe," i.e., as living just outside the old town walls, specifically in the parish of St. Michael's without the Walls or without North Gate. This identification was made by Richard Warner, *History of Bath* (Bath, 1801), pp. 360-61, on the basis of the miracle plays frequently put on in St Michael's church, today at the head of Northgate St (see below). This parish also specialized in weaving at which the Wife was adept. Manly 537; Bowden 214-15; Darby 251-53 and fig. 40. Elsewhere (*Buk* 29, CT D head., end and E 1170, 1685) she is merely "of Bathe," referred to in D 529 as "*our town*"; here just Bath in general is meant. Its former weaving importance is referred to in CT A 447 and the Wife's parish (of St

Michael's) in A 448 with the church itself mentioned in D 593 and implied in D 629, where there was good preaching, the performance of miracle plays, and weddings (D 556, 559). The outskirts or open country are *feeldes* (D 548, 564). Muirhead *England* 151-52.

The name derives from the three mineral springs of the place, the only really hot springs in Britain, famous since Roman times when it was known as *Aquae Sulis* "waters sacred to (the Celtic female divinity) Sul," whom the Romans appear to have identified with Minerva; see Darby 54-55. In OE *hát baðu* "hot baths," *æt* (*þóm hátum*) *báðum* "at (the hot) baths," the baths refer specifically to the Roman baths built there (adjoining the Pump Room in Stall St); since the seventeenth century the form of the name has been singular: "Bath." See NED "bath" sb. 2. Chaucer's form with -e presumably reflects the OE dat. plur. *baðum*.

BERWYCK (var. *Warrwik*, MR V, 65) is mentioned in a verse (CT A 692) apparently suggesting one limit of a stretch of territory within which the Pardoner had no equal in his profession (*craft*). The other limit is *Ware* (: *mare* "a mare") which may be either Ware (Herts) on the Lea and about 25 m. N of London (perhaps the more likely as the bigger and hence better known town) or Ware, an east Kentish hamlet 3½ m. NW of Sandwich. But to identify Chaucer's *Berwyck* with any real certainty seems all but hopeless (cp. Manly 537), since Chaucer's form may be represented or reflected in almost any one of the thirteen modern Berwicks distributed among the counties of Essex, Kent, Northumberland, Shropshire, Sussex, Worcestershire, Yorkshire (West Riding), 3 Barwicks distributed among Norfolk, Suffolk, Yorkshire (West Riding), 1 Berrick in Oxfordshire, and 1 Borwick in Lancashire. One most naturally thinks of Berwick-upon-Tweed (Northumberland) and the phrase "from Barwick to Dover, three hundred miles over" (Skeat V, 56 *ad loc.*) and thus, whichever Ware is meant, obtain a considerable distance or extensive territory within which Chaucer seems to want us to think of the Pardoner as operating. But he may be joking or anything.

The name looks back to OE *bere-wíc* "grain farm."

(under the) BLEE(N) (var. MR VIII, 61, 142) "(in the lee of) the Blean Woods" (K), is mentioned in CT G 556 to define *Boghtoun* and in H 3 to define *Bobbe-Up-and-Doun*. Blean Wood(s), forming the NE part of an extensive forest belt which once covered the greater part of Kent, formerly commenced at Boughton (*Boghtoun*) and reached almost to the walls of Canterbury; it still crosses W of Canterbury through parts of Harbledown (see *Caunterbury Wey*). To the east there neither is now nor probably was in the past any woodland of consequence. This woodland, still the most extensive in Kent and formerly next in importance to the Weald, is now divided under various local names. See Robert Furley, *A History of the Weald of Kent*, etc., I (London, 1871), 389-90, 61-62; also Jerrold 90, 92, and J. K. Wallenberg, *Kentish Place-Names*, etc. (Uppsala Universitets Aarskrift, 1931), pp. 63-64.

The -n in the name Blean (ME *Bleen*) is evidently organic and has been constant since Anglo-Saxon times (see Wallenberg 63 and *DEPN s.v.*) with the n-less forms chiefly in Chaucer manuscripts where they are probably scribal. The name is of uncertain origin, possibly connected with Welsh *blaen* "extremity, end, border" or with an OE weak dative singular \**bléan* from \**bléa* "rough terrain."

BOBBE-UP-AND-DOUN (var. MR VIII, 142), "*a litel town*" mentioned in CT H 2 as being "*under the Blee, in Canterbury Weye*," has been the subject of much discussion (Skeat V, 435, n.2; Robinson 870, n.2). The fullest and really only thorough examination of the locality and roads round about—made at

the request of Dr. Furnivall—is that by Cowper in 1868 (reprinted in Furnivall 32-34, later by Littlehales 36-38) who argues strongly for identification with Up-and-Down Field at Cockering Farm in the parish of Thanington Without about 1 m. SW of Canterbury and on the road on which *Boghtoun* in Chaucer's day may quite possibly have stood. Cowper's statement deserves respectful consideration. The alternate possibility, which I am inclined to view as somewhat questionable though it has long been the popular view (but cp. Manly 654), is identification with the small village of Harbledown set in a hillside (Littlehales 39, Jerrold 89-90) on the upper, main road leading into Canterbury and, like Up-and-Down Field, is about 1 m. outside the town. See *Caunterbury Wey*, below. Erasmus' experience at Harbledown (quoted by Littlehales 39 as a sort of clincher) tells nothing about Chaucer's pilgrims but only what Erasmus, and no doubt many Canterbury pilgrims, did. Cowper also points out that nowhere else does Chaucer invent nicknames of places or play with such words. And it might be remarked that his *Bobbe-Up-and-Down* bears little resemblance to Harbledown, a name which though unique (OE *Here-beald[es] dún* "Here-beald's hill") is not "funny" sounding, but that it is strikingly close to the name Up-and-Down Field which may in Chaucer's day actually have been known, jocosely or otherwise, in deference to the general undulating character of the countryside as *Bobbe-Up-and-Down*. The name may indeed have referred to some tiny hamlet there. A bit of intensive work with the local records rather than further perambulations might do something to clear the matter up.

BOGHTOUN (*under BLEE*, q.v.), answers formally to the present-day village of Boughton Street or Boughton under Blean (K) on the main Canterbury highway about 3½ m. SE of Faversham and about 1 m. after the fork at Brentley Corner; it is mentioned in CT G 556 (var. MR VIII, 61) as near the spot where the disreputable canon and his yeoman overtake the pilgrims (see [*Ospringe*], below). If the present Boughton is on the site of Chaucer's *Boghtoun*, then *Bobbe-Up-and-Down* is probably somehow to be identified with Harbledown, but there is considerable doubt whether such is the case. Much points to the name Boughton having applied in earlier times to the present hamlet of South Street about 3 m. from Ospringe or Faversham; see Cowper in Littlehales 36-38 and Littlehales 38-39; Robinson 16, Frag. IX (Group H). The hamlet of South Street, it has been noted, is about 5 m. from Ospringe ([*Ospringe*]), a fact which fits the statement "*Er we hadde riden fully five miles*" (G 552) from the generally assumed Ospringe *hostelrye* of G 589; the present Boughton under Blean is only about 3½ m. from Ospringe. Something has been made of the fact that the South Street route into Canterbury is less direct than the northerly main road, but the facts presented above plus what can be said about *Bobbe-Up-and-Down* speak for its being the route taken by Chaucer's pilgrims. See also *Caunterbury Wey*, below.

Early forms of the name: DB *Boltune*, 1247, 1288 *Bocton* make it uncertain whether the name looks back to OE *bóc-tún* "a *tún* where beeches grow" or to OE *bópl-* or *bold-tún* "manor-house settlement," the latter usually the source of the name Bolton. Some English Boughtons look back to *Buccan-tún* "Bucca's *tún*." See *DEPN s.v.*

BOWE, see STRATFORD-ATTE-BOWE.

BRET, adj. British, is used in HF 1208 (3,118) to define an unidentified Welsh bard Glascurion (Robinson 893, col. 2—894, col. 1, n. 1208).

The adjective looks back to OE *Bret* (plur. *Brettas*) "Briton;" see *NED* "Brit" sb. 2 (and §a).

BRITAI(G)NE (BRITEYNE) Britain:

I. Great Britain, mentioned in CT A 409 as a region of which the Shipman knew every little arm of the sea suitable for loading or unloading small vessels ("cryke," CT A 408; NED "creek" sb. 1). In CT F 810 it is identified with England (see *Engelond*, below).

II. Brittany, France, in Chaucer's day a dukedom of the house of Montfort, embracing the modern departments of Côtes-du-Nord, Finistère, Ille-et-Vilaine, Loire Inférieure, and Morbihan. Mentioned in CT F 729, it is equated with the older (Classical-Celtic) name of region "Amorica" (*Armorik*), this latter being used in F 1061 adjectivally (*Armorik Briteyne*) to distinguish it from "Great Britain" (#1, above). It is also mentioned in F 992, 1159, 1221, 1240, 1268; these references all apply to the maritime zone of Brittany and specifically to the district (*contré*, F 800) centering on the commune of Penmarc'h (*Pedmark*) in F 801 (in F 1351, 1502 a *toun*) in the SW corner of Finistère, home of "Arveragus of Kayrrud" (F 808 and probably with reference to some one of the common Breton place-names "Kerru"—Welsh *Caerudd*). Consonant with the subject of the Franklin's Tale great stress is laid upon the reef-filled sea and rock-bound coast, dangerous then as now to sailing craft. The *see* off the coast is mentioned in F 847, 863, 896, and the rocks in F 859, 868, 891, 993, 1061, 1064, 1158, 1221, 1268, 1296, 1301, 1338. On these rocks and the hazardous shore-line see John S. P. Tatlock, *The Scene of the Franklin's Tale Visited* (Chaucer Society, Second Ser. 51, London, 1914), pp. 1-9, and for an excellent modern description by a yachtsman see Frank Cowper, *Sailing Tours*, etc. Part III. *The Coast of Brittany*, etc. (London, 1894), pp. 156-58, also Claud Worth, *Yacht Cruising* (2d ed., London, 1921), p. 200, with a splendid chart facing p. 107.

BRITO(U)N, sb.—adj. Briton, Breton.

I. 1. sb. a native of Great Britain, in Chaucer always referring to pre-Saxon or Celtic Britain and virtually equivalent to "Welsh"; see NED "Briton:" so in CT B 545, 547, 561, with reference to members of the pre-Saxon British church. Cp. *Bret*, above.

2. adj. a "*Britoun book*" (B 666) refers ostensibly to a copy of the early Welsh Gospels (*Evaungiles*).

II. 1. sb. plur. natives of "Lesser Britain," Brittany, France, are mentioned in CT F 707 as producers of poems or lays and in D 858 perhaps as a people much interested in King Arthur. In F 1179 it is the nationality of Aurelius' scholar-brother (*clerk*, F 1105).

2. adj. *Briton tonge* "Breton language" is mentioned in F 711 as the language of native Breton lays (cp. II, 1, above).

BROMEOLM, Bromholm Priory, a ruin, especially a Norman gatehouse in a farm-yard at Bacton (Nf), a coast-guard station 4½ m. NE of North Walsham (Nf), is used in CT A 4286 (var. MR V, 422) by Symond the miller's wife as part of an oath "*Holy Croys of B.*" with reference to the Cross or Rood of Bromholm in the Cluniac Bromholm Priory founded in 1113, also mentioned in *Piers Plowman* B, V, 231: *And bidde the Rode of Bromeholme brynge me oute of dette* (Skeat PPI II, 84-5, n.). Muirhead *England* 613.

The name is based on OE *bróm* m. "broom plant" and ON *hólmr* "islet," "isolated piece of ground characterized by a growth of broom."

C

CANTERBREGGE, Cambridge (var. MR V, 389, 395) on the Cam, county-seat and full-fledged university town since at least 1209, is mentioned in CT A 3921 as not far from *Trumpington* and in A 3990 as the site of *Soler Halle*. Muirhead *England* 568-81.

The present name has developed irregularly from OE *Grantanbrycg* (cp. the near-by village of Grantchester SW of Cambridge) and meant "bridge over the *Grante*," now Cam, a late backformation from the present town name. PN XIX C 2-3 ("Cam"), 36-38 ("Cambridge").

CAUNTERBURY (var. *Cauntourbyri*, MR V, 73), Canterbury (K) on the Stour, county-seat and cathedral town, now the archdiocesan see of the Primate of All England, is mentioned in CT A 16-17, 769-770, as the site of the shrine of St Thomas, of Norman parentage and known as Becket, also there and as follows for the town itself: CT A 22, 27, 793 (*to-Caunterbury-ward*), 801, G 624 (*C. toun*). The shrine of St. Thomas, goal of the pilgrims and in Chaucer's day of incredible richness (Manly 496), was in the Trinity Chapel behind the high altar of the cathedral but was destroyed in 1538 and the saint's remains burned (see DNB XIX, 650, cols 1-2; Muirhead *England* 28). The shrine is referred to in terms of the saint (*martir*) in CT A 16-17, 769-770, and his name invoked in A 3291, 3425, 3461, D 666, 2107, HF 1131 (3, 41).

In CT I 1086 it describes or refers to the Tales: *the Tales of C., th'ilke sounen into sinne*. The title or phrase *Tales of C.* or "The Canterbury Tales," today the common designation, deserves a word of comment; on the early history of these titles see Aage Brusendorff, *The Chaucer Tradition* (London-Copenhagen, 1925), pp. 134-36. Neither Chaucer's nor the modern phrase really mean anything in ordinary English, since such a title ought to mean either "tales told in Canterbury" (cp. Henry W. Longfellow's *Tales of a Wayside Inn*) or "tales about the town of Canterbury." Yet obviously the title means neither but rather "tales told by pilgrims en route to and/or from Canterbury." We seem here to have an example of the phenomenon of the dropping—in reality or by implication—of the middle link of a three-link compound, that is, as if *Canterbury Tales* stood for *Canterbury Pilgrim's Tales*—which is just what they are. With this compare the almost classic examples of in any literal sense meaningless Germ. *Sonn-abend* and OE *Sunnan-æfen* "Sun-eve" or "Day before the Sun," each standing however for *Sonn-tags-abend* and *Sunnan-dæges æfen* "Eve of or Day before Sunday." On this see Otto Ritter, *Vermischte Beiträge zur englischen Sprachgeschichte*, etc., (Halle, 1922) pp. 88-90, Gustav Stern, *Meaning and Change of Meaning* (Göteborgs Högskolas Aarskrift, XXXVIII, 1932, No. 1), pp. 276-77, and on certain broader implications George K. Zipf, *The Psycho-Biology of Language* (Boston, 1935), Index, under "Abbreviatory Truncation."

The name is based on the OE dat.-loc. sing. (*æt, on, to* etc.) *Cant-wara-byrig* "(at, in, to etc.) the fortified place of the people of Kent (Celtic *Kantion*). It may be noted that the mediaeval and modern French equivalent *Cantorbéri* derives from the Old-Kentish form *Cant-wara-berig*, with its typical south-eastern *e* for *y*.

CAUNTERBURY WEY, "Canterbury Highway," essentially the present-day Route A-2, the old Roman Watling-Street (see *Watlynge-Strete*, below), has also been known as the Dover Road and the Old Kent(ish) Road; stretches of the route have here and there local designations; the distance from Southwark to Canterbury has been reckoned as 56-57 m. (Tatlock 481). The route is mentioned in CT H 3 and is implied in the set phrase *by the weye* in CT A 771, 774, 780, 806, 834, D 1274. On the route in mediaeval times in general and in connection with Chaucer's pilgrims in particular see Furnivall, Littlehales, Tatlock, and Owen. For maps of the mediaeval route see Littlehales, also Manly facing p. 494.

In the following discussion of the *Caunterbury Wey* the names are presented in their proper geographical order, though this order occurs fully in no CT manuscript; the most striking violation of geographical order comes as a result



of the notorious manuscript separation of Groups B<sup>1</sup>(II) and B<sup>2</sup>(VII), whereby *Rouchestre* of B \*3116 (1926) comes after *Sidyngborne* of D 847 (MR II, 491-92). Included in the main list of names and referred to in the present entry below are [*Derteford*] and [*Ospringe*], though these are not mentioned by Chaucer. The reason for their inclusion—as possible overnight stops—is discussed under the names themselves and summarily at the end of the present entry. It is somehow unsatisfying to deal with the *Caunterbury Wey* without some consideration—however futile such discussion surely is—of the number of days Chaucer might have assigned to the journey, had he developed his grand project to that point, in a word, to a discussion of possible or likely overnight stops.

In the main the pilgrims probably followed the course of the old Roman Watling-Street but at certain points may well have departed from it, for there were here and there alternate routes and not all pilgrims necessarily chose the same. In such cases one is reduced to a consideration of possibilities which can never be converted into certainties.

The pilgrims may be assumed to have got out of the London area from the Tabard inn in Southwark (*Southwerk*) by riding down the Borough High Street (S.E.1), and Great Dover Street (S.E.1), Old Kent(ish) Road (S.E.1), close to whose second mile-stone was a spring or brook St Thomas' Watering, S.E.1 (*Wateryng of Seint Thomas*), on and out New Cross Road (S.E.14) to Deptford, S.E.8 (*Depeford*) (Littlehales 10). At Deptford they would naturally have turned into Blackheath Road and up to Blackheath Hill, though probably skirting the side of Greenwich Park, S.E.10 (*Grenewych*), rather than following the present main road across the heath (Littlehales 11). Then it would be back up on the "Old" Dover Road to the main highway on to Shooter's Hill by Eltham Common (S.E.9) and on to Welling and Bexleyheath, Kent. At this point the present road is apparently not the old road (in existence until 1796, Littlehales 12). Then on to Crayford (K) where, at the local gas-works there may have been at that time as now two roads available to pass through the town, Old Road and London Road, both at the foot of the High Street joining Crayford Road leading to Dartford (K) (*Derteford*) about 15 m. from Southwark. Though not mentioned in *CT* it is possible that Chaucer would have made Dartford the first overnight stop (see below).

Proceeding out of Dartford and over the top of the hill to a small heath called Dartford Brent (Jerrold 377) there is again a choice of roads leading to Strood-Rochester (*Rouchestre*), some 15 m. beyond Dartford and 30 m. from Southwark, the main road is the left fork and passes Stone, Gravesend, and Gadshill; the more direct Roman road goes straight on. Available evidence concerning the route ordinarily taken by Canterbury pilgrims favors, however, the main road via Gravesend (Littlehales 17-23). Strood (Intra and Extra; OE *stród* "marshy land overgrown with brushwood"), reached by either road, stands across the Medway from Rochester and Chatham with which it was in Chaucer's day joined by a stone bridge (Littlehales 25-26). Under another dispensation the pilgrims might have spent the night there. For some distance beyond Rochester the route is plain enough (Littlehales 26-32): the pilgrims would go through Chatham and on to Sittingbourne (*Sidyngborne*), then pass Bapchild 1½ m. farther on and a bit over 17 m. beyond Rochester have come to Ospringe (*Ospringe*) 1½ m. SW of Faversham and about 10 m. NW of Canterbury (Littlehales 34-35); it is virtually certain that we should think of them as spending the night here. On what may most reasonably be viewed as the last day of the journey to Canterbury the pilgrims set out on the final short stretch of the way; it cannot be completely ruled out, however, that we may have here to do with the return trip to Southwark.

At Brenley Corner (Littlehales 36), about 2 m. beyond Faversham-Ospringe,

the highway forks, both forks leading to Canterbury, a little over 9 m. from Ospringe. The main and apparently normal and most direct pilgrim, and modern automobile, route was the left or north fork (Watling-Street, London Road—Route A-2), but which of these alternate routes Chaucer had in mind has been the subject of discussion. The weight of evidence (not the number of voices) seems to me to favor rather strongly the right or south fork, with *Boghtoun-under-Blee* (Littlehales 38-39) referring in those days to the locality now known as South Street; in this event *Bobbe-Up-and-Down* is perhaps to be viewed as once the name of tiny hamlet in the area of the present Up-and-Down Field at Cockering Farm in the parish of Thanington Without, stretching along the Canterbury and Ashford Road (Route A 28). If this is the route, the pilgrims would have proceeded along Thanington Road, Wincheap, Castle Street, St Margaret's Lane, and Mercery Lane to the Cathedral. If they took the upper or north fork and passed Harbledown, then they would follow London Road to St Dunstan's Church, thence to the Cathedral. Today St Margaret's Street is a one-way street toward Thanington, so the route described can only be taken by car in an out of town direction. Driving into Canterbury by way of Thanington one must follow Wincheap, then Pin Hill, Rhodaus Town, Upper Bridge Street, St George's Street, then Mercery Lane.

Mention may here be made of a twenty-three minute 16 mm. technicolor film "The Road to Canterbury" by London Films, released in England in 1952, in New York in 1954. The film starts at St Paul's Cathedral and crosses London Bridge; from Southwark on the route (A 2) is in the main that covered by Chaucer's pilgrims, though of course with a very different landscape; attention is given to various literary associations along the way. In the United States details about rental and purchase of this film may be had as of now from British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York City 20.

There has been much discussion about possible overnight stops that the pilgrims might have made, had they made them. The basis of modern scholarly discussion is that by Furnivall (pp. 12-17) with the upshot—with which many scholars have agreed—that there were three places with suitable sleeping accommodations on the road, at each one of which the pilgrims should be imagined as having spent the night: Dartford (p. 19), Rochester (p. 22), and Ospringe (p. 29), thus reaching Canterbury some time in the course of the fourth day; see his tabular view pp. 42-43 (reprinted in Littlehales 40-44). Perhaps rightly—Tatlock 485, n.1 seems to be more charitable —, Furnivall (pp. 15-17, [145] "Corrections and Additions") took a dim view of the state of the road and wanted the pilgrims to cover no more than 15 or 16 m. per day; yet see Darby 260-62, 261 nn. 1-2. This schedule or time table was generally accepted (Tatlock 478, n. 4) until Tatlock came out for a three-day journey (Tatlock 483) with overnight stops at Dartford (pp. 483, 484) and Ospringe (p. 484) but not at Rochester (pp. 483-84). Miss Rickert personally strongly favored a two-day trip each way (MR II, 493) but in MR II, 493-94 she or she and Manly (it is hard to know just whose opinion is being expressed) seem to have thought or recognized that a pilgrimage to Canterbury must have been planned for either three or four days. This Furnivall-Skeat scheme Lawrence (esp. 118) seems to accept. On the basis of a rather drastic rearrangement of the fragments Owen urges a five-day trip of which three are to Canterbury and the fourth and fifth on the road back to Southwark (Owen 822-23 for a tabular view). This Pratt (1159, n. 35a) rejects without, however—as lying outside the scope of his paper—favoring any particular system of stops. As MR II, 493-94, rightly observe: "But certainly the question of the number of days occupied by the pilgrimage is a matter of very small consequence, since the whole conception of a series of tales told while riding by so large a group of pilgrims is, however entertaining, entirely unrealistic."

D

DEPEFORD, Deptford (*det-ford*) (K), S.E.8, now a sizeable metropolitan borough of London, 4 or 4½ m. from Southwark (*Southwerk*) at the junction of the Ravensbourne with the Thames immediately west of *Greenewych* (q.v.) and now a slummy district, is mentioned in CT A 3906 (var. *Dartford*, MR V, 387) to define a point on the *Caunterbury Wey*, apparently between itself and Greenwich, which the pilgrims have reached at about 7:30 on the first morning after leaving Southwark (cp. CT A 822). That the Knight and the Miller between them should have got through with three thousand odd lines of verse in such short order is merely part of the unrealism of the whole plan and should not be pressed or in any way rationalized here or elsewhere. Muirhead *London* 455.

The name looks back to OE (*se*) *déopa ford* "(the) deep ford," presumably with reference to the Ravensbourne stream. With the unexplained intrusive -t- in post-Chaucerian spellings (*DEPN* s.v.) and the pronunciation cp. the Devonshire Deptfords of similar origin.

[DERTEFORD], Dartford (K) on the Darent and 15 m. from *Southwerk*, though not mentioned by name has often been urged as the place of the first overnight stop the pilgrims would have made on the *Caunterbury Wey*, had Chaucer ever got around to dealing with the matter of overnight stops. The night here in question is usually assumed to have intervened between the end of the A Group (CT A 4422) and the beginning of the B Group (Man of Law's Prologue); according to CT B 1-6 it was 9:58 A.M., April 18th, when Harry Bailey got the Man of Law going. See Skeat V, 132-34; Littlehales 40; Jerrold 373-77; Tatlock 481-82; Robinson 792-93, introductory note and n. 2; also *Caunterbury Wey*, above.

The name looks back to the Celtic river-name *Dærenta* and OE *ford* (DB *Tarentefort*, 1089 *Darenteford*) "ford over the Darent;" *DEPN* s.v., *ERN* 113-14, and cp. *Dertemouthe*, below.

DERTEMOUTHE, Dartmouth (D) on the W side of the Dart estuary, in Chaucer's day a very small settlement (Manly 523, n. 388 *ad fin.*) opposite Kingshaven where American troops embarked for Normandy in 1944 and today the site of the Royal Naval College, is mentioned in CT A 389 as the possible home of the Shipman (Bowden 195-96, Muirhead *England* 172). The latter is further described as living "*fer by weste*" "way in the West" with Darmouth hazarded as where he may actually come from (see *Weste*, below).

The name reflects the Celtic river-name *Dærenta*, later *Derta* (*ERN* 114-115) and OE *múða* m. "river mouth, estuary," "the mouth of the Dart;" cp. *Derteford*, above; *PN* VIII D 321.

DOVER, Dover (K) at the mouth of the Dour, starting point of *Watlynge-Strete* (q.v.) to London via Canterbury and chief of the Cinque Ports, is mentioned in CT A 4347 to define some undetermined cooked dish, perhaps a pie of sorts, perhaps a Dover sole ("*Jakke of D.*"), at any rate much warmed over, thought by Harry Bailey to be unwholesome or unfit to eat (A 4348), and sold by Roger the Cook in his food-shop in London. Muirhead *England* 14-16.

The name looks back to Late British \**Dubras* plur. "waters" with reference to the Dour river, yielding OE *Dofras* masc. plur.; the plural -s survives in the French name of the town *Douvres*.

DUNMOWE, Dunmow Priory, Little Dunmow (Ess), is mentioned in CT D 218 by the Wife in reference to the local custom by which in her time and intermittently ever since a flich of bacon (D 217) might at a ceremony or "trial by jury" (modern) be claimed by any married couple who had not quarrelled or regretted their marriage in a year and a day. In Chaucer's day the oath was

taken before the prior of Dunmow Priory (now a ruin) at Little Dunmow, 2½ m. SE of the present town (photos of Priory in Steer Pl II-IV). For a full length treatment of this see Francis W. Steer, *The History of the Dunmow Flitch Ceremony* (Essex Record Office Publ. 13), Chelmsford: Essex County Council, 1951, with many illustrations; Manly 578, n. 218; see additionally Chester L. Shaver, 'A Mediaeval French Analogue to the Dunmow Flitch,' *Modern Language Notes*, L (1935), 322-25, with much documentation on the custom in England, and a sprightly contemporary account by Acheson L. Hench, 'Dunmow Bacon, 1949,' *College English*, XI (1950), 350, expanded in 'The Dunmow Flitch Trials,' *Southern Folklore Quarterly*, XVI (1952), 128-31. Muirhead *England* 587.

The name looks back to OE *dún* "hill" and \**máwe* "mowed place, meadow."

## E

ELTHAM, Eltham (K), S.E.9, suburban village in the metropolitan borough of Woolwich 7¾ m. SE of London Bridge Station, is mentioned in LGW Prol. F 497 (omitted in G) with reference to Eltham Palace (now some ruins), a favorite royal residence from Henry III (1270) to James I (1612), as a place alternate to *Sheene* (q.v.), where Chaucer is to deliver the the completed *Legend of Good Women* to Richard II's first queen, Anne of Bohemia (died 7 June, 1394). Muirhead *London* 492-93.

The name is of disputed origin but may look back to OE \**Eltan-hám* "Elta's manor;" DEPN s.v.

ENGELOND, England, is mentioned in CT A 14 (its shires are referred to in A 15), 580, 2113, C 912, D 1322, 1340, G 1356; in B 1130 it defines Alla's kingdom, elsewhere *Northumberland*, q.v.; in F 810 it is further defined as a country "that cleped was eek Briteyne" (in opposition to Brittany, France; see *Britaygne*, above).

The name looks back to late OE *Engla-land* "England" "land of the Angles" (OE *Engle*), which displaced earlier *Engla-cynn* "race of the Angles." It is not unlikely that the ethnic name *Engle* was originally pronounced with a palatal *ng* and that the pronunciation *ng* was due to, or influenced by, ON \**Engla-land*, mod. Icel. *England*. Cp. *Scotland*, below.

ENGLISH, sb. the English language, is used in CT A 22, 265, 1459, B 49, F 37, G 87; BD 898; TC 5, 1794; LGW 1382; *Anel* 9, *Venus* 80.

The word looks back to OE *Englisc*, later probably under Scandinavian influence *Englisc*; see *Engelond*, above.

ESSEX, Essex, is mentioned in CT D 218 (var. MR V, 25) as the county in which *Dunmowe* is situated.

The name looks back to OE *East-Seaxe* "East Saxons" or, better, to such phrases as *on East-Seaxum* "among the East-Saxons" i.e., "in Essex;" PN XII *Ess* 1.

## G

GATESDEN, (Great) Gaddesden (Herts) on the Gade, presumed home of the physician "John of G." (1280?-1361) or of his family, is mentioned in CT A 434 (var. MR V, 39) in a list of medical men, Greek, Arabian, and English; DNB VII, 787-88.

The name probably looks back to an OE personal name \**Gáte*<*gát* f. "goat" and *denu* f. "dene, valley." The river name Gade is a back-formation; see DEPN s.v. "Gaddesden" and ERN 168.

GRENEWYCH, Greenwich (K), S.E.10, now a metropolitan borough of London, 5 m. S of London Bridge, until recently especially famous as the site of the Royal Observatory, is mentioned in CT A 3907 in close conjunction with *Depeford*, as a

point on the *Caunterbury Wey* perhaps between which and Deptford the pilgrims have reached at the beginning of the Reeve's Tale. Muirhead *London* 455.

The name looks back to OE *gréne* "green" and *wíc* "farm, farmstead."

## H

HAYLES, Hailes Abbey (Gl), founded in 1246, now a ruin 2 m. NE of Winchcombe (Gl) on the Isbourne and 6 m. NE of Cheltenham, is mentioned in CT C 656 by one of the three revellers in the Pardoner's Tale in connection with its relic of the Holy Blood. See Skeat's note V, 284-85; Manly 620-21; Muirhead *England* 297.

The name is derived from Hail brook which runs past the site and into the Isbourne and is of uncertain origin; see ERN 188-89.

HOLDERNESSE, Holderness Division (YER), a low-lying marshy peninsula and grain-growing district E of *Hulle* (below), is correctly described in CT D 1710 as a *mersshy contré* and is said to be the home of Friar John (D 2171; diminutive *Jankin* D 2288). In CT D 1299 it is referred to anticipatorially as a *contré* or district, home of an anonymous Summoner and Friar, as if both the Friar and the Summoner, perhaps for effect, were laying their tales in the same locale. In the ecclesiastical district is an imaginary friary or convent of friars (*covent*) mentioned in CT D 1863, 1959, 1975, 2130, 2250, 2259, 2261, 2285; in D 2099, 2102 it is a *cloistre*. In this same area, the "limitation" (NED 2a) or circuit of the Summoner's preaching and begging friar is a *toun* (D 1778) with houses (D 1738, 1765), a *hostelrye* (D 1779) and the house of one Thomas (*hous*: D 1766, 1989, 2200) which is the scene of the main action of the tale. Muirhead *England* 520.

The name may look back to ON *höldr*, gen. sing. *höldar*, in Anglo-Saxon times the title of a high official in the Danelaw (NED s.v. "hold" sb. 3) and OE *ness* m. "headland, peninsula;" DEPN s.v.; PN XIV YER 14-15.

HULLE, Kingston-upon-Hull, semiofficially and usually Hull (YER), an important sea (river-)port at the confluence of the little river Hull and the Humber estuary (Muirhead *England* 518-21), is mentioned in CT A 404 as the northern limit of a stretch of water extending to Cartagena (prov. Murcia), Mediterranean sea-port, Spain (*Carthago Nova* of antiquity).

The town takes its name from the river, OE (*sio éa*) *Hull*, of Celtic origin; see ERN 200-01, PN XIV YER 209-10.

## K

KENT, Kent, county SE of London, through which the route of the pilgrims passed (see *Caunterbury Wey*), is mentioned in HF 1131 (3, 41) and CT A 3291 to identify St Thomas à Becket whose shrine in Canterbury was the pilgrims' goal (see also *Caunterbury*). In Kent are *Bobbe-Up-and-Down*, *Boghtoun*, *Caunterbury*, *Depeford*, [*Derteford*], *Grenewych*, [*Ospringe*], and *Rouchestre*.

Kent (OE *Cent*) looks back to primitive OE \**Canti*, derived from Romano-British *Cantium*, *Cantii*, perhaps meaning "border country;" see DEPN s.v.

[KNARESBOROUGH (YWR)] on the Nidd, 17 m. NW of York with portions of John of Gaunt's castle where Richard II was imprisoned for a time in 1399 (Muirhead *England* 494), is not mentioned by Chaucer but may be implied in CT B 730, 786 (see also *Northumberland*, below), for in the Constance story in Nicholas Trivet's *Chronique* it is the site of Deumylde's or Doumilde's place: *Knarebourch* (var. -*bourth*, -*bourgh*, -*borugh*) (W. F. Bryan—Germaine Dempster, *Sources and Analogues of Chaucer's Canterbury Tales* [Chicago, 1941],

pp. 172-73, also as *Knaresburgh* in John Gower's *Confessio Amantis*, ii, 943, 1001 [*ibid.*, pp. 190-91]). There can be no question of Chaucers' not knowing that Knaresborough was the proper place for the wretched Donegild's "court," and one can only ask why he ignored or suppressed the name. A. C. Edwards, 'Knaresborough Castle and the *Kynges Moodres Court*,' *Philological Quarterly*, XIX (1940), 306-09, explains this omission not at all implausibly on the grounds of political discretion, of Chaucer's not wanting to identify the castle of John of Gaunt, unpopular but powerful Duke of Lancaster, in any way as "the home of treason and the unnatural Donegild."

The background of the first element of Knares-borough is uncertain; *DEPN* s.v.

## L

(CORSEYNT) LEONARD, St Leonard (November 6th), patron saint of prisoners, is mentioned in *HF* 117 as the saint of a shrine two miles from Chaucer's home. Since Chaucer is here following Jean Meun's *Roman de la Rose* (ed. Ernest Langlois, ll. 8836-38), the whole allusion may be merely jocose and be taken merely as a reference to the saint, but see under *Stratford-atte-Bowe*, below, for an apparently more personal application of the reference.

LYNCOLNE (var. *Lincolle*, MR VII, 178), Lincoln, mainly on the N bank of the Witham, county seat and cathedral town, is mentioned in CT B \*1874 (648) to define the young saint ("Little St Hugh") supposedly murdered by Jews in Lincoln in 1255 (Muirhead *England* 556) and his body thrown into a well in a courtyard (now "Jews' Court") next door to the right of "The Jews' House" in Steep Hill (street). Muirhead *England* 555-60.

Lincoln (OE *Lind-cyle*[e]ne) looks back to Romano-British *lindum* "lake" (cp. Welsh *llyn*) with reference to a broadening of the Witham at Lincoln, partly preserved in Brayford (Mere) and Lat. *colonia*.

LONDO(U)N, London or more precisely the City of London, now a county corporate on the N bank of the Thames, covering an area of about 680 acres, included two hills on either side of the Walbrook valley and today is included in the postal regions E.C. 1-4, now a center of business and industry. London in this older, restricted sense (population ca. 23,000; Darby 232-33) is mentioned in a general way in CT A 509, A 3632, D 555, G 1012; in A 383 it defines an ale, in A 4325, H 11 it identifies Roger (Hogge) the Cook, originally a man of *Ware*, q.v. In A 4343, 4365 it is a *cit  *, in A 4385 a *toun*, likewise in LGW Prol. FG 43 where it is mentioned as a place where daisies are called daisies (*dayes-yes*).

## STREETS AND BUILDINGS

The following account is obviously not intended for Londoners or persons familiar with the city, to whom everything here in question will be common-place; rather it is designed for persons who may be visiting London for the first time and might like to locate quickly and view the streets and buildings Chaucer mentions in the *Canterbury Tales*.

Starting in the SW corner of the City at Fleet St near Temple Bar we find the *Temple*, E.C.4 (CT A 567; in A 578 "*that hous*") as a general name of the two Inns of Court, the Middle and Inner Temple; the Outer Temple was merely a piece of ground once belonging to the Templars which early passed into private hands. Bowden 256; Muirhead *London* xlvii-viii, 216. Continuing east in Fleet St and up Ludgate Hill we come to *Sainte Poules*, old St Paul's Cathedral (E.C.4), destroyed in the Great Fire of 1666, mentioned in CT A 509 as a place where a country parson might find an easy and lucrative post (Muirhead *London* 244). St. Paul's appears further to be implied in *parvys* (A 310), with reference to the enclosed area or court in front of the Cathedral, noted as a

rendez-vous for lawyers and their clients (see Bowden 166-67, *NED* "parvis" 1, but questioned by Manly 518). In A 3318 "*Poules wyndow*" refers to traceried windows in the old cathedral, here conceived as the basis of an ornamental pattern cut out in shoe-leather, in Mediaeval Latin *calcei fenestrati* (Skeat V, 101 *ad loc.*). Continuing east on Cannon St and one block east after crossing King William St we are at Fish Hill St, E.C.3 (*Fyssh Strete*) which runs down past the Monument (to the Great Fire) to Lower Thames St near London Bridge, in C 564 (var. *Brig Strete*, *Fleet Strete*, MR VII, 66) named as a street where Spanish wine is sold. We are now in the district of the Vintry of old (*NED* s.v. b), where Chaucer grew up as a boy. Virtually at right angles to Fish Hill St and an eastward continuation of Cannon St is Eastcheap, which is almost surely referred to as *in Chepe* and in the same verse (C 564, also 569) as *Fyssh Strete* above and in the same connection; it is unlikely here to refer to Cheapside, E.C.2 (*in Chepe*, A 4377) below. Proceeding down Eastcheap and Great Tower St we come to Tower Hill and the Tower, E.C.3 (*Tour*), in the SE corner of the old city, referred to in A 3256 as the site of the old Mint (Muirhead *London* 305) where gold *nobles* were minted in the time of Edward III (*NED* "noble" sb. 1, 2). Thoughts of the White Tower proper, in its day a fortress, arsenal, and state prison, may lie behind *the (heighe) tour* of Cambuyskan in F 176, 340. Muirhead *London* 298-305. From the Tower we may retrace our steps to Eastcheap and King William St, then turn north up King William St to the statue of Wellington in front of the Royal Exchange, thence west into the Poultry and on into Cheapside, E.C.2 (*in Chepe*, A 4377), mentioned as a place where processions on horseback, perhaps jousts, attracted the unnamed apprentice of the Cook's Tale from his work. This same apprentice also liked to join up with noisy processions (*revel*), quite likely accompanying prisoners, which would start in Newgate St, E.C.1 (*Newegate*, A 4402) and continue back through Cheapside and straight on through Cornhill to the Cornhill prison called "the Tun" (Skeat V, 130 *ad loc.*, and *NED* "tun" sb. 5, for later references). Though received too late for use here, reference should be made to Eilert Ekwall, *Street-Names of the City of London* (Oxford, 1954).

Not identifiable are general references to food-shops (A 4352, 4376, 4395, 4410 [*place*], 4422), taverns in A 4375, miscellaneous dwellings in G 1023, 1217, and nooks and corners and blind alleys (*hernes and lanes blynde*) in G 658.

For other parts of the London area mentioned by Chaucer see *Depeford*, *Eltham*, *Grenewych*, *Sheene*, *Southwerk*, *Stratford-atte-Bowe*, *Wateryng of Seint Thomas*, [*Westminster*, *City of*], *Windsore*.

# M

MERCEN-RIKE, kingdom of the Mercians, Mercia, mentioned in CT B \*4302, (3113) as the kingdom of Kenulphus (OE *Cén-wulf*, regn. 796-821), father of little St Kenelm (OE *Cén-helm*). At the time in question Mercia embraced an area lying roughly between the Ribble and the Humber in the north to the Thames and the mouth of the Severn in the south, exclusive of East Anglia.

The normal OE designation of Mercia is *Miercna-land* "land of the Marchmen," in Latin *Merciorum regio* and the like; the OE form might have been expected to yield a later East Midland *Merchen-lond* or *-riche* (OE *ríce*). Chaucer's *rike* is Scandinavian (ON *riki*) and northern (see *NED* "riche"), and the *k* of *Merc-* (vs. *Merch-*) may likewise very well reflect Scandinavian influence. But the difficulty does not end here, for the overwhelming majority of the manuscripts (MR VII, 581) read *Merten-*, several with distorted spellings but showing a *t*, plus a miscellany of utterly wild forms. Only the Paris Ms. reads *Merkenryk*. Whatever Chaucer knew about this name or thought about it, it is only too apparent that later scribes either assumed a region *Merten-rike* or blew completely when faced with their exemplars at this point.

## N

NORTH CONTRE, the North country, essentially England north of the Humber (*NED s.v.*), is mentioned in *CT D* 1413 by the devil (alias a forester or bailiff) as his home ("*fer in the North contré*"). Reference thus to the north may have been intended by Chaucer, and conceivably so understood by his readers, as an oblique allusion to the infernal regions; see Robinson 809, n. 1413. In the frame-work of the Friar's Tale I suspect, however, that it was just understood as it would be understood today, namely, as the North country.

NORTHFOLK, the county of Norfolk in East Anglia, mentioned in *CT A* 619 (var. MR V, 58) to identify *Baldeswelle* (*q.v.*), home of Oswald the Reeve. Also in Norfolk is *Bromeholm*.

The name looks back to OE *Norþ-folc* "people settled in the north (of East Angia vs. the people designated as *Súþ-folc*, modern Suffolk).

NORTHUMBERLOND, despite the form this name does not historically refer here at all to Northumberland, small, most northerly eastern county, separated from Berwickshire, Scotland, by the Tweed, but to the far earlier Anglian kingdom of Deira. It is mentioned in *CT B* 578 as the kingdom of Alla (*OE Ælla, regn.* 560-588). This ancient kingdom, joined with Bernicia sometime after Ælla's death to form the large kingdom of Northumbria, included roughly the counties of Yorkshire (East and West Riding), Nottingham, Derby, and Lancashire. One may properly ask oneself, however, whether Chaucer in telling the "Northumberland" episode in the Man of Law's Tale knew of, or cared about, such historical matters; to him Northumberland may have meant the kingdom of Northumbria but perhaps even more likely the modern county, whose coast is his principal concern. The region is correctly said to be pagan (*B* 534, 540, 545) though a few Late British Christians linger on in *B* 547 (?). In *B* 508 the region is mentioned as where the sea cast Custance ashore. Alla's kingdom is referred to as a *lond* in *B* 522, 540, 604, 828, 862, as a *contré* in *B* 534, 541, and as his *regne* in *B* 735, 797. The coast is conspicuous and is referred to as *sond* in *B* 509, *stronde* in *B* 825, 864, *plages* "beaches" in *B* 542. The North Sea is *our wilde see* in *B* 506, 526, 557, 875, 902; in *B* 505 it is an *occian*. There is a castle or fortress in a town on or near the coast and is in charge of a governor or warden (*Constable, NED s.v.* 3b): *hold* "stronghold" *B* 507, *castel* 512, 550, 807, 878; it is called the *kinges hoom* in *B* 874, 876, and is said to be a *toun* in *B* 587, a *place* in *B* 575(?). The *court* of wicked Donegild, Alla's mother, of *B* 786 and implied in *B* 730, was presumably conceived by Chaucer as being at Knaresborough, *q.v.*

The name looks back to OE *Norþ-hymbra-land* "land of people living north of the Humber."

## O

OREWELLE, almost surely Orwell Haven (*Sf*), a fine and well-known anchorage at the mouth of the Orwell estuary, the sea reach of the Gipping, off Landguard and more or less opposite Harwich (*Ess*), has been much used from early times to the present day; Manly 514 properly refers to it as a harbor. It is mentioned in *CT A* 277 as the English terminus of the 125 m. stretch across the North Sea (formerly also the Flemish, German Ocean) to Middelburg, capital of the Dutch province of Zeeland, near Flushing (Dutch *Vlissingen*), which the Merchant wanted kept open for trade at all costs. The harbor is praised by Michael Drayton in his *Poly-Olbion* (1612, 1622), Song XIX, ll. 155-60 (J. W. Hebel, ed., *The Works of Michael Drayton*, IV [Oxford, 1933], p. 401). On Orwell Haven past and present see Alker Tripp, *Suffolk Sea-Borders* (London, 1926), p. 178-96 (Chap. IV: "Seaward from Orwell Haven"); Darby 301, n. 1, also my paper



'Orwell Haven in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle' in a forthcoming issue of *The Modern Language Review*.

The OE name of the estuary seems to have been *Arwe* (gen. *Arwan*) but any development to ME *Ore-* seems to be fraught with difficulties unless Scandinavian influence is assumed. See ERN 311-12, with early references to Orwell Haven, including the present Chaucer passage.

OSNEYE, Osney village (O), a suburb of Oxford W of the railway and about ½ m. W of the town with the remains of an Augustinian priory founded in 1129 (Muirhead *England* 267), is mentioned in CT A 3274, 3400, as the place where a carpenter John used to go on business; in A 3659 it is said that the parish-clerk once went there. The *chirche* of A 3663 is Osney Abbey, and a *cloisterer* or monk of the same is mentioned in A 3661. Somewhere near Osney is a *grange* (A 3668) or outlying farm-house, presumably thought of as belonging to the Abbot of Osney, where it is suggested untruthfully that John the carpenter may be staying for a day or two to get for the Abbot some timber stored there (A 3666-67).

The name looks back to OE *Osan-ieg* "Osa's island, or land in the midst of marshes and the like."

[OSPRINGE, K], Ospringe (: *binge*, *hinge*), a village on the *Caunterbury Wey* (q.v.) ½ m. W of Faversham and a little more than 47 m. from *Southwerk*, is not mentioned by name but was in the Middle Ages, along with [Derteford] and *Rouchestre*, a suitable overnight stopping place on the *Caunterbury Wey* (q.v.) for Canterbury pilgrims and must have been the site of the *hostelrye* of CT G 589. Furnivall 29; Skeat V, 415-16, n. 555, also p. 418, n. 589; Littlehales 34-35; Jerrold 415, Tatlock 483 and n.2; Robinson 867, n. 556. A not very likely suggestion that the overnight stop in question might have been at Faversham was made by "Hermentrude," 'Chaucer's Pilgrimage,' *Notes and Queries*, 8th Series, I (25 June 1892), 522-23. Muirhead *England* 22.

The name probably looks back to OE \**or-* or \**of-spryng* (not *spring*) "spring, source;" DEPN s.v.

OXENFORD, Oxford, episcopal see and university town, is mentioned in Astr Pr. 12 (1-5), Pr. 121-22 (20-25), pt. II, §22 (head.), l. 6 (245-51), §25, l. 28 (266-70) in connection with its latitude, in CT A 3187 as a town. In CT A 285, D 527, E 1 it defines Oxford students, and in A 3329 a style of dancing. In A 3334, 3846 it is a *toun*. A (*paryssh-*)*chirche*, one of well over a score in mediaeval Oxford, is mentioned in A 3307, 3312, a *chirche*, perhaps the same, in A 3429. The adjuration to "*Seinte Frydeswyde*" in A 3448 would recall the Augustinian Priory of St Frideswide, now the site of Christ Church College; friars in the chancel of St Frideswide are mentioned in A 3656. John the carpenter's dwelling is a *hous* (A 3356, 3484, 3669, 3694) or *in* (A 3547) and has a (*shot-*) *wyndowe* or casement window, central to the action of the story and mentioned in A 3358, 3676, 3695, 3708, 3727, 3740, 3801; here he took in lodgers (A 3188), including the Oxford student "*hende Nicholas*" (A 3199), a point that reminds one of the small number of students who at that time lived in a college. Muirhead *England* 245-68.

OE *Oxna-ford* "ford where oxen can cross" referred specifically to Hinksey.

## R

ROUCHESTRE, Rochester (K), across the Medway from Strood and immediately contiguous to Chatham and Gillingham and 30 m. from *Southwerk* on the *Caunterbury Wey* (q.v.), is mentioned in CT B \*3119 (1926) as a point near which the pilgrims are at the beginning of the Monk's Tale. Muirhead *England* 17-21. Rochester was well-known as an overnight stopping place between Southwark and Canterbury, indeed the only other suitable place apart from

Dartford [*Derteford*] and Ospringe [*Ospringe*]. See Furnivall 22, Littlehales 25, Tatlock 483-84, who is almost alone in rejecting Rochester as a conjectural overnight stop.

In all CT manuscripts fragment B<sup>2</sup> [VII] is separated from B<sup>1</sup> [II] with the result that mention of Rochester follows that of *Sidynghborne*, itself some 11 m. nearer Canterbury. This discrepancy, ignored by the early editors, was noted by Henry Bradley who in turn pointed it out to Furnivall (p. 22) who adjusted the order of tales to take care of this point and was followed by many other scholars (Pratt 1143 for list). MR and Robinson have unfortunately reverted to the Ms., particularly Ellesmere, arrangement and this again has led to all manner of discussion. Robinson 1005, col. 1 (near top) excuses or justifies the manuscript arrangement as one among "so many small discrepancies" and to be viewed as a "slip of Chaucer's own;" to Lawrence 102 "it seems less like a slip than a somersault." If it represents a slip on Chaucer's part (as it surely is not) but the result of an arrangement bungled by scribes (as it surely is), this should earn Chaucer a place high in the *New Yorker* magazine's department of "Our Forgetful Authors." See further Lawrence 116-18, Pratt 1159-61 with full literature.

The name looks back to OE *Hrofes-æaster* as if meaning "the Roman fort of one *Hrof*." For the rather elaborate development of a personal name *Hrof* from Romano-British *Durobrivæ*, apparently assumed by the Anglo-Saxons, see DEP<sup>N</sup> s.v.

ROUNCIVAL, see [WESTMINSTER, CITY OF].

## S

SCOTLAND, Scotland, is mentioned in CT B 718 (var. MR V, 507) as a region toward which (*to-Scotland-ward*) King Alla of "Northumberland" proceeded to attack his enemies.

The name looks back to OE *Scot-land* (pron. *shot-land*) "land of the Irish who settled Scotland, of Gaels;" see *Scottes*, below. The later pronunciation *skot-* is presumably due to Scandinavian influence; cp. *Engelond*, above.

SCOTTES, Scotsmen, natives of Scotland, are mentioned in CT B 580 as enemies of "Northumberland" against whom Alla's Constable was to hold the royal castle.

The name looks back to OE *Scot*, plur. *Scottas*, meaning originally "Irishman," later by extension to the Irish settlers in *Scotland* (q.v. above). On the etymology see NED s.v. sb. 1.

SHEENE is the early name Richmond (Sr), residence of English kings from Edward I (regn. 1272-1307) to 1394 when Richard II had the palace at least partially razed; in 1499 what remained was destroyed by fire but was magnificently rebuilt by Henry VII who changed the name of the manor to Richmond in honor of his own title of Earl of Richmond inherited from his father Edmund Tudor and based on Richmond on the Swale (YNR). Muirhead *London* 482-83. It is mentioned in LGW Pr F 497 (omitted in G) as a royal palace alternate to *Eltham* (q.v.) where Chaucer might deliver the completed *Legend of Good Women* to Richard II's first queen, Anne of Bohemia (died 7 June 1394).

The name looks back to some form or derivative of OE *sciene* "fair, beautiful" and presumably meant "the beautiful spot or site." PN XI Sr 1, 26, 65-66. The name survives in the adjoining Sheen Common and in the village of East Sheen (SW 18) (in contrast to West Sheen or Richmond).

SHEFFELD, Sheffield (YWR) at the confluence of the Sheaf with the Don, famous for its cutlery since the present reference, is mentioned in CT A 3933

(var. MR V, 390) to define a knife ("thwitel") carried by the miller Symond or Simkin. Muirhead *England* 432-35.

The name looks back to the river-name Sheaf (OE \*scéap, scœp "boundary") and originally applied to the region or *feld* on the river. See ERN 360-61.

SIDYNGBORNE, Sittingbourne (K) on the Swale, 39 m. from London and adjoined on the N by the ancient borough of Milton Regis or Royal on the Swale (*Middel-tún* of the *Parker Chronicle* s.a. 893, 897, 964), is mentioned in CT D 847 (var. MR VI, 84) as the place before reaching which the Summoner will have told a tale about friars. Muirhead *England* 22.

The name looks back to OE *Sidinga-burna*, m., or -burne, f., "stream of the hillside-dwellers(?)", with reference to the Swale. DEPN s.v.

SOLER HALLE, conceivably but with no certainty to be identified with the former King's Hall, Cambridge, originally the handsome timbered house of one Robert de Croyland situated between the present Great Gate, Trinity Chapel and the sundial and leased by Edward II in 1317 as a hostel or student rooming-house for his "King's Scholars or Childer." If *Soler Halle* does refer to the King's Hall, this seems to be the only instance of its being so referred to. Twenty years later it was bought outright by Edward III for the same purpose; the building—gradually other buildings were bought in and added—remained a hostel or "hall," not a college in the modern sense of the word, for a couple of centuries. On the "hall" vs the "college" system in the early English universities see H. S. Salter, *Medieval Oxford* (Oxford, 1936), pp. 102-03; note that Trinity Hall is the only college that retains the name of "Hall". In Chaucer's day King's Hall may have housed some twenty students. In 1546 Henry VIII bought up King's Hall and the neighboring Michaelhouse and Physwick's Hostel to form the present Trinity College. See George M. Trevelyan, *Trinity College: An Historical Sketch* (Cambridge, 1943), pp. 1-11 ("Proto-Trinity"), with map of the old arrangements p. 2.

*Soler Halle*, which had it survived as an academic entity would today be written Sollar Hall (cp. Trinity Hall), is mentioned in CT A 3990 (var. MR V, 395) as being at Cambridge (*Cantebregge*), in A 3989 it is a "greet collegege," i.e., a large academic building or complex of buildings (NED "college," 5); in A 4003 it is a *halle*. The high-school-age boys are looked after by a "Wardeyn" (A 3999, 4006, 4005, 4112). There was also a purchasing agent or manciple (A 3993, 4029).

The element *soler* (NED "sollar") referred to the upper chambers of Robert de Croyland's house (if the identification with King's Hall is right) above the main downstairs rooms (OE *solor*, Old French *soler*, *solair*, adapted from Lat. *solarium*).

SOUTHWERK, Southwark (Sr), now a metropolitan borough of London (S.E.1) stretching along the S bank of the Thames between Blackfriars and London Bridge, was even in the fourteenth century virtually a part of London proper; it was annexed to the city in 1549 (Darby 363). It is the starting point of Chaucer's Canterbury pilgrimage and is mentioned as such in CT A 20, 718; in A 3140 it defines the local ale; in A 566 it is referred to as a *toun*. Two inns out of probably several or many are reported being there. The *Tabard* (A 20, 719), run by the historically identified Henry (Harry) Bailey and named from the short sleeveless jacket used as the inn-sign, is an actual hostelry of the day (Manly 498; Robinson 753, n. 20; Bowden 38-39) and stood on the east side of Borough High St; here at one time or another have stood a series of famous inns including Shakespeare's "White Hart" (2 H VI, iv, 8). The present Talbot Yard in the Borough High St is on the site of the old Tabard. Muirhead *London* 318-319. In A 23 it is a *hostelrye* with spacious stables (*stables wyde*, A 28),

a *herberwe* or lodging place (NED "harboury") in A 765, and in A 800 a *place*. The name is adapted from Old French *tabart* of uncertain origin. Another inn, the *Belle* (CT A 719) is also mentioned, not certainly identified but perhaps across the road from the Tabard (Robinson 700, n. 719).

The name *Southwerk* looks back to OE *sūþ* "south" and *geweorc* "fortification," thus the "southern fortification" with reference to its position on the S bank of the Thames, or perhaps "fortification of the people of Surrey." See PN XI Sr 29-31.

STRATFORD-ATTE-BOWE, Bow, E.13, formerly Stratford at Bow or le Bow (OFr *le=lez* "near, by" [Lat. *latus*]), about 3 m. E of St. Paul's, is in Middlesex county in the metropolitan borough of Poplar in the notorious Limehouse district. It is mentioned in CT A 127 to define the Anglo-French or Hainaut(?) type French of the Prioress, Madame Englantyne, probably though not absolutely necessarily a member of the Benedictine nunnery of St Leonard's (Manly 504-05; Bowden 94, 101-02). It is also quite likely that Chaucer had this same religious foundation in mind in HF 116-17 when he humorously speaks of making a two-mile pilgrimage to the *Corseynt Leonard*; see H. M. Smyser, 'Chaucer's Two-mile Pilgrimage,' *Modern Language Notes*, LVI (1941), 206-07.

Like all "stratfords" the name looks back to OE *stræte* "highway" and *ford* "ford" to describe a place where a main road crosses a stream, here a branch of the Lea. The element *Bow(e)* (OE *boga* m. "bow") describes the arched bridge said to have been built in the time of Henry I (*regn.* 1100-35); for a discussion of the lore connected with the building of the bridge see PN XVIII Mx 134.

STROTHER is said in CT A 4014 to be the name of the *toun* in which Alain and John, student residents of *Soler Halle*, were born; it is said to be *fer in the north, I cannat telle wher* (A 4015). Today this is a lost name but a Strother family, surely taking its name from the town or district, has long been associated with, and prominent in, Northumberland. In the fourteenth century there was a Castle Strother in Glendale in Wooler and an Alan and John Strother were prominent (Manly 561, n. 4014); in the seventeenth century there was the medical writer Edward Strother born in Alnwick (DNB XIX, 62-63).

The name almost surely looks back to OE *\*strōðor*, a derivative of OE *strōþ*, *strōd* "marshy land overgrown with brushwood"; cp. Strood (K) under *Rou-chestre*, and see DEPN "strōd" with the statement that "strother" "is also found in pl. ns" but without any instances being cited.

## T

TRUMPINGTON, Trumpington (C), a village 2 m. S of Cambridge out Trumpington St, is mentioned in CT A 3921 (var. *Thorpynton*, MR V, 389) as near the site of a *mille* (A 3923, 4008, 4021, 4061, 4115, 4242, 4311); in A 3943, 3977, 4135 it is a *toun*. The mill site is the spot "Old Mills" on the Ordinance Survey map and was obviously on the original channel of the Grante or Cam over which went a bridge (A 3922), called a *brook* (A 3922, 3923, Bourne Brook) in the surrounding *fen* (A 4065, 4080, 4091). Skeat V, 116 seems to think that Chaucer could not have known Cambridge or known it well, otherwise he would not have made the boys feel that they had to spend the night out at the mill (A 4177); this may all be quite true, but in view of the state of mediaeval roads the boys may very well have felt that to ride back in the dark might have resulted in the horse breaking a leg or themselves breaking their necks. See Manly 561; PN XIX C 2; Muirhead *England* 580.

The name looks back to OE *Trumpinga-tún* "village of \*Trumpa's people," based on an unrecorded personal name *\*Trumpa*, perhaps "surly fellow."

WALES, the principality of Wales, is mentioned in CT B 544 as a refuge of pre-Saxon, Late British Christians who had fled from Deira (i.e., *Northumberland*) before the days of King Ælla.

The name looks back to OE *Wéalas* (sing. *Wealh*) "Britons."

WARE, a place-name Ware, is mentioned in CT A 692 to define one limit of the Pardoner's territory or beat (see *Berwyck*, above) and in A 4336 as the home town of Roger the Cook. There are three Ware's of any consequence in England: most prominent is Ware on the Lea (Herts; PN XV Hert 206-07), in the fourteenth century the site of a Franciscan monastery, the limit of John Gilpin's ride, and whose vicar Charles Chauncey became the second president of Harvard University (1654-72). There are also two hamlets of this name, one near Sandwich (K) and one (Ware Cross or Barton) by Kingsteignton (D). The name is also applied to numerous private places which cannot enter into the question here. It is probably impossible, as in the case of *Berwyck*, to determine definitely which Ware Chaucer had in mind; in the case of Roger the Cook it would be of no consequence (Manly 53, Bowden 187 assume the Herts Ware). In the case of the Pardoner, where *Ware* is opposed to *Berwyck* and is thus intended to indicate the geographical extent of the latter's money-raising activities, it would be of some little point to know. The Herts Ware is probably the best bet.

The name almost certainly looks back to OE *wer* m. or the byform *wær* "wier, fishing pool;" DEPN s.v.

WATERYNG OF SEINT THOMAS, a lost site, St Thomas Watering, S.E.1 (Sr), close to the second mile stone on the Old Kent Road (see *Caunterbury Wey*) is mentioned in CT A 826 as a spring or road-brook where the pilgrims halted and presumably watered their horses (cp. NED "watering" sb., 15b). The site is mentioned from Chaucer to Ben Johnson (1630), after which it drops out of use. See Littlehales 10; PN XI Sr 5 *ad fin.*

The significance of the name seems to be "watering place for horses or cattle on the road to the shrine of, or dedicated to, St Thomas à Becket", martyred (A.D. 1170) archbishop of Canterbury.

WATLYNGE-STRETE, Watling-Street, said in HF 939 (2,431) to be what some people call the "*Galaxie*" (HF) 936 [2,428] or "*Milky Wey*" (HF 937 [2,429]); on this extension of the old Roman highway-name see NED s.v., 2, for instances from Chaucer to 1590; now obsolete. See Muirhead *England* 17.

OE *Wæclinga stræt* is the old native name for the Roman road running from near London through St Albans (Herts) (OE *Wæclinga céaster*) to Wroxeter (Sa) and Chester, and from the twelfth century on also applied to the road running SE from London to Canterbury and on to Dover (see *Caunterbury Wey*; NED s.v. introductory note and 1; PN XV Hert 7, 86-87).

(by) WESTE, in the west, the term "west" then as now defining England more or less W of Dorset and S of Bristol, is mentioned in CT A 388 to indicate the general region from which the Shipman came, specifically *Dertemouthe*. See NED *west* adv. 3a.

[WESTMINSTER, CITY OF, Mx] even in Chaucer's day was separated from the City proper (see *Londoun*, above) probably by a bar or chain opposite the SE corner of the Law Courts (see *Temple* under *Londoun*). Westminster is not named but is more or less implied in the phrase of *Rouncivale* (CT A 670) used to define the Pardoner. *Rouncival*, short for the Hospital and Chapel of St Mary of Rounceval, Augustinian house to which the Pardoner belonged, stood at Charing, later Charing Cross (S.W.1), just E of the ancient royal palace of Whitehall (PN XVIII Mx 167). "Rouncival" was the English branch of

Nuestra Señora de Roncevalles (OFr *Rencevaulx*, Fr *Roncevaux*), prov. of Navarre, Spain, founded in 1229. See Manly 536; Robinson 769, cols 1-2; Bowden 284-86. The first element of Ronce-valles probably looks back to Lat. *rumex* (Fr. *ronce*) "bramble", the name meaning "bramble grown valley".

No direct mention is made of the English Parliament or of Westminster Hall (Muirhead xlv, 90) but it is hard not to think that Chaucer would not have had this in mind when he had Theseus tell Emelye that on the advice of "*my parlement*" she is to take Palamon as her husband (CT A 3076-81), and even more so, with hinting allusions to Jack Straw, in the case of the Trojan Parliament which decides on the exchange of Criseyde for Antenor (TC 4, 143, 211, 217, 218, 344, 377, 559, 1297).

WINDESORE, Windsor (Berks), on the Thames ca 21 m. W of London, is mentioned in RR 1250 to define a "lord's son" who may have been a "*bachelere*" dancing with Franchise; similarly in Guillaume de Lorris' *Roman de la Rose* 1228: *Fiz au seignor de Guindesores* (ed. Ernest Langlois, II [Paris, 1920], 63, 305 "notes"), where *Guindesores* is likewise regularly identified with Windsor in Berkshire. The only real question at issue is whom Guillaume and Chaucer may have had in mind in speaking of the "lord's son." As for Guillaume, it is most likely that he thought of the *seignor* as King Arthur who both in Chrétien de Troyes' *Cligès* (cp. ll. 1197-2056 on Arthur's long but successful siege of Windsor Castle) and in the Old-French romance of *Rigomer* appears as the "king of Windsor." In Guillaume the son was probably nobody in particular, his genealogy being merely created to provide him with a background of social elegance. In translating Guillaume Chaucer perhaps or even probably—since he seems to have had little interest in Arthurian romance—knew nothing of these Arthurian associations and is unlikely to have made any personal identification of either the lord or his son. That he, still less Guillaume, was thinking of Henry II and his son Prince Edward, later Edward I (as suggested by Skeat I, 427, n.), strikes me as an improbable and unnecessary consideration.

The etymology of the name is uncertain, though the second element *-ore* very likely looks back to OE *óra* m. "river-bank," here perhaps in the sense of a place suitable for landing. See further *DEPN*, s.v.

## Y

YORKSHIRE, the county of Yorkshire, more specifically the East Riding, mentioned in CT D 1709 (var. *Engelond*, MR VI, 177) as the county in which the district of *Holdernes* (q.v.) is situated. In Yorkshire beside *Holdernes* are *Hulle*, [*Knaresborough*], *Sheffield*.

The county-name is based on the name York, looking back more or less directly to ON *Jöfurrvík*, adapted from OE *Eofor-wíc*, in turn adapted from Romano-British *Eburacum*, perhaps a derivative of Brit. *eburos* "yew tree;" see PN XIV YER 278-80.

## Mediaevalia

### I. Chaucer's Ancient and Biblical World: Addenda.

A YEAR ago I published in *Mediaeval Studies*, XV (1953), 107-36, a paper with the above title in which through inadvertence or most curious oversight I omitted certain names which should have been included. In the interval I have also noted a few inexactnesses and minor omissions—there are probably others—which I correct below. Thanks to Professor Huntington Brown of the University of Minnesota I am now able to make a proper statement about the origin of the modern Greenland Thule (*Tyle*, below). I would also thank my colleague, Professor B. J. Whiting, for suggestions leading to an improved punctuation of *HF* 1920-23 (3,830-33) together with a correct interpretation of the passage in question which I had misunderstood.

ACHADEMYCIS, see AT(T)HENES.

ALEXANDRYN, adj. (*land* A., var. *land* of A.), of or pertaining to Alexandria (*Alisaundre*, below), Alexandrine; *land* (of) A. means the region centering on Alexandria and by extension probably includes the East or Near East in general as a source of things exotic; it is the part of the world whence the head-gardener Mirth imported trees for the garden of the Rose (*RR* 602). The contemporary city is here to be assumed.

The received text (ed. Ernest Langlois) of the *Roman de la Rose* 592 reads *la terre as Sarradins* (var. *Sarrasins*) "Saracen country" but several manuscripts have *terre Alixandrin(s)*, and so obviously Chaucer's copy of the OFr text.

ALISAUNDRE, Alexandria, Arab. al-Iskenderieh (Lat. *Alexandrea*, -ia), Egypt. Located at the mouth of the Nile delta, Alexandria (founded B.C. 332), the most important of several—according to the *Historia de Preliis Alexandri Magni* §131, twelve—cities established by Alexander the Great, ranked only second to Rome for many centuries and for some thousand years was the capital of Egypt. In the Middle Ages it was a great emporium of trade with the East; it lost much of its importance with the discovery A.D. 1498 of the route to the East via the Cape of Good Hope.

A With reference to its greatness in antiquity it is mentioned in *CT* G 975 in association with the ancient cities of *Nyneve(e)*, *Rome*, and *Troie*.

B. In *CT* A 51 and B \*3582 (2392) it is mentioned in connection with its temporary conquest by Peter I, king of Cyprus, in 1365 (Manly 499-500; Robinson 753, col. 2, 856, n. 2391; Bowden 55-56); in *RR* 1025 it is one of a number of places remote from France or England to which a difficult lady might dispatch her courtly lover.

Chaucer's form is based on the standard OFr form of the name *Alixandre* (mod. Fr *Alexandrie*).

AMAZONES (Lat. *Amazon*, -es, f.) Amazons, warlike women, who according to ancient tradition lived on the banks of the Thormodon, mod. Turk. Terme cayı, are mentioned in *CT* A 880 in connection with their defeat by the Athenians and the marriage of their queen Hippolyta to Theseus, king of Athens. Their kingdom is *Femenie* (*art. cit. supra*), equated with *Scithia*.

ARABIK, adj.-sb. Arabic, the language of the mediaeval Arabian scientists, is mentioned in *Astr.Prol.* 37 (5-11).

Chaucer's form may either reflect Lat. *arabicus* or OFr *arabique*.

AT(T)HENES. Add at end of §3, p. 110: Likewise a mile or so NW of the ancient city out in the country on the banks of the Cephissus, flowing into the

Saronic Gulf, is the Academy (Lat. *Academia*) founded by Plato ca. B.C. 387 and presided over by him until his death B.C. 348. Its existence is implied in the phrase "*in the studies and scoles of Eleaticis* (see *Elea*, below) and *Achademycis in Grece*" (Lat. dat. pl.) (Bo. 1, pr. 1, l. 74 [30-35]), an awkward rendering of Boethius' *in studiis et scholis Eleaticis et Academicis*.

DOMUS DEDALY, see HOUS OF DEDALUS.

[ELEA, also called VELIA] in the ancient South Italian district of Lucania, now Castelammare della Bruca at the mouth of the Alento (prov. Campania), was the birthplace of the philosopher Zeno "of Elea" and founder of the Eleatic school; the name is implied in the phrase "*in the studies and scoles of Eleaticis and Achademycis in Grece*" (Bo 1, pr. 1, l. 74 [30-35]).

ETHIOPEEN, adj.-sb. Ethiopian, inhabitant of Ethiopia (Lat. *Aethiopia*), with the common implication of blackamoor or African negro, is used in CT I, 344 (345-50) to describe the color of St. Jerome's skin after exposure to the desert sun. In the OFr romances *Ethiope* (mod. *Ethiopie*) was viewed as a Saracen country and may have been so viewed by Chaucer.

Chaucer's form is OFr *Ethiopien*, -en; for many instances see the *Middle English Dictionary* (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1953), s.v.

FRIGIUS, Lat. *Phrygius*, a Phrygian, native of ancient Phrygia, a country of varying destinies and boundaries in NW Asia Minor, is used in BD 1064 to define one Dares, supposititious author of a tract *de Excidio Troiae Historia* (A.D. 400-600?), presenting in digest form the Trojan story from the Trojan point of view; Dares is also mentioned, though without further definition, in HF 1467 (3,377) and TC 1,146, 5,1771.

HELLESPONT; delete last line of entry.

HOUS OF DEDALUS, alternately Lat. *Domus Daedali*, the legendary labyrinth of Minos, king at Knossos in Crete (mod. Gk Kandia), is mentioned in Bo 3, pr. 12, l. 171 (1100-05) in connection with the elaborate scheme of entrances and exits characteristic of this structure, supposedly built by the skillful Athenian craftsman Daedalus. Though not referred to by name it plays an important part in the "Legend of Ariadne" (LGW 1886 ff.), where it is commonly called a *prisoun* and its maze-like character described in LGW 2012-14. In HF 1920-21 (3,830-31) it is, evidently for the sake of rime, once called by its Latin name *Domus Dedaly* (: *faste by*) and defined *Laboryntus* (see Skeat III, 283-84; Robinson 896, n. 1920). Related to, though said to be not half so remarkable or elaborately constructed as, the *Hous of Dedalus* is a curious structure, often referred to by the modern and non-Chaucerian designation "House of Rumor;" in fact, the word *rumour* is scarcely ever used by Chaucer. This outlying building, implicitly on Fame's manor, is one of Chaucer's most striking conceptions and is made the basis of some of his most remarkable description. The suggested relationship or similarity, if not identity, appears in HF 1920-23 (3,830-33), a passage to be punctuated somewhat as follows:

an hous. (That *Domus Dedaly*,  
that *Laboryntus* cleped ys,  
nas mad so wonderlych, y-wis,  
ne half so queyntelych y-wrought.)

It is a *hous* in 1925 (3,835), 1935 (3,845), 1942 (3,852), 1945 (3,855), 1977 (3,887), 1987 (3,897), 1989 (3,899), 2030 (3,940), 2121 (3,1031); in 1996 (3,906) it is a *place*, in 2142 (3,1052) a *halle*. It is a central news-gathering bureau, a proto-Reuters



or ur-AP, located at the foot of a cliff or hill on whose top stands the *Hous of Fame* (q.v.); *tydinges* "news items" is the usual word (*passim*) for what is collected and exchanged there and thence disseminated throughout the world through the agency of Fame (cp. 2111-17 [3,1021-27]).

This fantastic *hous* is conceived as a huge, elaborately wrought (1923-24 [3,833-34]) structure revolving at the speed of thought (1924-23 [3,834-35])—for this and other examples of prescientific conceptions of maximum speed, see Stith Thompson, *Motif-Index of Folk Literature* III (Bloomington, Ind.-Helsinki, 1934), 339 H 632.2— and emitting a tremendously loud noise (1927-30 [3,37-40], *swough* 1941 [3,851], *chirkinges* 1944 [3,854]). It is made of wickers, presumably osiers (*twigges*, 1936-37 [3,846-47], 1941 [3,851]), red, white, green and natural wood color (*fawle*), such as are used in making (bird)cages and baskets of various sorts (1938-40 [3,848-50]). Its open-work character, like that of a peasant-made birdcage, is stressed; there are zillions of openings: *dores open wyde* (1952) [3,862]) *entrees* (1945 [3,855]), *holes* (1949 [3,859]), 2110 [3,1020]), and windows (2029 [3,939]), 2083 [3,993]), 2091 [3,1001]), all to facilitate ready passage in and out of news items, true or false, bits of gossip, and the like. It is *sixty myle of length* (1979 [3,889], in effect 60 m. in diameter, and despite the insubstantial material with which it was constructed was built to last (1980-81 [3,890-91]). On various possible sources of inspiration for various parts or elements of the structure see Robinson 896-97, n. 1925 ff.

Here as in the Boece passage cited above *hous* renders Lat. *domus* in a transferred and much less common sense of "building."

HOUS OF FAME, Castle of "Fama" or "Fame," a semi-mythological site (HF 1114 [3,24]), is conceived as located on a space-platform of considerable area just between heaven, earth, and sea (714-15 [2,206-07]), at a point presumed to be the center of gravity, so to speak, of the Universe. It is referred to inferentially in 'the book also of Fame' of CT I 1085 [1085-90]. It is pictured as a mediaeval fortified castle on a cliff (*roche*, 1116-17 [3,26-27] ff.) at least as high as the highest in Spain, not of stone but of ice (1130 [3,40]) and towering above a settlement which is in a *valey*e (1918 [3,828]) with a *strete* (1049 [2,541]). (The highest mountain in Spain is the Pico de Aneto or Pic d'Anethou of 10,965 ft. or 3404 meters in the eastern Pyrenees; it is doubtful if Chaucer knew much if anything about this and nearby peaks. He did certainly know of the Rock of Gibraltar [*Jubaltare* in CT B 947] whose highest point, Rock Gun, is 1349 ft. and this he may well have had in mind here.) There Chaucer, having touched down after his flight through the firmament, finds himself and from there, after a good stiff climb 1118-19 [3,28-29]), reaches the castle and ultimately Fame's *halle* or throne-room. On the remarkable structure in the valley on the outskirts of Fame's manor (see under *Hous of Dedalus*, above).

In order of descending frequency Fame's residence is referred to as *hous*, *castel*, *place*, *paleys*, and *woon*. The titular designation *hous*, mostly in the combinations *Fames Hous* and *Hous of Fame* and used only a little more than halfway through the poem, is mentioned in 663 (2,155), 786 (2,78), 821 (2,313), 882 (2,374), 1023 (2,515), 1026 (2,519), 1064 (2,556), 1070 (2,562), 1105 (3,15), 1114 (3,24); hereafter it is a *castel* in 1161 (3,71), 1176 (3,86), 1185 (3,95), 1196 (3,106), *castel-yate* 1294 (3,204), 1917 (3,827), 1919 (3,829); *place* in 662 (2,154), 843 (2,335), *Fames place* 1053 (2,545), 1088 (2,580), 1111 (3,21), 1115 (3,25), 1169 (3,79); *paleys* in 713 (2,205), 1075 (2,567), 1090 (2,582), *paleys-walles* 1398 (3,308); a *woon* or dwelling in 1166 (3,76). The existence of Fame's place is implied in 2111-17 (3,1020-27).

The *roche* is a *hil* (1152 [3,627], 1165 [3,75]) of ice on whose faces are carved the names, mostly melted away by thawing, of former great men (1136-37 [3,46-47]). At the top (cop 1166 [3,76]) stands Fame's castle, whose walls are

built of glistening beryl (1184 [3,94], 1288 [3,198]), with a *tour* (1185 [3,95]); there are "bowers" or private apartments (1186 [3,96]) and a magnificent *halle* or great reception hall, in effect a throne-room (see below). The castle is elaborately adorned with architectural ornaments (1188 [3,98] ff.), as are the *yates* (1301 [3,211]), presenting a picture which recalls something similar in *Sir Gawain and the Grene Knight* 767-78, where *Sayn Gilyan* (l. 774) and *bone hostel* (l. 776) likewise invite comparison—almost surely without significance—with the eagle's "*Seynt Julyan, loo, bon hostel*" of *HF* 1022 (2,514). For some of the multitude milling about outside the castle there are seats (see 1251 [3,161]).

The *halle* is conceived as a vast throne-room in which the essential action of ll. 1341-1917 of the poem takes place. Its floor, walls, and roof are plated with gold half a foot thick (1343-46 [3,253-56]); it is a sumptuous place and is referred to in 1356-57 (3,266-67) as *Fames halle*, elsewhere simply as *halle* in 1186 (3,96), 1314 (3,224), 1342 (3,252), 1514 (3,424), 1527 (3,437), 1533 (3,443), 1568 (3,478). High on a dais is an imperial throne made of a single ruby-red carbuncle (1360-63 [3,270-73]) where Fame sits and dispenses her in the main uneven-handed justice. Along both sides of the hall from the dais to the wide portals (*dores wide*, 1420 [3,334]) are statues of great historians of the past (1421 [3,331] ff.) mounted on pedestals (*peler* 1421 [3,33] ff.) of metal, base and noble and of appropriate symbolism.

The designations *castel* and *paleys* for this remarkable edifice need no comment since they convey to the modern reader exactly what they conveyed to Chaucer and his audience; nor do such general terms as *place* and *woon*, but a word may be said about *hous*. Today "*house*" normally suggests a private dwelling of modest or reasonable proportions, though it is still used on occasion for a complex of buildings such as "monastic house," a university college as "the House" for Christ Church, Oxford, Peterhouse for St. Peter's College, Cambridge, the several "Houses" of Harvard University, or a humble flophouse (see *NED* s.v. "house" for these and other uses). In *HF*, however, *hous* is through about the first half of the poem used very definitely as a virtual synonym for the subsequently used *castel* and *paleys* which replace it after l. 1114 and presumably represents a survival of similar uses in Old English (Anglo-Saxon) where, perhaps most conspicuously, *hūs* is used frequently in *Béowulf* to refer to the great Danish royal hall of "Heorot." It may be recalled that Middle-High-German *hūs* is likewise frequently used in the *Nibelungenlied* to refer to the Burgundian royal palace of King Gunthere (see *Mediaeval Studies*, VII [1945], 134, under *Wormez*).

INDUS: l. 1 read "West Pakistan."

JACONITOS: l. 2 read "*valde*."

JEWERIE, "B." Add: This Jewry is in a *greet cité* (B\* 1678 [488]) in Asia Minor (See *Asie*), predominantly (?) Christian and governed by a *Provost* (\*1819 [629]) or chief magistrate (*NED* "provost" 5). There is a church school (*scole*, *passim*). The Jewry, *place* in B\* 1791 [601], is crossed by a *strete* (B\* 1804 [614]) off which ran an *aley* (B\* 1758 [567]) where there was a privy (*privé place* \*1758 [567], *pit* \*1761 [571], 1796 [606], *wardrobe* \*1762 [572]) into which the Jews are said to have thrown the body of the little Christian school-boy. There was an *abbay* \*1814 [624], also referred to as a *covent* (\*1827 [624], \*1867 [677], and a marble tomb (\*1871 [881]) where the child martyr was buried. Without Chaucer's immediate source for the story it is not possible to say whether Chaucer might have had any particular place in mind; variant versions of this miracle are laid in Carcassonne (France), Paris, Albigenian territory, Lincoln, and Toledo (Spain) (see W. F. Bryan - G. Dempster, *Sources and Analogues*, pp. 467, 470, 475, 477, 480). See also *Lincolne*, p. 143, above.

LABORYNTUS, see HOUS OF DEDALUS.

OCCIAN: add TC 5,1815-16 (se).

TYLE, II. 516, delete "Today . . . Greenland" and substitute "The name Thule [tu:li], reminiscent of *Ultima Thule* of antiquity, was given to the site of the present weather-station and airbase up the north-west coast of Greenland in 1910 by Peter Freuchen, who with his friend Knud Rasmussen, started the first settlement for white men there; see his *Vagrant Viking: My Life and Adventures* (New York, 1953), esp. pp. 7, 90, and Index p. 421, s.v.

TROIE, p. 134, l. 15 read "209, HF 155 (1,155). Prominent." P. 135 diagram: the door leading from Criseyde's room (b) out into the corridor should be marked f, and the door leading from her room directly into Troilus' room (a) should be marked e.

VERONE, l. 3, read: "where Boethius legally defended."

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## II. *ELEMENTATUM*: Its Appearance among the Twelfth-Century Cosmogonists.

THIS word, which occurs as a substantive in mediaeval works on natural philosophy from the twelfth century onward, seems to have provoked little attention on the part of lexicographers. Du Cange records the adjectival form *elementatus*: *Ex elementis seu litteris compositus*, but with no direct reference to a mediaeval text.<sup>1</sup> And recently Baxter and Johnson, *Medieval Latin Word-List from British and Irish Sources*, cites the substantive in a thirteenth-century manuscript: *elementatum*, body formed of elements a[n]te 1180.<sup>2</sup>

That it was indeed known in England before 1180 is certain, since it occurs in John of Salisbury's *Metalogicon*, which may be dated about the year 1159.<sup>3</sup> Here (iv. 40: *Ad quid Peripatheticorum et omnium recte philosophantium tendat intentio*) John, arguing the distinction between mere *curiositas* and what is profitable in philosophy, writes: *Quid autem prodest homini elementorum aut elementatorum nosse naturam, magnitudinis et multitudinis proportionem doctrinaliter querere, . . . et sui ipsius esse ignarum?*<sup>4</sup> Webb's comment on the passage takes the form simply of a brief definition, which parallels that of Baxter and Johnson: *elementatorum*: i.e. *rerum ex elementis compositorum*.<sup>5</sup>

But where did John get this word from, and can its uses be defined any more precisely? It does not seem to appear in the published glosses for the time before the twelfth century, and if any older mediaeval texts contain the word, this fact has apparently received no special scholarly notice. Nor do the modern dictionaries of earlier Latin record it.

In the twelfth century itself the most significant occurrences cluster about a group of philosophers connected with Chartres and Toledo, and among these the first instance observed by the present writer is in Guillaume de Conches,

<sup>1</sup> *Glossarium*, verb. cit. The reference is to "Chevillier. De Orig. impress. pag. 14." Cf. *coelementatus* in Tertullian, *Adv. Val.*, 23, cited in the *Thesaurus linguae latinae* and in A. Souter, *A Glossary of Later Latin* (Oxford, 1949); and the references below to *elementatus* (n. 25) and *elementans* (in the quotation from Bernardus Silvestris), as from a verb *elemento*, -are.

<sup>2</sup> (Oxford, 1934), p. 148.

<sup>3</sup> See R. L. Poole, *Studies in Chronology*

and History (Oxford, 1934), p. 268; and H. Liebeschütz, *Mediaeval Humanism in the Life and Writings of John Salisbury* (London: The Warburg Institute, 1950), p. 13.

<sup>4</sup> Ed. C. C. J. Webb (Oxford, 1929), p. 214. Among the extant manuscripts several are of the twelfth century: see the prolegomena to Webb's ed. of the *Policraticus* I (Oxford, 1909).

<sup>5</sup> The same, n. 4.

*De Philosophia mundi*,<sup>6</sup> which also provides us with what is perhaps the best basic context for a definition. The exact date of this treatise remains a problem, but whatever evidence there is suggests that it must have been written a little before or after 1130.<sup>7</sup> As for the context, it is Guillaume's attempt to define precisely the nature of the elements, which he undertakes by the method of *divisio* and which owes its originality in his day to the fact that he seeks to provide an atomic account based, not merely on the Platonic cosmogonical tradition long familiar to the West, but on Galen's human physiology as this came up to the high Middle Ages, by way of the Arabic, in the Latin translation of Constantinus Afer.<sup>8</sup>

An element, he writes, is the simple and minimal part of any body, simple with respect to quality and minimal with regard to quantity. He then goes on to rule out, as examples of what he means, such bodily divisions as humors, bones and flesh, hands and feet; for these are not minimal parts. Similarly, earth, water, air, and fire, as we normally perceive them, are not elements in the true sense, since each may have a variety of qualities under a variety of circumstances. Thus, in earth there may be something of hot, of cold, of dry, of moist; and so with the other three. Hence the four bodies, as they occur in nature, are not simple or minimal parts, hence not *elementa* in Guillaume's definition. In order to approach what we should mean when we call these four bodies elements, we must use the method of *divisio*, and this is based, not on sense-perception, but on intellect. With regard to the human body, organs (i.e. hands and feet) and similar parts (i.e. bone and flesh) may be divided in fact; the further division of these, however, into humors and of humors into elements, can be accomplished only by an intellectual act. The intellect thus recognizes that what makes earth earth, water water, air air, and fire fire, is the combination of *qualitates* peculiar to each, i.e. cold and dry, cold and moist, warm and moist, warm and dry, respectively; and that the minute particles of each of these characteristic *commisiones* of qualities, being, as they are, simple and minimal parts, are *elementa* in the absolute sense. As for the view of those philosophers who maintain that the elements are indeed what we perceive by our various senses (traditionally known as Pythagorean, from Chalcidius), Guillaume asserts that there is nothing in his position which contradicts it. But

<sup>6</sup>Printed twice from older editions by Migne, PL 90, 1127-78, among the *dubia* and *spuria* of Bede; and PL 172, 39-102, among the works of Honorius of Autun. A third edition, not in Migne, was printed under the name of William of Hirschau in Basel in 1531. The passage in question, which appears on coll. 1132 ff. and 48ff., respectively, of the Migne volumes, varies considerably as between the two versions, as is true also of the text as a whole, of which there is no modern critical edition. See M. Grabmann, *Handschriftliche Forschungen und Mitteilungen zum Schrifttum des Wilhelm von Conches und zu Bearbeitungen seiner naturwissenschaftlichen Werke* (Sitzungsab. d. Bayerischen Akad. d. Wiss., phil.-hist. Abt., München, 1935), p.5; and A. Vernet, 'Un remaniement de la *Philosophia* de Guillaume de Conches,' *Scriptorium*, I (1946-47), 243-59, which also gives a list of the manuscripts. For the attribution to Guillaume see Grabmann, pp. 5 and 6 and the references there to Rose and Jourdain.

<sup>7</sup>Liebeschütz, 'Kosmologische Motive in der Bildungswelt der Frühscholastik,' *Vorträge der Bibl. Warburg*, III, 1923-24 (Leipzig-Berlin, 1926), pp. 119-20, would place the work in the '20's "in die Nähe der ersten Abaelardschrift, von der sie Einzelheiten

übernimmt"; and both Grabmann, p. 6, and H. Flatten, *Die Philosophie des Wilhelm von Conches* (Koblenz, 1929), p. 10, agree with him. Vernet, 'Un remaniement,' 244, dates it "entre 1125 et 1135 environs," which seems safer. Guillaume also wrote two earlier books, glosses on the Chalcidian *Timaeus* and Boethius, *De Consolatione philosophiae*, which are now placed about 1120-25: P. Courcelle, 'Etude critique sur les commentaires de la Cons. de Boèce,' *Archives d'hist. doctr. et litt. du m. à., XIV* (1939), 79-80; and Vernet, p. 244. These have never been edited in full nor their manuscript tradition exactly worked out (see J. M. Parent, *La doctrine de la création dans l'école de Chartres* (Publ. de l'Inst. d'Etudes Méd. d'Ottawa, VII, Paris-Ottawa, 1938), pp. 122-77 and 215; cf. Courcelle, pp. 129-31); but the passages from the first as published by Parent (pp. 142 ff.), though they deal with elements, chaos, and *hyle*, and quote Constantinus Afer (see p. 160, ll. 26 ff., and below nn. 8 and 10 and their context), do not use *elementatum*; and this is apparently the case also with the Boethius in the text known to the present writer: Paris, Bibl. Nat., Ms. lat. 14380, ff. 66-99. See n. 9 below.

<sup>8</sup>See, e.g., Flatten, pp. 105 ff.

such bodies as we actually see in nature, though each may be dominated by the qualities of a single element, are not in themselves *elementa*, but *elementata*.<sup>9</sup>

The chief source of this passage, as has long been known and indeed as the author himself tells us, is Constantinus' rendering of Galen, called *Pantegni*.<sup>10</sup> To it Guillaume added materials from, among others, Johannitius, Boethius on Porphyry, and the Chalcidian *Timaeus*.<sup>11</sup> And the present writer is convinced, from the appearance in the passage of certain Greek terms not explained by these authorities alone, that there was at least one further and thus far unnoted source.<sup>12</sup> This may have been the treatise *περί φύσεως ἀνθρώπου* of Nemeseius of Emessa, translated with the strange title *Premnon physicon* by the eleventh-century Salernitan bishop Alfano, a friend of Constantinus.<sup>13</sup> But none of these works, though some have materials germane to Guillaume's distinction, contains the word *elementatum*.<sup>14</sup>

The Toledan writers contemporary with Guillaume de Conches who use the term are John of Spain and Dominic Gundissalinus. It turns, up for example, a number of times in John's translation of Albumazar, *Magnum introductorium*.<sup>15</sup> And in the Latin version of Avicbron, *Fons vitae*, which was the product of his collaboration with Gundissalinus, we find the following passage:

et sicut sunt quaedam formae affixae materiae nec separabiles ab ea, sicut formae intelligentiae et simplices substantiae, et sunt quaedam quae non sunt affixae, sicut formae elementorum et *elementatorum*, similiter ex formis substantiae aliae non sunt affixae, ut color et figura propria et similia accidentia, et sunt aliae affixae, sicut forma quantitatis quae est affixa substantiae.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>9</sup> PL 172, 48D-51A. Cf. PL 90, 1132C-1134B, which prints, however, *elementa* for *elementata* (1133B) and spoils the sense. The Pythagorean view is referred to in the Chalcidian *Timaeus* comm., sec. 51; ed. Wrobel, (Leipzig, 1876), pp. 119-20, which quotes some verses on the subject attributed to Empedocles:

Terram terreno comprehendimus,  
aethera flammis,

Humorem liquido, nostro spirabile flatu.  
Guillaume obviously has in mind this argument and its subsequent uses but does not give its verses here (he does, however, quote them in his glosses on the *Timaeus*: Parent, p. 169); instead he gives us Juvenal, *Sat.* XI, 14, as representing the position which he corrects: Interea gustus elementa per omnia quaerunt. In his Boethius commentary there is also a long discussion which distinguishes between the pure elements and those which we perceive, but the word for both, at least in *Ms.* 14380 (f. 80<sup>v</sup>, col. 2), is the same, *elementa*: dicunt enim fere omnes . . . non esse elementa que videntur a nobis, scilicet, terra, aqua, aer, ignis, sed elementa ab elementis composita . . . alii dicunt elementa ea esse ex quibus constant ista elementa, scilicet, puram terram sine proprietatibus aliorum, et puram aquam, aerem [ms. aera] et ignem.

<sup>10</sup>Cf., e.g. PL 172, 48D, 49A, and 50C. PL 90, loc. cit., takes out the specific references to Constantinus and substitutes *philosophi*. . .

<sup>11</sup>These sources are all named in PL 172, including Johannitius *Isagoge*; PL 90, typically transforms Johannitius into *ille philosophus*.

<sup>12</sup>The terms are those for two of the bodily parts, which Guillaume gives as *homioimeriae*, *id est consimiles*, and *organica*, *id est officiales* (PL 172, 49A). Constan-

tinus and Johannitius, drawing as they do on Galen through the Arabic, regularly have *similia* (or *consimilia*) *membra*, and *officialia membra*. See, e.g., *Opera Constantini* I, 2, I, 3, II, 1, III, 1 (Basel: Henricus Petrus, 1539), pp. 2, 4, 24, and 43; and Johannitius, *Isagoge ad Tegni Galieni*, in *Articella* (Venice, 1487), ff. 2, col. 1; 2, col. 2; and 5, cols. 1-2. Guillaume would also have found some relevant materials in Apuleius, *De Platone*, I, 215-16 (ed. P. Thomas, *Apulei opera quae supersunt* III [Leipzig, 1908], p. 101), but there the one significant term that appears is *consimiles partes*, *consimiles*.

<sup>13</sup>Ed. C. Burkhard (Leipzig, 1917), p. 59, where all of Guillaume's terms appear: *elementa*, *humores*, *homioimera id est simpiles partes habentia*, and *organica id est officialia*; and these in a passage directly connected with an account of the elements which contains details suggestive of both Constantinus and Guillaume. The present writer is engaged in a fresh examination of Guillaume's sources generally, of which the question of Alfano's influence is a part.

<sup>14</sup>This is true also of Thierry of Chartres' *De Sex dierum operibus* and Abaelard's *Expositio in Hexameron*, with both of which the *De Philosophia mundi* has associations; and we may add—in view of John the Scot's limited but growing influence among the Chartrians—of the *De Divisione naturae*: see B. Haureau, *Notices et extraits de quelques mss. latins de la bibl. nat.* I (Paris, 1890), 52-70; PL 173, 731 ff., but especially, 733-35; and PL 172, 700A, 701 AB, and 712 ff.

<sup>15</sup>See, e.g., Florence, Laurentiana, *Ms. Plut.*, XXXIX, 12 f. 11<sup>v</sup>. Cf. n. 25 below.

<sup>16</sup>II, 8; ed. C. Baumeister (Beiträge z. Gesch. d. Philos. d. Mittelalt., I 2-4 [Münster, 1895]), p. 39, ll. 13-19. Italicization in quotations

Even more important instances occur in Gundissalinus, *De Processione mundi*, an original cosmogonical treatise based on Avicbron and Avicenna, but also on Boethius, Chalcidius, and other works common to Christian philosophy.<sup>17</sup> Here, in two separate passages, we get an account which differs considerably from Guillaume de Conches, in method, in certain matters of philosophic principle, and in sources. For Gundissalinus employs *compositio* as well as *divisio* to make his distinctions and argues his case syllogistically, imports and uses precisely the Aristotelian differentiation between *forma* and *materia* as this appears in Avicbron, and shows no trace of anything from the Galenic physiology. Neither passage in the *De Processione* defines *elementatum* directly, but both together, from the position to which they assign it in the order of essences and substances and in the actual world of nature, provide important details for a definition.

In the first passage, which treats an ancient question, namely, what chaos was at the beginning of Creation, Gundissalinus distinguishes it from its principles in the order of their priority:

Quod autem illa confusio rerum non fuit prima materia, sic probari uidetur. Elementa constant ex materia et forma; elementa enim corpora sunt, quia circumscripta sunt et qualitates habent. Quaecunque autem constant ex aliquibus, posterior sunt eis, ex quibus constant. Materia igitur et forma priora sunt elementis. Sed chaos illa erat permixtio ex elementis et *elementatis*. Quare chaos illa de nihilo creata non est, quae siquidem ex multis corporibus commixta est. Nulla enim res de nihilo creata esse dicitur, quae ex tam multis composita esse uidetur. Quare chaos illa prima materia esse non potuit, quia creatio eorum simplicium eam antecessit, etsi non tempore, tamen causa. Item, quicquid resoluitur in aliqua, posterius est eis, in quae resoluitur; sed chaos resoluitur in *elementata* et *elementata* in elementa, elementa uero in materiam et formam.<sup>18</sup>

The second passage differentiates corporeal from incorporeal substances and assigns the former to the sublunary sphere. Such corporeal substances, as Gundissalinus tells us, are the *elementa* and *elementata*, the *elementata* themselves being divisible into those four primary bodies called elements of which the entire body of this sublunary world is composed:

Et substantia corporea, quae est corpus, diuisa est in corpus, quod est elementum, et in corpus, quod est *elementatum* tantum, ut omnia sensibilia a luna inferius, et in corpus nec elementum, nec *elementatum*, ut omne corpus, quod est a luna superius. Corpus, quod *elementatum*<sup>19</sup> est tantum, secundum elongationem sui a motu superiorum aduenientibus caliditate et frigiditate, siccitate et humiditate distinctum est in illa prima quattuor simplicia corpora, quae dicuntur elementa, ex quibus omne mundanum corpus hoc, sublunare scilicet, integraliter componuntur. Proles uero mundana eorum commixtione et conuersione generatur.<sup>20</sup>

here and henceforth is the present writer's. The word does not appear in the Hebrew version, from the Latin, by Shem-tov Palkherah: see *Sefer mekhon hayyim*, text sec. 13, transl. p. 22, in S. Munk, *Melanges de philosophie juive et arabe* (Paris, 1859). A.-M. Goichon, *Lexique de la langue philosophique d'ibn sinā* (Paris, 1938), collects from various of Avicenna's works the terms for elements and bodies formed of elements, together with Latin renderings, but does not record *elementata*; see especially items 15, 16, 99, 466, 467.

<sup>17</sup> Ed. G. Bülow, *Die Dominicus Gundis-*

*salinus Schrift "Von dem Hervorgange der Welt"* (Beiträge, XXIV, 3 [Münster, 1925]). For the sources see the notes to the text.

<sup>18</sup> Bülow, p. 38, ll. 6-20. The manuscripts confuse in various ways the readings *elementa*, *elementata*, and Bülow has failed to get them straight in his text, which is here amended in accordance with the plain meaning of the argument and of indications elsewhere in this work and from John of Spain.

<sup>19</sup> Bülow, p. 44, l. 2, incorrectly prints *elementum*.

<sup>20</sup> Bülow, pp. 43, l. 22-44, l. 7.

How are we to explain the presence of *elementatum* in Guillaume de Conches and the Toledan translators? Does it argue some undiscovered source from which both have drawn independently? Or if one has borrowed from the other, who from whom?

Once again the problem of dates arises to plague us, since neither the absolute nor the relative chronology of Gundissalinus' books or those of John of Spain is satisfactorily established. If we can accept Bülow's arguments, based on those of Baumer and Baur,<sup>21</sup> then the *Fons vitae* and the *De Processione* must have been written around 1150, a date which gives Guillaume de Conches a priority of as much perhaps as twenty years. To Bülow's tentative position we may now add a small point from the *De Essentiis* of Hermann of Carinthia, a Chartrian who spent considerable time in Spain translating scientific books from the Arabic.<sup>22</sup> This treatise shows some remarkable similarities in language and ideas to the *De Processione*, but without the latter's borrowings from Avicenna and, especially, Avicbron,<sup>23</sup> a fact which, if the coincidences indicate an actual relationship between the two writings and not merely independent derivation from an unknown common predecessor, would argue that the *De Processione* is the debtor. Since the *De Essentiis* can be dated precisely as complete between June 1 and the end of 1143,<sup>24</sup> this would then become the *terminus post quem* of the work by Gundissalinus. One further remark may be made, in the midst of these uncertainties, and this is that in none of Hermann's surviving *opera* known to the present writer—the *De Essentiis* and his translations of Zael ben Bischr, Ptolemy, and Albumazar—does the word *elementatum* as noun seem to occur.<sup>25</sup>

But all such considerations fail to settle securely the question of priority, nor shall we be able to do so until we have more information about these pioneers of the twelfth-century scientific renaissance, especially John of Spain, who is known to have been at work by 1135 and had undoubtedly begun somewhat earlier.<sup>26</sup> The discovery of evidence placing the *De Philosophia mundi* a little later in the '30's or defining the earliest stages of John's activities could change the status of the question decisively. It need not, of course, be remarked that the unearthing of *elementatum* in a book earlier than either would not only add a new small item to lexicography, but also furnish a likely clue to some of the further bases of Guillaume de Conches' 'new science.'<sup>27</sup>

Wherever priority lies, however, indications are clear enough of the ways by which *elementatum* spread. It is found, 1145-47, in the *De Mundi universitate* of Bernardus Silvestris of Tours, a philosopher-poet closely connected with Chartres: *Praecedat hyle, natura sequitur elementans, elementanti naturae elementa, elementis elementata conveniunt. Sic principia principii sed a prin-*

<sup>21</sup> "Prolegomena," p. xxiv-vi.

<sup>22</sup> Ed. M. Alonso (Comillas: Universidad pontificia, 1946 [Aparte de Miscelanea comillas V, 7-107]). For Hermann's career, especially his relations with Spain, see Alonso, "Introducción," pp. 9-19; Thorndike, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science II* (New York, 1923), 84-5; and C. H. Haskins, *Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science* (2nd. ed., Cambridge, Mass., 1927), pp. 43-66; and the present writer's forthcoming article, 'Hermann of Carinthia and Greek: A Problem in the 'New Science' of the Twelfth Century,' to appear in the Bruno Nardi Festschrift. See also, for his Chartrian associations, Hermann's address to Thierry in the introduction to his translation of Ptolemy's *Planisphere*; ed. Heiberg, in *Opera II* (Leipzig, 1907), 183 ff.

<sup>23</sup> See Alonso, pp. 9-10, and the notes, *passim*, to the text.

<sup>24</sup> Alonso, p. 104, and Haskins, p. 48.

<sup>25</sup> Of these works of Hermann only the *Fatidica* of Zael, finished in 1138 (see Haskins, p. 44), has never been printed. It has been read by the present writer in Bodleian, Ms. Digby 114, ff. 176-99. The Albumazar regularly uses the phrase *res elementatae* (in *rebus elementatis*) and there is no instance of *elementatum* as in John of Spain's version: *Introduitorium in astronomiam Albumazaris abalachi* (Venice: Erhardt Ratdolt, 1489), I, 1, iv. 2. etc.; sigg. a3, c1', etc.

<sup>26</sup> C. A. Nallino, *Al-Battani sive Albatenii Opus astronomicum* (Pubb. del R. Osserv. di Brera in Milano, XL [1904]), p. lvii, dates John's *Alfraganus* and his *Centiloquium* in 1135 and 1136, respectively. Neither book, incidentally, gives us *elementatum*. It should be added, to make the problem more difficult, that 'John of Spain' may be more than one person; see Thorndike, *Hist. Mag.* II, 73ff.

<sup>27</sup> See below, n. 36 and its context.

*cipe principio cohaeserunt.*<sup>28</sup> Its appearance in John of Salisbury's *Metalogicon* about 1159 is equally significant, since, as is well known, he had studied under Guillaume de Conches from 1138 to 1141.<sup>29</sup> Later in the century it is also used by the English cosmogonist Daniel of Morley in his *Liber de naturis inferiorum et superiorum*,<sup>30</sup> which, written during the years 1175-1189, after a long stay by the author in Toledo, shows the presence of the two Spanish masters, as well as his countryman and predecessor Adelard of Bath, but also of Guillaume.<sup>31</sup>

On the subject of the state of matter during primordial chaos Daniel writes:

Quia enim omne inordinatum in se malum esse manifestum est, elementa in prima creatione licet non, prout nunc sunt, separate, tamen ubi nunc sunt, ordinata fuisse certum est, ita tamen, quod terra cooperta fuit aquis, aer aliquantulum corpulentior, quam modo sit, in latitudinem se usque ad maximam partem ignis extendebat. Ignis similiter aliquantulum spissior, nec fuerunt isti visibiles elementorum ornatus, qui nunc *elementata* uocantur.<sup>32</sup>

In short, *elementatum*, as Daniel uses it, properly refers to the condition of bodies in the natural universe after its *ornatus*, that is, when the *forma confusionis* of Creation had been superseded by the *forma dispositionis* of the Work of the Six Days.<sup>33</sup> The passage, when read in its fuller context, reminds us to some extent of Gundissalinus on chaos, with the significant differences that Daniel makes little reference here to matter and form but instead has a preliminary account of primordial *hyle*,<sup>34</sup> and that, dealing with the temporal order of *ornatus*, he puts the *elementata* last, whereas the Toledan philosopher, in an argument stressing the causal order of principles, makes a point of the priority of *elementatum*. More nearly parallel still to Daniel's ideas, though not his language, is the passage already given from Bernardus Silvestris.

Whether or not the English cosmogonist had read the *De Processione* or Bernardus' *De Mundi universitate* is a matter of doubt, but there is no doubt at all that he knew Guillaume de Conches, since the passage in question, as an examination of its details has disclosed, is drawn directly from the *De Philosophia mundi*, though from a later section than that which we have cited and one which does not use the word *elementatum*.<sup>35</sup> But Daniel's language suggests that he had Guillaume's earlier definition in mind all the same, since his phrase *nec fuerunt isti visibiles elementorum ornatus, qui nunc elementata uocantur*, seems to be an adaptation to his immediate context of the words of the *De Philosophia*: *Si ergo illis velimus imponere digna nomina, particulas praedictas dicamus elementa, ista quatuor quae videntur elementata*.

The present article does not propose to trace in detail other instances of the word's occurrence which might be attributed to either Guillaume's influence

<sup>28</sup> Ed. C. Barach and J. Wrobel (Bibl. philosophorum med. aet. I [Innsbruck, 1876]), I, 4, p. 30, ll. 49-52.

<sup>29</sup> See *Metalogicon* I, 5 and II, 10, and Webb's notes. Cf. Thorndike, II, 50, and Liebeschütz, *John of Salisbury*, p. 111. To be sure, this does not rule out the possibility that John and Bernardus had also found the word in a Spanish source, since the latter shows other indications of such influence, and the former's knowledge of the "new science," yet to be investigated adequately, surely went beyond Guillaume and Firmicus Maternus, as noted in Webb's edition of the *Metalogicon* and the *Policriticus*.

<sup>30</sup> Ed. Karl Sudhoff in *Archiv f. d. Gesch. d. Naturwissenschaft u. d. Technik*, VIII, 1 (Leipzig, 1917): corrections by Birkenmajer in the same journal, IX, 1, 45-51.

<sup>31</sup> See M. Müller, 'Die Stellung des Daniel

von Morley in der Wissenschaft des Mittelalters,' *Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görres-Gesellschaft*, XI, 3 (1928), 301-37; and Silverstein, 'Daniel of Morley, English Cosmogonist and Student of Arabic Science,' *Mediaeval Studies*, X (1948), 179-96. *Elementatum* does not occur in Adelard of Bath's *De Eodem et diverso* (ed. Willner, [Beiträge, IV, 1 (1903)]); nor in his other works which are relevant to Daniel: *Quaestiones naturales* (ed. M. Müller, [Beiträge, XXXI, 2 (1934)]), and *De Opere astrolapsus* (inedited; see Cambridge, Fitzwilliam Mus., *Ms. Mac-Clean* 165, ff. 81 ff.).

<sup>32</sup> Ed. Sudhoff, p. 12.

<sup>33</sup> See *Mediaeval Studies*, X, 193.

<sup>34</sup> Ed. Sudhoff, pp. 10 ff.

<sup>35</sup> PL 172, 54B. Cf. PL 90, 1136D-1137A. See *Mediaeval Studies*, X, 193.



or that of the Spanish translators and their successors, but this could easily be done because of the well-documented testimony that the *De Philosophia* and the works of John of Spain and Gundissalinus were widely read in the twelfth and following centuries.<sup>30</sup> Nor did the distinctions which they helped to establish go without opposition during this period of influence. Thus, a *Compendiosus tractatus de philosophia et eius secretis*, extant in a xiii-xiv century manuscript of the Barberini collection, attacks the view which we have found in the *De Philosophia*, attributing it and the term *elementata* to the *Salernitani*, but whether to those before or after (and including) Guillaume is not clear:

Si nobis salernitani prauī opponunt. dicentes Elementa non sunt simpla ut superius exposuistis. Videmus enim infra terram. aquam. ignem. aerem et econuerso in aqua in aera. igne. Et hec terra que uidetur. aqua. aer. ignis. que uos dicitis elementa non sunt elementa sed *elementata*. et respondemus. Licet in terra sit aqua et cetera. . . .<sup>31</sup>

Instead we may conclude with the observation that from the tradition of philosophic discourse stimulated by the labors of Chartres and Toledo, *elementatum* reached the *glossaria* of the high Middle Ages, as represented by the Uguccione da Pisa—Giovanni Balbi line, and so passed on to some of the Renaissance dictionaries which did not entirely purge Latin of its mediaeval barbarisms.<sup>32</sup>

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### III. A Metrical MHG Version of Pseudo-Aristotelian Proverbs.

THE so-called pseudo-Aristotelian proverb-collections, made available by recent research, are all known to be prose versions.<sup>1</sup> Therefore the following MHG rhymed version, hidden away in a volume of miscellanies in the Wolfenbüttel library, might prove to be of considerable interest. This volume, *Codex 2.4, Aug. 2.*, entitled *Der welt lauff*, comprises more than one thousand short and popular poems, all of which originated in that prolific, but not very lustrous literary period which lies between Rosenplüt and Hans Sachs. Karl Euling who has edited this volume is of the opinion that this manuscript was written in Nuremberg in the last decades of the fifteenth century.<sup>2</sup> The apophthegms in question are found on f. 211<sup>va</sup> (p. 156). They are preceded by short sayings ascribed to Albertus Magnus, Augustine, Bernard, Gregory, Chrysostom, and

<sup>30</sup> *Elementatum* is found, for example, in Albertus Magnus, *Liber de causis et processu universitatis*, a work heavily indebted to the *Fons vitae*: I, 1 (ed. Borgnet, *Opera omnia*, X, 364). See also the items in n. 31 above, and Alexander Neckam, *De Naturis rerum* I, 16 (ed. Thomas Wright, [Rolls Series, XXXIV (London, 1863)], p. 56). Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum naturale*, frequently quotes Guillaume on the elements but does not use the word in those passages: i.e. II, 1-8, 12 and 14 (ed. Douai [1624], cols. 79-87). Grabmann, pp. 26 ff., gives some brief indications of the *De Philosophia*'s influence.

<sup>31</sup> Vatican, *Ms. Barb. lat.* 283, f. 63v. The unknown author several times quotes or refers to Constantinus Afer's definition of the elements.

<sup>32</sup> See, for example, Giovanni Balbi, *Summa que Catholicon appellatur... emendata per prestantem virum magistrum Petrum Egidium...* [Leyden, 1520] s. v. *elementum*: Et

nota quod elementum quandoque dicitur ipsum elementatum: vt terra quam videmus et calcamus. et aqua quam videmus et potamus. et sic de ceteris. Quandoque est etiam ipsum verum elementum cuiusque libet pars est eiusdem generis cum ipso toto; vt elementum terra dicitur illud corpus cuius quelibet pars est terra: et sic de aliis. sed hec potius ad philosophiam pertinent. Cf. Matthew Martin, *Lexicon philologicum* (Frankfurt, 1655), s. v. *elementum*: Et nota, quod elementum quandoque dicitur ipsum elementatum, ut terra, quam videmus et calcamus, et aqua, quam videmus et potamus: quandoque est etiam ipsum verum elementum.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. PMLA, LIX, 585-86; LXI, 627-32; LXVII, 584-86; MLN, LIX, 31-33; LXIV, 491-92; *Speculum*, XV, 92-94; PQ XIX, 328-36; CBQ, V, 264-75.

<sup>2</sup> Kleinere mhd. Erzählungen, Fabeln und Lehrgedichte, 'Dt. Texte des Mittelalters, XIV (Berlin, 1908), pp. v, vi.

Aristotle<sup>3</sup> and are followed by the dicta of Bede, Bonaventura, Seneca, Paul, Hieronymus, Ambrose, Boethius, Isidore, and others. Nothing is known about their provenance, source, or scribe. There can be little doubt, however, that the scribe belonged to that circle of Nuremberg artisans who toward the end of the fifteenth century developed such an outstanding literary activity. The assumption of Nuremberg as the background of the collection is also confirmed along philological evidence: the dialect is North Bavarian throughout. In the case of the metrical proverb collection the author used his 'poetic' skill merely to rearrange his material and, as will be shown below, to put a prose version of his Vorlage into a metrical form. The text of the poem in question (= W) is as follows:<sup>4</sup>

- Aristotiles ein ler fur sich nam  
und zu dem grossen Allexander kam:  
(1) "Ir solt nit gesellschaft hant  
mit menschen die sein unbekant,  
(2) und offenbar nit leichtlich mit scherzen  
die heimlikeyt deines herzen.  
(3) gelaub nit was du horen machst,  
(4) und behalt das du hast.  
(5) einem verlogen freunt und frawen  
der keinem soltu nit trawen.  
(6) du solt nit sein ein betruber huter  
von dem verlust hie deiner guter.  
(7) du solt nit reden zwischen peden,  
weiszlich und keim zu nahent reden  
(8) und solt nit kriegen zu keiner frist  
mit keym mechtigern den du pist.  
(9) du solt dich frewen zu keiner zeit  
deines nechsten widerwertigkeyt.  
(10) in allen deinen sachen und dingen  
soltu gut ret geben und pringen  
(11) und merck den eben den anfanck,  
das mittel und den ausganck."

Since the MHG prose versions with which the above rhymed version has so very much in common can be traced back to a common Latin original (=L),<sup>5</sup> it would seem advisable to compare the above MHG text with this Latin version (Cod. 142 of the University Library, Munich). A comparison will show the following surprising correspondences:

W 1=L 10: *Non te ignoto socies.*

W 2=L 12: *Inimico tuo reconciliato ne des fidem; L 16: Secreta tua uni electissimo, tantum cum necesse fuerit, (pectus)trade.*

W 6=L 13: *De re amissa irrecuperabili non doleas.*

W 7=L 2: *Loquere pauca; L 3: Verax esto; L 4: Ne sis velox loquendo.*

W 8=L 15: *Noli contendere cum potentiore te.*

<sup>3</sup> Aristotle's saying which immediately precedes the above proverb collection reads as follows: *Aristotiles spricht. Mensch, du solt Got danken fru und spot / das er dich geschaffen und nach jm gepildet hat / und danck im auch do pey in rechter begir / aller der gutheyt die er hat verilien dir.* Euling (op. cit., p. 156) who is not aware of the nature of the proverb collection is of the erroneous opinion that this quatrain forms one unit with the following rhymed version.

Of course, they do not belong together but just happen to be written together because they share the same author, i.e. Aristotle.

<sup>4</sup> The Arabic numbers preceding the individual sayings of W are the present editor's own and merely serve to facilitate a comparison with the corresponding sentences of other texts.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. C. Selmer, 'An Unpubl. Coll. of Pseudo - Ar. Proverbs,' *Speculum*, XV (1940), 92ff.

W 9=L 14: *Noli gaudere adversitate proximorum.*

W 11 is a saying found in contemporary MHG literature.

This comparison shows that with the exception of three proverbs (viz. W 4, W 10, and W 11) all sayings of W are represented in L. It is, moreover, evident that the 'poet' of W versified only the introductory and final sections of L, and, for reasons unknown, left the middle sections untranslated. In each of the two sections he combined, as shown in *dicta* W 5 and W 7, two or even three sayings of L to form one sentence in W. Of the three sayings left unidentified in L, W 11, which for its religious meaning has ever exerted a particular appeal to the Middle Ages, can be found in the writings of Peter Suchenwirt; when he versified the *Epistula* in the *Secretum secretorum* in 1394, he expressed the same thought in the following verses: '*Auch gedenck an missewend / In allen deinen sachen / Anfanck, / paide mitt und end, / Wildu dein er nicht swachen.*'<sup>6</sup> Sayings W 4 and 10, however, derive from the same classical source to which the pseudo-Aristotelian proverbs can be traced, viz. the *Dicta Septem Sapientum*, and are of Greek origin.<sup>7</sup> Proverb W 4 can be verified as a *dictum* of the Seven Sages in Sosiades' collection<sup>8</sup> as *Res tuas custodi* and in the *Breves sententiae*,<sup>9</sup> erroneously ascribed to Cato, as *Datum serva*. Proverb W 10, stemming from the same background, can be identified with *Consule utilia* in Sosiades,<sup>10</sup> *Vitae (tute)*<sup>11</sup> *consule* (attributed to Thales), *Consultus esto* (attributed to Cleobulus) in *Breves Sententiae*,<sup>12</sup> and in a more elaborate form *Civibus optimorum consiliorum auctor esto* (attributed to Cleobulus) in Demetrius' collection.<sup>13</sup> Both sayings, W 4<sup>14</sup> as well as W 10, are clearly interpolations taken over from a related proverb collection. They also occur in the distichs which are commonly attributed to Cato in an incunabulum of the year 1482, which reads as follows:<sup>15</sup> *Son, as dyr ycht gegeuen is / dat halt dat du des syn gewys / Ouch saltu wirsichtig syn / wem du geven wolt dat dyn and Gyff allen luten rait / Nycht en lere sprechen quait / Verstant ind halt ouch dese lere / da mit gewinst du guyt ind ere.*

As can be observed from the above comparison, the Greek (and Latin) proverbs of the Seven Sages served—with one exception—as the source of the MHG verses. The sense expressed in the prose versions has been rendered rather faithfully by the MHG verses of the Wolfenbüttel manuscript. Some allowance must be made for poetic license, particularly the telescoping of sentences. Saying W 7, dealing with careless talk, combines three admonitions in one, adapted to concrete cases and instructs the reader, how to talk, how not to talk, and when not to talk. One slight inaccuracy occurs in W 5; this saying, instead of cautioning against friendship with a reconciled enemy, as the original *dictum* used to read,<sup>16</sup> commends one to beware of a 'mendacious friend,' and is fittingly

<sup>6</sup> Ed. F. Bobertag, 'Erzählende Dichtungen des späteren Mittelalters,' *Dt. Nat.-Litt.*, X (1886), 167, verses 81-89.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. C. Selmer, 'A Latin Coll. of Pseudo-Arist. Paroimiai and its Relation to the Sayings of the Seven Sages,' *Philol. Quarterly*, XIX, 328 ff.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. I. Conradus Orelus, *Opuscula Graecorum Veterum Sententiosa et Moralia, Graece et Latine* (Leipzig, 1819), p. 152. In Orelus as well as in E. Stechert (note below) the sayings are offered in Greek and Latin. In this article only the Latin quotations will be given.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. E. Stechert, *De Catonis quae dicuntur distichis* (Greifswald, 1912), p. 26.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. I. C. Orelus, *op. cit.* p. 154.

<sup>11</sup> About the reading *tute* for *vitae*, cf. E. Stechert, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. E. Stechert, *op. cit.*, p. 23, 24.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. I. C. Orelus, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

<sup>14</sup> The thought expressed in W 4 is found once more toward the end of the Wolfenbüttel manuscript (f. 246<sup>r</sup>, no. 981) by the following MHG quatrain: *Wiltu mit eren dich ernern, / so soltu alzeyt meslich zeren. / und was hast, dasselb behalt: / So bricht dir nichtz so diu wurst alt.*

<sup>15</sup> Cato. *Vulgo Disticha Catonia* (Colonia, 1482), p. 3a and 3b.

<sup>16</sup> About *widerprachen* or *versünt en* (=reconciliato) to be added to *veindt*, cf. C. Selmer, 'An Unnoticed Version,' *PMLA*, LIX, 585.

combined with a saying which warns one not to tell one's secrets to his *frawe*.<sup>17</sup> Thus the above unique metrical version shows the same homogeneous structure and background which are exhibited by the MHG prose versions.

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#### IV. The Place of Irish Saints in Late Mediaeval English Hagiography.

THE recent publications of Professor Wormald have supplied evidence to the fact that the place occupied by Irish saints in the official and liturgical calendars of the English Church during the Middle Ages does not fully reflect the geographical nearness nor the historical indebtedness of the English to the Irish Church.<sup>1</sup> Only St. Brigid's feast was celebrated throughout the Middle Ages in all parts of the English Church. St. Patrick's feast disappeared by the twelfth century to be revived, to some extent, in the general expansion of the calendar shortly before the Reformation. St. Aidan was commemorated intermittently down to the fourteenth century; Sts. Fursey, Columba, Columbanus and Brendan were mentioned only in a few calendars.

The study of the position of Irish saints in the official calendars of mediaeval England has thrown new light on the unique place occupied in this tradition by the calendaric poem contained in *Mss. Galba A xviii*, *Tiburius B v* and *Julius A vi* of the British Museum. The enlargement of the late eighth-century poem, traditionally known by the erroneous title: *Martyrologium poeticum Bedae*, into a *martyrologium breuiatum* with one hexametrical entry for each day, was a further significant contribution made by England to the short-lived attempt to raise the calendar of saints to a form of literature.<sup>2</sup> Among the additions are entries for ten Irish saints, most of which can be traced back to Irish sources. As he listed thirteen further entries which can be traced to Irish sources, though not Irish in subject-matter, Bishop stated: "I have no doubt whatever that the author of this calendar was an Irishman".<sup>3</sup>

When he referred to this work among the sources of the early ecclesiastical history of Ireland, Dr. Kenney confined himself to saying that in *Ms. Julius A vi* "the text is considerably modified".<sup>4</sup> The decisive point, however, is that in this version the Irish saints have been replaced by continental saints with the exception of Sts. Brigid, Patrick and Kevin of Glendalough. In nineteen other instances, moreover, the Julius manuscript substituted other names, sometimes changing the whole hexameter in the process. *Ms. Julius A vi* is a continental adaptation as is most obvious from the substitution of *Francorum* for *Anglorum* in the entry for the nones of December. The other entries, described by Bishop as of Irish origin, were not rejected by *Ms. Julius A vi*. The introduction of Irish saints in *Mss. Galba A xviii* and *Tiburius B v*, therefore, stands out as an indication of the hagiographical unity of these islands, but, by this very fact and

<sup>17</sup> It seems that throughout the Middle Ages women were given little credence to keep an entrusted secret. The above Wolfenbüttel manuscript warns in various other quotations not to trust one's wife. e.g. no. 993, p. 217: *Glaub nit, was dir deyn weyb züsagt*, and *ibid.*, no. 1008, p. 219: *Deyns weybes red der acht nit vil*. In the above quoted Cato version (n. 15) the following related saying is found on 4<sup>o</sup>: *Du salt nit sobald diner frowen glauben, ob si dir vor dinen knechten klaget vnder augen*. See also R. Jente, 'A woman conceals what she knows not,' *MLN* XL, 253, 254.

<sup>1</sup> The Henry Bradshaw Society LXXII,

LXXVII and LXXXI and my paper 'Irish Saints in Mediaeval English Calendars', to be published in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, 1954.

<sup>2</sup> See my 'Studies in the Literary Tradition of the *Martyrologium Poeticum*', *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy*, LVI C (1954), 216 ff., and my paper 'England's Contribution to the History of the Calendar', *Clergy Review*, (1953), 165 f.

<sup>3</sup> *Liturgica historica* (1918), p. 254 f.

<sup>4</sup> J. F. Kenney, *Sources for the Early History of Ireland I* (New York, 1929), p. 481. References to literature listed by Dr. Kenney are not repeated.

by its form as a versified *martyrologium breuiatum*, this work is clearly non-liturgical.

*Ms. Galba A xviii* and *parall.* may be compared with the martyrology in the *Drummond Missal*<sup>5</sup> where, on many days, entries are added that expressly refer to saints in *Hibernia*. In the *Communicantes* of this Missal the name of St. Patrick was added after those of Sts. Martin, Gregory, Augustine, Jerome and Benedict and that of St. *Brigita* (the Irish form of the name) in the *Nobis quoque*. However, in both instances these additions were marked for omission *ad libitum*. The *Drummond Missal* illustrates an important step in the assimilation of the Irish liturgy, which originally had no *Sanctorale*, to the Roman liturgy (the *Drummond Missal* has only the *Communio sanctorum*) and cannot be considered as a source for the study of the position held by Irish saints in English or Scottish calendars. It forms the counterpart on the Irish side of the attempt, illustrated also by *Mss. Galba A xviii* and *Tiburius B v*, to coordinate the traditional Irish form of devotion to the national saints to the Roman liturgical veneration of individual saints.

What is significant for the further development of the part of Irish saints in English calendars is that it was realized, not only in Ireland but also in mediaeval England, that the Irish saints were a distinctive national group. Indeed, the Irish may be credited with the introduction of a national point of view into the veneration of the saints. The most important record in this regard is the late tenth-century *Martyrology of Tallaght*. In it were added to entries for the saints of the universal Church for each day, such as are found in the *Hieronymianum*, entries, often equally numerous, for Irish saints in a further paragraph.<sup>6</sup> The *Félire Oengusso*,<sup>7</sup> which may be described as an abbreviated versification of the subject-matter of the *Martyrology of Tallaght*, intermingled foreign and Irish saints, but in the *Drummond Martyrology* Irish entries appear again, clearly as additions to the entries for saints of the universal Church.

That the place occupied by Irish saints in the official calendars of the English Church does not fully reflect the position held by these saints in the devotional life of mediaeval England has been demonstrated by studies on the veneration of relics and on church dedications. The present study proposes to demonstrate this point in the hagiographical field.

In all the manuscripts of the ninth-century Anglo-Saxon *Martyrologium*, the pages for February 1st and March 17th are missing, but from the presence of passages dealing with Sts. Fursey and Columba it can be assumed that there were also passages for Sts. Brigid and Patrick.<sup>8</sup> Together with the Anglo-Saxon *Menologium*,<sup>9</sup> this is a record of an attempt to bring the ordinary people into closer contact with the liturgy. However, with readings for each day irrespective of its liturgical status, the *Martyrologium* itself is not liturgical, nor can its texts be derived from liturgical texts. It is not unlikely, however, that the feasts of those four Irish saints were then actually celebrated in many parts of England.

The thirteenth and fourteenth-century English legends and copies of these right down to the sixteenth century, as for example *Ms. Bodleian 779*,<sup>10</sup> contain at the most three Irish saints, namely a summary of the *Purgatorium sti. Patricii* (*Seint paterick . . . makede ane pit in Irelande . . .*), the *Seinte Breide, virgine* [or] *holy meyde: In Scotlonde heo cam*, and a summary of the *Navigatio sti. Brendani* (*Vita s. Brendani abbatis de Hybernica: Seint Brendan, the holi man / was here of owre londe*). In *Ms. Egerton 1993* Brendan is missing as is St. Brigid

<sup>5</sup> Kenney, p. 705 f.

<sup>6</sup> Kenney, p. 481 f. and *The Henry Bradshaw Society LXVIII* (1931).

<sup>7</sup> Kenney, p. 479 f.

<sup>8</sup> See my paper mentioned *supra*, note 1.

<sup>9</sup> See my paper 'The Irish Counterparts of

the Anglo-Saxon *Menologium*', *Mediaeval Studies*, XIV (1952), 98-106.

<sup>10</sup> See Hortsmann's publications, Paderborn (1875), Heilbronn (1878-81) and Early English Text Society (1887).

in Ms. Bodleian 779; some other copies are even less complete. For none of these texts need we assume direct Irish sources.

The most important English contribution to the tradition of Irish saints was the *Sanctilogium* of John of Tynemouth.<sup>11</sup> The only Irish saint in the *Legenda aurea* by Jacobus de Voragine (d. 1298) had been St. Patrick, mainly the *Purgatorium*.<sup>12</sup> Sts. Brigid and Kilian were added after the English translation had been made (in 1438). When he printed this translation in 1484, Caxton added St. Brendan. John of Tynemouth, however, has lessons for the following: St. Patrick (*vita*),<sup>13</sup> Benignus and Indractus, Fursey and Foillan, Brigid (*genere Lagenensis*), Kieran, Finan (*Aradeorum gente de Ulidia Ms E: nudia*), Brendan (*in occidentali parte Hiberniae . . . in Cluanarca sepultus*), Aidan (*in regione Connactorum*), Columba, Modwenna and Osmanna. In the beginning of all these lessons *Hibernia* is specifically mentioned. Maxentia, described as the offspring of *rex Scotorum*, is probably to be counted as Irish.

The tradition of Osmanna belongs to Brittany<sup>14</sup> and that of Maxentia to Northern France.<sup>15</sup> These are representatives of a group of female saints associated by twelfth-century continental tradition with the Island of Saints. The parallelism in the tradition of these saints can be fully appreciated since the process of hibernisation of local saints has been studied as a distinctive feature of Western European hagiography of that period.<sup>16</sup> In this tradition of hibernisation of female saints in particular, Modwenna has been a British contribution: the text given by John of Tynemouth is an abridgment of the *Sanctae Modvennae vita* by Geoffrey, abbot of Burton-on-Trent (1141-51), where the life of an Irish Saint Monenna has been applied to a local English saint.<sup>17</sup>

The Irish saints in the *Sanctilogium* represent various strata of what, by analogy to Irish-continental hagiography, may be termed Irish-British hagiography. Patrick, Benignus, on whom this is the oldest source, and Indractus, whose life by William of Malmesbury was abridged by John, were inserted mainly in deference to their association with Glastonbury, which is, of course, a purely English tradition. These associations may also account for the insertion of St. Brigid. The tradition of Fursey was based on Bede—from whom the lessons are taken even in Ireland to this day—and replenished from continental sources.<sup>18</sup> Kieran of Saighir was inserted because of his associations with Wales. On Finan of Moville John of Tynemouth is again the oldest known source, although the parallelism of his tradition with that of St. Frediano of Lucca, hibernised in the late twelfth century,<sup>19</sup> suggests that the Welsh sources were considerably older. The insertion of St. Brendan was clearly due to the Europe-wide popularity of the *Navigatio*.<sup>20</sup> The lesson on St. Columba is an abridgment from Adamnan with the addition of some material from Bede, justified in his case by English literary tradition rather than by the saint's historical associations with Scotland.<sup>21</sup>

Thus we are left with the lesson on St. Aid, the summary of an early thirteenth-century English abstract (Ms. Brit. Mus. *Vespasian A xiv*) of a lost Irish original which does not seem to have been very old either.<sup>22</sup> John arranged his work in the calendaric order similar to the Anglo-Saxon *Martyrologium*. In contrast to the latter, John does not have a lesson for each day of the year;

<sup>11</sup> Kenney, p. 307.

<sup>12</sup> L. Bieler, *Codices patriciani latini* (Dublin, 1942), p. 42.

<sup>13</sup> Bieler, p. 30 f. *Ibid.* p. 37 for the (lost) life of St. Patrick by William of Malmesbury (d. ca. 1142).

<sup>14</sup> Kenney, p. 181.

<sup>15</sup> Kenney, p. 528.

<sup>16</sup> See my papers in *Mediaeval Studies*, VII (1945), 21-39, and VIII (1946), 217-44.

<sup>17</sup> Kenney, pp. 367 ff. Compare the application of the life of St. Finan of Moville to

St. Frediano of Lucca (*infra*, n. 19).

<sup>18</sup> See my paper in *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* V, LXXVII (1952), 18-28.

<sup>19</sup> See my paper in *Mediaeval Studies*, XIII (1951), 234-42.

<sup>20</sup> See my paper in *Traditio*, VIII (1952), 397-402. A typical example of the creation of an Irish saint has been described by Grosjean in *Analecta Bollandiana*, LXXI (1953), 359.

<sup>21</sup> Kenney, p. 429 f.

<sup>22</sup> Kenney, p. 449.

however, his work is not the record of a naturally grown legendary of saints actually venerated. It is rather a systematic collection of records of "saints" in the wide Irish connotation of the word, without regard to their actual cultus. None of the lessons on Irish saints has the liturgical appendix which John gave to some of his chapters. Benignus, Indractus and Finan were undoubtedly never venerated liturgically and Aid, Osmanna and Maxentia, at least, not so in England. John obviously did not know the hexametrical martyrology contained in *Ms. Galba A xviii* and *Tiberius B v*; it does not contain the material on Fintan, Comgan, Coemgen, Mactail and Maelruan. Moreover, the tradition on which he drew for St. Aid is quite different from that on which the entry for Aid in *Ms. Galba A xviii* was based.<sup>28</sup>

In contrast to *Ms. Galba A xviii*, John of Tynemouth did not draw on direct Irish sources. The insertion of Osmanna and Maxentia shows that he did not confine his researches to England but had information from the Continent. Horstmann assumes<sup>29</sup> that John's collection "may also have contained Gallus, Deicolus—two historical Irish saints whose names were inserted at an early date in continental martyrologies, but were not known in Ireland before the fourteenth century"<sup>30</sup>—Livinus—[Patron of Ghent, hibernised in the eleventh century, but apparently unknown in Ireland prior to the late sixteenth century]<sup>31</sup>—, Cummian<sup>32</sup> etc." The systematic collection of records of saints generally does not mark the climax but rather the beginning of a decline in the devotion to them. It is outside the scope of this paper to compare John's work with the Catalogue of Saints drawn up a generation later by Petrus de Natalibus, a work which also contains records, otherwise unknown, of saints associated with Ireland.

The alphabetical rearrangement of the *Sanctilogium* in the fifteenth century, probably by Capgrave, may be described as an admission of its scholastic character. In this rearrangement fifteen new lives were added, including those of Wiro<sup>33</sup> and Kilian. Both are described as belonging to *Scotia* and their association with Ireland is reasonably historical but their tradition is continental.<sup>34</sup> When in 1516 this rearrangement was printed, the original title *Sanctilogium Angliae, Walliae, Scotiae et Hiberniae* was shortened into *Sanctilogium Anglie*.<sup>35</sup> In the prologue this abbreviation was justified by the following statement: *terrae Hibernie, Scotie et Wallie de iure subici debent et obediens esse tenentur huic regno Anglie*. In the tradition of systematic collections of lives of the saints, the *Sanctilogium* was the first to be based on a geographical conception in contrast to the universal conception as expressed in *Apoc.* vii, 9, and emphasized by the *Isagoge* to the *Hieronymianum* and the patristic testimonies prefacing the modern *Martyrologium Romanum*.

The addition of Irish names by the *Martyrology of Tallaght* as a separate group to those from the *Hieronymianum* was justified by the necessity to co-ordinate, rather than to identify, the conception of *sanctus* with the Irish conception of *nóibh* (venerable).<sup>36</sup> The addition of Irish saints to general martyrologies as exemplified in the *Drummond Martyrology* or the *Martyrology of Christ Church Dublin*,<sup>37</sup> was justified as an assertion of Ireland's title of Island

<sup>28</sup> See *supra*, n. 2.

<sup>29</sup> Introduction to his edition of John's *Sanctilogium* (Oxford, 1901), p. xxvi.

<sup>30</sup> Kenney, p. 206 ff.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 509.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 420 f.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 509.

<sup>34</sup> See my paper in *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* V, LXVIII (1952), 22-33.

<sup>35</sup> In Cambridge, Christ Church 5 and 6, the title is *De Sanctis Wallie et Scotie*. Leland referred to the *Nova legenda* as *Vitae Sanctorum Anglorum* and Bale as

*Catalogus Sanctorum Anglie*—catalogus undoubtedly in analogy with the work of Petrus de Natalibus. See Hortmann's introduction, *supra*, note 24 pp. lx and lxvii.

<sup>36</sup> These Irish entries have come down to us in their entirety only through a separate copy. This copy was the basis of M. Kelly's unsatisfactory edition entitled *Calendar of Irish Saints* (Dublin, 1857). See, on the other hand, my paper on English saints in early Irish calendars to be published in *Medium Aevum*.

<sup>37</sup> Ed. J. C. Crosthwaite (Dublin, 1844).

of Saints and does not exceed the measure of local emphasis in contemporary works of that nature elsewhere. The compilation of a legendary restricted to a geographical unit (John of Tynemouth), not to speak of a (controversial) political unit (1516 print) was a new departure.<sup>33</sup> Retaliation was inevitable. The first English works to reestablish Catholic saints after the Reformation were John Wilson's *English martyrology conteynyng a summary of the lives of the Saintes of the three kingdomes England, Scotland and Ireland* and Jerome Porter's *Flower of the lives of the most renowned Saints of the three Kingdoms* (1608 and 1632), important contributions to the tradition of Irish saints in English literature.

On the Continent those countries which were in special need of asserting their nationhood were the first to adopt the idea of national hagiography. Molanus' *Indices Sanctorum Belgie* (Louvain, 1573) perhaps suggested the title of Colgan's *Acta Sanctorum Hiberniae* (Louvain, 1643) and was one of its sources, listing also those saints who were historically or traditionally associated with Ireland. In Switzerland, St. Peter Canisius was the first to make use of nationalism to preserve or revive devotion to the saints. However, when in 1589, twenty seven years after his German martyrology which listed a large number of Irish saints, mostly spurious, he proposed to the Swiss people their national saints, he referred in the first instance to "the famous abbot St. Fridolinus whose country was *Schottland* (named *Hibernia*), situated near *Engelland*".<sup>34</sup> In 1615, Rader, another Jesuit, published his *Bavaria Sancta*. In it he included saints of foreign origin who had labored in Bavaria including several Irish saints.<sup>35</sup>

The geographical grouping of saints according to the countries where they labored, died and were venerated has proven superior to their grouping according to the countries of their birth. In spite of the strenuous efforts made by Irish historians since Colgan, in spite even of the sanction given by Urban VIII and Benedict XIV—sanction summarized in the Office for the Feast of All the Saints of Ireland instituted in 1916<sup>36</sup>—none of the really or reputedly Irish saints whose cult had originated on the Continent gained real popularity in Ireland and Great Britain.

The ninth-century continental *Passio II sti. Kiliani* stated: *Columbano gaudet Italia, Gallo ditatur Alemannia, Kiliano Teutonica gaudet Francia*.<sup>37</sup> Similarly, it is to the glory of the Anglo-Saxon Church that Boniface and Suitbert are listed in the index of place-names in the *Roman Martyrology* under *Germania*. The commemoration of St. Suitbert, March 1st, does not even mention the country of his birth. Of many of the Irish saints listed in the *Roman Martyrology*, only in the latest revision have historical or traditional associations with their country been specified.

An ugly feature of the encroachment of nationalism in this field has been the controversy as to the nation or country to which a saint 'belonged'. The bathos was reached when, owing to their somewhat generous interpretation of the term *Scotia*, Hector Boecius and Thomas Dempster, the early Scottish hagiologists, were described as 'stealers of saints'. On this very point, John of Tynemouth seems to have had a prescience of danger when, expanding the introduction to Adamnan's work, he thus defined *Hibernia* in his introduction to the passage dealing with St. Columbanus:

insula in oceano sita quam Scotorum gens inhabitat, antiquitus Scotia dicta, de qua gens Scotorum Albaniam Britannie Maiori proximam, que ab eventu modo Scotia dicitur, inhabitans originem duxit et progressum habuit.

<sup>33</sup> See my paper on the place of Switzerland in the hagiographical tradition of Ireland in *Zeitschrift für Schweizer Kirchengeschichte*, XLVI (1952), 204-15.

<sup>34</sup> See also my paper on 'St. Peter Canisius and Ireland', *Irish Monthly*, LXXIV (1946),

129-35.

<sup>35</sup> See my paper in *Mediaeval Studies*, VII (1945), 21-39.

<sup>36</sup> See my paper mentioned *supra*, note 29.

<sup>37</sup> Kenney, p. 512 and my paper mentioned *supra*, note 33.



In 1516 John of Tynemouth's work was published in an English translation. Four years later, *The lyfe of Seynt Brandon* was published, likewise by Wynkyn de Worde, the only separate printing of the life of an Irish saint in pre-Reformation England. In 1526 the *Martiloge in Englysshe* which marks the transition from mediaeval to modern English hagiology appeared.<sup>39</sup> In his preface to the work, Rychard Whytford gives us the reason for his translation: he translated this—

martiloge out of latyn in to englysshe for the edificacyon of certayn religyous persones unlearned that dayly dyd rede the same martiloge in latyn not understandinge what they redde.

Eighteen years later, in the introduction to the first Litany, Cranmer said that the 'vulgar tongue' was used 'for styrring the people to more devotion'.

In the body of the *Martiloge* are found: *Furcey*, *Brigide* (in Scotlonde), *Finian* (February 17th, in scotland), *Ciaue* (March 5th, recte: Ciaran, in yrelonde), *Patrike* (in scotlande), *Lafreane* (April 18th, recte: Lasreane,<sup>40</sup> no country stated), *Brendane* (in yrelonde), *Columbane* (June 9th, in scotland), *Patryke* (August 24th, i.e. Palladius, in yrelond at nyuerne), *Querany* (September 9th, in scotland), *Columbane* (no country stated). All of these are found in the augmented *Usuardianum*.<sup>41</sup> In Whytford's *addycyons*, however, are forty two further saints associated with *yrelond*.

Concerning these *addycyons*, Whytford said that they were derived from 'the sanctiloge / legendaurea / catalogo sanctorum [i.e. Petrus de Natalibus] / the cronycles of Antonine / and of saynt Vincent / and other dyvers auctours'. The editors of the Henry Bradshaw Society edition of the *Martiloge* suggested that the *sanctiloge* referred to by Whytford as his first additional source was 'probably not the *Sanctilogium Britannicum* [!] of John of Tinmouth [not published as yet at that time] . . . but the *Sanctilogium Salvatoris* of which a copy . . . had been presented to Syon Monastery by the Duchess of Clarence'.<sup>42</sup> This gift is recorded in the Catalogue of the Library of Syon Monastery where and for which the *Martiloge* was written, but the Catalogue, published in 1899 by Bateson, also lists two copies of John of Tynemouth's work as well as seven of the *Legenda aurea*. There is no Irish saint in John of Tynemouth's work that is not also recorded in the *addycyons* of the *Martiloge* and we have seen that for several of these saints John is the only known source.

However, some thirty additional Irish saints listed in the *Martiloge* are not found in John's work. The study of the sources of Whytford's *addycyons* would be the first chapter in a study of modern English interest in Irish saints. Whytford claimed that he made these *addycyons* for the sake of edification. However, the numerous misspellings of the names of Irish saints show that they were not familiar to him. Moreover, the entries for these additional Irish saints are particularly bare. Indeed, nothing is known of many of these saints except the name. This tendency toward external completeness of enumeration was followed up in Canisius' martyrology which lists a host of spurious Irish saints.

Owing to historical conditions, the *Martiloge* remained unknown to later English students of Irish saints, but because it gathers up the mediaeval sources<sup>43</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Henry Bradshaw Society III (1893).

<sup>40</sup> Similarly in the entries for Senan, March 3rd and Sinchel, March 26th, f is read for s.

<sup>41</sup> In the thirteenth-century martyrology at Christ Church, Canterbury, ed. Henry Bradshaw Society III, p. 287 f., we have Fursey, Brigid in hibernia, Patrick in scocia, Modwenna in scocia, Patricius August 24th in ybernia . . . ad monasterium gleslingense, Queranus September 9th in scocia, Camichus recte: Cainichus in scocia and Ronanus

in ybernia . . . brachium cantuarium delatum; cf. Grosjean's article, *supra*, note 20. Queranus and Cainichus are Usuardian; cf. my paper on Irish influences in the early calendars of St. Gall in *Zeitschrift für Schweizer Kirchengeschichte*, 1954.

<sup>42</sup> Henry Bradshaw Society III, pp. xii and 206.

<sup>43</sup> It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss the vernacular versions of the *Visio Fursaei* for example in Robert de Gretham's

and converts them into a scholastic rather than a devotional work, it marks a milestone in the tradition of English interest in Irish saints.

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## V. *Le Prologus in Eptatheucon* de Thierry de Chartres.

DEPUIS que Clerval a attiré l'attention des chercheurs sur l'*Heptateucon* de Thierry de Chartres, de nombreuses études ont été consacrées à cet important témoin de la culture médiévale.<sup>2</sup> Il n'y a pas lieu évidemment de redire ici ce que d'autres ont fort bien dit.<sup>3</sup> Désormais, ce que peuvent souhaiter surtout les historiens du moyen âge c'est moins de voir paraître de nouvelles études sur l'oeuvre de Thierry que de pouvoir aborder cette oeuvre elle-même dans une édition fidèle et intégrale. Une telle édition, qui eût pu paraître superflue à quelques uns au temps où la Bibliothèque municipale de Chartres conservait encore les deux gros volumes légués par Maître Thierry au Chapitre, s'impose aujourd'hui avec une particulière instance. Il est des choses dont nous ne mesurons la valeur qu'après les avoir perdues ou même simplement lorsque nous avons failli les perdre. L'*Heptateucon* est de ce nombre. Les deux manuscrits 497 et 498 de Chartres qui en contenaient le texte ont été détruits par l'incendie de la Bibliothèque le 26 mai 1944. La fameuse *Bibliotheca septem liberalium artium*, véritable somme de l'enseignement chartrain en la première moitié du douzième siècle, serait donc à tout jamais perdue sans la prévoyance de deux Instituts dont le mérite doit être hautement reconnu.

Avant le sinistre, le *Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies* de Toronto (Canada) et l'Abbaye du Mont César à Louvain (Belgique) avaient pu fixer sur microfilms le texte des manuscrits 497 et 498. Grâce à ces heureuses initiatives, l'*Heptateucon* nous a donc été conservé. Pour combien de temps? Sans chercher à mettre en doute la longévité des documents photographiés, on peut légitimement se demander s'ils résisteront aux attaques du temps aussi bien que le parchemin. Or, la génération présente a le devoir impérieux de transmettre aux générations futures un recueil de textes si important pour l'histoire des idées. Et nous ne pensons pas qu'une analyse, même détaillée, puisse remplacer une édition intégrale. Que de témoins précieux de la pensée antique auraient à

*Miroir*, 1250, or in the *Handlyng Synne* of Robert Mannyng of Brunne, 1303; the *Navigatio Brendani* in the Anglo-Norman version and Benoit's *Vie de saint Brendan*: cf. my paper mentioned *supra*, note 20; and the *Purgatorium Patricii* in its five Anglo-Norman adaptations, in the Auchinlech manuscript at Advocates' Library, Edinburgh, and the late fifteenth-century *Owayne Myles*, ed. E. Köbling, *Englische Studien*, I (1877), 57-121, or William Staunton, 1409. See R. Kapp, *Heilige und Legenden* (Halle, 1934).

<sup>2</sup> Contentons-nous de signaler les études suivantes: Michel Chasles, *Catalogue des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque de la Ville de Chartres* (Chartres, 1840), pp. 29-36 (les manuscrits 497 et 498 étaient cotés 141 et 142 dans le catalogue de 1840); *Catalogue général des manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques de France-Départements XI* (Paris, 1890), pp. 211-4; A. Clerval, *L'enseignement des arts libéraux à Chartres et à Paris dans la première moitié du XII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, d'après l'*Heptateucon* de Thierry de Chartres, *Memoire présenté au Congrès scientifique international des Catholiques*

tenu à Paris en 1888 II, 276-96; A. Clerval, *Les écoles de Chartres au moyen âge* (Paris, 1895), pp. 220-48; Bubnov, *Gerberty . . . Opera mathematica* (Berlin, 1899), pp. xxvi-xxviii; M. Manitius, *Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters III* (Munich, 1931), p. 200; C. Haskins, *Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science* (Cambridge, Mass., 1924).

<sup>3</sup> La liste établie par Clerval dans *Les écoles de Chartres* aurait cependant besoin d'être revue. A titre d'exemple nous signalons ici deux retouches.

Haskins fait à propos du Ms. Chartres 498 la remarque suivante: f. 141-141v, which was once considered a fragment of Adelard's version of Hyppsikles is identified by Bubnov (pp. xxvi f.) as a part of the geometry of the pseudo-Boethius (*Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science*, p. 91, n. 52).

Par ailleurs, le P. Isaac signale qu'aux folios 33v-37r du Ms. Chartres 498 se trouve le *Peri hermeneias* d'Apulée indiqué par Clerval comme anonyme. Cf. *Le "Peri hermeneias"* en occident de Boèce à saint Thomas, *Bibliothèque thomiste*, XXIX (1953), 54, n. 2.

tout jamais disparu si les scribes s'étaient contenté d'en rédiger des sommaires! Il est vrai que les textes rassemblés dans l'*Heptateuchon* nous sont déjà familiers: Donat, Priscien, Boèce et les autres peuvent être lus dans des éditions bien supérieures à ce que nous trouvons chez Thierry. Soit! Il n'en demeure pas moins d'une souveraine importance pour l'historien de la philosophie, par exemple, de pouvoir se référer à la version d'Aristote qu'utilisaient les maîtres chartrains.<sup>3</sup> Mais une édition intégrale de ces deux manuscrits qui ne totalisent pas moins de 585 folios écrits sur deux colonnes de 47 lignes chacune est une oeuvre considérable qu'il est plus facile évidemment de souhaiter et d'encourager que de réaliser.<sup>4</sup> Pour une aussi lourde tâche la collaboration de plusieurs érudits serait bien précieuse, pour ne pas dire tout à fait indispensable.

Quoi qu'il en soit, il n'est ni nécessaire ni utile d'attendre que ce travail soit achevé pour publier le court prologue placé par Thierry au début de son anthologie. Ce prologue,—à notre connaissance du moins,—n'a jusqu'ici jamais été publié.<sup>5</sup> Nous en donnons le texte ci-après en y joignant la brève introduction à la *secunda editio Donati*. Ces quelques lignes de Maître Thierry nous font connaître l'esprit qui animait les écolâtres chartrains: esprit de fidélité aux anciens et à la tradition des sept Arts Libéraux représentée par Varron, Plinie l'Ancien et Martianus Capella.<sup>6</sup> C'est au *De Nuptiis* de ce dernier que le prologue fait évidemment les plus larges emprunts.

Après un rapide préambule, l'auteur s'attarde à nous décrire la grammaire qui, en sa qualité de premier des sept Arts, éclipsé un peu trop ses compagnes. La grammaire nous apparaît comme une noble dame de visage et de mise austère. Elle ouvre le cortège des Arts Libéraux; elle préside leur assemblée. Elle enseigne aux enfants à bien écrire et à bien parler. Elle a le secret de traduire une langue dans une autre. Elle a un droit exclusif de regard sur tous les auteurs qu'elle juge et expose avec autorité. Elle n'argumente pas, elle ne cherche pas à démontrer ses règles: aux yeux de ses élèves son ancienneté vénérable doit tenir lieu de preuves.<sup>7</sup>

Dans son introduction à la *secunda editio Donati*, Thierry nous explique que l'enseignement de la grammaire se fait en deux étapes. La première étape est celle de l'enseignement élémentaire qui procède par questions et réponses. Cet enseignement dialogué était appelé par les Grecs *Dialecticisimus*. La seconde étape, celle de l'enseignement supérieur, consiste pour le maître, à

<sup>3</sup> Un récent article de M. Lorenzo Minio Paluello illustre fort à propos notre thèse. Après avoir confronté minutieusement le texte de l'*Heptateuchon* et celui de la version courante d'Aristote, l'auteur conclut: Risulterebbe quindi, che sia per i Primi Analitici che per gli Elenchi Sofistici, l'*Epitaeuchon* presenta il testo più vicino all'originale boeziano, mentre il manoscritto Ambrosiano antico (Milano, Bibl. Ambros. I, 195 Inf.) presenta un testo in parte rimaneggiato. Ma, mentre nel caso dei Primi Analitici il testo rimaneggiato è diventato il testo comune, nel caso degli Elenchi il testo comune è diventato quello originale rappresentato dall'*Epitaeuchon*. 'Note sull'Aristotele latino medievale: VIII: I Primi Analitici; IX: Gli Elenchi Sofistici', *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-scolastica*, XLVI (1954), 225.

<sup>4</sup> Le manuscrit 497 comprend 338 folios numérotés 1 à 349; les folios 179 et 210-9 manquent. Le manuscrit 498 comprend 247 folios numérotés 1 à 246; mais il y a un folio 166bis.

<sup>5</sup> Clerval a donné une traduction partielle du prologue dans *Les écoles de Chartres*, p. p. 221 et p. 224 (#1). Le texte traduit à la page 224 fait immédiatement suite au texte traduit à la page 221. A la page 224

(#2) du même ouvrage l'introduction à la *secunda editio Donati* a été partiellement traduite. Enfin, dans 'L'enseignement des arts libéraux...', on peut glaner aussi quelques citations du prologue aux pages suivantes: 278, 283, 284 (deux citations).

<sup>6</sup> En faisant ainsi profession de fidélité aux anciens, Thierry marchait dans le sillage tracé par son aîné, Bernard de Chartres, dont on connaît le mot célèbre: Dicebat Bernardus Carnotensis nos esse quasi nanos gigantium humeris insidentes, ut possimus plura eis et remotiora videre, non utique proprii visus acuminis aut eminentia corporis, sed quia in altum subvehimur et extollimur magnitudine gigante. Jean de Salisbury, *Metalogicon* III, 4; éd. Webb, p. 136.

<sup>7</sup> Rien ne saurait mieux illustrer cette description de la grammaire qu'une sculpture du Portail Royal de Chartres. Aux cordons de voussures de la Baie de droite on peut contempler cette matrone à la mise austère dont parle Thierry: assise et la tête noblement voilée, elle tient d'une main un livre ouvert et, de l'autre, un faisceau de verges. A ses pieds sont deux enfants dont l'un, presque dévêtu, s'agenouille et semble s'approprier à recevoir un châtiment.

énoncer les conclusions auxquelles, après une longue recherche, il a pu aboutir. Les Grecs ont nommé cette deuxième méthode *Analecticismus*. Donat, nous dit Thierry, a eu le mérite de distinguer ces deux méthodes et d'employer la première dans sa *prima editio*, réservant la seconde pour sa *secunda editio*. Entendons que Thierry se conforma à cette façon de faire.

La définition de la philosophie qui nous est proposée dans le prologue est à peu de chose près celle que nous trouvons chez Boèce: *Phylosophya autem est amor sapientie. Sapientia uero est integra comprehensio ueritatis eorum que sunt*.<sup>8</sup> Il y a lieu toutefois de noter la cohésion qui, aux yeux du chancelier chartrain, existe entre les différents Arts: "nous avons marié, dit-il, le trivium au quadrivium pour l'accroissement de la noble race des philosophes." Le quadrivium, science des choses, éclaire l'intelligence; le trivium, science de mots, doit fournir à la pensée une expression élégante, rationnelle et ornée. Le philosophe complet est celui qui a cultivé les deux ordres de disciplines, en d'autres termes, celui qui a parcouru successivement les Arts du trivium et ceux du quadrivium. Il est donc évident, conclut Thierry, que l'*Heptateuchon*, c'est-à-dire la Bibliothèque des sept Arts Libéraux est l'instrument indispensable de toute la philosophie: *manifestum est eptatheucon totius phylosophye unicum ac singulare esse instrumentum*.<sup>9</sup>

Que Thierry ait porté sur son oeuvre un tel jugement ne doit évidemment pas nous surprendre. Qu'il ait éprouvé le besoin de le formuler dans une préface, c'est là également une de ces traditions dont les auteurs modernes ne nous ont pas déshabitués. Mais les contemporains de Thierry ont jugé comme lui: à leurs yeux aussi l'*Heptateuchon* fut une oeuvre considérable et le plus beau titre de gloire de son auteur. Telle est du moins l'impression que nous laisse la lecture de Jean de Salisbury: en décrétant à Maître Thierry le titre d'*Artium studiosissimus investigator*, l'auteur du *Metalogicon* fait une allusion assez claire à la rédaction de l'*Heptateuchon*.<sup>10</sup> Mais nous pouvons désormais invoquer un autre témoignage. Monsieur Vernet a eu la bonne fortune de retrouver une épitaphe de Thierry sur la feuille de garde d'un manuscrit ayant appartenu à Clairvaux, Ms. Troyes 923.<sup>11</sup> Cette longue épitaphe de vingt-neuf distiques élégiaques rassemble avec assez d'élégance une bonne collection de thèmes spécifiquement chartrains; elle dénote chez le rédacteur une réelle familiarité avec la pensée de Thierry telle qu'elle nous est connue par le *De sex dierum operibus*.

Mais, pour nous contenir dans les limites qu'impose le cadre de cette étude, nous nous contenterons de faire deux citations. La première nous révélera que le grand mérite de Thierry fut d'avoir rendu le trivium et le quadrivium accessibles à tous:

Quadruium triuiumque simul scrutando labore  
Peruigili cunctis fecit utrunque patens (vv. 21-22)

Une deuxième citation nous permettra peut-être d'apporter un argument nouveau en faveur d'une hypothèse qui, bien qu'assez communément reçue, n'aurait néanmoins jusqu'ici un peu de preuves. Parlant des *Topica*, des *Analytica* et des *Sophistici Elenchi* d'Aristote, Jean de Salisbury nous apprend qu'après être restés longtemps dans l'oubli, ces traités ont été remis en honneur

<sup>8</sup> Est enim sapientia earum rerum quae vere sunt cognitio et integra comprehensio. Boèce, *De Arithmetica* I, 1; PL 63, 1081C.

<sup>9</sup> Cette cohésion entre le trivium et le quadrivium est encore une idée chère aux Chartreux; ils la défendent contre Cornificius. Et Jean de Salisbury a consacré le premier chapitre de son *Metalogicon* I à célébrer la *dulcis et fructuosa coniunctio rationis et verbi*.

<sup>10</sup> *Metalogicon* I, 5; éd. Webb, p. 16.

<sup>11</sup> M. Vernet a annoncé sa découverte dans le *Bulletin de la Société Nationale des Antiquaires de France* (1950 - 51), 38. L'épitaphe sera publiée par M. Vernet dans le *Recueil de travaux offert à M. C. Brunel* à paraître prochainement.

Signalons au passage que le manuscrit qui contient l'épitaphe de Thierry est une édition abrégée du Commentaire de S. Jérôme sur Isaïe dont l'auteur serait Arnould de Bonneval.

à son époque *diligentis ingenii pulsante studio*<sup>12</sup> Il était assez naturel de voir en Thierry ce *diligens ingenium* puisque son *Heptateuchon* contient les trois traités en question. Notre épitaphe, toutefois, confirme cette interprétation en nous affirmant que Thierry fut le premier en France à faire connaître les *Analytica* et les *Sophistici Elenchi*:

Dissoluens Logice nodos penetrauit ad illa  
Que non adtigerant tempora nostra prius:  
Primus Analeticos primusque resoluit Helencos  
E Gallis grecas accumulauit opes (vv. 25-28)

Ainsi, l'épitaphe découverte par Monsieur Vernet souligne avec une évidence nouvelle l'importance de l'oeuvre accomplie par le chancelier chartrain en la première moitié du douzième siècle. Il n'en demeure pas moins nécessaire, si nous voulons comprendre la signification de cette oeuvre, d'entendre l'auteur lui-même, car nul, mieux que lui, n'est en mesure de nous la révéler. Il convenait donc de donner la parole à Thierry en rendant accessible le prologue de l'*Heptateuchon*. Nous ne saurions dire assez combien nous sommes reconnaissant au *Pontifical Institute* de Toronto et tout particulièrement à Monsieur Stapleton, son dévoué Bibliothécaire, de nous avoir permis de le faire.

\* \* \*

Ms. Chartres 497

(fol. 2<sup>va</sup>) INCIPIT PROLOGUS THEODERICI IN EPTATHEUCON. (V)olumen VIIitem artium liberalium, quod greci eptatheucon uocant, marcus quidem uarro primus apud latinos disposuit, post quem plinius, deinde marcianus. Sed illi sua. Nos autem non nostra sed precipuorum super his artibus inuenta doctorum quasi in unum corpus uoluminis apta modulatione coaptauimus et triuium quadruuio ad generose nationis phylosophorum propaginem quasi maritali federe copulauimus. Siquidem phylologiam mercurio, tota preeuntis hymenei uirtute magnoque apollinis et musarum consensu, epithalamica sollempnitate coniunctam esse tam grai quam romulei uates contestantur, artibus his septem, quasi sine eis res agi non possit, interuenientibus. Nec immerito. Nam, cum sint duo precipua phylosophandi instrumenta, intellectus eiusque interpretatio, intellectum autem quadruuio illuminet, eius uero interpretationem elegantem, rationabilem, ornatam triuium subministret, manifestum est eptatheucon totius phylosophye unicum ac singulare esse instrumentum. Phylosophya autem est amor sapientie; sapientia uero est integra comprehensio ueritatis eorum que sunt, quam nullus uel parum adipiscitur nisi amauerit. Nullus igitur sapiens nisi phylosophus.

In hac autem septem artium liberalium synodo ad cultum humanitatis conducta prima omnium grammatica procedit in medium, matrona uultuque habituque seuero. Pueros conuocat, rationes recte scribendi recteque loquendi prescribit, ydiomata linguarum decenter transmittit, expositionem omnium auctorum sibi debitam profitetur; quicquid dicit<sup>13</sup> auctoritati eius committitur. Canities enim matrone ueneranda apud discipulos pro argumentatione.

Nam ueterum perhibent hanc copula sacra deorum  
Niligeno patre progenitam et nilotide matre  
Urbe in memphytica quando regnabat osyris.  
Tempore post longo fuit abdita; deinde repertam  
Fouit atlantiades graiasque euexit in urbes;  
Tandem ad romuleos uenit grandeuia nepotes.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> *Metalogicon* III, 5; éd. Webb, p. 140, Cf. à ce sujet Clerval, 'L'enseignement des arts libéraux . . .', 286-9.

<sup>13</sup> *dicit*: sic legitur in manuscripto, licet Clerval hoc verbum correxerit in *dicitur*. Cf.

'L'enseignement des arts libéraux . . .', 284.

<sup>14</sup> Similiter depingebat *grammaticam* Martianus Capella in suo libro *De Nuptiis philologiae et Mercurii*, éd. Eyssenhardt (Lipsiae, 1866), p. 54, ll. 25-34.

(fol. 2<sup>ra</sup>) ..... constantii, filiorum constantini maximi.<sup>15</sup> Docuit autem artem mira breuitate, compendioso artificio, subtilissimo doctrine scemate. Siquidem ad initiandum pueros primam editionem quasi legem interrogandi in disciplinam atque respondendi in doctrinam promulgauit ita ut capitibus summam artis comprehendentibus et paucitate exemplorum ad uniuersale inducentium artis integritatem colligeret et quasi lac in ore puerorum poneret, quod alii multiplici genere doctrine ac pene infinito usque in fastidium lectorum proluxauerunt et multis erroribus atque difficultatibus implicuerunt. Explicit prologus.

\* \* \*

(fol. 8<sup>va</sup>) (H)ec est secunda editio donati grammatici urbis rome, in qua prouectis loquens et idcirco ab elementis artis incipiens, doctrinam eius ad calcem usque protraxit. Quoniam quidem de uoce et litteris, de sillabis ac pedibus, de tonis siue accentibus atque posituris fundamentum doctrine constituens, deinde in hoc fundamento disciplinam partium orationis superedificans, tandem artificioso fine quem barbarismum appellauit artem conclusit ut articularium compositiones que ex accidentibus littere uel sillabe uel dictioni uel orationi comprehendere regulariter non poterant, scilicet barbarismi, soloecismi, allotete siue tropi ceteraque huiusmodi ex hoc fine certissime perciperentur. Igitur, cum sint duo modi quibus docetur precipui, unus quidem per sermonem qui rudes ad interrogandum magistros assuefacit, quem modum greci dialecticismum uocant, alter uero per affirmationem, in quo post diutinam inquisitionem (fol. 8<sup>va</sup>) tenenda ponuntur, quem modum idem greci analecticisum dicunt, Donatus, doctor egregius, in prima quidem editione priore, in hac uero secunda posteriore modo est usus.

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<sup>15</sup> Initio hujus columnae aliqua verba desunt quae probabilius litteris diversi coloris componenda essent. Sensus hujus

loci nobis videtur fuisse: (Donatus floruit tempore Constantini et) constantii filiorum etc.

# Report of a Recent Thesis Defended at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies

*Saint Peter Damiani and His Canonical Sources: A Preliminary Study  
in the Antecedents of the Gregorian Reform.* (History Section).  
J. Joseph Ryan, S.T.L., H.E.L.

THERE is still wanting a satisfactory general study of the complex movement of the Gregorian, or Hildebrandine, reform, which was an integral part of the recovery of Western Europe after the disorders of the tenth century were finally brought under control. Nor is there a modern critical biography of any of the chief figures active in the reform. Before either task may be undertaken with a reasonable prospect of success, many questions still *sub lite* must be settled and some important fields of investigation require to be more carefully explored. The present study is concerned with one of the key figures of this movement in its early years, St. Peter Damiani (1007-1072), about whose person and work there has been a considerable divergence of opinion but whose extensive writings by general consent constitute a source of the first importance for our knowledge, not only of the reformer himself, but also of the opening phases of the movement of reform. It is the limited problem of the canonical sources drawn upon in these writings that is here investigated in an effort to shed additional light on their author and on the canonical aspects of the early reform.

## I. THE PROBLEM

This literary problem was suggested by a reading of the Damiani corpus (Migne, *Patrologia latina*, vols. 144-145), which revealed the frequency of canonical citations and the author's preoccupation and familiarity with canonical tradition. Despite Damiani's reputation as *vir in sacra scriptura et canonibus versatissimus* (L. von Heinemann) and his recognition as a forerunner of Gratian in the Camaldolese tradition (A. Giabbani and A. Stickler), the fact is that the canonical aspect of his work has attracted very limited attention in recent scholarship. This may be explained in part at least by the widely current distinction between a pre-eminently canonical "Lorraine program" and an ascetico-mystical "Italian program" for reform, whose chief representative Cardinal Damiani is commonly taken to have been.

Abbot Costantino Gaetani, the only editor of the *Opera omnia* (tom. I-IV, Rome, 1606-1640), undertook to identify the explicit canonical references and some *Scholia* of canonical interest appear in the edition. The modern editors of individual tracts and some recent studies have somewhat improved our knowledge of Damiani's sources, especially in the *Liber gratissimus*. But in addition to further work which could profitably be done here towards an eventual critical edition of the complete works, what of the problem of the immediate provenance of the texts, which, when considered at all, has received only casual consideration? From the point of view of the historian, the question of the collections from which the canonical material came (*fontes formales*) presented itself as a promising approach to a fuller understanding of Damiani's intellectual formation, methods of work and his place in the reform. It also held out the hope of providing some new evidence for the history of the canonical collections in use in the pre-Gregorian period, a subject of considerable current interest in the canonical background of the reform and in the history of Canon law. In this respect, as prior of Fonte Avellana and cardinal-bishop of Ostia, Damiani is an

admirably qualified witness. The bulk of his writing was done between the Council of Sutri (1046) and the last years of Alexander II (1061-1073), the immediate predecessor of Gregory VII. Throughout this time he was a leading figure among the Italian reformers and their principal literary representative. He was both widely travelled and widely read, with an abiding interest in books. Furthermore, the fact that the greater part of his letters and tracts has been dated makes possible a precision in dating the evidence for the use of a given collection, which is seldom attainable on the evidence of the manuscripts alone.

## II. THE INVESTIGATION

In the light of these considerations the individual works were examined in the order of their date of composition (established by F. Neukirch) and the texts singled out and enumerated as they occur in each work. These texts include the explicit citations of papal decretals and conciliar canons, the frequent references to *canonica auctoritas*, *auctoritas canonum* and the like, as well as such dependences on canonical texts as it was possible to recognize. Within the limits imposed by the amount unpublished and by the defective condition of much that has been published of the pertinent material, the source for each text was identified and an attempt made to establish the particular collection from which it was taken on the basis, for the most part, of internal criteria. The selected texts are not all reproduced in whole but quotations are identified by their *incipit* and *explicit* to facilitate the use of the Migne printing in which the punctuation is frequently faulty. References to contemporary councils were included for completeness. These texts, numbering just under three hundred with some repetitions, with the brief commentaries on their provenance, constitute one section of the study (Part Two: *Texts and Sources*).

## III. SUMMATION

Damiani made regular use of two major canonical collections: the old Roman *Dionysiana* in one of its later augmented forms and the systematic *Decretum* of Burchard of Worms (d. 1025). These were his customary tools and, on the basis of his familiarity with them, notable items in his intellectual formation. The other collections that supplied canonical texts may be considered his supplementary instruments. There is no evidence for his use of the canonical collections compiled in Italy in the tenth and eleventh centuries. The number of texts from the collection of Pseudo-Isidore is small, in many instances being excerpts already in circulation, which makes a direct use of this collection doubtful. Damiani is generally accurate in reproducing his *auctoritas* and his errors in citation are attributable for the most part to his exemplar. In his criticism of texts he reveals a clearly conceived doctrine of the sources of law (*de fontibus iuris*) substantially the same as that arrived at by the Gregorian collectors. Of particular interest is his use of the broad principle of non-contradiction with papal decrees as a test of the validity of particular laws rather than the more rigid rule of some of his contemporaries that would require positive papal approval. His methods of conciliating the apparent contradictions in admittedly authentic texts merit comparison with the rules of interpretation formulated by the theorists of the next generation.

Damiani's inspiration as a reformer appears to have been much less personal than it has sometime taken to have been. His place in the line of the earlier episcopal reformers, rather than in the strictly monastic tradition, is consistent with his familiarity in common with them with the broad concerns of the Church enshrined in the canonical monuments. For Damiani a return to the canons was an integral and fundamental part of the reform movement, which,



as he exemplified it, included the work of preacher and moralist in the internal forum of conscience and also the full sanction of law for clergy and laity alike to be applied with vigor and prudence beginning with the highest ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Roman see in the external forum of canonical procedure. As a canonist Damiani does not suffer by comparison with any of the reformers of his generation and to neglect this side of the man is to risk obscuring the canonical aspects of the Italian origins of the reform.

With the reservations required by evidence provided by a single witness, the chief points of interest with respect to the collections in use in Italy during these critical years may be summarized as follows. The *Decretum* of Burchard was certainly in use in Italy shortly before 1050. From the use made of it by the leading writer of the period it is not possible to establish an unfavorable reaction to Burchard's collection in the peninsula at this time. Of the twenty books of the *Decretum*, only five (*Lib.* X, XII, XIV, XVI, XX) are not represented by any excerpt. There are good grounds to believe that the form of the Dionysian collections used by Damiani was that of the *Hadriana aucta* (the *Collectio additionum Dionysii* of the Ballerini), which had also served Atto of Vercelli (d. 961). It thus appears that the old Roman collection had not lost its pride of place and that this particular augmented form of Italian origin was still in use. The *Vita S. Gregorii Magni* of John the Deacon was an important vehicle of transmission for the letters of Pope Gregory I and offered the advantage of a systematic arrangement of these influential documents. The texts assembled by Auxilius in his defense of the ordinations of Pope Formosus (891-896) were known to both sides of the controversy on the validity of the sacramental ministrations of simonists. (See *Mediaeval Studies* XIII [1951], 218 ff.) In view of the paucity of material from Pseudo-Isidore it is not possible to say that this collection was the favorite collection of the early reformers without exception. There is no evidence that Damiani knew the *Collection in 74 Titles* (*Diversorum sententiae patrum*).

The canonical resources revealed in Damiani's writings invite comparison with those of the leading writer among the Lorraine reformers, Cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida, as revealed in his *Libri III adversus simoniacos* and in the other writings attributed to him in recent years. Especially suggestive is the almost completely reversed positions with regard to the use of Pseudo-Isidore and Burchard. A full investigation of these differences and their implications was beyond the scope of the present study, but its findings do suggest that the early reform is not to be conceived as a single canonical movement under the exclusive leadership or inspiration of any individual or particular group and that the existence of different canonical currents within the reform movement merits further consideration.

# The Proverbs of Serlo of Wilton

A. C. FRIEND

SERLO OF WILTON made his collection of Proverbs between the years 1150 and 1170. He was an Englishman born about the year 1110.<sup>1</sup> Having taken an Arts degree at the University of Paris, he became a teacher of rhetoric.<sup>2</sup> He joined the party of Queen Matilda in the civil war in England, as we learn from an Elegy which he wrote on the death of the great leader, Robert of Gloucester, in 1147.<sup>3</sup> In this poem we can see Serlo's personal admiration for Robert as a leader in battle and as a patron of literature, the same sentiment which we find in William of Malmesbury in the dedication of his work, *De Gestis regum anglorum*.<sup>4</sup>

After the death of Robert and the defeat of Matilda, Serlo spent the next years in exile at Antibes on the Mediterranean, a town which he describes for us as filled with Englishmen, so that the place seemed to him almost like another England.<sup>5</sup> Certainly the middle of the twelfth century was a time of migration.

Shortly after the year 1150, Serlo was teaching at the University of Paris.<sup>6</sup> About the year 1167 King Henry II called him to take part in the new *studium generale* at Oxford.<sup>7</sup> Not long after this he left the schools, and we may assume that he gave up his interest in the arts curriculum. He first joined the Cluniac order at La Charité-sur-Loire, and later became a Cistercian, for his name appears as Abbot of the House of L'Aumône in 1171 and again in 1173.<sup>8</sup> He died in the year 1181, according to the Annals of Waverley.<sup>9</sup>

One of the contributions which Serlo left to the learned world is his collection of proverbs which he used, we may assume, in his Arts course. We know how important proverbs were to medieval rhetoric. From the twelfth century, the *ars dictamina* emphasized the value of a proverb in the opening or conclusion of a composition.<sup>10</sup>

Many of the Latin proverbs came down to Serlo from the classics and were familiar to him and probably to his students. Such proverbs, of which we find a good many in his collection, he revised into leonine Latin verse, a rhyming six syllable line. Often he added a parallel in the vernacular, either Anglo-Norman or English.

<sup>1</sup> See J. De Ghellinck, *L'Essor de la littérature latine au XII<sup>e</sup> siècle* II (Brussels, Paris, 1946), pp. 276-7; M. Manitius, *Geschichte der Literatur des Mittelalters* III, (Munich, 1931), pp. 905-10, and cf. F. J. E. Raby, *The Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature* I, (Cambridge, 1941), p. 288. H. Böhmer, 'Der sogenannte Serlo von Bayeux', *Neues Archiv*, XXII (1897), 701-38, gives a good review of the early bibliographers. See my article in the *Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi*, XXIV (1954), 85-110.

<sup>2</sup> Du Boulay, *Historia Universitatis Parisiensis* II, (Paris, 1665), pp. 774-5: Serlo natione Anglus grammaticis Professor . . .

<sup>3</sup> Paris, *Ms. lat.* 6765, fol. 58, col. 2, printed by B. Hauréau, *Notices et Extraits de Quelques Mss* I (Paris, 1890), pp. 309-10.

<sup>4</sup> Ed. William Stubbs, *Historia Novella* II (Rolls Series 90, London, 1889), pp. 356 and cf. p. 519.

<sup>5</sup> See Serlo's poem beginning *Ut clarus clarum* in Paris, *Ms. lat.* 6765, fol. 62 and in *Ms. lat.* 3718, fol. 84v, col. 2, printed by E. Faral, *Romania*, XLVI (1920), 267-8. The

poem appears also in Vatican *Cod. Reg.* 344, fol. 42, col. 2. Brial has pointed out that Serlo's poem deals with the town of Antibes: *Histoire littéraire de la France* XV (Paris, 1820), p. xi.

<sup>6</sup> Serlo's poem addressed to King Louis VII indicates that he was teaching in Paris: Paris *Ms. lat.* 6765, fol. 58v and *Ms. lat.* 3718, fol. 84v, printed by Faral, *Romania*, XLVI (1920), 265-6; Vat. *Reg.* 344, fol. 42, printed by Hauréau, *Notices et Extraits de l'Institut* XXIX, Partie 2 (1880), 339-40. The poem is cited in G. Paré, A. Brunet, P. Tremblay, *La Renaissance du XII<sup>e</sup> siècle: Les écoles et l'enseignement* (Paris-Ottawa, 1933), p. 64 and cf. pp. 76-7.

<sup>7</sup> Marcel Schwob, *La légende de Serlon de Wilton* (Paris, 1899), pp. 8-16, based on Troyes, *Ms.* 946, fol. 166.

<sup>8</sup> See J. De Ghellinck, *op. cit.*, II, p. 277, and *Gallia Christiana* VIII (Paris, 1744), col. 1398.

<sup>9</sup> H. R. Luard, *Annales Monastici* II (Rolls Series 36, London, 1865), p. 242.

<sup>10</sup> B. J. Whiting, *Chaucer's Use of Proverbs* (Cambridge, Mass., 1934), esp. pp. 17-20.

Many of the proverbs, on the other hand, do not appear in the classical writers, but are found in the later Latin literature of the Church, where they are used to teach a moral lesson, like the proverbs of Othlo, which I have indicated in the notes.

Many are popular proverbs of which the source is more difficult to trace. Some of these clearly belong to an agricultural community such as my Proverb Number 77: "Who fears the sparrow does not fear the hawk." This probably indicates a farmer who fears the sparrow, which may destroy his grain, but who need not fear the hawk, which may destroy the sparrow.

It is also possible that Serlo used some of the vernacular proverbs to teach his students Latin verse. This is probable, since manuscripts record more than one Latin translation of the same proverb. Moreover, while some of these Latin verses are clear and clever, representing the work of a master of rhetoric, others are distorted and complex, suggesting the work of a student.

There was a second step in the development of the texts used in school to teach grammar: in the course of time, the Anglo-Norman proverbs were translated into English and were included in larger collections arranged in alphabetical order according to the initial letter or according to the key word of the proverb. An outstanding example is now in John Rylands Library in Manchester, *Ms. 394*, dating from the late fourteenth century, about the time of Chaucer. The manuscript contains 27 Serlonic proverbs in English, a close translation of the Anglo-Norman, together with the usual Serlonic Latin verses. A later copy of this text, now at Oxford, *Douce Ms. 52*, shows us that Serlo's proverbs were still in use as late as the fifteenth century.

Serlo's work represents the earliest collection of Anglo-Norman proverbs, for it precedes by about twenty years the famous French *Proverbes au vilain*, edited by Adolf Tobler (Leipzig, 1895), in which we see 40 of the proverbs from Serlo's collection. Moreover, in the thirteenth century compilation, the *Proverbia rusticorum*, we find an even greater number: 42 proverbs can be traced back directly to Serlo, as indicated in my notes.

In Middle English literature, it is also possible to follow the influence of Serlo's work. *The Owl and the Nightingale*, a poem which reflects so much of popular lore, contains 3 proverbs which appear in Serlo's collection. His work is the earliest written source for 11 verses in Hending, and at least 16 proverbs in Chaucer, as indicated in my notes.

#### MANUSCRIPTS

The manuscript used as the base for the following collection is Oxford, *Digby 53*, which is the oldest surviving text. It dates from the late twelfth century and was written in England at the Augustinian House of Bridlington.<sup>11</sup> The manuscript contains 62 proverbs, of which 60 are Anglo-Norman and 2 are English.<sup>12</sup>

Another manuscript dating from the twelfth century is Paris, *Ms. lat. 6765*. This furnishes us with additional Latin proverbs, my numbers 62-85 inclusive. Additional proverbs, numbers 86-88, come from Cambridge, Caius College *Ms. 136*, a Latin manuscript closely related to Paris. Proverbs 89-96, from *Ms. Royal XIII A IV*, represent what are perhaps later additions to Serlo's work. The Royal manuscript is, however, dependable, for in most other proverbs in the collection, it follows closely my basic text, *Digby 53*, and therefore these additional proverbs are of value.

Proverbs 97-105 appear in only one manuscript, Dublin, Trinity College, *Ms.*

<sup>11</sup> See my list of manuscripts.

<sup>12</sup> Most of the Anglo-Norman proverbs and some of the Latin verses have been printed by Paul Meyer from *Digby 53* in

*Documents Mss. de l'ancienne littérature de la France conservés dans les bibl. de la Grande-Bretagne* (Paris, 1871), Appendix B, 170-7.

B.3.5, (PP), and therefore it may be assumed that these proverbs are a later addition to Serlo's work.

The last four proverbs of my collection, 106-109, from manuscripts in Troyes, Uppsala (which are closely related) and from Cheltenham, are also Serlonic in form, but they do not occur frequently enough in other manuscripts to give any assurance that they were compiled directly from Serlo's work.

As an appendix, I have added from *Digby* 53, five proverbs, numbered *i* through *v*, which, while coming from the twelfth century, do not appear in other Serlonic collections.

#### LIST OF MANUSCRIPTS OF PROVERBS WITH SYMBOLS

- Oxford, *Digby* 53, fol. 8: *Prouerbia magistri Serlonis*; fol. 15: *Diuersa prouerbia*. Printed in part by Paul Meyer, *Documents mss. de l'ancienne littérature de la France conservés dans les Bibl. de la Grande-Bretagne* (Paris, 1871), Appendix B, 170-7.
- R— British Museum, Royal XIII A IV, fols. 84-85. 51 Anglo-Norman proverbs and 85 Latin verses. Manuscript of the thirteenth century. See *Catalogue of Western Mss. in the Old Royal and King's Collections*, ed. Sir G. F. Warner & J. P. Gilson, II (London, 1921), pp. 75-6; H. L. D. Ward, *Catalogue of Romances I* (London, 1883), pp. 27-9, and Paul Meyer, *Romania*, XIV (1885), 497 f.
- PP— Dublin, Trinity College B.3.5, fols. 273v-5v. 76 French and English proverbs and 79 Latin proverbs. Manuscript of the fourteenth century from the Abbey of St. Thomas, Dublin. See *Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin*, ed. T. K. Abbott (Dublin, London, 1900), p. 12, #97.
- T— Troyes, 645, fol. 98v. 36 proverbs in French and Latin. Proverbs in hand of thirteenth century from the *scriptorium* of Clairvaux. See the *Catalogue général des manuscrits . . . Départements II*, (Paris, 1855), pp. 271 f. The proverbs, French and Latin, have been printed by A. Vernet, 'Proverbes français de l'Abbaye de Mores,' *Romania*, LXXI (1950), 100-8.
- UP— Uppsala, University Library Ms. C523, fol. 148v. 30 proverbs in French and Latin. Manuscript of the fourteenth century, from Vadstena Monastery; probably written in the vicinity of Metz; containing a collection of *exempla* for the use of preachers. French proverbs, Latin verses omitted, printed by P. Högberg, *Zeitschrift f. franz. Spr. u. Litt.*, XLV (1919), 469-71, and see *ibid.*, XLVII (1924), 72 (Hilka's review).
- TO— Tours, 468, fol. 178: *Incipiunt prouerbia et uersus prouerbiorum*. R. 30 proverbs in French and Latin. Manuscript of the fifteenth century, paper, formerly belonging to Saint-Martin of Tours. See *Catalogue général des manuscrits . . . Départements XXXVII*, 1 (Paris, 1900), pp. 368-9 and described by Léopold Delisle, *Bibl. de l'Ecole des Chartes*, XXIX (1868), pp. 598 f. Proverbs are printed by A. Hilka, *Beiträge zur Fabel und Sprichwörterliteratur des Mittelalters* (Breslau, 1914).
- RK— Oxford, Rawlinson C641, fol. 13v. 47 proverbs in French and 1 in English with Latin equivalents probably derived from *Digby* 53. Proverbs in hand of the thirteenth century, English. See W. D. Macray, *Cat. Cod. Mss. Bibl. Bodl.*, Pars V, *Rawlinson Mss. Fasc. II* (Oxford, 1878), cols. 329-30. The proverbs of Serlo of Wilton and those that follow to fol. 19v have been printed by E. Stengel, *Zeitschrift f. franz. Spr. u. Litt.*, XXI, 1 (1899), 1-21.

- RJ— Oxford, Rawlinson A273, fol. 96. 13 proverbs in French and 1 in English with Latin equivalents probably derived from *Digby* 53. Manuscript of the fourteenth century. See W. D. Macray, *ibid.*, *Rawlinson Mss.* Fasc. I (Oxford, 1862), col. 287-93. The proverbs have been printed by E. Stengel, *Zeitschrift f. franz. Spr. u. Litt.*, XXI, 1, (1899), 1-21 f.
- CH— Cheltenham, Phillips 8336, fols. 96-107, alphabetic collection of proverbs with parallel passages from the Bible. At the end of each section there are additional proverbs in another hand including some twenty proverbs of Serlo in French and Latin, beginning under the letter A: *A voyde mayn voyde priere*. Manuscript of the middle fourteenth century, French. See Bernard, *Catalogi Lib. Mss. Angliae* . . . (Oxford, 1697), #9160 and P. Meyer, *Romania*, XIII (1884), 497-541. The proverbs are printed by J. Morawski, 'Proverbes français inédits tirés de trois recueils anglo-normands', *Zeitschrift f. roman. Philologie*, LVI (1936), 419.
- H— British Museum, *Harley* 3775, fol. 178. 14 proverbs in French and Latin. Manuscript of the fifteenth century, probably from Saint Albans. The proverbs are added on the last folio following the *Poetria* of Geoffrey de Vinsauf. See *Catalogue of the Harleian Mss. in the B.M.* III (London, 1808), pp. 60-1. The proverbs of Serlo are printed by J. Morawski, *art. cit.*, 419-39.
- P— Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale *lat.* 6765, fol. 64. *Uersus prouerbiales ad opus H* (the rest of the line is erased, but seems to read: *Hugonis de Serua (Sana) Sorig (Seng)*). 189 Latin verses. Manuscript of the late twelfth or early thirteenth century. See B. Hauréau, *Notices et extraits de l'Institut* XXVIII, 2, (1878) 429 ff. and B. Hauréau, *Notices et extraits de Quelques Mss.*, I (Paris, 1890-3), 302 f. Proverbs printed by J. Werner, *Lateinische Sprichwörter und Sinnsprüche des Mittelalters* (Heidelberg, 1912), included with proverbs from other manuscripts in alphabetical order.
- DI— Oxford, *Digby* 65, fol. 77v. 72 Latin verses. Manuscript of the thirteenth century, English. See W. D. Macray, *Catalogi Codicum Mss. Bibl. Bodl.*, IX, *Digby Mss.* (Oxford, 1893), cols. 67-71.
- CA— Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College 136, fol. 69: *Quod Serlo celat, Serlonis penna reuelat*. 60 Latin verses. Manuscript of early fourteenth century. See M. R. James, *A Descriptive Catalogue* . . . (Cambridge, 1907), pp. 147-51 and P. Meyer, *Romania*, XXXVI (1907), 482-502.

MANUSCRIPTS OF PROVERBS OF SERLO INCLUDED IN OTHER COLLECTIONS

- Tr— Cambridge, Trinity College O-II-45, p. 351. 23 proverbs of Serlo scattered among others, Norman-French and Latin, numbered in our text consecutively. Manuscript of the thirteenth century, written after 1248 in England, at Cerne Abbey. See M. R. James, *The Western Mss. in the Lib. of Trinity College* III (Cambridge, 1902), pp. 150-60. Printed in part by M. Förster, *Englische Studien*, XXXI (1902), 1-20.
- Pf— Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale *français* 25545, fol. 9. 18 proverbs in French without Latin: lines 18-36, and other Serlonic proverbs are scattered through the collection. Manuscript of the fourteenth century, French. Printed by J. Ulrich in *Zeitschrift f. franz. Spr. u. Litt.*, XXIV, I (1902), 1-35.
- Ry— Manchester, The John Rylands Library *latin* 394, fol. 2. 26 proverbs in English and Latin among others in alphabetical order. In our text we are using line numbers counted from line 1 of each folio. Manuscript

of the late fourteenth or early fifteenth century. The English proverbs and a few Latin verses are printed by W. A. Pantin, *The Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, XIV, 1, (1930), 3-31.

Douce—Oxford, Douce, 52, fol. 13. 13 or 14 Serlonic proverbs, English and Latin among others, in alphabetical order. Manuscript of the fifteenth century, English. See F. Madan, *Summary Catalogue* IV, 2 (Oxford, 1897), p. 505. Printed by E. Stollreither, *Festschrift zum XII allgemeinen Deutschen Neuphilologentag* (Erlangen, 1906), with few of the Latin verses.

Selden—Oxford, *Selden Supra* Ms. 74, fol. 35v. "Li respit del curteis e del vilain," printed by E. Stengel, *Zeitschrift f. fr. Spr. u. Litt.*, XIV, 1 (1892), 154.

□— represents the common reading from the three manuscripts: R; T; RK.

◆— represents the common reading from the two manuscripts: UP; TO.

#### METHOD USED IN SETTING UP THE TEXT

Under the label "A" appears the vernacular text from the *manuscrit de base*, and I have set above each proverb symbols for the other manuscripts in which the line appears. Beneath each line of text is a record of variant readings.

The label A in parenthesis, (A), indicates that the vernacular text does not appear in the *manuscrit de base*, and that I have supplied the line from a parallel text. The source is indicated in parenthesis at the end of the line.

Under the label "B" appears the first Latin verse of each proverb. Again I have employed symbols above the line to indicate the other manuscripts and have given variant readings below the line. Under the labels "C", "D", and so on, I have included additional Latin verses from the basic manuscript. Under the letter labels in parenthesis, for example, (E), (F), and so on, appear additional Latin lines for the same proverb from related texts, and the source is indicated in parenthesis at the end of the verse. Again variant readings are given below the line and these include *Mss.* Douce and Rylands (Ry). Under *Pantin*, I have also indicated lines from the Rylands manuscript printed by W. A. Pantin in *The Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, XIV (1930).

As for the order in which I have listed the symbols for the manuscripts, first I have set the nine manuscripts which contain both Latin and vernacular. In this group the two Oxford, Rawlinson manuscripts (RJ and RK) are incomplete copies of Digby and therefore of less value. These I have placed after the more complete Tours manuscript (T) and before the fragmentary Cheltenham (CH). Next in order come the three manuscripts which contain the Latin text only. These, accurate and reliable, are Paris 6765, (P), *Digby* 65, (DI), and Cambridge, Caius College 136, (CA).

In this way the reader can readily see which proverbs were most often copied.

In the explanatory note following each proverb, I have listed parallels, including Salomon and Marcolf of the tenth century and the *Fecunda Ratis* of Egbert of Liège of the eleventh century. At the end of my note, I have indicated the possible source of the proverb: from the Bible and patristic sources, or from the tradition of ancient Rome as recorded in Otto, *Die Sprichwörter und Sprichwörtlichen Redensarten der Römer* (Leipzig, 1890) and as found in classical writers. The final reference in each note is to a modern collection of proverbs, such as Apperson, (Ap.), *The Oxford Dictionary of Proverbs*, (ODP), or Tilley.

The following collection will show how many proverbs are derived from classical tradition. In this way Serlo's work serves to bridge the gap between the classical and the mediaeval world, and many of the proverbs survive today.

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## PROVERBIA MAGISTRI SERLONIS

## PROVERB 1 (fol. 8)

A PP; UP; TO; RJ; CH; H.

Pur suffreite de prud hume met lum fol en banc.

UP 3: Pour deffault de prouhome meth len fou en cheire.

TO 3: . . . soffrete . . . cheire.

RJ 6: Pour defaut de franc met lem merde en bank.



B R; PP; UP; TO; RJ; CH; H; P; DI.

Occupat indignus/sedem cum non prope dignus.

(C) Uir stolidi mentis/loca sepe tenet sapientis (Ry fol. 17v, #12).

(D) Occupat incestus/scamnum cum desit honestus (Ry fol. 17v, #13).

(E) Praeus honoratur/dum non bonus inueniatur (Ry fol. 17v, #14).

[A M-1696; M-1697; Vilain 46-Singer II, 107; Vilain 278-Singer II, 151; Rusticorum 4-Singer II, 13-4; For default of a good man, me settes a shrew on a benche. Ry fol. 17v, #10-Pantin 26; Douce fol. 27. [B Werner 0-14; Strecker Chatillon str. 53, 4, p. 178: Accipit indignus . . . Tilley W30: For want of a wise man, a fool is set in the chair. (Spoken when we see unworthy persons in authority).

## PROVERB 2

A R; PP; T; UP; TO; RJ; H.

Si fert ki ne ueit.

R 2: Si feit ki ne ueit.

B R; PP; T; UP; TO; RJ; H; P; DI.

Sic illi feriunt/qui cassi lumine fiunt. [cassi) ceci R capti DI.]

C PP; H; DI; CA; P.

Sic scit percutere/quem scimus luce carere.

D PP.

Sic fatuum scire/sic cecum cito ferire.

[A M-2259; Fec. Ratis I, 170-Singer I, 80-1; So kastis þe blynde man his staffe,/ So smytis he that may not see: Ry fol. 4v, #25, 26-Pantin 17. [B Werner S-130, cf. Virgil Aen. II, 85: nunc cassum lumine lugent . . . [C Werner S-133, cf. Virgil Georg. II, 235, 472: luce carentem . . . Cf. Whiting Drama p. 255, #77; Ap. 54. 8; Tilley M74: As the blind man casts his staff.

## PROVERB 3

A R; PP; T; UP; TO; CH; H.

Meulz ualt paille en dent que nient.

B R; PP; T; UP; TO; CH; H; P.

Da paleam denti/plusquam nichil hoc fit edenti. [nichil hoc) nil hec PP T.]

C PP; T; H; P.

Sit denti palea/plus nichilo fit ea. [palea) paila H; fit ea) fuit illa H.]

[A M-1275; Vilain 268-Singer II, 150. [B Werner D-1 and see Werner C-14, cf. Ovid Her. 18, 170: exiguum, sed plus quam nichil illud erit. [C Werner S-147. Cf. Richard Hill p. 133, #105a, l. 55: Hungre maketh harde bones softe; Otto fames 1: Nihil contemnit esuriens; cf. Tilley H822: Hunger makes hard beans sweet, and Tilley S623.

## PROVERB 4

A R; PP; T; UP; TO.

Ki meuz ne pot a sa ueille se dort.

B PP; T.

Pars sit anus thori/cum posse caret meliori. [Pars sit) par fit T.]

C R; PP; T; UP; TO; H; P; CA.

Cum non posse datur/melius, uetule sociatur. [Cum) cui PP H P; sociatur) societur T.]

D R; PP; H; P.

Qui meliora nequid/uetule fert basia que quit. [fert) det P.]

(E) Gaudia danda thori,/cum posse carent meliori (P 24).

(F) Baucidis in gremio/dormit qui non habet Yo (◆).

[A M-1995; Vilain 152-Singer II, 130; Rusticorum 159-Singer II, 65; Pf. 29; Romania XXVI, 496. [C Werner C-147. [D Werner Q-82. [E Werner G-5. Cf. Otto *fundus* 3: Fundum alienum arat, incultum familiarem deserit: Plaut. *Asin.* 874.

PROVERB 5 (A variant form appears at fol. 15, col. 2).

- A R; PP; UP; TO; RJ; H.  
Ki ne fait quant il poet, ne fert quant il uolt.  
R 8: Ki ne fet quant pot ne fiat quant uoldra.
- B R; PP; UP; TO; RJ; H; P; DI; CA.  
Non faciet quod uult,/qui quando potest ea non uult.
- C R; PP; H; P; DI.  
Cum uult non faciat,/res quando potest nisi fiat. [faciat) *Ms. reads* faciet;  
quis faciat H P.]
- (D) Qui potest et non uult/fugit ipsa potencia cum uult (*Digby* 53, fol. 15, col. 2).
- (E) Qui non uult cum quit/cum uellet forte nequebit (*Ry* fol. 24v, #18; *Douce* fol. 31).
- (F) Quod non uis cum quis/non debes denique cum uis (*Ry* fol. 24v, #19).

[A M-2026; *Digby* 53, fol. 15, col. 2; Ki pot e ne uo fit ne fra quant uodra (*gloss corrects*: ne fait quant pot.); Pf. 36; *Ry* fol. 24v, #17-Pantin 30: Who so wol not whan he maye he shal not whan he wolde; Hending C-35-Singer III, 136-7. [B Werner N-165. [C Werner C-200. Cf. *Poema Morale*, ed. H. Lewin (Halle, 1881), v. 35; *Ancren Riwele* p. 296, 338; *Handlyng Synne*, ed. F. J. Furnivall, E.E.T.S. 119 (1901), ll. 4795 ff.; Gower *Miroir de l'homme* 5666; Walz p. 6, #12; M. Förster, *Archiv*, CXXXII (1909), 259, vv. 49-51; John of Salisbury, *Policraticus* VII, 17: Nam et proverbio dici solet . . . ; Meech #3; Klapper #516; Whiting *Drama* p. 139, #45 and p. 290, #85; Based on the *Regula Pastoralis* III, 12 of Saint Gregory: Admonendi sunt, ne, placere Deo si, cum voluerint sero, non possint. Cf. *Isaiah* LV, 6: Seek ye the Lord while he may be found; Tilley N54: He that will not when he may, when he would he shall have nay.

PROVERB 6

- A R; PP; T; UP; TO; H.  
Al uespre deit lum loer le ior.  
T 8: Au uespre lo um le bel jor.
- B PP; T; H; P.  
Que debetur ei,/laus uespere danda diei. [danda) dampna H.]
- C R; PP; T; UP; TO; H; P; CA.  
Uespere detur ei/si laus est danda diei.
- D R; PP; P.  
Uespere laudetur/si pulcra dies perhibetur.
- (E) Sero diem lauda/non quam cito cantat alauda (*R* 9, *Ry* fol. 6v and fol. 9).  
*Douce* fol. 19v: Hostiumque lauda/cum surgens cantat alauda.
- (F) A casu describe diem non solus ab ortu (*Ry* fol. 6v, #3. *Douce* fol. 14).

[A M-215 and see M-197; M-1054; Fec. Ratis III, 594—Singer I, 150; Vilain 12—Singer II, 99; Rusticorum 117—Singer II, 52; *Ry* fol. 6, #30—Pantin 18: At evyn preyse the feyre day; Hending I, 33—Singer III, 135. [B Werner Q-6. [C Werner V-25 quoted by Gerald of Wales *Gemma Ecclesiastica* II, 7, ed. J. S. Brewer, Rolls Series XXI, 2 (London, 1862). [D Werner V-26. [(E) Werner H-43: Hospicia lauda . . . [(F) Geoffrey de Vinsauf 283. Cf. Schepp p. 15 and pp. 41-2; Lydgate *Fall of Princes* IX, v. 2024; Taylor 151, 178-9; Taylor *Modern Language Notes* XXXVI (1921), 115-8 gives parallel from Eddic *Hávavál* str. 86, (eighth or ninth cent.); Otto *vesper*: Nescis quid uesper serus

vehat: Aul. Gell. 13, 11, 1 and cf. Macrobius I, 7, 12; Ap. 509 and 186.6; Tilley D100: Praise a fair day at night, cf. Tilley E190.

PROVERB 7

- A R; PP; UP; TO; RK; CH; H.  
 "Dehez eient tanz meistres," dist le crapod al herce.  
 CH under A-49: Au diable tanz . . .
- B R; RK; H; DI.  
 Sic buffo crati/fatur, "Ue (sunt *added above*) cui tot dominati!" [Sic] Dixit R Si H; fatur) R. H. *omit*; Ue) Ue, ue R.]
- C R; PP; UP; TO; RK; H; DI.  
 Bufo crati fatur,/"Ue turba quibus dominatur!" [crati) trahe♦ sic H; fatur) datur♦; quibus) cui.♦]
- D PP; CA.  
 Buffo trahe dixit, "Domini tot sint maledicti!" [Buffo) Dixit bufo crati,/"Maledicti tot dominati!" PP CA.]
- (E) Ad traham dixit bufo, "Pereant tot magistri!" (UP 9). [magistri) bufo magistri TO queso magistri Tr p. 365, #89.]

[A M-446; Mi-A49; Stengel Vilain 203: Mal ayent tant seignor . . . [D Odo of Cheriton Fable 53, ed. Hervieux IV, 224; T. Wright *Mapes* p. 105, l. 389; T. Wright *Political Songs* 166: Dixit bufo crati . . . ; Strecker *Chatillon* (str. 21, 4) p. 177. Cf. Wyclif *Select Works* II, 280; John Gower *Miroir de l'homme*, ll. 24962-3; John Gower *Vox Clamantis* VI, 467; Walz p. 17, #49a, 49b; Taylor 209; Ap. 636.2; Tilley M735: Many masters, quoth the paddock (frog) to the harrow when every tine took her a knock (denoting a man in difficulties).

PROVERB 8

- A R; PP; RK.  
 Meluz (*for meulz?*) uaut nature que nourreture.
- B R; RK; P; DI.  
 Mos est conuictus/per te, natura, relictus (fol. 8v).
- C R; PP; RK; P; DI; CA.  
 Dat studium mores/si dat natura priores. [si) sed PP P.]

[A M-1273; Salomon and Marcolf 27, 9—Singer I, 56; Vilain 262—Singer II, 149. [B Werner M-49. [C Werner D-23. Cf. Schepp p. 11, #34 and pp. 51-2, XXIV; Whiting Froissart p. 317, #388; Tilley N47: Nature passes nurture. (The converse is also proverbial, cf. M-1399: Nouriture passe nature and Trinity 36: Scit nutritura nature uincere iure. Draxe 567; Ap. 49.)

PROVERB 9 (The same proverb appears again at fol. 16, col. 1)

- A R; PP; T; RK; RJ.  
 Bunte altre requert (*above*: uarde) é colée sa per.  
 R 15: Bunte altre regarde.  
 RJ 5: Bounte autre reward.  
 T 9: Por bien, bien; por mal, mal.
- B R; PP; T; RK; RJ; P; CA.  
 Pro bonitate bona,/pro tristi tristia dona,  
 Pro blandis blanda,/pro duris aspera danda.
- (C) Unum sponte datum/reliquum poscit benefactum (Ry fol. 2, #18).

[A M-299 and M-298; Vilain 39—Singer II, 106; Vilain 223—Singer II, 143; Ry fol. 2, #17—Pantin 14: O good turne asket another'. [B Werner P-109. Cf. S. B. Meech, #26; Heywood *Proverbs* I, xi, p. 41: ka me, ka thee; one good turn asketh another; Singer III, 88-9—Freidank 127, 16; Quoted in Latin Sermons:

Hauréau *N & Ex* II, 96, 284; IV, 146; Whiting *Drama* p. 134, #42 and p. 280, #82; *Distichs of Cato* I, Sic bonus esto bonis, ne te mala damna sequantur; Otto *alter* 1, 2: Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris. Publ. Syr. 2; Othlo. Q60; Ap. 470; Tilley T616: One good turn asks another, cf. Tilley K1. Cf. *Matth.* vii, 12; *Luc.* vi, 31.

## PROVERB 10

A R; T; UP; TO.

Un iur porte que tut lan ne pot.

T 10: Que ne done uns anz, done uns jorz.

UP fol. 150v: On fait pluz en 1 iour que en 1 an (TO).

B R; PP; T; UP; TO; RK; P; CA.

Quod donare mora/nequit annua, dat breuis hora. [quod) que; donare) dare longa Ry fol. 6, #6; breuis hora) dies una T.]

(C) Anno cura datur;/tamen una dies operatur (PP RK P).

(D) Sepe dat una dies quod non dat circulus anni (Ry fol. 6, #2, Pantin 17).

[A M-2452, cf. M-315; Ry fol. 6, #1-Pantin 17: Ofte bryngeth o day, þat after alle þe gere ne may. and RK 15. [B Werner Q-194. [C Werner A-83. [D Cf. Werner S-6 and cf. *Douce* fol. 13v: Unus dies totus poterit dare quod nequit annus. Cf. Meech #56; Schepp p. 54, XXVII; Richard Hill p. 128, #104, l. 20; Chaucer *The Knight's Tale*, ll. 1668-9: Yet somtyme it shal fallen on a day/ That falleth nat eft withinne a thousand yeer; Whiting *Chaucer* p. 80; Publ. Syr. 609: Solet hora quod multi anni abstulerint reddere; Tilley D83: It falls on a day that falls not all the year after.

## PROVERB 11

A R; PP; UP; TO; RK.

Bel pramettre é nient doner fait fol conforter.

◆ 10: Promesce sanz donner sest au foul conforter.

B R; PP; UP; TO; RK; P; DI.

Re sine promissa/stulto solatia missa. [Re) Res PP, RK; sine) bene PP.]

C R; PP; RK; P; DI.

Stultum solata/re sine uerba data. [solata) solato DI; data) dato DI.]

(D) Si stulto spondes/gaudet quamuis sibi non des (UP). [non des) mordes TO.]

(E) Letificat stultum/qui scit promittere multum (UP; TO; CA). [Letificat) Solatur CA;—qui scit) dare nil CA Tr p. 351, #3.]

[M-230, cf. M-228, M-459; Fec. Ratis I, 592-Singer I, 100; Singer I, 159; Vilain 181-Singer II, 136; Rusticorum 246-Singer II, 88: De bel promesse se fet fol lie; Meech #11; Steiner #284. [B Werner R-28. [C Werner S-171. [E Wright *Rel. Ant.* I, 287; Meech #11; Ebert p. 15, #38; Richard Hill p. 128, #104, l. 11; *The Romaunt of the Rose* B4475 ff.: And heeste certeyn, in no wise,/Withoute yift, is not to prise; Lydgate *Minor Poems* II, 748; Whiting *Drama* p. 93, #27; Cf. Christine de Pisan *Proverbes Mouraulx* #80, ed. Roy III (Paris, 1896), p. 54; Ap. 514.3; Ap. 200.37; Tilley N333: To promise and give nothing is comfort to a fool; Tilley W794.

## PROVERB 12

A PP; T.

Ceo que oill ne ueit quer ne dout.

T 2: Que euz ne voit, cuers ne duet.

A þat einen ne sen, herte ne reut. (fol. 8v).

B PP; T; RK; P; DI.

Cor non tristatur,/pro re cum non uideatur. [pro re cum) cum rem RK.]

[A M-1766 and M-1767; *Fec. Ratis* I, 179-Singer, I, 81; Vilain 40-Singer II, 106; *Rusticorum* 133-Singer II, 56; Pf. 22; Hending I, 21: For, þat eye ne seeþ, herte ne reweþ; Singer III, 132 coupled in Hending with our proverb #40: Que oil ne ueit quor ne desiret. [B Werner C-102; RK 7 gives the Latin text under the proverb: Que oil ne ueit quer ne desire; Cf. Steiner #224; Schepp p. 29, #370 from Robert of Blois and pp. 29-40, #VI; Wright *Rel. Ant.* I, 207, and I, 114; Whiting *Drama* p. 220, #70; Singer I, 81, quotes a sermon of Saint Bernard making use of the proverb: Vulgo dicitur: quod non videt oculus, cor non dolet; Taylor 51; for other sermons see Hauréau *Notices et Extraits* II, 94, and IV, 104; cf. Venant. Fort. *Carm.* VII, 12, 71: an quantum ex oculo, tantum tibi corde recedo; Ap. 196. 19; Tilley E247: That the eye sees not, the heart rues not. (Men may have losses, but if they be unknown to them, they give them no trouble).

PROVERB 13

- A PP; RK; RJ.  
Ki uedue ú enfant sert, tut sun seruise pert.  
RK 8: Ki uedue e enfant sert, tute sen tente (for sen ten?) pert.  
RJ 7: Qi uedfe moigne ou enfant sert, tut sun seruise pert.
- B PP; RK; RJ; P.  
Nil agis utroque/perdes uidue pueroque,  
O puer! O uidua!/perdita cura tua. [agis] agit P maius RK; perdes) famu-  
lans P monacho RJ serui RK.]

[A M-2184. [B Werner N-59. Cf. Tilley W 335: He that marries a widow and three children marries four thieves.

PROVERB 14

- A R; PP; T; RK; H.  
A tel marche tel uente.
- B R; PP; T; RK; H; P; CA.  
Res fit uenalis/cum uendicio sibi talis. [fit] sic □ PP P CA; uendicio sibi  
fori conditio CA.]
- C PP; H; P.  
Sic suus emptorum/mos ubi tale forum.
- (D) Res ualet hoc modicum/cui leue sit precium (Ry fol. 16, #20, Pantin 25).

[A M-160; Vilain 200-Singer II, 140; Hending I, 32-Singer III, 135; Ligtte chep lupere forzelde. [B Werner R-67. [C Werner S-135 misreads *emptorum* as *emptori* and *forum* as *fori*. Cf. Schepp p. 16, #135, pp. 49-50; Chaucer *Wife of Bath's Prologue* ll. 522-3; Whiting *Reynard* #120; Whiting *Drama* p. 19; Otto *emere* 3: Bene emo, bene vendo: Petronius 75; Ap. 403; Tilley M284: A man must sell his wares according to the rates of the market.

PROVERB 15

- A R; PP; T; UP; TO; RK; RJ; CH.  
Ki en ieu entre, ieu consente.
- B PP; T; P; DI.  
Ni legem sequeris/ludi, quid ludere queris? [quid] qui T cur DI.]
- C R; PP; RK; P; DI.  
Ludi (s added above for ludis) consenti,/si ludi sunt tibi menti. [Ludis]  
Ludo RK Ry fol. 10v, #2 Douce fol. 21; sunt) sint PP.]
- D R; PP; RK; RJ; P.  
Non eque ludo,/si non consencio ludo.
- E R; PP; T; UP; TO; RK; P.  
Ludis ut intratur,/ludo fauor exhibeatur. [Ludis] Ludus PP Ry; ludo) decet  
ut ludo PP.]

(F) Si quis init ludum/ludi custodiat usum (CA Ry fol. 10v, #10).

Ry fol. 10v, #3: Intrans in ludum/ludendi perforat usum.

[A M-1914; Mi-Q38; Rusticorum 146-Singer II, 61. [B Werner N-55. [C Werner L-66. [D Werner N-102. [E Werner L-73. Cf. Ebert p. 22, #97; Chaucer *The Clerk's Prologue* ll. 10-1: For what man that is entred in a pley/ He nedes moot unto the pley assente; Whiting *Chaucer* p. 102; ODP 505: Play the game.

#### PROVERB 16

A R; PP; T; RK; RJ.

Ki feit e nent ne parfeit, nent ne desert.

R 25: Ki ne parfert ren ne desert.

RK 10: . . . rien ne fait.

RJ 9: Qi rien fait, rien ne desert.

B R; PP; T; RK; RJ; CA.

Ni res completur/que fit, non dona meretur. [Ni res) si non PP; que fit) exhinc CA.]

Ry fol. 12v, #26: Nil homini detur/qui nil operando meretur.

(C) Nil operans uere/debet mercede carere. (Ry fol. 12v, #27, Pantin 22).

[A M-1938 and M-2116; Ry fol. 12v, #25, Pantin 22: Who so nowȝt dos nouȝt seruys. Cf. Vilain 132-Singer II, 126: Mal fait la chape, qui ne fait le chaperon. Othlo B 28: Bona coepisse et non perficere nulli prodest.

#### PROVERB 17 (fol. 9)

A R; PP; RK; RJ.

Ki tart se herberge, tost se curuce.

RJ 10: . . . a tort se corouce.

B R; PP; RK; RJ; P; DI; CA.

Hospicii seri/cito dant (n dotted for deletion) iactura doleri. [Hospicii) Hospicium RK RJ; doleri) dolori RK.]

Ry fol. 9, #6, Pantin p. 20: Hospicii sero/captor flebit cito vero.

C R; PP; RK; P; DI.

Hospicium petito,/tibi sero querere scito (for cito). [tibi) R PP RK P omit; sero) fere RK uespere P; querere) quere RK P.]

P: Hospitium petito,/uespere quere cito.

(D) Tecta petens sere/poterit fortasse dolere (Ry fol. 9, #7).

[A M-2154 and cf. M-2153, M-2158; Stengel Vilain 285; Rusticorum 138-Singer II, 58-9; Ry fol. 9, #5-Pantin p. 20: Who so komyth late to hynne shall' erly for þynke. [B Werner H-40. [C Werner H-44. Cf. Otto *scabies* 2: occupet extremum scabies: Horace *Ars P.* 417. Ap. 109.21: Who cometh late lodgeth ill.

#### PROVERB 18

A R; PP; T; UP; TO; RK; RJ.

De autri quir large coraie.

B R; PP; P; DI.

Corrigiam breuius/quis de cute sumit alias?

R 23: Corrigiam melius . . .

C R; PP; T; UP; TO; RK; RJ; P; DI; CA.

De cute non propria/fit bona corrigia. [bona) maxima □ PP RJ P DI prodiga ♦ PP; fit bona corrigia) sumitur absque bria CA.]

(D) Alterius corio scindetur ligula larga (CA).

(E) Corrigias corio/largas damus ex alieno (T).

[A M-453; Fec. Ratis I, 271-Singer I, 89-90; Vilain 131-Singer II, 126; Vilain 238-Singer II, 145; Cf. Vilain 58-Singer II, 109-10; Rusticorum 108-Singer II, 49; Hending I, 30: Of unboht huide me taketh broð þwong; Singer III, 134 prefers the reading of Mss. C and L of Hending: *kervith* instead of *takeþ*. [B Werner C-111. [C Werner D-26; Cf. Steiner #46; Werner D-27 . . . propria scinditur . . . Cf. Wright *Rel. Ant.* I, p. 207; Gower *Miroir* 15405 and 24995; Walz p. 35, #103a; Whiting *Froissart* p. 312, #267; Richard Hill p. 132, #105a, l. 44: Corigium corige/longam damus ex aliene: Serlo's 18(E). The proverb appears in Abaelard's *Sententie* addressed to his son Astralabe from Ms. Saint-Omer 115, ed. V. Cousin, Jourdain and Desfors, *Opera* (Paris, 1849), p. 348, col. 1: Corrigias corio largas facit ex alieno. At folio 14v, among miscellaneous verses in *Digby* 53: Nemo tam parcus quin prodigus ex alieno/Parcus in ede sua, largus in alterius. Otto *corium* 1: Re vera ludis de alieno corio: Apuleius *Met.* 7, 11; Ap. 131.11; Tilley T229: He cuts large thongs of other men's leather.

PROVERB 19

- A PP; T; UP; TO; RK; RJ.  
U fu nest, nest fume.  
T 15: Ou n'a feu, ne fume.  
B PP; T; UP; TO; RJ; P; CA.  
Cum locus igne caret,/iam fumus non ibi paret. [locus) focus ♦.]  
C PP; T; UP; TO; RK; RJ; P.  
Cum procul ignis abest,/non prope fumus adest.  
(D) Ignis ubi nullus,/nec fumus nascitur ullus (Ry fol. 9v, #9).

[A M-1566; Ry fol. 9v, #7, Pantin 20: Where is no fyre þer is no smoke. [B Werner C-173. [C Werner C-183. Cf. Whiting *Reynard* #45; Whiting *Drama* p. 379, #74; Otto *ignis* 7: Numquam ubi diu fuit ignis, deficit vapor: Publ. Syr. 389; Ap. 214.14; Tilley F282: There is no fire without some smoke; and Tilley S569.

PROVERB 20

- A R; PP; T; UP; TO; RK; CH.  
Chascun prestre loe ses reliques.  
B PP; T; RK; P; CA.  
Presbiter, ut didicit,/sua sacra sacerrima dicit.  
C R; PP; CH; P.  
Que probat ac memorat/sacra presbiter omnis adorat. [probat) colit  
P CH c-29; adorat) honorat CH c-29.]  
D R; PP; T; UP; TO; P.  
Presbiter omnis amat/sua sacra uerendaque clamat.  
E R; PP; P.  
Omnes presbiteri/malunt sua sacra teneri. [teneri) tueri P.]  
(F) Reliquias proprias collaudat quisque sacerdos (Ry fol. 18, #13).

[A M-360; Mi-C29; Ry fol. 18, #12, Pantin 26: Eche preste preyseth his awgh relikes. [B Werner P-100; Cf. Steiner #165. [C Werner Q-5. [D Werner P-99. [E Werner O-39; Taylor 68; Taylor *Index* p. 83. Cf. Ovid *Fasti* 2, 7, 31: Quisque suum laudat. Cf. ODP 518: Each priest praises his own relics.

PROVERB 21

- A R; PP; T; UP; TO; RK; CH.  
Mal atent ki pent.  
B R; PP; T; CH; P.  
Propositum differt/misere, suspendia qui fert.  
C PP; UP; TO; P.  
Expecto meste,/dum suspendo tua (for ruo?) peste. [suspendo) suspendi

UP suspensi TO P; tua) ruo UP ruo PP TO P.]

D R; PP; UP; TO; RK; P; CA.

Expectat misere/cui mortem crux dat habere. [cui mortem) mortem cui PP.]

E PP; P.

Expectat uere (for bene?)/quem dant suspendia pene.

P: Expectatne bene/quem dat suspensio pene? [Expectatne) Expectasne PP.]

[A M-1158; Mi-M25; Singer I, 74. [B Werner P-124; Fec. Ratis I, 103-Singer I, 74; Cf. Steiner #110. [C Werner E-146. [D Werner E-144. [E Werner E-145; Cf. Werner N-222. Cf. Chaucer *Troilus* II, 985-987 . . . but he/That hangeth by the nekke, soth to seyne/In gret disese abideth for the peyne; Whiting *Chaucer* p. 67; Cf. Whiting *Drama* p. 149, #47: Sithens there is no remedy, best is a short payne. Cf. I would hate to have to hang for that length of time.

#### PROVERB 22

A R; T; RK; CH.

Ki bien atent ne suratent.

B RK; P.

Nulla grauet mora te/faciente sub utilitate.

RK: Nulla graue facienda ab utilitate.

C R; T; P.

Res bene dilate/non sunt nimium remorate. [dilate) *Ms. reads celate.*]

D R; T; CH; P; CA.

Non nimis expectat,/quiquis sua comoda spectat.

[A M-1838 and cf. M-248; Mi-Q59; Vilain 1-Singer II, 97; Rusticorum 10-Singer II, 16; Ry fol. 7v, #5, Pantin 19: Who so wolde abyde, he shall wel be tyde. [B Werner N-271. For the use of the proverb in sermons see Hauréau IV, 240. Cf. Steiner #146. [C Werner R-47. [D Werner N-201. Cf. Hending I, 38: Muchel of his wille abit, þat wel may þolien, and Singer III, 135-6; Whiting *Drama* p. 374, #1; Draxe #1597; Cf. Virgil *Aeneid* V, 710; Ap. 182.2: He that can quietly endure overcometh; ODP 179-80: Everything comes to him who waits. Cf. Tilley E136.

#### PROVERB 23

A R; PP; T; UP; TO; RK.

Sun tens pert ki felun sert.

R 36: Ki malueis sert tut le pert.

♦ 20: Son loueir pert qui mauuaiz sert.

B R; PP; T; P; DI.

Nil homo profecit/qui nequicie bene fecit.

C R; PP; T; UP; TO; RK; P; DI (fol. 9v).

Hoc amisisti/quod iniquis exhibuisti.

D PP; P.

Prauis obsequere/perdita spes opere. [spes) res P.]

(E) Litus aro lateremque lauo/dum seruio prauo (RJ CA). [seruio) predico Ry fol. 17v, #15.]

(F) Prauis inpensum/perdimus obsequium (T).

[A M-2272. [B Werner N-61. [C Werner H-23. [D Werner P-97. [(E) Werner L-52 from Basel Manuscript; quoted by Odo of Cheriton as a conclusion to Fable 59: the man who saved a serpent (Berne, *Ms.* 679, fol. 96v); RJ fol. 90v the proverb follows a distich of Serlo's said to have been composed upon his leaving the schools: sterilis uola stans scola sola./Unda lauans lateres/bos



arans litus sine re res; on the phrase "Litus aro lateremque lauo" as an ancient proverbial expression for the impossible see Singer I, 173 and III, 50 and also Otto *later*: laterem lavem: Terence *Phormio* 186. [(F) Cheriton Fable 46, ed. Hervieux p. 218: Qui malo seruit/seruicium suum perdit. Cf. Whiting *Reynard* #115, *The Romaunt of the Rose* B 3146: Who serveth a feloun is yvel quit; Whiting *Chaucer* p. 24; *Disticha Catonis*: Nolo putes pravos homines peccata lucrari, ed. Le Roux de Lincy II, 447.

# PROVERB 24

- A PP; T; RK.  
Ki crapoud aime lune li semble.
- B PP; RK; P; DI.  
Buffonem cura,/fiet te iudice luna.
- C T; P; DI.  
Buffo curetur/iam buffo luna uidetur.
- D P.  
Sit buffo carus,/fiet luna mage clarus.
- E T; P.  
Sit buffo quod amas,/hunc lunam uincere clamas. [hunc] id T.]
- (F) Si quis amat ranam,/ranam putat esse Dianam (CA Ry fol. 2, #4 Pantin 14).
- (G) Ranam siquis amat/quod sit sibi Cinthia clamat (Ry fol. 2, #5 Pantin 14).
- (H) Esse putat lunam/qui ranam diligit unam (Tr p. 366, #176).

[A M-1874; cf. Morawski *Romania* XLVIII (1922) p. 494: Anglo-Norman only; Rusticorum 106-Singer II, 48-49; Cheriton Fable 14, ed. Hervieux; Ry fol. 2, #1, Pantin 14: Whoso loueth þe toode, he wenyth yt is þe mone; Steiner #279. [B Werner B-29; *Liber localis* II. 973-5, ed. P. Lehmann, *Munich S.B. Phil. Hist.* 1938, Heft 4, p. 92: collected in thirteenth century before 1280; cf. Steiner #233. [C Werner B-28. [D Werner S-145. [E Werner S-146. [(F) Cheriton Fable 14, ed. Hervieux; *Liber localis* *ibid.*; *Distinctiones Monasticarum*, ed. J. B. Pitra, *Spicilegium Solesmensis* III (Paris, 1855), p. 463; Taylor 30; Steiner #279; Cf. Ap. 124.8; Cf. Tilley C-851: The crow thinks her own bird fairest.

# PROVERB 25

- A R; PP; T; UP; TO; RK; H.  
Force paist le pre.
- B R; PP; T; UP; TO; RK; H; P; DI; CA.  
Uis pascit pratum./uis prato fert dominatum. [pascit] falcit Ry fol. 17v, #6 *Douce* fol. 27; prato] prati R T P Ry; prato fert dominatum] dampnat sepe probatum Tr p. 365 #148.]
- (C) Pratum pascit ouis/si demere tu prius .o. uis (♦).
- (D) Forcior in prato/pascit forti superato (PP).

[A M-1003; Vilain 121-Singer II, 125; Rustici 23; Ry fol. 17v, #5, Pantin 26: Strenght moweth the medowe. [B Werner V-61. Cf. Ebert p. 11, #11; Whiting *Reynard* #53; Whiting *Froissart* p. 314, #306; cf. G. E. Brereton *Des Grantz Geanz* (Oxford, 1937) l. 184 and p. 44, note 184: the proverb contains a pun on *force* meaning "shears" and "might" in French; Tilley M741: Mastery mows the meadow down. (Spoken when people of power and wealth effect a great business in a short time.)

# PROVERB 26

- A R; PP; T; UP; TO; RK.  
Meulz ualt un "tens" que doux "tu laueras". (i gloss over tens for tiens?  
e gloss over laueras for laueres?).

- B R; PP; T; P.  
Non me letificant/promissa "tene" nisi dicant. [nisi] mihi P.]
- C R; PP; RK; P.  
Plus laudo fruere/quoddam quam mille fruere. [laudo) unum plus laudo  
R unum fruere laudo PP RK P; quoddam) R RK P omit.]
- D R; PP; P; DI; CA.  
Iudicio plebis/non fallit habe, set habebis.
- E PP; T; P; DI.  
Spes melior plebis,/semel "accipe" quam bis "habebis". [Spes melior plebis)  
malo mihi ditas Tr p. 352, #21.]
- (F) Pollicitis melius ualet unum sume duobus (R).
- (G) Plus ualet omne datum/modo quid quam cras geminatum (UP). [omne)  
omnes TO; RK 31: Unum malo datum/quam promissum geminatum.]
- (H) Plus ualet a. per habe/quam per habebis a.b (♦).
- (I) Plus ualet hoc tribuo/quam tribuendo duo (♦).
- (J) Diligo plus "cape this"/quam si sonat "bis bis habebis" (Ry fol. 5v #7).

[A M-1300; Vilain 48-Singer II, 107; Vilain 245-Singer II, 146; Rusticorum 142-Singer II, 60. [B Werner N-195; cf. Steiner #36. [C Werner P-72. [D Werner I-141; Singer II, 60: The lesson of a fable in the prose Avianus p. 361 in L. Hervieux, *Les Fabulistes latins* III (Paris, 1893-9). [E Werner S-155. Cf. Ebert p. 15, #37; Whiting *Drama* p. 385, #188; cf. Whiting *Drama* p. 155, #49; Ap 48; Tilley B363: A bird in hand is better than two in the bush. Tilley A14: Better is one *Accipe* than twice to say, *Dabo tibi*. On the relation between this proverb and "One bird in the hand" see Singer III, 105 and I, 168; Taylor 22-24.

## PROVERB 27

- A R; PP; T; RK.  
Cuenant lai ueint.
- B R; PP; T; RK; P; DI.  
Lex pacto cedit,/pacto lex omnis obedit.
- C PP; T; P; DI; CA.  
In quouis facto/lex est obnoxia pacto. [facto) pacto T; est obnoxia) debet  
cedere Douce fol. 22v; pacto) facto T.]
- D R; PP; P.  
Lex iubet hoc poni/quod cedat condicioni.
- (E) Infringit plura/certe conuencio dura (Ry fol. 17, #10).

[A M-431; Rusticorum 259-Singer II, 92; Ry fol. 17, #7 Pantin 25: Conuenaunte ys auenaunt. [B Werner L-36. [C Werner I-62. [D Werner L-35. Cf. Abailard's *Sententie*, ed. V. Cousin (Paris, 1849), p. 346, col. 1: Plus ratio quam lex, plus consuetudine lex sit. A legal maxim, cf. Frederick Pollock and F. W. Maitland, *The History of the English Law* II (Cambridge, 1923), 216-22 on *covenant*. The question is how early covenant implied a written agreement; local courts as late as the thirteenth century were still free to go their own way about such matters. They enforced agreements that were not in writing.

## PROVERB 28

- A R; T; RK.  
Pur bien fait col freint.  
RK 29: Pur bien fait col frait.
- B R; T; RK; P; DI; CA.  
Non numquam fractum/collum fuit ob benefactum. [Non numquam)  
Nullius CA; fuit) dat R datur DI.]
- C R; P; DI.  
Res collum fregit/quam quis non turpiter egit.

[A M-463; Vilain 143-Singer II, 128. [B Werner N-204; cf. Steiner #47. [C Werner R-48. Cf. Kadler p. 13; Whiting *Drama* p. 300, #87; Tilley T-109: Save a thief from the gallows and he will cut your throat.

PROVERB 29 (A Latin variant appears at fol. 12, col. 2)

- A PP; UP; TO; RK.  
Ki ne dune que il aime ne prent quo desire.  
B PP; P; DI; CA.  
Non erit optati/compos non (*gloss above: nisi*) largus amati.  
C PP; UP; TO; P; DI.  
Non feret optatam/qui rem non donat amatam. [optatam) *Ms. reads*  
optatum, aptatum DI.]  
♦ 30: Non capit optatum/qui non largitur amatum.  
PP: Non feret optatum/qui non donabit amatum.  
D PP; RK; P.  
Ni quod amas dederis,/non sumes quod tibi queris.  
(E) PP; RJ.  
Qui non dat quod amat,/non accipit ille quod optat (*Digby* 53 fol. 12, col. 2).  
[ille) omne PP.]  
(F) Dans tibi crede dari/conditione pari (♦30).  
(G) Nolens cara dare/non caca mereris habere (♦30).

[A M-2023; Vilain 124-Singer II, 125; Rusticorum 32-Singer II, 23; Rustici 18. [B Werner N-143. [C Werner N-170. [D Werner N-56. (E) Werner Q-99 from Basel, University Library A XI 67, also in Carl Horstmann ed., *Richard Rolle I* (London, 1895) 423. Cf. Schepp p. 14, #97; Chaucer *Troilus* IV, 1585: Ek "whoso wol han lief, he lief moot lete." Whiting *Chaucer* p. 62; Abailard, *Sententie* *ibid.* p. 347, col. 1: Qui non dat quod amat, non accipit ipse quod optat. For use in sermons see Hauréau IV, 146 and J. De Vitry, *Sermones Vulgares*, J. B. Pitra, *Analecta Novissima* II (Paris, 1885) 428. Cf. Ovid, *Am.* 3, 8, 62: qui dare mihi potest.

PROVERB 30

- A R; PP; UP; TO; RK.  
Bysuinne fait ueille trotter.  
B (written in top margin of fol. 10)  
Currere "plus ke le pas" uetulas/compellit egestas. [plus ke le pas uetulas)  
plusquam a pase uetulam Ry fol. 24v, #3.]  
C R; PP; RK; P; DI; CH.  
Ut cito se portet/uetule pes cogit oportet.  
Tr p. 351 #13; Ry fol. 24v, #4.  
D PP; UP; TO; P; DI; CA.  
Fert indefesse/uetule carendo necesse. [uetule) uetulam PP Ry fol. 24v,  
#5 *Douce* fol. 30v; carendo) prodire Ry pro dure *Douce*.]  
(E) Anxietas ueterem/trottare facit mulierem (Ry fol. 24v, #8 Pantin 30).

[A M-236; Rusticorum 2-Singer II, 11-2; Tr. p. 351, #13: Neode makab heald wif eorne; cf. Steiner #272. [B Probably not a Serlonic verse. [C Werner U-99. [D Werner F-27. (E) Werner A-92 from Basel manuscript. Cf. *The Owl and the Nightingale* 638; Meech #72; Wright *Rel. Ant.* I, 207; Richard Hill p. 128, #104, l. 5; Whiting *Reynard* #14, p. 237; Whiting *Drama* p. 131, #40 and cf. pp. 137 and 376; Heywood, *Proverbs* II 10, p. 99 and *Epigrams* #91, p. 183; Tilley N79: Need makes the old wife trot.

PROVERB 31 (fol. 9v in bottom margin)

- A RJ.  
Selden gifis men dumb man land.

RJ 13: Seld men gyfth a dumbe man lond.  
Ry fol. 12v, #15: Seldon getys domb man londe.

B RJ.

Raro datur muto tellus aut regia surdo.

RJ 13: Raro datur muto/libera terra puto (Ry fol. 12v #18).

(C) Raro terra datur/cui lingua ligatur. *Gloss adds*: seu sermo negatur (Ry fol. 12v, #17).

(D) Mutus homo terram raro lucrabitur ullam (Ry fol. 12v, #16 *Douce* fol. 23v). [terram) terra *Douce*; lucrabitur) habebitur *Douce*; ullam) ulla *Douce*.]

[A The proverb appears only in Rawlinson A 273, which is a copy of *Digby* 53; Cf. *Douce* fol. 16v: Who so sparyth to speke, sparet to spede; Richard Hill p. 132, #105a, l. 47. [B M. Förster *Englische Studien* XXXI, 15 and 21. Cf. Whiting *Chaucer* p. 138: Langland I, 1293; Gower *Confessio Amantis* VI, 447: For selden get a domb man lond; Walz p. 15, #45; Hoccleve *La Male Regle* st. 55, ll. 433-6, ed. F. J. Furnival EETS, Extra Series LXI, (1892), p. 38; Ap. 170; Tilley F418: Dumb folk get no lands. (Said when anything is to be obtained by speaking); Tilley S709: Spare to speak spare to speed.

PROVERB 32 (in bottom margin)

A PP.

Meuz ualt pume dune que mange.

B PP.

Prestat donare/pomum quam uentre uorare.

PP: Prestant poma dari/pocius quam uentre uorari.

Ry fol. 16, #24: Prestat poma dare/socio quam dente uorare.

Ry fol. 16, #25 Prestat poma dare/quam dentibus illa uorare.

Ry fol. 16, #26: Plus quam gustare/diligo poma dare.

[A M-1280 and cf. M-1297; RK gives the proverb as #52 following the collection of Serlo's proverbs; cf. Vilain 113-Singer II, 124: Mieuz vaut ues donez . . . and Rusticorum 153-Singer II, 63: Miez vaut oef done . . . ; Hending I, 13 (L)-Singer III, 128-9: Better is appel igeuen þen ieten; and cf. old Germanic proverb Singer I, 11-2: Better is apple given as a token of friendship. [B Cf. Cato, *Distich* I, 20: Exiguum munus cum dat tibi pauper amicus,/Accipito placide . . . Cf. Ap. 13; Tilley A292: Better apple given nor eaten.

PROVERB 33 (fol. 10, col. 1)

A (The vernacular proverb omitted in *Digby* 53).

(A) Autant uaut qui pie tient com qui escorche (♦).

B UP; TO; CH.

Pellem tollenti/par pena pedemque tenenti.

[A In Uppsala and Tours manuscripts among proverbs following the Serlonic collection. In the Cheltenham manuscript the proverb is also included, but not among the Serlonic verses: Ch fol. 96: Assez escorche qui pie tient. Also Tr p. 352, #24 with rubric: Qui faciunt talia digni sunt morte, *Rom.* i, 32. It is made to apply to an accessory in a crime: non solum qui ea faciunt, sed etiam qui consentiunt facientibus. Cf. M-207: Autant gaaigne qui pie . . . and Langlois, *Bibl. de l'Ecole des Chartes* LX (1899), 572-601, #60 and #89: Autant fait celui qui tient comme celui qui escorche. [B Werner P-39 from the Basel manuscript; cf. Steiner #243. Cf. Schepp p. 20, #219 under "usury" and p. 55 for parallels; Othlo N-30; and M.P.L. 146, col. 262.

PROVERB 34

A (The vernacular proverb omitted in *Digby* 53).

- (A) Li chat set ben ki barbe il lecch(e) (R).  
 B R; PP.  
 Murilegus bene scit/cuius gernoboda lambit. [lambit) suggit PP labit *Douce* fol. 23v.]  
 C PP; P.  
 Scis, catte, cui lingis/barbam, cui murmura fingis. [cui) *Ms. omits.*]  
 (D) Murilegus bene scit/cui barbam lingere sueuit (R). [lingere) lambere P DI CA Tr p. 351, #8; sueuit) suescit P DI CA Ry fol. 13.]  
 (E) Cui barbam mouit/lingendo catus bene nouit (PP P DI). [mouit) *Ms. reads* nouit, fouit PP DI.]

[A M-1063 and M-1064; Fec. Ratis I, 7-Singer I, 67; Salomon and Marcolf 65b-Singer I, 38-40; As a saying of Marcolf see Kemble *Dialogue* p. 61, #39; Vilain 4-Singer II, 97; Steiner #285; Ry fol. 12v, #32 Pantin 22: Well' wote þe catt whoys berde she likes; *Douce* fol. 23v: . . . he lykkys; Wel wote badde wose berde he lickith, Hending II, 4 (C)-Singer III, 138; On *Badde* as a name for a cat see M. Förster *Englische Studien* XXXI, pp. 16-7 and *Anglia* XLII (1918), 202, #16. [B Rustici 43; *Liber Iocalis*, l. 512; Du Cange *Glossarium* s.v. *gernoboda* quotes our proverb and indicates that it applied to the whiskers of a cat or goat. From this we may understand the first meaning was that the cat licks its own whiskers. Later uses of the proverb indicate a second meaning: familiarity with someone great or powerful. [C Werner S-39. (D) Werner M-93. (E) Werner C-143. Cf. *Romania* XXXI, 477; Whiting *Fabliaux* p. 245 and *Reynard* #20; Heywood, *Proverbs* II 9, p. 98; Ap. 87; Tilley C140: The cat knows whose lips (beard) she licks. (When someone goes unpunished and the malefactor fears no authority.)

PROVERB 35

- A (The vernacular proverb omitted in *Digby* 53).  
 (A) Uentre saoul ioiue non cotelete noue (♦).  
 B UP; TO; P.  
 Uenter farcitus/ludit, non ueste politus.  
 (C) Dum uenter plenus/est illi ludus amenus (♦).  
 (D) Uenter letatur/quando fit ille satur (♦).  
 (E) Uenter ouat plenus/cicuis quam ueste serenus (Ry fol. 24v, #12 Pantin 30).

[(A) M-2466; Ry fol. 24v, #9 Pantin 30: Sonner pleyeth the fulle wombe, than feyre clothis; *Douce* fol. 31. [B Werner U-10; Fec. Ratis I, 26-Singer I, 68; Rustici 15. Cf. Tilley M811: Better have meat than fine clothes.

PROVERB 36 (fol. 15, col. 1)

- A (The vernacular proverb omitted in *Digby* 53).  
 (A) Touz iourz sent le pot la sauour. (♦).  
 B UP; TO.  
 Quod noua testa capit/inueterata sapit.  
 C Quo semel est imbuta recens seruauit odorem, testa diu. [testa) *Ms. reads* teste.]

[(A) M-2414.[B Werner Q-204 from Basel manuscript; Fec. Ratis I, 233-Singer I, 85-6: Ex testa qualis fuerit dinoscitur olla; *Liber Iocalis* l. 8; Hervieux III, 478 from the New Avianus: Quod noua testa capit . . . [C Horace, *Ep.* 1, 2, 68-9: Otto testa.

PROVERB 37 (fol. 15, col. 1 among miscellaneous verses)

- A (The vernacular proverb omitted in *Digby* 53).  
 (A) Chiens en cuisine son per n'i desirre.

## B PP.

Dum canis os rodit,/sociari pluribus odit. [sociari) socia PP sociari pluribus) socium quem diligit Ry fol. 3v, #13.]

[(A) M-382; Tr p. 351, #16: Wil þe hund gnash bon, ifere nebe (or nelde) he non. [B Werner D-151 from Basel manuscript; Cf. Fec. Ratis I, 65-Singer I, 130; Rusticorum 158-Singer II, 64; Richard Hill p. 137, #105r, l. 17; Steiner #24. Cf. *Distinctiones Monasticarum*, ed. J. B. Pitra, *Spicilegium Solesmense* III (Paris, 1855), p. 459; M. Förster, p. 8; Richard Hill #37, Latin only; Ap. 162.94; Tilley D462: A dog will endure no companions in the kitchen. (Greedy or ill natured people cannot endure competitors.) and Tilley D518: While a dog gnaws a bone, he hates his fellow.

PROVERB 38 (among miscellaneous verses.)

A (The vernacular proverb omitted in *Digby* 53).

(A) Il nest pas mestier de pendre campane a col a foul (♦).

B UP; TO.

Non opus est follo/suspendere cymbala collo. Ry fol. 23, #4. [follo) stulto Douce fol. 18.]

[(A) M-912; Fec. Ratis I, 732-Singer I, 124: Arguitur fatuo sua tintinnabula amare; Hending II, 16-Singer III, 141: þarf þe neuere hongen belle on bicche-taille. [B Werner N-215 from Basel manuscript; UP fol. 154, TO fol. 184 not among Serlonic verses. Cf. *The Romaunt of the Rose* 5266: A fooles belle is soone runge. The sense of the proverb appears from the preceding line: And fooles can not holde her tunge; Whiting *Chaucer* p. 25; Ap. 224.24; ODP 216: A fool's bell is soon rung; Tilley F 445: As a fool thinks the bell clinks.

PROVERB 39 (among miscellaneous verses.)

A (The vernacular proverb omitted in *Digby* 53).

(A) Laueis chien, peinez chien, tuteveis est chen chen (RK).

B RJ.

Ablue, pecte canem/semper canis est, canis idem,/De cane quod canis est/nec aqua nec pectine tolles.

[(A) In RK this proverb follows after the regular collection of Serlonic verse. It also appears as #302 among the *Prouverbes au Uilain* without Latin. [B Werner A-10 from the Basel manuscript; Fec. Ratis I, 95-Singer I, 72; Kemble *Dialogue* p. 58, #35 from Salomon and Marcolf; RJ fol. 95 (probably copied from *Digby* 53 and not in the original collection of Serlonic proverbs); Steiner #1. Cf. Hending II, 17-Singer III, 141: Sher asse and shrap asse, ne bringest þou neuere asse to gode rodehorse.

PROVERB 40 (fol. 15, col. 1 under the heading *Diuersa Prouerbia* comprising 19 proverbs)

A R; T; H; RK; RJ.

Que oil ne ueit quor ne desiret.

RJ: . . . ne coueit.

B R; PP; T; H; P; DI; CA.

Cor non affectat/oculi quod non nota spectat. [oculi) oculo H; oculi quod non) quod non oculi PP T.]

C R; PP; T; H; P; DI.

Non oculo nota/res est de corde remota. [de) a PP T H P Ry fol. 15, #19.]

D PP; R; T; P.

Cordi raro datur/oculo quod raro notatur.

(E) Qui procul est oculis procul est a lumine corde (Ry fol. 15, #20).

(F) Res oculo uisa/non est a mente recisa (Ry fol. 20v, #18 Douce fol. 29).

- (G) Res raro uisa/procul est a mente recisa (Ry fol. 20v, #19 Douce fol. 29).  
 (H) Obluiscetur/cito uir qui raro uidetur (Ry fol. 15, #15 Douce fol. 25).

[A M-1767; cf. M-1893; Fec. Ratis I 160-Singer I 80; RK 7 adds the Latin proverb: Cor non tristatur,/cum rem non uideatur; See above Proverb 12; Ry fol. 15, #14, Pantin 24: Seldon seyen, son' for geton'; Ry fol. 15, #18, Pantin 24: Ferre from ye, ferre from hert; Hending I, 20-Singer III, 132: Fer from eye fer from herte. [B Werner C-99. [C Werner N-207. [D Werner C-105. [(E) Werner Q-113 from Basel manuscript; Steiner Appendix #16. Cf. *The Proverbs of Alfred*, ll. 483-484, Maidstone manuscript, ed. H. P. South (New York, 1931), p. 122: For he þat is uten biloken/he is inne for-geten. *The Proverbs of Wisdom* p. 244, l. 25; Meech #13; Chaucer *Troilus* IV, 415; IV, 427; *Miller's Tale* I (A) 3392 f.; Richard Hill p. 129, #104, l. 35; Whiting *Drama* p. 84, #24, and p. 108 ff; Otto *oculus* 8: Quantum oculis, animo tam procul ibit amor: Prop. 3, 21, 10; Ap. 476; Ap. 557; Tilley S438: Out of sight out of mind; Tilley S208: Seldom seen soon forgotten.

PROVERB 41

- A R; PP; H.  
 Ceo est dreit que bele femme puite fait.  
 B R; PP; H; P.  
 Cuius forma bona/ueneri sit femina prona.  
 C R; PP; H; P.  
 Quid lex edixit/de formosa? Meretrix sit.  
 D PP; H; P (fol. 15v, col. 1).  
 Ut studeat ueneri/speciose fas mulieri. [studeat) statuatur P.]  
 E R; PP; P; DI.  
 Quo mage formosa/mulier, mage luxuriosa.  
 F Pulcra sit incesta,/mulier sit turpis honesta.  
 G R; PP; H; P.  
 Cui laus debetur/speciei luxuriatur.

[A M-337; Ry fol. 16v, #24, Pantin 25: The smaller peses, þe mo to potte,/The feyrer woman, þe mor' gyglotte; See OED s.v. *giglet*: a wanton silly woman; Rylands fol. 16v, #27 adds a Latin translation of the first line: Quo minor est pisa tanto plures capit olla; Wright *Rel. Ant.* II, 40. [B Werner C-157. [C Werner Q-153. [D Werner U-118. [E Werner Q-186. [F Werner P-145. [G Werner C-145. Cf. Whiting *Drama* p. 14; Otto *forma* 2: Rara est adeo concordia formae/Atque pudicitiae; Juvenal 10, 297; ODP 493; Tilley P 137: The smaller peas the more to the pot, the fairer woman the more giglot.

PROVERB 42

- A R; PP; T; UP; TO; RJ; H.  
 Male buche deit lum luer.  
 UP 1: Male bouche doit on sor loueir.  
 T 32: Male boche doit len oindre.  
 B R; PP; T; UP; TO; P; DI; CA.  
 Os nequam mulce/ne quid sapiat nisi dulce.  
 C PP; H; P; DI.  
 Iurgia ne replicet/os nequam munus amicit.  
 D R; PP; UP; TO; RJ; H; P.  
 Munera compescant/linguam ne iurgia crescant.  
 E PP; P.  
 Os nequam locutant/precio sic crimina uitant. [locutant) lotices PP; precio sic crimina uitant) quod discrimina uites PP.]

[A M-1162 and cf. M-308; RK among the *Prouerbes au Uilain* without Latin #331; Rusticorum 89-Singer II, 43-4. [B Werner O-82. [C Werner I-151. [D Werner M-85. [E Werner O-83. Cf. Tilley K121: Better kiss a knave than be troubled with one.

PROVERB 43

- A R; PP; T; UP; TO; H.  
Ki bien eimet tart le ublie.  
B R; PP; T; UP; TO; H; P; DI; CA.  
Cuius amor uerus/sapor est in pectore serus. [sapor) sopor T; pectore serus) corpore cerus H.]  
C PP; T; H; P.  
Uerus amor uera/si mens obliuio sera. [Uerus) Huius H; si mens) sumens T.]  
D R; PP; T; UP; TO; H; P.  
Uix absentatur/cordi uere quod amatur. [Uix) Non PP T P.]  
(E) Numquam cessator/repperitur uerus amator (R P).  
(F) Sic usus clamat:/"Semper amator amat" (R P).

[A M-1835; RK among the *Prouerbes au Uilain* #309; the French proverb appears twice in the Royal manuscript as #5 with Latin verses B and D, as #32 with Latin verses (E) and (F); Rusticorum 141-Singer II, 59-60: one of the most popular proverbs in many languages. [B Werner C-156. [C Werner V-24. [D Werner N-101. [(E) Werner N-292. [(F) Werner S-136. Cf. The poems of Robert Partes (1162-1172): Si sit amor uerus, capit hic obliuia serus, ed. W. H. Cornog, *Speculum* XII (1937), 233, l. 9; Kadler p. 15; *Cursor mundi* 4510: Qua leli luues, forgettes lat; *La Folie Tristan*, ed. Bedier (SATF) l. 702; Whiting *Chaucer* from Deschamps p. 208; Chaucer *Parliament of Fowls* between ll. 679-80: Qui bien aime a tard oubliie; Whiting *Chaucer* p. 40; Gower *Bal. XXV*; Walz p. 59, #181b; See Grace Frank, 'Proverbs in Medieval Literature' *Modern Language Notes*, (1943), 510; Tilley L542: Sound love is not soon forgotten.

PROVERB 44

- A R; PP; T; RK; CH.  
Main u dout oill u uout.  
R 37: U ea dolor est, la est la main prest.  
T 16: Li mains torne a dolor et li oil a lamor.  
B R; PP; RK; CH; P; DI; CA.  
Proxima langori/manus est et ocellus amori.  
C R; PP; P; DI.  
Clamat ocellus, "Amat."/"Dolet hic," manus anxia clamat.  
(D) Dexter a langorem,/uisus comitatur amorem (P).

[A M-1150 and cf. M-1020 and M-1022; Singer I, 57-8 and cf. Singer II, 76-Rusticorum 201. [B Werner P-132; Fec. Ratis I, 12-Singer I, 67; CH adds in margin: uel idem: ubi cor ibi oculus/ubi dolor ibi digitus; this is the oldest form of the proverb. See Singer I, 57-8; cf. Steiner #247 and #220. [C Werner C-42. [(D) Werner D-72. Cf. *The Ancren Riwele* p. 90: Ubi amor, ibi oculus; Schepp p. 26, #329; Whiting *Drama* p. 146: Ubi animus ibi oculus; Erasmus *Adagia* II, 2, 44; Ry fol. 6, Pantin 17, #12: Euer is my tonge there my tonge akes; #13: Quo dolor est dentis/uersatur lingua dolentis; Tilley E233: The eye will be where love is (ubi amor ibi oculus).

PROVERB 45

- A R; PP; T; UP; TO; RK.  
Ki tut me pramet, ne me pramet.



R 35: Ki tut promet, tut escundet.

T 11: Qui tot me premet, rien ne me done.

B R; PP; T; UP; TO; P.

Que nichil exceptit,/promissio fallere cepit.

C R; PP; T; RK; P.

Qui mihi cuncta dabit/promissor, cuncta negabit.

D PP; RK; P.

Ni cito cuncta dabo,/quid ais nisi cuncta negabo? [Ni cito) Dic ita RK P; ais) aliud RK.]

E R; P.

Queuis pollicitus/queque negat penitus. [Queuis) quod uis R; queque) cuncta R.]

(F) Qui bona promittit/mihi singula non ea mittit (CA).

[A M-2168 and cf. M-2167; Vilain 30-Singer II, 103; Rusticorum 223-Singer II, 81-2. [B Werner Q-8. [C Werner Q-84. [D Werner D-75. [E Werner Q-14. Cf. Draxe 1737: He that promiseth all, deceiveth all; Tilley N272: He that promises too much (all) means nothing.

#### PROVERB 46

A R; PP; T; RK.

Ne mal feire ne creire.

R 39: Chescun se purueie a ki il se descouure.

T 20: Trecheor ne doit lum croire.

B R; PP; T; RK; P; CA.

Cui sunt cura doli,/cui fraus, huic credere noli. [sunt) sit CA; cui) uel CA; huic) uix RK.]

C R; PP; T; P.

Cui nichili iura,/non illi credere cura.

(D) Quisquis agit praeue,/que feret, illa caue! (PP P). [agit) agat PP.]

[A M-1341; RK among the *Prouerbes au Uilain* 121 and 227. [B Werner C-154; cf. Fec. Ratis I, 506-Singer I, 141. [C Werner C-146. [D Werner Q-175. Cf. Whiting *Drama* p. 52, #15; Ebert p. 13, #25 from Hughes Capet; Camden p. 295: Evil will never said well; Publ. Syr. 68: Cave illum semper, qui tibi imposuit semel; cf. Ap. 194.3: He that evil does never good weens; and Tilley E199.

#### PROVERB 47

A PP; RK.

Ki de luinz ueit que aimet de pres se eioist.

B PP; RK; P; DI.

Qui procul aspiciunt/quod amant, prope gaudia fiunt. [Qui) Cum PP RK P DI.]

C PP; P; DI; CA.

Cor prope letatur,/quod amat longe speculatur. [amat longe) amata procul DI.]

[A M-1899: Qui de loin voit de pres joit; Vilain 78-Singer II, 115 and Vilain 246-Singer II, 146; Rusticorum 66-Singer II, 36; the *Proverbes au Vilain* and the *Proverbia Rusticorum* seem to combine this proverb with the next Serlonic proverb, 48: Ki est garniz . . . [B Werner C-182; cf. Steiner #197. [C Werner C-103. Cf. Otto *linea* 3: extrema linea/Amare haud nil est: Ter. *Eun.* 640.

#### PROVERB 48 (fol. 16, col. 1)

A R; PP; T; UP; TO; RK; CH.

Ki est garniz nest pas huniz.

CH under A-34: Acounchié se sent/qui de loing se defent.

B R; PP; T; P; DI; CA.

Qui sibi precauit,/non casus eum superauit. [casus] *Ms. reads* cautus;  
casus eum superauit) illum sors mala strauit P CA.]

C R; PP; T; UP; TO; RK; P; DI.

Qui premuniuit/bene se non dampna subiuit. [non dampna] *Ms. omits;*  
*leaves space.*]

[A M-1923 a; Mi-A34; and see notes to Proverb 47 A; Hending I, 22: Wis is, þat war is. [B Werner Q-125; for use in sermons see Hauréau II, 98 and V, 35; cf. Steiner #200. [C Werner Q-111. Cf. Meech #33; *The Owl and the Nightingale* II. 1225-6; *Handlyng Synne* l. 8084; Richard Hill p. 128, #104, l. 15; Whiting *Drama* p. 103, #31; Otto *pransus*: pransum ac paratum: Publ. Syr. 503; Taylor 144, 154; Ap. 697.25; Tilley H54: Forwarned is forearmed.

#### PROVERB 49

A PP; T; RK; CH.

Forte chose a en "faire lesteet."

B PP; T; RK; CH; P; DI.

Est graue non esse,/fieri quodcumque necesse. [quodcumque) quecumque  
DI CH under F-13.]

(C) Rem graue mutari,/quamcumque necesse parari (PP P DI). [quamcum-  
que) quodcumque DI].

[A M-761 and M-814; cf. Rusticorum 38-Singer II, 25: Besoing ne garde loi.  
[B Werner E-46. [C Werner R-42. Cf. Whiting *Drama* p. 159, #50; Cf. Chaucer  
*Troilus* IV, 1586; *Knight's Tale* I (A) 3041 ff; *Squire's Tale* V (F) 593; Otto  
*necessitas* 4: facis de necessitate virtutem: Jerome *adv. Ruf.* 3, 2; Publ. Syr.  
399 and 425: Necessitas dat legem, non ipsa accipit; Tilley V73: Make a virtue  
of necessity; and N76: Necessity has no law.

#### PROVERB 50

A PP; T; RK; CH.

Meulz ualt un bon atente que malueise haste.

B PP; T; RK; CH; P; DI; CA.

Dat mora consulta/plus quam properatio stulta.

(C) Res bene dilata/melior male re properata (PP T P DI). [dilata) morate  
DI; properata) properate DI]

[A M-1244; Pf. 33; Ry fol. 15, #4, Pantin 24: The more haste, be werse spede;  
*Douce* fol. 25; cf. Steiner #275. [B Werner D19. [C Werner R-46. Cf. Hending  
I, 38: Muchel of his wille abit, þat wel may bolien: Singer III, 135-6; Schepp  
p. 29, #378; Chaucer *Troilus* I, 956: He hasteth wel that wisely kan abyde.  
*The Tale of Melibee*: B 2244 and cf. *Troilus* IV, 1568; Whiting *Chaucer* p. 51  
and p. 62; Lydgate, *Minor Poems* II, 759; Gower *Confessio Amantis* III, 1658;  
Walz p. 3, #5a; Whiting *Drama* p. 139, #45, and cf. pp. 140, 178; Cf. Virgil,  
*Aeneid* V, 710; Cf. *Eccl.* iii, 1; Otto *celeriter* 1: Sat celeriter fieri quidquid fiat  
satis bene. Cf. Otto *mora* 1; Tilley H197: More haste than good speed.

#### PROVERB 51

A R; PP; CH.

Si halt si bas.

CH under D-31: De haut en bas, e de trot au pas.

B R; PP; P; CA.

Sic illum strauit/quem sic fortuna leuauit. [strauit] *Ms. reads* statuit.]

(C) Sic summus nactus,/sic rursus ad ima redactus (PP P). [nactus) uectus PP.]

(D) Taliter en stratus,/qui taliter ante leuatus (PP P DI). [en] ea DI.]

[A M-557; Mi-D31; Fec. Ratis I, 198; Vilain 179-Singer II, 135 and Vilain 219-Singer II, 143; *Proverbs of Wysdom* 34: Clemme nott to hygh, lest þow fall. [B Werner S-131. [C Werner S-134. [D Werner T-4. Cf. Lydgate *Minor Poems* 24; Schepp p. 45-6, #XIVA; Whiting *Reynard* #66; Whiting *Chaucer* from Deschamps p. 213; Whiting *Drama* p. 44, #11 and pp. 75 ff.; Otto, *altus*: . . . tolluntur in altum ut lapsa graviore ruant: Claudian *In Ruf.* I, 20; Publ. Syr. 667; Othlo Q-63; Ap. 102: Who climbs high, his fall is great; Tilley S823: The higher standing, the lower fall.

# PROVERB 52

A R; PP; RK; CH.

Pur nent nad (*for uad*) cunseil ki nul ne creit.

R 45: Fous est ki counsel demande ki creire nel uolt.

RK 47: Pur nent quiert conseil, ki creire nel uolt.

B R; PP; CH; P; DI.

Frustra consulitur/cui nulla fides reperitur. [cui] *Ms. reads nisi.*

C R; PP; RK; P; DI.

Cui non pronus eris,/cur consilium tibi queris?

(D) Consuluisse uolunt/frustra, qui credere nolunt (PP P DI).

(E) Frustra, ni sequitur/credere, consulitur (PP P).

[A M-1678; Mi-P15; Vilain 24-Singer II, 101-2; Rusticorum 110-Singer II, 50. [B Werner F-76. [C Werner C-148. [(D) Werner C-88. [(E) Werner F-77. Cf. Chaucer *Troilus* V, 327 f: But whoso wil nought trowen reed ne loore,/I kan nat sen in hym no remedie; Whiting *Chaucer* from Deschamps p. 209; Ap. 2 and Ap. 115; Tilley V2: In vain he craves advice that will not follow it.

# PROVERB 53

A PP; RK; CH.

Desuz bon seignur prent hume grant colee.

PP: Suz haut seingnor receit . . . .

B PP; RK; CH; P; DI.

Dantur ob ingentes/dominos colaphi uehementes. [uehementes] *Ms. reads uenientes.*

C PP; P; DI.

Sepe refutatur/mage cui maior dominatur.

[A M-1664; Mi-D46; Vilain 252-Singer II, 147; Cf. Singer I, 177: Luxuriant reges, et rustica turba laborat; *Proverbs of Wysdom* 107: Under grete lordis men haue grete strokis. [B Werner D-13. [C Werner S-18. Cf. Otto *rex* 4: Quicquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi: Horace, *Ep.* 1, 2, 14. There are two possible interpretations of the proverb: that even under a good master does a man suffer heavy blows, and that while the great disagree, the common men take the blows.

# PROVERB 54

A PP; RK.

þe stille sue aet gruniende hire mete.

PP: þe stille suwe het þene grunende mete.

Ry fol. 21v, #13: The styлле sowþe etus alle þe draffe (Tr).

B PP; RK; P; CA.

Sus taciturna uorat/dum garrula uoce laborat.

C PP; RK; P.

Sus dape fraudetur/clamosa, tacens sacietur. [fraudetur] fraudatur RK; sacietur] sociatur RK.]

[A See Max Förster, *Englische Studien* 15-8: "gruniende" (from groyn), grunting; cf. RK: Si stille suge fret there grunninde mete; Pantin 29. [B Werner S-209. [C Werner S-206. Cf. Shakespeare *Merry Wives of Windsor* IV, 2: Still swine eat all the draff; Whiting *Drama* p. 191, #63; Taylor 13; Tilley S681: The still sow eats up all the draff. (Spoken to persons who look demurely but are roguish.)

PROVERB 55

A R; PP; RK; CH.

Bel seruise trait pain de main.

B R; PP; RK; P; DI; CA.

Obsequium pronom/trahit ex manibus graue donum. [ex) e R PP CA.]

[A M-244; Mi-B9; RK among the *Prouerbes au Uilain* #160. [B Werner O-12; Based on Horace *Ep.* 1, 18, 10 ff. Cf. Ap. 262: A good servant must have good wages; Tilley H69: Good hand, good hire.

PROVERB 56

A R; PP; UP; TO; RK.

Asurement beit ki sun li ueit.

B PP; RK; P; DI; CA.

Secure gustat/potum cui presto thorus stat. [Secure) Securus P DL.]

C R; PP; UP; TO; RK; P; DI.

Potat ad affectum/qui presto uidet sibi lectum. [presto) prope ♦.]

D R; PP; P.

Cui thorus aptatur/tute ciffus euacuatur. [Cui) Cum R.]

(E) Secure potat/qui sua strata notat (♦).

(F) Pocula tractantur/tute, cum strata parantur (PP P).

(G) Quisquis presto notat/lectum, tute mage potat (PP P).

[A M-128; Vilain 56-Singer II, 109; Rusticorum 143-Singer II, 60-1; Rustici 31; Cf. Ry fol. 6v, #10, Pantin 18: Who so is fer from his disch is nyge his harm. [B Werner S-43. [C Werner P-85. [D Werner C-155. [(F) Werner P-73. [(G) Werner Q-180.

PROVERB 57

A R; PP; T; RK.

Cum pot si prenet.

R 42: Cum lem pot si prenge.

T 34: Comant quil puet se preigne.

B R; PP; T; RK; P; DI; CA.

Ut ualet eueniat;/utcumque potest, ita fiat! [Ut) Ms. reads Cum; ualet) ualet DI; eueniat) eueniet PP; fiat) fiet PP.]

[A M-412. [B Werner U-121. Cf. Whiting *Drama* p. 386, #201: Tel qu'il viendra il le prendra; Tilley T196: Take all things as they come and be content.

PROVERB 58

A R; RK.

Priue seignur fait fol garcun.

PP: Suef seingnur fet fol vassal.

B R; PP; RK; P.

Cum cor mitescit/domini, seruile pigrescit. [Cum) Dum R PP RK P.]

C R; PP; P.

Mens praua seruilis/cum mens mansuescit herilis. [praua) pigra R PP P; cum) si R; mansuescit) Ms. reads suescit, permittescit R; mens) R omits.]

- (D) *Mitis prelatus/facit ignauos famulatus* (R PP P CA).  
 (E) *Miti prauus (h)ero/famulus ualidusque seuero* (PP P).

[A M-1722; Mi-P8: *Provez seynnur fet fou sergaunt*; Vilain 120-Singer II, 125; Rusticorum 49-Singer II, 28-9. [B Werner D-156; Cf. Steiner #190. [C Werner M-27. [(D) Werner M-36. [(E) Werner M-34. Cf. Wright *Political Songs* 165; Whiting *Drama* p. 385, #185 and p. 117, #36; Singer II, 28-9 points out the parallel to the proverb: Intimacy breeds contempt: Taylor 146 and Ap. 203; Chaucer *Melibee* VII, 1686: *over-greet hoomlynesse engendreth dispreisyng*; Whiting *Chaucer* p. 123; Tilley M731: *A sleepy master makes his servant a lout*.

PROVERB 59 (fol. 15, col. 2 among miscellaneous verses)

- A *Uncore nest lespurun fait é ia se testent le*.  
 B P.  
 C *Iam calcitratur/nondum stimulus fabricatur*. [nondum) needum P.]  
 C *Ante repugnatur/calcarum quam stimulat*.

[A M-639: *Encore n'est fet l'esperon, e ja en pet l'asne*; Rusticorum 249-Singer II, 88. [B Werner I-2. Cf. Ap. 125.5: *To cry out before one is hurt*.

PROVERB 60 (fol. 15, col. 2 among miscellaneous verses)

- A PP; H.  
*En iuer plot quant pot, en este quant Du uout*.  
 H 6: *En iour par tout plut, en este ou Deu ueut*.  
 B PP; CH; H; P.  
*Quando potest pluuias/dat hyems cum uult Deus estas*. [pluuias) *Ms. reads pluuiam*; *Quando potest*) *Semper habet H omits dat.*  
 C PP; P.  
*Estas, cum mandat/Deus, ut quit hyems pluuiam dat*. [cum) *Ms. reads non; ut quit*) *Ms. reads unquid.*  
 D PP; H; P.  
*Semper hyems undat,/Deus undans solsticium dat*. [undans) *Ms. reads unus.*  
 H 6: *Semper hyems undat,/cum uult Deus estas abundat*.

[A M-657 and cf. M-1019; Salomon and Marcolf 24, 21-Singer I, 56; Rusticorum 227-Singer II, 84. [B Werner Q-38. [C Werner A-48. [D Werner S-46. Singer II, 84 remarks that this proverb about the weather applies to England more obviously than to France.

PROVERB 61 (fol. 16, top margin, French proverb only)

- A PP.  
*Nest hume ki ne prent sumne*.  
 (B) *Non ut homo uiuit,/quem numquam somnus inuit* (PP P).  
 (C) *Non tibi mos hominis,/uigilandi ni tibi finis* (PP P).

[A M-1363; Rusticorum 197-Singer II, 75. [(B) Werner N-253. [(C) Werner N-245. Cf. Homann p. 47, note 133; Whiting *Drama* p.380, #104; Tilley M249: *A man is known to be mortal by sleep and lust*.

ADDITIONAL PROVERBS from Paris, *Ms. lat.* 6765, fols. 64-65v (P)

PROVERB 62 (fol. 64)

- (A) *Qui contre aguillion rebelle deus fois se point* (M-1873).  
 B *Quando repugnatur/calcarum, bis stimulat*.

[(A) Salomon and Marcolf 25B-Singer I, 36-7: *Current chiefly in France*;

Fec. Ratis I, 570-Singer I, 98; RK among the *Prouerbes au Uilain* #286; Rusticorum 251-Singer II, 89; Kemble *Dialogue* p. 51-2; #18: Salomon: Durum est tibi contra stimulum calcitrare; Marcolf: Bos recalcitrosus pungi debet vicibus binis. [B Werner Q-39; cf. Steiner #59 and #219. Cf. Schepp p. 22, #250 and pp. 36-7, #II; Alain of Lille *Parabolae* 5, 81, 5; Ebert p. 23, #108; Gower *Miroir de l'Omme* 2354-5; Walz p. 21, #62a; Christine de Pisan *Proverbes Mouraulz* #85, ed. Maurice Roy III (Paris, 1896), p. 55; Whiting *Drama* p. 34, #8b; Whiting *Froissart* p. 297, #30; cf. *Acta Apost.* IX, 5 and *Otto stimulus* 1: Adversum stimulum calces: Ter. *Phorm.* 77; Taylor 59; cf. Tilley F433: Folly it is to spurn against the prick.

## PROVERB 63

- (A) Que ne mengue Saint Martin, meine son pelerin (UP fol. 151, TO fol. 181).  
B UP; TO.

Quod non Martinus/comedit, suus hoc peregrinus. [comedit suus hoc) hoc manducat ♦.]

- C Hec non Martino,/sed conueniunt peregrino.

[ (A) M-1771: . . . se manjue ses asnes; Vilain 183-Singer II, 136; Rusticorum 95-Singer II, 45 suggests that the proverb refers to what is left on the fields after Saint Martin's Day, the time of the first frost in November. [B Werner Q-203. [C Werner H-3.

## PROVERB 64 (fol. 64, col. 2)

- (A) Ne hui que her (PP).

- B PP; RK.

Nec quod nunc fit idem, sic sicut nunc (for nec?) ita pridem. [sic] nec RK.]  
Non quod heri fit idem/nec (n<sup>c</sup>) sicut nunc nota pridem.

- C PP; RK.

Contingit fieri/non hodie quod heri. [quod heri) quod fuit heri RK.]

[ (A) Cf. M-2395; cf. Singer I, 49-50 and Singer I, 162: Cras hodieque sumus quod fueramus heri. [C Werner C-93. Cf. Whiting *Drama* p. 87, #25; cf. 2 *Esd.* iv, 5; cf. Ovid *Fasti* 6, 771: Tempora labuntur . . . ; cf. Tilley T343: Times change and we with them: Tempora mutantur et nos mutemur in illis; and Tilley Y31: It is too late to call again yesterday; Tilley D69: Every day is not yesterday.

## PROVERB 65

- (A) Len n'a nul demain (M-1477).

- B Nullus torpescat/sua nec benefacta tepescat.

- C Qui non est hodie, cras minus aptus erit.

[B Werner N-288. [C Werner Q-101: Ovid *Remedium Amoris* l. 94. Cf. Whiting *Drama* p. 375, #14; Chaucer *Melibee* B-2984: Ther is an olde proverbe, quod she, seith that 'the goodnesse that thou mayst do this day, do it,/and abide nat ne delaye it nat til to-morwe'. *Otto dies* 3: Cotidie est deterior posterior dies: Publ. Syr. 103; Tilley T378: Defer not until tomorrow if you can do it today.

## PROVERB 66

(Reddere lentus erit hilaris promissor et audax.

Ad promissa parum credulitatis habet.)

- (A) Entre faire et dire a moult (M-695).

- B Non que uerba iacent,/sed mihi facta placent.

- (C) Actibus et uocis/concordans conpatriotis (DI).

[B Werner N-227; cf. Steiner #149; see notes to Proverb 86.

PROVERB 67 (fol. 64v, col. 2)

(A)1. Passe chien en batel, si te abaira quant vendra a riue (PP).

(A)2. Naige le chien, quant vendra a la rive si rabaira (T).

(A)3. Enrage chien aime si tabai (RK).

B PP; T; RK.

Cimba cani detur:/latrabit ut egredietur. [Cimba) Ciba RK.]

C PP; T.

Anne (for Amne?) canem mina;/grates aget ira canina. [Anne) Amne PP.]

[(A)2. Printed by A. Vernet *Romania* LXXI (1950), 106. [(A)3. M-681; Stengel reads *dune* for *aime*: *Zs. f. fr. Spr. u. Litt.* XXI, 1. [B Werner C-40. [C Werner A-73.

PROVERB 68

(A) Mere que mere (RK).

B PP.

Matri deuotus/non mos a matre remotus. [non) est PP.]

C PP.

Morem maternum/matri placet esse supernum.

D PP.

Matris natura/matris maternaque cura.

[(A) M-1224. [B Werner M-14. [C Werner M-43; RK reads: Morem maternum matri maternaque cura, a combination of C and D. Cf. Tilley M1199: Like mother like daughter.

PROVERB 69

(A)1. Luges atent ke primcs apient (R).

(A)2. Qua prent baiart en denteure si ueut tenir les iours qui dure (UP).

TO 18: . . . tant que il dure.

PP: Que pulain prent en danture tu ses iours li dure.

B PP; UP; TO.

Quem domo mos pullo/ueniens deest tempore nullo. [ueniens) dedero TO; ueniens deest) deest sibi UP deletur PP.]

C R; PP; RK; CA.

Dant stabiles mores/pullo primi domitores.

D R; PP.

Ex quo frenatur,/mos pullo perpetuatur.

[(A)2. M-1765; *Fec. Ratis* I, 653-Singer I, 104-5; Vilain 115-Singer II, 124: Qu'aprent poulain en denteure . . . ; *Rusticorum* 88-Singer II, 43; *Rustici* 71; *Ayen-bite* p. 220: Vor ase me say huo bet takp colte en daunture, hyalde hit wyle berhuyle hit ilest. [B Werner Q-49. [C Werner D-12. [D Werner E-126. Cf. Gower *Miroir de l'Omme* 9445-7; *Whiting Drama* p. 239, #73; For use in sermons see Hauréau II, 282; Tilley T520: The trick the colt gets at his first backing will, while he continues, never be lacking.

PROVERB 70

(A) Solone tens temprure (PP).

B PP.

Ut tempestiue/uiuas, pro tempore uiue!

C PP.

Nil intempestum,/quod in apto tempore gestum.

D PP; CA.

Tempus ut aptatur,/res tempestiua probatur.

[ (A) Vilain 81-Singer II, 115-6. [B Werner U-119, cf. Singer I, 153-4. [C Werner N-63. [D Werner T-23. Cf. Chaucer *Troilus* II, 989; III, 855; and *Friar's Tale* III (D) 1475; Whiting *Drama* p. 245, #75 and p. 75, #19; *Ecclesiastes* iii, 1: *Omnia tempus habent*; Othlo T9 and cf. Publ. Syr. 188: *Feras facilia ut difficilia perferas*; Ap. 634.8: *There is a time for all things*; Tilley T314; Tilley S190: *Everything is good in its season*.

PROVERB 71 (fol. 65)

B Uiribus immensis/taurus datur hostia mensis.

[B Werner V-55.

PROVERB 72

(A) T; UP; TO; RK; CH.

Meuz ualt pres iunchere ke lung praere (R).

B R; T; UP; TO; RK; CH.

Iunci qui prope sunt/pratis que non prope presunt. [presunt) prosunt RK.]

C UP; TO.

Iuncetum prato/superest confine (for affine?) remoto. [confine) affine ♦.]

D R.

Presta magis uoto/prato iunceta remoto.

R 40: Prata magis uoto/presunt quam iuncta remoto.

[ (A) M-1281; Mi-M24; Fec. Ratis I, 183-Singer I, 82; Vilain 236-Singer II, 145; Vilain 266-Singer II, 150; Rusticorum 157-Singer II, 64. [B Werner I-145. [C Werner I-144. [D Werner P-90. Cf. *Proverbs* xxvii, 10: *Melior est vicinus iuxta quam frater procul*. Abailard *ad Astralabum* 85 combines the Bible text and the proverb: *Proximas est melior vicinus fratre remoto*,/Et iuncus prato sic erit utilior; cf. Proverb 26.

PROVERB 73

(A) Fol ne creit ne mais ceo quil ueit (RK).

B PP; CH.

Stultus opinatur/nil esse, nisi uideatur.

C PP; CH.

Nil nisi uisa re/nouit mens stulta notare.

D PP; RK.

Stultus nil credit,/nisi quod uisu sibi cedit. [nil) non RK; uisu) uisus RK; sibi) mihi PP.]

E PP.

Non est mens solida/nisi uisa re sibi fida. [solida) stolidia PP.]

F PP.

Dulce uel inuisum/nichil est stulto nisi uisum. [uel) nil PP; nichil) nil PP.]

[ (A) M-788 and cf. M-982; cf. Mi-F14: *Fol ne creyt si yl ne receyt*; cf. Fec. Ratis I, 89: *Segnius auditis malim quam credere uisis*, and Fec. Ratis II, 367-Singer I, 163. [B Werner S-174 and cf. Steiner #238. [C Werner N-63. [D Werner S-173. [E Werner N-157. [F Werner D-140. Cf. Whiting *Drama* p. 379, #77: *Fol ne croyt . . . recoit*; Otto *oculus* 9: *Homines amplius oculis quam auribus credunt*; Seneca *Ep.* 6, 5; cf. Otto *credere* 3: *omnibus credere et nulli*; Tilley B268: *I will believe it when I see it*; cf. Tilley S212: *Seeing is believing*.

PROVERB 74

(A) PP; UP; TO; RK.

Vyaunde preste, leure en geneste (CH-V6).

UP 24: *N'est pas preste uiande que lieure e genesty.*

PP, RK 35: *Prestre uiande, lieure en genest.*



- B PP.  
Mirteto detur,/presto lepus esus habetur.
- C PP; RK; CH.  
Uepribus inclusus/lepus esce presto sit usus. [esce) ecce RK; sit) fit RK.]
- D PP.  
Silua donata/lepori, lepus esca parata.  
Ry fol. 11, #17: Currens per prata/non est lepus esca parata.
- E PP.  
Siluis ingestus/lepus esus erit tibi prestus. [erit) PP omits.]
- F PP; UP; CH.  
Qui silua latitat,/leporis mensam caro ditat. [leporis) lepus hic UP lepores  
CH-V6; caro) retro UP cito CH-V6; ditat) ditant CH-V6.]
- (G) TO.  
Esca spei modice/lepus est sub fronde mirice (UP).

[ (A) M-1718 and cf. M-1373; Rusticorum 136-Singer II, 58. [B Werner M-33; cf. Steiner #186. [C Werner V-17. [D Werner S-142. [E Werner S-144; Otto *herba* 1: Messis in herba est: Ovid *Her.* 16, 263. [F Werner Q-126. Cf. Werner C-214 from Basel manuscript; cf. Ap. 258: It is good fish if it were caught; and Tilley F-317; cf. ODP 246: God send you readier meat than running hares; Singer II, 58.

#### PROVERB 75

- B Mens ouis et linum/super ostrum corque lupinum.

[B Werner M-26; the *linum super ostrum* may perhaps refer to the mouth painted on the face of an actor. Cf. Chaucer *The Romaunt of the Rose* 7013 ff.: Outward, lambren semen we,/ . . . And inward we, withouten fable,/Ben greedy wolves ravysable; Whiting Chaucer p. 33; cf. *Matthew* vi, 15.

#### PROVERB 76

- (A) "El ad en tine,"/dit le suriz, "que farine" (RK).  
PP: En la cutine ke farine.
- B PP; RK.  
"Non est in tina,"/mus dixit, "sola farina." [dixit) PP omits.]

[ (A) M-627. [B Werner N-154. See Singer I, 93-4. The proverb is based on a fable of Romulus, number LXXII, in G. Thiele, *Der lateinische Aesop des Romulus* (Heidelberg, 1910): the old and tired cat hides in the flour bin to catch the mouse. The proverb is used to indicate a naive person.

#### PROVERB 77

- B PP.  
Qui te formidat,/passer, miluumne strui dat?
- C PP.  
Passere quando datur/timor, haud miluum comminatur.
- D PP.  
Cui passer timor est,/non milio timor est.

[B Werner Q-139. [C Werner P-10 reads . . . *milvum cumeratur* perhaps for *milvus cumeratur*. [D Werner C-149; Heraeus suggests that the kite is not hindered, or hurt, when the sparrow is more to be feared; for the farmer fears the sparrow who may eat his grain, but does not fear the hawk who may eat the sparrow: in *Schriftenreihe der Hist. Vierteljahrschrift* I (1931), 88-9 and cf. *Phaedrus* I, 6.

## PROVERB 78

## (A) PP; TO; RK.

Len dit en reproueir que toziourz aime amis (UP).

PP: Tut dis aime amis.

RK: Tut dis ami amis.

## B PP; RK; CA.

Numquam cessator/reperitur uerus amator.

## C PP; UP; TO; RK.

Sic usus clamat:/"Semper amicus amat."

[(A) M-2409. [B Werner N-292. [C Werner S-136. Cf. *Proverbs* xviii, 24; *Roman de la Rose* (ed. Michel) I, 365: Tous jours aime qui est ami; *The Romaunt of the Rose* 5520: For who is freend, loveth evermore; Whiting *Chaucer* p. 31; Whiting *Froissart* p. 311, #238; Otto *amare* 2: Si vis amari ama; Publ. Syr. 306; cf. ODP 389: Love begets love; cf. Tilley L515: Love is the reward of love; cf. Tilley F745: He that would have friends, must show himself friendly.

## PROVERB 79 (fol. 65v, col. 1)

## (A) PP; T; CH.

Meuz ualt honuree ke uentree (R).

## B R; PP; T; CH; DI; CA.

Prestat honorari/potius quam uentre grauari. [grauari] *Ms. reads gratari*, uorari CH under M-26; potius) multo Ry fol. 9, #9, *Douce* fol. 20.]

## C R; PP.

Uentre magis cure/sit honor! Stat res ita iure.

## D PP.

"Uentri preponor,/si color," inquit honor.

[(A) M-1265; Mi-M26; Rusticorum 236-Singer II, 85-6; Ry fol. 9, #8, Pantin 20: Bettur is worship þan full' wombe. [B Werner P-91. [C Werner V-13. [D Werner V-15.

## PROVERB 80

## (A) R; PP; T; RK.

Si fet ki pot (R).

T: Ensi fait qui miez ne puet.

## B PP; T; DI.

Cui sic posse datur/operandi, sic operatur.

Ry fol. 17v, #18: Hic cui posse datur/sic multociens operatur.

## C R; PP; RK; DI.

Res scio sic gestas/ab eo, cui tanta potestas. [Res] Sic RK.]

## (D) Non est culpandus/facieris quod fit, sed amandus (Ry. fol. 5, #2).

[(A) M-2258 and cf. M-2151 and M-1935; Vilain 146-Singer II, 128-9; Ry fol. 17v, #16, Pantin 26: He þat dothe as kanne, blame hym no man. [B Werner C-153. [C Werner R-65. Cf. Ebert, p. 23, #110; Whiting *Drama* p. 243, p. 378, #69; cf. Otto *modo*: modo sic, modo sic; cf. *Petron* 45; Tilley M220: A man can do no more than he can; Singer II, 129: the proverb based on the legal maxim: *Impossibilium nulla obligatio est*. Dig. l. 17, 185.

## PROVERB 81

## (A) Hume ne set qu'il ad, tresqu'il ne nad (PP).

## B DI; PP.

Nescit homo, quid sit/quod habet, si non prius absit. [homo quid sit) quid sit homo PP; habet) habit PP.]

[(A) See also M-391; Vilain 63-Singer II, 111; cf. Rusticorum 116-Singer II, 52. [B Werner N-47. Cf. Seneca *Consolatio ad Marciam* 16, 6: . . . nihil magis placeat quam quod amissum est. "You don't know what you have until you have lost it."

PROVERB 82

(A) R; RK.

"Chescun pur sei," dist le pucin (R).

B R; PP; DL

Hec si queris que/Pulcinus ait: "Sibi quisque." [Hec) Et PP; Pulcinus) Pulcillus R.]

C R; PP; RK; DL

"Quisque sibi," dixit/Pulcinus: "Sic uolo, sic sit." [Pulcinus) Pulcillus R Pulus RK; sit) fit RK.]

[(A) M-359. [B Werner H-5; cf. Steiner #90. [C Werner Q-173 and cf. Juvenal 6, 223: hoc volo, sic iubeo. Cf. Chaucer *The Knight's Tale* I, 1181 f.: And therefore, at the kynges court, my brother,/Ech man for hymself, there is noon oother; Whiting *Chaucer* p. 78; Whiting *Drama* p. 114, #34; Ap. 189; Tilley M112: Every man for himself.

ADDITIONAL PROVERBS from Digby 65, fol. 77v (DI)

PROVERB 83

(A) PP; CH

Ki fol enuoit a mere, ne poisson ne el (PP).

B PP; CH

Stultum pisce mare/non ditat non alia re. [non) uel CH under Q-53.]

[(A) M-1947; Mi-Q58; Vilain 100-Singer II, 121 and Vilain 260-Singer II, 149. [B Mi-Q58. Cf. Whiting *Drama* p. 138, #44; cf. Tilley F503: Send a fool to the market and a fool he will return again; cf. Tilley F460.

PROVERB 84

B Numquam ridebit/solus solusue dolebit.

Cf. *Proverbs* xiv, 13; cf. Othlo R-9: Risus dolore miscetur, et extrema gaudii occupat luctus.

PROVERB 85

B Actibus et uocis/concordans compatriotis.

[A Cf. M-695: Entre faire et dire a moult. [B See Proverb 67. Cf. *The Romaunt of the Rose* 7099 ff., 15190; Chaucer *Canterbury Tales* General Prologue, 741-2: Eek Plato seith, whoso that kan hym rede,/The wordes moote be cosyn to the dede. F. N. Robinson ed. (1933) note p. 770: "The reference is to the Timaeus 29B; Chaucer's knowledge of the passage may come from Boethius iii, pr. 12 . . ."; Cf. *The Manciple's Tale* IX, 207-8; and Boece III, pr. XII, 225 ff.; Whiting *Chaucer* pp. 77, 130, 41; Schepp p. 55; Whiting *Drama* p. 78, #20, and cf. p. 185, #61; Otto *facere* 3: factum, non fabula. Othlo D-70; N-36 and cf. *I John* iii, 18; Cf. Ap. 155.18; Tilley D402: It is better to do well than to say well.

ADDITIONAL PROVERBS from Cambridge, Ms. Gonville and Caius 136, fol. 69 (CA)

PROVERB 86

(A) Il ne vait pas dou tout a honte qui de mi-voie se retourne (M-944).

B Hic male procedit/qui postea non retrocedit.

[ (A) Cf. M-312, M-1850 and M-907; cf. Rusticorum 202-Singer II, 76-7; cf. Rusticorum 241-Singer II, 87. Cf. Tilley T620: He will turn rather than burn.

## PROVERB 87

(A) Bele la me fai, bele la te ferai (M-223).

B Si mihi des, tibi dem;/redit et illud idem.

[ (A) Cf. M-1668, M-2156 and M-2321; Rusticorum 37-Singer II, 25; Ry fol. 5, #20, Pantin 17: zeue me and I the, and so shull' we frendes be. Cf. Gower *Vox Clamantis* III, 800; Walz p. 9, #26; Cf. *Luke* vi, 31, *Matthew* vii, 2; For references to Otto, see Proverb 9; cf. Ap. 337 and Ap. 100: Claw me claw thee; Tilley KI: Ka me, ka thee.

## PROVERB 88

(A) Par petit pertruiz voit on son ami (M-1598).

B Possumus in minimis/dilectos cernere rimis.

(C) Per speculum modicum/speculatur amicus amicum (Ry fol. 29v, #17).

[ (A) Vilain 153-Singer II, 130; Ry fol. 21v, #16, Pantin 29: Thorow a lytell' hole a man may se his frende. [ (C) Richard Hill p. 132, #105a, l. 50: At a lytill hole, a man may se his frende./Ad speculum modicum/speculatur amicus amicum. Cf. Chaucer *The Wife of Bath's Tale* III (D) 1203 f.: Poverte a spectacle is, as thynketh me,/Thurgh which he may his verray freendes see; cf. Tilley D99: One may see day at a little hole.

## ADDITIONAL PROVERBS from Ms. Royal XIII A IV, fols. 84-85 (R)

## PROVERB 89

A Apres le rei uait la lei.

B Lex sequitur regem/uincit conuentio legem.

[A M-422: Con vicut li rois si va la loys; Fec. Ratis I, 243; Vilain 175-Singer II, 134; Rusticorum 104-Singer II, 47. Cf. Draxe 1153; Based on Justinian *Institutes* I, 2, 6: Quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem; cf. Frederick Pollock and F. W. Maitland *The History of the English Law* I (Cambridge, 1923) 173; Tilley K72: What the king wills that the law wills. (Laws are expounded as the king thinks good).

## PROVERB 90

A PP; UP; TO.

Aise fet larron.

B PP.

Commoditas facti/prauī causam facit acti.

(C) PP; UP; TO; DI.

Commoditas causa/quod mens ad furta sit ausa (♦). [Commoditas) Est requies *Douce* fol. 17; causa) facti causa DI; quod) qua DI *Douce* omits.]

[A M-39; Mi-L28; RK among the *Prouerbes au Uilain* #182; Rusticorum 179-Singer II, 70-1: French or German origin; *Hali Meidenhad* 22, 230: Me seið þat eise makeð þeof; *Douce* fol. 17. [B Cf. Werner M-77 from Basel manuscript. Cf. Camden p. 308: The posterne door makes theefe and whore; Singer compares Sallust *Jugurtha* 6, 3, but allows for possible Germanic origin; cf. Ap. 21; Tilley 071: Opportunity makes the thief; Tilley B21: The back door robs the house.

## PROVERB 91

A Plus couent al cheual ke leesperun.

B Plus debetur equo/calcarī iudicis equo (Ry fol. 7v, #27).

[A Cf. Singer I, 154. [B The Latin seems to read: It is better to be trampled on by a horse than by the justice of a judge. By supplying the words *quam homini* before *iudicis equo* the verse might read: More is owing to a horse than the spur, just as more is owing a man than the justice of a judge. On the play on *equo* (a) *equo* see the *De Differentiis* of Serlo: *Non est dignus equo cui carior est equus aequo*; printed by Hauréau, *Notices et Extraits des Manuscrits* XXVIII, Partie 2 (1878) 430.

PROVERB 92

A PP.

Co quide le lere ke tuz scient sis frers.

B PP.

Fur semper retur/quod quisque sibi similetur.

(C) Hoc rentur fures/quod fratres sunt sibi plures (PP).

[A M-317 and M-316; Vilain 23-Singer II, 101; Rustici 19. [B cf. Werner E-22 from Basel manuscript. Cf. Tilley T116: The thief thinks all are of his condition.

PROVERB 93

A Poure home nad lei.

B Nescit lege regi/paupertas dissona legi.

[A M-1712; Vilain 86-Singer II, 116-7. Cf. Whiting *Fabliaux* p. 248; Whiting *Drama* p. 375, #11; Tilley M486: A poor man's tale cannot be heard.

PROVERB 94

A Meuz ualt a cur nestre ke de bons estre.

B Moribus ornari/prestat quam rege creari.

[A M-1238: Mieiz vaut a bon ore nestre que de bons estre; Rusticorum 166-Singer II, 66. Cf. Whiting *Drama* p. 376, #35. See notes to Proverb 8.

PROVERB 95

A UP; TO; CH.

Ne a fur baer na fol tencer.

UP: Na foul paier na fien baer.

B UP; TO.

Non fatuum fatu/nec furnum uincit hiatu.

[A M-1325; Mi—under the letter N: N'en puis beer n'a fou tencer; RK among the *Prouerbes au Uilain* #282; Fec. Ratis I, 346; cf. Singer I, 154-5 and Singer III, 47-8; *The Owl and the Nightingale* 289: bat me ne chide wiþ þe gidie/Ne wiþ þan ofne me ne gonie. [B Werner N-169 from the Basel manuscript. Cf. Ap. 243.2; Tilley G33; ODP 233: A man ought not to chide with a fool nor gape over an oven. There is reason to think that in the twelfth century proverb the French *fur* and the Latin *furnum* meant "dung heap" rather than "oven".

PROVERB 96

(A) En plein mine de cuider ne ad plein puin de sauer (PP).

B PP.

In modi(c)o rendi/non est uola plena sciendi.

[ (A) Rusticorum 222-Singer II, 81; M-702. [B Richard Hill p. 131, #105a, l. 32: In a busshell of wynnyng, ys not a hondfull of cunnyng./In modico rendi/non est uola plena sciendi. Cf. Ap. 73; Tilley B744: In a bushel of winning is not a handful of cunning. (Beginner's luck.)

ADDITIONAL PROVERBS from Dublin, Ms. Trinity College B.3.5,  
fols. 273v-274 (PP)

PROVERB 97

- A Mai ne uait ke ne reuenge.
- B Sic abscessurus/maius est si non redivurus.
- C Nam sic maius quod rursus non remeabit.

[A M-1365; Langlais *Bibl. de l'Ecole des Chartes* LX (1899) 572-601, #337: Il n'est mois qui ne revienigne. Cf. Whiting *Froissart* p. 299, #78. Cf. Tilley T369: If today will not tomorrow may.

PROVERB 98

- A Euir is min eye i þe woðe leie.
- B In quam delectant/illic mea lumina spectant.
- C Mente quod affecto/mentis quo lumine specto.
- D Lumina spectant te/quicumque loci teneant te.
- E In te ducente/me lumina fixa uidente te.

[A Singer I, 58 quotes the English verses from Brown *English Lyrics of the Thirteenth Century* (Oxford, 1932) p. xi: Euer is þe eie to þe wude leie,/þerinne is þet ich luuie, taken from the text of *The Ancren Riwele* ed. Morton p. 96. The English verses are quoted in Odo of Cheriton, Fable 22, ed. Hervieux IV, 195: the wolf who became a monk. R. M. Wilson, *The Lost Literature of Medieval England* (New York, 1952) p. 135 suggests that the lines may be from a lost English poem about Isengrim, perhaps dating from the thirteenth century. The verse appears only in the Dublin manuscript and is probably a late addition to the Serlonic corpus.

PROVERB 99

- A De sech busche cler fu.
- B De siccis linguis/clarus componitur inguis.

[A Cf. M-2469: Verte buche fait chault feu; cf. Vilain: Torte buche fest dreit feu, Le Roux de Lincy II, 464. Cf. Tilley W740: Old wood best to burn. . . .

PROVERB 100

- A Suf se chastie ki par altre se chastie.
- B Corripitur lene/pene metuens aliene.
- C Alterius penis/fit castigacio lenis.

[A M-2265 and M-314; Rusticorum 248-Singer II, 88. [C Werner A-67. Cf. Chaucer *Troilus* III, 329: For wyse ben by foles harm chastised; Richard Hill p. 132, #105a, l. 36: He is wysse, þat can beware by an oþer manys harme. Felix, quem faciunt aliena pericula cautum; Whiting *Drama* p. 281, #82, and p. 377, #43; Publ. Syr. 150, and Othlo C 28: Ex alieno periculo sapiens se corrigit et amendat, and Othlo T 30; Tilley N114: Better learn from your neighbor's scathe than your own; M615: It is good to beware by other men's harms; M612.

PROVERB 101

- A Veil peche fat nouele hunte.
- B Fert antiquatus/noua sepe pudenda reatus.

[A M-2481; Fec. Ratis I, 136-Singer I, 134: Antiqua enituere nouo commissa rubore; cf. *Ysengrimus* IV 167; cf. Vilain-Singer II, 102 who quotes our proverb with parallels. Cf. Whiting *Chaucer* p. 151: Langland VII, 5115f.; Tilley S471: Old sin breeds new shame.

PROVERB 102

- A Ne let naut þin olde frende for þe newe.  
B Non erit antiquo/nouus ante colendus amico.

[A Cf. Fec. Ratis I, 190-Singer I, 115: Non callem ueterem, non obliuiscere amicum; cf. Werner N-40. Cato's *Distichs*: Love better a known friend than a stranger: Early English Text Society 117, Original Series, p. 572; cf. Richard Hill p. 47, #56: An old sawe hath be fownd trewe:/Cast not away thyn old for newe; Alanus de Insulis *Parabolae* 1, 13; cf. Tilley F752: Keep well thy friends when thou has gotten them.

PROVERB 103

- A Ðan ich am dede mak me kaudel.  
B Fac mihi caudellum/post mortis funebre bellum.  
C Ni spes obstaret/cor sepe dolore tibi paret.

Cf. Chaucer *Troilus* V 741 ff.: But al to late comth the letuarie/Whan men the cors unto the grave carie; Tilley C196: When I am dead make me a caudle. (Be kind to me when I am alive, for I shall not be better for your presents when I am dead.)

PROVERB 104

- A Pur manger deuez cumbatir, pur femme tencer.  
B Pro dape pugnetur/pro coniuge lis agitur.

[A Rusticorum 80-Singer II, 41 explains the proverb as meaning that one should strive for his woman with words, and battle for his food with his fists.

PROVERB 105

- A De poi petit.  
B De modico modicum/dando retinebis amicum.

[A M-539: De petit petit et de assez assez; cf. Rusticorum 203-Singer II, 77. Cf. Otto *nihil* 1: Nihil ex nihilo: Boeth. *Consol. Phil.* 5, 1; cf. Tob. iv, 9; Tilley L363: Of a little take little; Ap. 372.

ADDITIONAL PROVERB from Ms. Troyes 645, fol. 98 (T)

PROVERB 106

- A Des cotes rit qui sun damage voit.  
B De cubitis ridet/qui sua dampna uidet.

[A M-400; printed by Vernet *Romania* LXXI (1950) 108; Rusticorum 190-Singer II, 73. Cf. Homann p. 41, note 119; Whiting *Drama* p. 264, #78; Tilley L93: He laughs that wins. (Spoken when people laugh at your loss or trouble.)

ADDITIONAL PROVERB from Ms. Uppsala C523, fol. 149 (UP)

PROVERB 107

- A TO.  
Tout est ale quamque Berte (*changed to Berta*) file.  
B TO.  
Usus deleuit/quod Berte dextera neuit.

[A M-2397; Fec. Ratis I, 241-Singer I, 87-8: current chiefly in North Italy: Hoc quoque cum multis abiit, quod Bertheca neuit; Ovid *Met.* 14, 310: Hoc quoque cum multis. Bertheca or Bertha is used as a familiar name for an old woman in Italy according to Singer. Cf. E. Muret, 'La Legende de la Reine Berthe,'

*Schweitz. Archiv f. Volksk.* XXX (1897) I 284-317: Bertha, widow of Rudolph II of Transjurane Burgundy, founded a Clunaic Abbey at Payerne, in the Canton of Vaud, in 961-2. The queen at her spinning wheel is a folk heroine of Western Switzerland. There is possible conflation with the story of a fay, Berchta, of German Switzerland and Bavaria, who appears between Christmas and Twelfth Night to punish negligent spinners. Cf. Taylor 155. (The proverb means: The old days, the old ways.)

ADDITIONAL PROVERBS from Cheltenham Ms. *Phillips* 8336, p. 424f (CH)

#### PROVERB 108

- A A voyde mayn voyde priere (under A-63).  
 (B) (Latin proverb omitted).

[A Morawski includes the French proverb among the collection of Serlonic verses; cf. M-576 and M-2105; Mi-D30; Vilain 70-Singer II, 113. [(B) Werner Q-149: Qui uult parua dare/non debet magna rogare from the Basel manuscript; cf. Steiner #115 and #253. Cf. Whiting *Chaucer* from Deschamps p. 216: De uide main la sourde oreille; Whiting *Drama* p. 375, #11; Draxe 1499: Emptie hands deserve no prayer; John of Salisbury *Policraticus* V, 10 speaks of the proverb as old; Otto *lucrum* 2: Necesse est facere sumptum, qui quaerit lucrum: Plautus, *Asin.* 217; ODP 463: Nothing for nothing; cf. Tilley M397: To grease a man in the fist.

#### PROVERB 109

- A Voyde chaumbre fet fole dame (under V-1).  
 B Parua penus mentem/domine facit insipientem (under V-1).

[A M-2500; Fec. Ratis I, 152; RK among the *Prouerbes au Uilain*, #139; Le Roux de Lincy II, 462; Rusticorum 3-Singer II, 12-3: Voide grange . . . [B Cf. Werner I-72 from the Basel manuscript. Cf. Kadler p. 22; Ap. 25 and Ap. 182.11; Tilley W18: Bare walls make giddy housewives; Tilley C220: Empty chambers make foolish maids. (Make women play the wanton.)

### APPENDIX

The following five proverbs appear in the lower margins of *Digby* 53. There is no evidence that they belong in the corpus of Serlonic verse.

#### Proverb i (fol. 10)

- A Þar þe childe is kings and þe iuerl is Alderman and þe wale is biscop, wa þene lede.  
 B Unde uersus:  
     Ue populo cuius puer est rex, censor agrestis,  
     Externus antistes: hii mala multa mouent.

[A This version of the proverb points out the evil time when a foreigner is bishop. See M. Förster *Englische Studien* XXXI (1902) p. 19, a note on *wale*. I believe that the proverb points to the years between 1143 and 1154, from the time that Henry II first came to England at the age of ten and the time of his coronation. For a parallel proverb see M. R. James, *Suffolk Institute of Archaeology* XXII (1946) p. 94: Ipswich Public Library Ms. 6, fol. 178. Cf. Ry fol. 15v, #15, 16-Pantin 24: þere childe is kyng/and clerke bysshop,/And chorle reue/all is greue. For a French version see M-589: Dolente la terre que enfe gouverne. [B Cf. British Museum, *Additional Ms.* 26770, fol. 120 (fourteenth century): Infans cum sit rex et agrestis presul abit lex./Cum dux seruus erit, lex sine lege perit. Cf. Ry fol. 15v, #17, 18: Quando puer regnat et clerus pontificatur,/Seruus preficitur,



prouincia tota grauatur; and *Douce* fol. 25. Cf. Shakespeare *Richard III* II, 3: Woe to the land that's govern'd by a child; *Ecclesiastes* x, 16: Ve tibi, terra, cujus rex puer est, et cujus principes mane comedunt; *Othello* V-21: Vae ciuitati cuius rex iuuenis est; Prologue to *Piers The Plowman* between ll. 191-2, ed. W. W. Skeat (Oxford, 1906); Tilley W600: Woe to the land whose king is a child.

Proverb ii (fol. 14v and fol. 16, col. 2)

A De dous mals le meins mal.

B Cum duo contingunt aliquando pericula dura,  
Ex illis facimus minus et leuius nocitura.

[A M-486; Mi-D6: De deux maus deyt len elire le meyndre; RK among the *Prouerbes au Uilain* #319; *Rusticorum* 199-Singer II, 76; and Singer I, 175-6. [B Cf. Werner S-118: . . . Beda docet. from the Basel manuscript; Chaucer *Troilus* II, 470: Of harmes two, the lesse is for to chese. Cf. Schepp p. 18, #188 and pp. 44-5, XIII; Whiting *Reynard* #102; Whiting *Chaucer Fabliaux*, p. 245 and from Deschamps p. 213; Whiting *Drama* p. 155, #49; cf. Otto *malum* 3: Cicero, *De officiis* 3, 1, 3 and Jerome *Adv. Ruf.* i, 11; Taylor 61; Tilley E207: Of two evils choose the least.

Proverb iii (fol. 15, col. 1)

A De hoste e de pluie apres tert iur ennuie.

B Hospitis et pluuiie tedia post tridie.

C Uel aliter:

Post triduum resides/fetebunt piscis et hospes.

(D) Post tres sepe dies/uilescit piscis et hospes,  
Ni sale conditus,/uel sit ueteratus amicus (Ry fol. 9, #14, 15, Pantin 20).

[A M-1562. [C Werner P-83 from Basel manuscript. Cf. Otto *hospes*: Plaut. *Mil. Glor.* 741; Tilley F310: Fresh fish and new come guests smell by that time they be three days old; Common in many lands: see introduction to S. G. Champion *Racial Proverbs* (London, 1938) p. XXV.

Proverb iv (fol. 15, col. 2)

A Letire (L'heure ?) despuruue semble beste cornue.

[A Signifies perhaps that the hour which finds one unready can be as dangerous as a horned beast.

Proverb v (fol. 16)

A Apres la feste Saint Thomas bele fille tuche la sarz.

B A festo Thome taratanthara filia tange.

[A M-114; On *sarz*, *saaz* for sieve—*tarantorium* see P. Meyer, *Romania* XXIV (1895) 171: old French glosses in B.N. Ms. lat. 8246. [B Quoted by Du Cange s.v. *taranthara*; J. H. Mozley *Medium Aevum* XI (1942) 11, #72: Ad festum Thome tarantantara filia tange/Ut possis niueam tarantarizare farinam; Cf. André Wilmart 'Le Florilège de Saint-Gatien' *Revue Bénédictine* XLVIII (1936) 32, #198.

# <Tractatus Secundus Guillelmi Alvernensis

*De Bono et Malo.* >

J. REGINALD O'DONNELL C.S.B.

## I. THE MANUSCRIPTS

A—Oxford, Balliol College, Ms. 287, fols. 29<sup>v</sup>–57<sup>r</sup>. Parchment, 15th century, 300mm x 210mm, written in one column 200mm x 130mm. Quaternios with *voces reclamantes*, 40 lines to the column. Ink is light brown; blue and red *initialia*, blue paragraphing. A large lettrine has been neatly excised from folio 2<sup>r</sup>. The manuscript has been fairly carefully corrected. It bears the following notice: *Liber domus de Balliolo in Oxoniense ex dono Magistri Ricardi Bole archidiaconi Eliensis quondam socii dicte domus*. Richard Bole is listed as archdeacon of Ely for the 12th of February 1466 in J. LeNeve, *Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae* III (Oxford, 1854), p. 351.

B—Oxford, Balliol College, Ms. 207, fols. 216<sup>v</sup>–233<sup>r</sup>. Parchment, 15th century, 460mm x 310mm, written in 2 columns 330mm x 71mm a column. Quaternios marked *abc* etc. on lower right margin. Ink is black; gold, red, blue, rose, orange, yellow and white in the lettrines; paragraphing alternating red and blue. A notice reads: *Liber domus de Balliolo in Oxoniense ex dono Willelmi Gray Eliensis episcopi*. According to LeNeve, *Fasti Eccl. Angl.* I, p. 339, William Gray was consecrated bishop of Ely in 1454, installed 1457 and died 1479.

In the edition of the first treatise of the *De Bono et Malo*, published in *Mediaeval Studies* VIII, (1946), 245–299, I gave a brief description of the manuscripts based on microfilm copies; since then I have had the good fortune to be able to examine the manuscripts themselves. I should like to thank the authorities of Balliol College for their gracious hospitality. Both manuscripts are beautifully done, especially Ms. B. Of the two, A carries the better text, both because it has been corrected and because of the fact that B abounds in homoeoteleuta. Both manuscripts belong to a single family, perhaps copied from the same exemplar; but I have no evidence to prove the fact other than to allege their great similarity, even in corrupt passages. Scholars are looking forward to the publication of the catalogue of the manuscripts of Balliol College being done by Professor R. A. B. Mynors; it is carefully and eruditely prepared and contains many precisions possible only after long research.

## II. THE EDITION

The first difficulty facing an editor of the present treatise is to determine a title. Following N. Valois, *Guillaume d'Auvergne, sa Vie et ses ouvrages*, (Paris, 1880), p. 181, some scholars have given it the name *De Paupertate spirituali*; the theme of spiritual impoverishment forms a large part of the discussion; consequently the title would be apt enough. Other writers have not seen fit to separate it from the *De Bono et malo*. If we are to believe William of Auvergne's own words, he considered the *De Bono et malo* as a separate treatise. He writes: *Jam autem audivisti intentionem meam de bono et malo et declarationes meas de utriusque intentionibus in tractatu singulari de eis, De Universo*, IIaIIae, c.1, (Orléans, 1674–5), p. 844a. In the present treatise, in which he refers to the *De Bono et malo* as another tractate (*in alio tractatu*), he intends, as he says, to continue his study of evil in a new vein: *de malo quod sola perfecte sentit et fugit gratia* and *mala morum*. From the very outset William makes it

clear that he is discussing evil in a new light, namely in the order of conduct and grace, yet at the same time insisting that it is a sequel to the *De Bono et malo*. For this reason I have thought it worthwhile to depart from tradition and to assign to it the above title, since it seems more in accordance with the author's own words. I should like to note that the excision on folio 2<sup>r</sup> did not show up on the microfilm; the manuscript originally read: *Incipit tractatus* etc.

At times it has been necessary to emend the text. Square brackets [ ] enclose words or letters which, it seems, ought to be suppressed; pointed brackets < > indicate an addition by the editor.

The whole treatise has been written or copied with but a single indication of a chapter heading, which is noted in the proper place. I thought it might be convenient for the reader to introduce, without any manuscript authority, an approximate division of the text. Based on these divisions, I submit a tentative table of contents. Many of the divisions overlap. The nature of William's composition does not lend itself readily to divisions; his style is both repetitious and disordered. Often he embarks upon a theme, turns to another and finally finds his way back to the original topic.

For a study and bibliography on William of Auvergne consult E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, Part 6, ch. 3, (New York, 1955), pp. 658-60.

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#### <MALI DESCRIPTIO>

Quoniam in alio tractatu,<sup>1</sup> videlicet quem de bono et malo scripsimus, declaravimus malum omne, quod sentit et fugit per semetipsam naturaliter omnis natura, esse aut destructionem ipsius esse aut laesionem aut oppressionem aut inquietationem sive molestationem, consequens est, ut de malo, quod sola perfecte sentit et fugit gratia, eo quidem modo qui gratiae congruit, disseramus; hoc est, ut non philosophando per viam probationis, sed magis narrando per viam explicationis et explanationis procedamus. Ibi<sup>2</sup> siquidem certum fecimus malum omnis mali esse ipsum non esse et propter istud omne quod est, et destructionem ipsius esse, quales sunt corruptio et mors, et laesiones, quales sunt vulnus et aegritudo, et oppressiones, quales sunt carcer et vincula, et molestationes, quales sunt dolores et damna fugere et declinare. Destructio enim non<sup>3</sup> alia de causa fugitur nisi quia via est ad ipsum non esse; laesio vero atque oppressio molestatio ipsius, non nisi quia approximant<sup>4</sup> ad ipsum non

<sup>1</sup> Cf. my edition in *Mediaeval Studies*, VIII (1946), 247-299.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. especially 257-8 of the above edition.

<sup>3</sup> non enim B.

<sup>4</sup> approximant B.

esse. Omne enim, quod suum esse<sup>4a</sup> habet integrum<sup>5</sup> illaesusque atque liberum (217') et quietum, immune est ab omni malo nec dubium est illud ex modis omnibus bene se habere eidemque ex omni parte bene esse. Et ista quattuor ibi<sup>6</sup> diligentius tractavimus quae proprie mala naturae, non quorum natura sit causa, sed ex modo, quo diximus, accipienda sunt.

Reliqua vero mala, quorum hic explanationem et enumerationem aggredimur, mala morum, quia scilicet moribus adversantur et in bonitate perfecti mores ea soli declinant, fugiunt et evadunt, merito nominantur. Quae licet a paucis et finitis radicibus incipiant et extenduntur in immensum et supra numerum multiplicantur. Judicia enim Domini, quibus damnata est merito praevaricationis humana natura, *abyssus multa* in Psalmo<sup>7</sup> et in Jeremiae XVII<sup>8</sup>: *Pravum est cor hominis et inscrutabile, et quis cognoscet illud?* Et alia translatio habet ibidem: *Profundum est cor hominis.*<sup>9</sup> Et Sapientiae XIX<sup>10</sup>: *Apparuit campus germinans de profundo.* Immo et de hoc Aristoteles<sup>11</sup>: Bonum determinatum, malum vero infinitum. Et Seneca<sup>12</sup>: Rectitudo finita, error vero immensus. Et manifestum est quia sanitas una est et finita, aegritudinum autem nec finis nec numerus. Sic unitas et aequalitas determinatae sunt et finitae. Multitudo autem et inaequalitas in infinitum abeunt. Sic bonitas et gratia certae sunt et determinatae omni modo, malitia autem infinita. Haec est enim infernus et mors, Habacuc II:<sup>13</sup> *Dilavit quasi infernus animam suam et quasi mors non adimpletur.* Hoc est os angustum et non habens fundamentum subter se, de quo Job XXXVI<sup>14</sup>. Hic est saccus pertusus de quo Aggaeus I<sup>15</sup>: *Qui congregavit merces misit eas in saccum pertusum.* Omnis enim malitia et saccus est, qui nec impleri potest, sicut infra<sup>16</sup> narrabimus, et nihil eorum quae ibi mittuntur custodiens.

#### <MORUM MALUM>

Possumus et mala morum juxta praedictam divisionem distinguere. Malum enim omnis mali quod invenitur in moribus non est nisi primi et incommutabilis boni, quod Deus est, desertio sive amissio sive carentia sive ab illo aversio aut separatio. Et hoc sic certum facimus. Hoc enim solo posito ponitur malum in moribus et hoc so-(29')-lo<sup>17</sup> removetur totaliter; salvato enim in moribus obtentu primi boni sive ipsum adhaerere ei quod bonum est, teste Psalmista.<sup>18</sup> Salvato, inquam, omni modo, hoc est, nec destructo nec laeso nec oppresso nec turbato, salvi sunt boni mores et salva est bonitas morum per omnia. Obtento enim integro et incommutabili bono sive per modum viae sive per modum patriae obtento etiam illaese, libere et quiete, nemo dubitare potest obtinentem non solum bonum esse obtentu et participatione ipsius, quin etiam manifestum est ipsum pro modo obtentus<sup>19</sup> aut modo viae aut modo patriae esse beatum.

In bonis autem et beatis salvi sunt boni mores et salva est per omnia bonitas morum. Objectionem autem primi et universalis boni tunc destructam dicimus, cum gratia et donum, quo ei adhaeremus, extincta est, cum foedus amicitiae ruptum est in transgressione mandatorum ipsius; tunc laesam, cum adeo debilis est ipsa adhaerentia nostra ad ipsum, ut nos avertere non sufficiat ab his quae fecit, sicut legitur Job XXXIII<sup>20</sup>: *instruit disciplina ut avertat hominem ab his quae fecit*, cum non praevalet elevare a pavimento temporalium bonorum, quod

<sup>4a</sup> est A.

<sup>5</sup> integrum habet A.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. supra note 2.

<sup>7</sup> Ps. xxxv, 7.

<sup>8</sup> Jer. xvii, 9.

<sup>9</sup> St. Jerome, *Comm. in Jeremiam Prophetam*, III, 17; PL 24, 819B.

<sup>10</sup> Sap. xix, 7.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Averroes, *In II Mor. Nich.* 6, t.c. un. (Venice, 1574), p. 25aC. Aristotle 1106b29.

<sup>12</sup> Seneca, *Ep. Mor.* XVI, 9.

<sup>13</sup> Hab. ii, 5.

<sup>14</sup> Job xxxvi, 16.

<sup>15</sup> Agg. i, 6.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. p. 227.

<sup>17</sup> Add remoto (?).

<sup>18</sup> Ps. lxxii, 28.

<sup>19</sup> obtentum A.

<sup>20</sup> Job xxxiii, 16-7.

ei calcandum est et subigendum pedibus affectuum mentem humanam et alia multa huiusmodi, quae suo loco<sup>21</sup> numerabuntur. Oppressum vero dicimus vel timore vel desidia quibus opprimitur libertas Spiritus, de qua II ad Corinthios III<sup>22</sup>: *ubi Spiritus Domini, ibi libertas*; et ad Romanos VIII<sup>23</sup>: *creatura liberatur a servitute corruptionis, in libertatem gloriae filiorum Dei*.

Manifestum enim est illum esse bonum virum et moribus perfecte laudabilem, qui sic adhaeret incommutabili bono, ut alia eum bona ab illo nec avertant nec separent, qui ab aliis non eo usque trahitur ut abrumpatur ab illo nec ab illo adeo ad modicum trahitur ut adhaerere aliis permittatur. Quod accidit in tepidis qui ex ore Domini evomuntur, Apocalypsis III;<sup>24</sup> et divisus, de quibus Osee X<sup>25</sup>: *Divisum est cor eorum, nunc interibunt*, qui et hic volunt gaudere in saeculo et in futuro regnare cum Christo sicut dicit Hieronymus.<sup>26</sup> Qui tepent ad ea quae Dei sunt, ardent autem ad ea quae carnis et mundi sunt, horum adhaerere Deo laesum est, et vinculum quo ei alligati sunt valde longe est a debita fortitudine. Qui vero integre, ut diximus, et illaese et insuper libere a servitute timoris et oppensione pigritiae, quiete etiam a molestiarum<sup>27</sup> perturbationibus Deo adhaerent, viri boni atque laudabiles absque dubio sunt. Quibus autem molestiae pacem et quietem internam auferunt, quos jugum servitutis timoris et mores pigritiae, quae Dei sunt operari prohibent, et velut reclusos et religatos diabolo potius custodiunt, et ad operanda bona exire non sinunt, quosque amor temporalium sic inflammavit ut paene in eis divini amoris ignem extinxerit, manifestum est malos esse et moribus reprobos.

Verum igitur est quia sublatis istis quattuor, sublatum est omne malum de moribus et posito quocumque ex illis necessario ponitur malum in moribus. Neque enim alius malus dici potest nisi qui vel omnino a Deo aversus est vel non ei quattuor modis quibus diximus adhaeserit. Et sicut non esse est malum quod maxime et ante omnia et propter quod alia omnia naturaliter fugit omnis natura, et ipsum esse est bonum propter quod conservandum alia omnia exponit natura, sicut apparet in castore qui propter conservandum esse membra genitalia (217<sup>r</sup>) sibi propriis dentibus abscindit<sup>28</sup> et in nobis qui membra omnia sine quibus salvum (30<sup>r</sup>) esse potest nobis ipsum nostrum esse periculis pro illis exponimus in<sup>29</sup> quorum salute ipsius nostri<sup>30</sup> esse salus consistit, ut manum pro capite et corde jaculis imminentibus et gladiis obtendimus, sic gratia pro ipso bono quod Deus est, ut ei scilicet salvum sit, non solum alia omnia, sed et ipsum esse naturae vitam et membra corporis exponit, omnibus utens ut clipeis defensionis et pretiis redemptionis. Omnia enim obtendit ut illud sibi protegat. Omnia dat ut illud sibi retineat. Ex quo manifestum est ut, sicut testimonio et aestimatione naturae malum omnium maximum et malum, ut ita dicamus, omnis mali naturalis est ipsum non esse sive divisio aut separatio ab ipso esse, sic malum omnis mali moralis atque culpabilis est ipsa divisio sive separatio a primo et incommutabili bono.

Amplius, omne quod nec separat nos a primo et incommutabili bono, nec laedit conjunctionem nostram ad illum nec opprimit nec turbat, omnino malum non est nec malum facit eum in quo est. Quod apparet ex contrario. Quicumque enim primo bono conjunctus est conjunctione, ut diximus, integra, illaesa, libera et quieta sive imperturbata indubitanter bonus est. Nemo autem bonus est cum admixtione nigri. Manifestum igitur est malum culpabile sive perversum nullum esse praeter quattuor, quae diximus, et quantum quod est malum omnis mali, scilicet ipsum non esse. Manifestum etiam quia totum bonum sive bonitas qua boni sumus non est nisi adhaerere Deo. Cetera vero quattuor, scilicet integritas,

<sup>21</sup> Cf. p. 265.

<sup>22</sup> II Cor. iii, 17.

<sup>23</sup> Rom. viii, 21.

<sup>24</sup> Apoc. iii, 16.

<sup>25</sup> Osee x, 2.

<sup>26</sup> St. Jerome, (?).

<sup>27</sup> molestatione B.

<sup>28</sup> Pliny, Nat. Hist. VIII, 47, 109.

<sup>29</sup> pro B.

<sup>30</sup> nostra B.

sanitas, libertas et pax perfectiones sunt seu alterius modi dispositiones nostrae bonitatis. Verum etsi aliud non inveniatur quod malum dici possit, aliud, inquam, subjecto sive<sup>31</sup> essentialiter, tum multae aliae rationes et comparationes seu facies inveniuntur monstruositatis malitiae quam revelare aggredimur.

### <MALI FACIES>

Dico igitur quia malum omne generaliter tres habet facies sive respectus. Prima est ad bonum a quo separat, bonum scilicet primum et universale, quod Deus est; et huiusmodi monstruositas in tot deformitates extenditur et tot nocumenta quot sunt ad nos primi boni nominationes seu comparationes, verbi gratia, quia primum et incommutabile bonum bonum est, cuius sola participatione seu conjunctione seu adhaerentia bonus est quicumque bonus est, necessario ejus separatio a contrariis malitia est et ea mali sumus, et quia fons vitae nobis est non solum naturae, sed gratiae, ejus separatio mors nostra est et ea mortui sumus; et quia fons aquae vivae est et aquarum viventium vena, ex II et XVII Jeremiae,<sup>32</sup> necessario separatio ab eo arefactio nostra est<sup>33</sup> et ea aridi sumus; de hoc in Psalmo:<sup>34</sup> *aruit cor meum*. Et iterum:<sup>35</sup> *ossa mea sicut cremum aruerunt*. Et Ecclesiastici XIV:<sup>36</sup> *non satiabitur donec consumet injustitiam arefaciens animam suam*. Et Numerorum X:<sup>37</sup> *Anima nostra arida est*. Et Jonae ultimo<sup>38</sup> de hedera quae aruit subito. Et quia lux est vera quae illuminat omnem hominem, ex I Johannis,<sup>39</sup> ejus separatio obtenebratio est et ea obtenebrati sumus ibidem dicitur:<sup>40</sup> *lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt*. Et ad Ephesios V:<sup>41</sup> *fuistis aliquando tenebrae, nunc autem lux in Domino*. Et Johannis I, I:<sup>42</sup> *Qui diligit fratrem suum, in lumine manet. Qui autem odit fratrem suum, in tenebris est, et in tenebris ambulat, et nescit quo eat; quoniam tenebrae obcaecaverunt oculos ejus*.

Et quia felicitas nostra est seu beatitudo, ejus separatio est miseria<sup>43</sup> et illa sola miseri sumus. De hoc Proverbiorum XIV:<sup>44</sup> *miseros facit populos peccatum*. Et quia locus nostrae quietis ipse unicus est, separatio ab illo commotio est et ea<sup>45</sup> commoti (30°) et instabiles sumus. Et hoc Threnorum I:<sup>46</sup> *Peccatum peccavit Jerusalem, propterea instabilis facta est*. Et quia ipse patria nobis est et urbs quaedam, ut dicit Tullius,<sup>47</sup> beatorum animorum in eo beate degentium. Et Jeremiae:<sup>48</sup> *dedi te in murum aeneum et in civitatem munitam*. Et Isaiae XXVI:<sup>49</sup> *urbs fortitudinis nostrae Sion salvator; secundum quam lectionem erit necessario separatio ab eo exulatio sive peregrinatio et ea exules et peregrini sumus*. Et quia Deus noster est, recessio ab eo est necessario apostasia et ea apostatae sumus. Et quia sponsus, adulteratio, ut breviter dicamus, de quo Osee I fere per totum et Ecclesiastici XXIII in fine<sup>50</sup> et Ezechiel XVI<sup>51</sup> et XX.<sup>52</sup> Et ut breviter dicamus, quia pater nobis est, erit alienatio qua nos erimus ei alieni; unde filii alieni mentiti sunt mihi. Et quia solus plenitudo est totius nostrae capacitatis, evacuatio est et nos ea<sup>53</sup> vacui; Genesis I:<sup>54</sup> *Terra autem erat inanis et vacua*, et Lucae I,<sup>55</sup> *divites dimisit inanes*. Et in Psalmo:<sup>56</sup> *dilata os tuum et ego adimplebo illud*. Et quia soliditas et firmitas nostra, sicut legitur

<sup>31</sup> sui B.

<sup>32</sup> Jer. ii, 13; xvii, 13.

<sup>33</sup> Om. arefactio nostra est B.

<sup>34</sup> Ps. ci, 5.

<sup>35</sup> Ps. ci, 4.

<sup>36</sup> Ecclus. xiv, 9.

<sup>37</sup> Num. xi, 6.

<sup>38</sup> Jon. iv, 7.

<sup>39</sup> Jo. i, 9.

<sup>40</sup> Jo. i, 5.

<sup>41</sup> Eph. v, 8.

<sup>42</sup> I Jo. ii, 10-1.

<sup>43</sup> Add. est A.

<sup>44</sup> Prov. xiv, 34.

<sup>45</sup> a B.

<sup>46</sup> Thren. i, 8.

<sup>47</sup> Cicero, *Somnium Scipionis* III, 1; in *Macrobius*, ed. F. Eyssenhart (Leipzig, 1893), p. 655.

<sup>48</sup> Jer. i, 18.

<sup>49</sup> Is. xxvi, 1.

<sup>50</sup> Ecclus. 3-7.

<sup>51</sup> Ezech. xvi, 22-35.

<sup>52</sup> Ezech. xx, 21-39.

<sup>53</sup> ei B.

<sup>54</sup> Gen. i, 2.

<sup>55</sup> Lc. i, 53.

<sup>56</sup> Ps. lxxx, 11.

in Psalmo:<sup>57</sup> *Dominus firmamentum meum*; et alia littera habet:<sup>58</sup> *Dominus petra mea*, II Regum XXII.<sup>59</sup>

Separatio nostra ab illo vanificatio nostra est et in ea vani vel vanitas sumus; unde illud: universa vanitas omnis homo vivens et homo vanitati similis factus est. Et quia fundamentum nobis; nos autem domus ad illum, ex VII Matthaei<sup>60</sup> et III, II ad Corinthios,<sup>61</sup> erit<sup>62</sup> ipsa separatio ab eo ruina nostra et nos ea ruentes et ruinosi et quia in pugillo ejus sumus ut aquae modicum, erit separatio nostra ab illo nostra effusio et nos ea effusi. Et ad Hebraeos II:<sup>63</sup> *ne forte effluamus*. Genesis penultimo,<sup>64</sup> Ruben effusus es sicut aqua. Et Ecclesiastici XXV:<sup>65</sup> *non des aquae tuae exitum vel modicum*. Et Isaiae XL:<sup>66</sup> *Quis mensus est pugillo aquas et cetera*. Et quia ipse est Dominus, nos autem servi ad illum, erit recessio nostra ab illo velut servi fuga et nos ea velut servi fugitivi; de hoc ad Hebraeos II:<sup>67</sup> *Nusquam enim angelos apprehendit, sed semen Abrahae apprehendit*; intellige ut servum fugitivum.

Similiter et quia amicus, erit separatio nostra ab illo (218<sup>o</sup>) inimicitia et nos per hoc inimici, ad Romanos V:<sup>68</sup> *Si enim cum inimici essemus et cetera*. Et quia ipse est pars hereditatis nostrae, sicut legitur in Psalmo<sup>69</sup> et Threnorum III:<sup>70</sup> *Pars mea Dominus, dixit anima mea*, erit amissio ipsius exhereditatio nostra et nos exhereditati. Et quia ipse panis unicus, nostra refectio est et potus nostrae inebriationis, Ecclesiastici XXIV:<sup>71</sup> *Qui edunt me, adhuc esurient; et qui bibunt me, adhuc sitient*; est necessario separatio nostra ab illo nostra exinanitio et vitalium consumptio; et quia ipse salus et medicina nobis, erit separatio nostra ab illo infirmitas nostra sive aegrotatio et nos infirmi sive aegroti. Et quia sapientia, erit similiter separatio nostra ab illo stultitia et nos ex ea stulti. Et quia gubernator, nos vero ad illum navis, erit separatio nostra ab illo periclitatio et nos inde periclitati. Et quia protector, erimus ex separatione ab illo expositi sive nudi. Et quia nutritius sive nutrix, erimus ex separatione ab illo velut parvuli nutrimento et nutrice pariter destituti qui vulgo dicuntur projecti. Et quia ipse castigator et edomitor nobis, nos autem velut ferae et jumenta ad ipsum, erit separatio nostra ab ipso velut efferatio et indomatio. Et quia ipse solus velut locus est in quo solo se invenit et agnoscit mens humana, erit separatio nostra ab illo perditio. Et quia ipse dux nobis in bello, erit separatio nostra (31<sup>a</sup>) ab illo velut exercitus dispersio, et nos inde velut dispersus exercitus. Et quia ipse nobis virtus, erit ejus amissio nostra debilitatio, et nos inde debiles. Et quia ipse est portans suos et onera suorum, erit separatio nostra ab illo oneratio nostra qua onerati relinquimur, non solum aliis sed etiam nobis ipsis. Et quia ipse est pax nostra, erit amissio ejus incursus belli et nos per eam in bello.

Has igitur comparationes ex ordine persequentes et malitiae facies revelantes, ut sic sacris doctoribus verborum quibus malitia suggilletur affluentia, et Dei sagittariis divinarum sagittarum copia, et de ipso thesauro doni scientiae Dei nummulariis tradatur pecunia quam<sup>72</sup> negotiatores ad usuram ab eis accipiant, incipimus a prima quam separationem a fonte boni malitiamque diximus.

Haec igitur inprimis illam faciem habet turpitudinis quod est divini decoris dissimilitudo atque deformitas; secundo quia bonitas ipsa principium est associationis et communionis qua et Deus ipse nos in societatem et communionem bonorum suorum vocavit, sicut legitur, Johannis I, I:<sup>73</sup> *Ut et vos societatem habeatis vobiscum et societas vestra sit cum patre et cum filio ejus Jesu*

<sup>57</sup> Ps. xvii, 3.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Origen, *Hexap.*; PG 16, 653.

<sup>59</sup> II Reg. xxii, 2.

<sup>60</sup> Mt. vii, 5.

<sup>61</sup> I Cor. iii, 11-2.

<sup>62</sup> ostendit B.

<sup>63</sup> Heb. ii, 1.

<sup>64</sup> Gen. xlix, 3.

<sup>65</sup> Eccclus. xxv, 34.

<sup>66</sup> Is. xl, 12.

<sup>67</sup> Heb. ii, 16.

<sup>68</sup> Rom. v, 10.

<sup>69</sup> Ps. xv, 5.

<sup>70</sup> Thren. iii, 4.

<sup>71</sup> Eccclus. xxiv, 9.

<sup>72</sup> quoniam B.

<sup>73</sup> I Jo. i, 13.

Christo, et ultimo II ad Corinthios:<sup>74</sup> *Communicatio Sancti Spiritus* et cetera. In quibus duobus omnes boni Deo similes sunt, dum ad ea quae de fonte bonorum receperunt alios sibi gratis associant, et ea illis libenter communicant. Sunt ergo istae duae facies malitiae, solitudo et excommunicatio; de qua solitudine Ecclesiastes IV:<sup>75</sup> *Vae soli*, et cetera. Quarta facies est paupertas et haec multiplex. Sicut enim bonitas copia est sive affluentia contendens redundare in alios et replere illos, sic malitia necessario paupertas est seu penuria, hians<sup>76</sup> in aliena et contendens ex illis repleri.

### <MENS HUMANA>

Cum autem consideraverimus mentem humanam velut agrum, dicemus quia participatione primi boni erit dives et affluens sicut competit agro, hoc est, arboribus et fructibus virtutum, qui sunt sicut odores pertinentes aromaticantes mentem humanam, et sicut vestigia permodica et vix apparentia, decorantes illam de praesentia gratuita primi boni, et sicut umbrae illius parvissimae obumbrantes illam et assimilantes eandem ad ipsum assimilatione longe dissimili. Propter hoc dictum est Ecclesiastici XL:<sup>77</sup> *Timor domini sicut paradisus benedictionis*, idest, mens timens dominum. Et Canticorum IV:<sup>78</sup> *Hortus conclusus soror mea est*, et cetera. Et iterum:<sup>79</sup> *Emissiones tuae paradisus malorum puniceorum*. De utroque vero, hoc est dearomaticatio quam diximus et affluentia, Ecclesiastici XXIV:<sup>80</sup> *Ego quasi storax, et galbanus, et ungula, et gutta, [et gutta] et quasi Libanus non incisus vaporavi habitationem meam*. Et ibidem:<sup>81</sup> *Transite ad me, omnes qui concupiscitis me, et a generationibus meis implemini*. Et fere per medietatem ipsius<sup>82</sup> capituli de ista affluentia continue legitur.

Si autem consideraverimus mentem humanam quasi virum, tunc dicemus eam divitem quemadmodum dives describitur, Job in I,<sup>83</sup> et qualis describitur Abraham ab ipso servo suo Eliezer XXIV<sup>84</sup> juxta tropologicam intelligentiam.

Et cum consideraverimus eam ut thesaurum vel receptaculum divitiarum, dicemus eam divitem sicut civitatem multas continentem divitias. Et de his duobus legitur, Proverbiorum VIII:<sup>85</sup> *Ut ditem diligentes me, et thesauros eorum repleam*. Nihil enim aliud sunt (31<sup>a</sup>) thesauri, idest receptacula divitiarum spiritualium in mente humana, quam mens ipsa humana sive vires ipsius. Et Ecclesiastici I:<sup>86</sup> *Omnem domum implebit a generationibus illius et receptacula a thesauris illius*.

Et cum consideraverimus mentem humanam sicut terram habentem venas auri et argenti et aliorum metallorum qualis describitur in VII Deuteronomii:<sup>87</sup> *Cujus lapides ferrum sunt, de cujus montibus aeris metalla fodiuntur*. Et Job XXVIII:<sup>88</sup> *Habet argentum venarum suarum principia*. Et iterum:<sup>89</sup> *Locus sapphiri lapides ejus et glebae illius aurum*, etc. Dicitur dives quarto modo, scilicet velut terra ex naturaliter insitis vel inditis divitiis.

### <PAUPERTATIS SPIRITUALIS FACIES>

Paupertas igitur spiritualis quattuor<sup>90</sup> habebit facies, cujus prima, qualis dicitur in agro, erit sicut vastitas aut sterilitas, et haec opponitur divitiis agri

<sup>74</sup> II Cor. xiii, 13.

<sup>75</sup> Eccl. iv, 10.

<sup>76</sup> hians AB.

<sup>77</sup> Eccl. xl, 8.

<sup>78</sup> Cant. Cant. iv, 12.

<sup>79</sup> iv, 13.

<sup>80</sup> Eccl. xxiv, 1.

<sup>81</sup> Eccl. xxiv, 26.

<sup>82</sup> istius B.

<sup>83</sup> Job i, 3.

<sup>84</sup> Gen. xxiv, passim.

<sup>85</sup> Prov. viii, 1.

<sup>86</sup> Eccl. i, 21.

<sup>87</sup> Deut. viii, 9.

<sup>88</sup> Job xxviii, 1.

<sup>89</sup> Job xviii, 6.

<sup>90</sup> Add. scilicet B.



quas diximus. De utrisque autem legitur Joelis II:<sup>81</sup> *Quasi hortus voluptatis terra coram eo, et post (218') eum quasi solitudo deserti.*

Ex secunda est inopia quae, cum increverit, facit mendicum, deinde debitorem, postmodum raptorem. Videbis enim malos mendicare aliena suffragia et corrogare sibi complices et adjuutores nequitiae; videbis eos petentes, rogantes omni impudentia et importunitate, demum vero rapientes et furantes quibus suas aut expleant aut pascant nequitas. Quis enim mendicus ea improbitate circuit divites petens ab eis beneficium eleemosynarum qua ambitiosus circuit canonicos suos aut alios quibus adjuvari posse se credit? Deinde quis pons tantis emendicationibus nummorum extruitur quantis emendicationibus animarum ambitionis ascensus paratur? Et heu, quia non facilius aedificando ponti vel cuiquam pietatis operi vel emendicant vel erogant homines quam animas suas vel alienas ambitionum fautores! Haec autem omnia quae enumeravimus, scilicet impudentia et importunitas petitionum, rapinae et furta, quid aliud quam internae paupertatis intollerabilitatem indicant?

Tertia vero facies paupertatis erit direptio vel depraedatio, sicut legitur Isaiae XXIV:<sup>82</sup> *Direptione praedabitur terra;* et ejusdem XXXIII:<sup>83</sup> *Tunc dividuntur spolia praedarum multarum;* et per contrarium, Matthaei XII<sup>84</sup> et Lucae XI,<sup>85</sup> alligabit fortem et arma ejus auferet et spolia ejus diripiet.

Quarta vero facies erit sterilitas quae opponitur generationi metallorum; quemadmodum enim dicit Tullius:<sup>86</sup> eadem est differentia animorum quae et agrorum; sunt enim animi in quibus etsi non ingignatur aurum sapientiae et argentum doctrinae et lapides pretiosi eminentissimarum virtutum, frugis tamen laudabilis conversationis et fructus bonorum operum uberrimi et feraces sunt.

Si autem vis scire per singula qualiter malitia paupertas sit et alieno impleri contendat,<sup>87</sup> attende qualiter superbia aliena subjectione et conculcatione impleri conetur, et ira aliena vindicta, et invidia alieno detrimento, et ambitio alieno et ad se omnino non pertinente honore, et luxuria aliena et sibi omnino indebita voluptate similiter se habet ad pecuniam, et ita de aliis. Propter has igitur paupertates mali et desertum dicuntur et arena et vasa vacua. Desertum, Matthaei III<sup>88</sup> et Lucae III:<sup>89</sup> erat Johannes in deserto et cetera, et idem Marci I' et Isaiae XXXV:<sup>90</sup> (32') *Laetabitur deserta et invia; exultabit solitudo,* et XLI de eodem:<sup>91</sup> *Ponam in deserto abietem et cetera;* et ejusdem LI:<sup>92</sup> *Pone desertum ejus quasi delicias et solitudinem ejus quasi hortum domini.* De arena, Genesis XV<sup>93</sup> et XVII:<sup>94</sup> *Multiplicabo semen tuum sicut stellas caeli, et arenam quae est in litore maris.* Et Apocalypsis XII:<sup>95</sup> *Draco stetit super arenam et cetera.* De paupertate inopiae, Proverbiorum XV:<sup>96</sup> *Omnes dies pauperis mali.*

Rami vero et species paupertatis sunt fames, sitis, nuditas, indefensio ab imbre<sup>97</sup> et gelu et aliis injuriis aeris, deinde servitus et obligatio debitorum. Et per contrarium, bonitas ipsa, quae non est nisi participatio primi et universalis boni sive adhaerentia ad ipsum, satietas et ebrietas et calefactio et vestimentum et tegimen sive tabernaculum in absconsione a turbine et a pluvia et ardore, deinde vero libertas, novissime immunitas ab obligationibus malis.

Manifestum est autem qui haec habet quae enumeravimus nihil ei deest. Ut igitur summam breviter colligamus, septem sunt facies paupertatis spiritualis et septem rami et septemdecim in universo facies quas enumeravimus. Omnis

<sup>81</sup> Joel. ii, 3.

<sup>82</sup> Is. xxiv, 3.

<sup>83</sup> Is. xxxiii, 23.

<sup>84</sup> Mt. xii, 9.

<sup>85</sup> Lc. xi, 21-2.

<sup>86</sup> Cicero, Tusc. Disp. II, 5, 13.

<sup>87</sup> contendit B.

<sup>88</sup> Mt. iii, 3.

<sup>89</sup> Lc. iii, 2.

<sup>90</sup> Mc. i, 4.

<sup>91</sup> Is. xxxv, 1.

<sup>92</sup> Is. xli, 19.

<sup>93</sup> Is. li, 3.

<sup>94</sup> Gen. xv, 4-5.

<sup>95</sup> Gen. xvii, passim; Mss. read xviii.

<sup>96</sup> Apoc. xii, 18.

<sup>97</sup> Prov. xv, 15.

<sup>98</sup> umbre B.

enim malitia quolibet istorum<sup>10</sup> est quae enumeravimus, idest et divinae pulchritudinis dissimilitudo et solitudo et excommunicatio, et<sup>11</sup> deinde sterilitas a fructu, et inopia ab opibus, et directio a spoliis, et infecunditas a metallis, et deinde fames, sitis, nuditas, algor, indefensio ab injuriis aëris spiritualibus, novissime vero servitus et obligatio debitorum. Et haec septem ultima per singula persequemur.

Quod autem omnis malitia fames sit est evidenter videre per singula. Quid enim est luxuria nisi fames spurcissimae voluptatis? Et quid avaritia nisi fames divitiarum? Et quid superbia nisi fames dominationis? Et quid ira nisi fames vindictae sive vindicandi? Et quid invidia nisi fames alieni detrimenti? Et quid odium nisi fames studiosa quaerens alienum malum? Et ad hunc modum de aliis.

Et de timore, de quo minus videtur male, et spe possemus ad ipsum dicere directe quia timor est fames evasionis et effugii; hoc enim quaerit avidissime. Similiter spes fames est obtentus et apprehensionis imminenti boni tempore et possibilitate propinqui, sed fames quae jam manus ad capiendum extenderit et fauces ad glutendum aperuerit propter propinquitatem quam diximus. Sicut enim timor est fuga et resilitio et retractio cordis ab imminente malo, sic spes est insecutio imminenti boni et extensio cordis ad apprehendendum illud, et utramque istarum affectionum sequitur similis motus in corpore, sed haec alias latius disputantur.

#### <FACIERUM DIFFERENTIA>

Haec igitur facies non melius describi potest quam ut dicatur valida vel canina, quattuor differentiis aperte<sup>12</sup> notabilis. Prima est rapiditas qua impetu praecipiti ad ea currunt mali quae cibus non sunt ut ea devorent, sicut legitur Job XXX:<sup>13</sup> *De convallibus ista rapientes cum singula reperissent, ad ea cum clamore currebant*, id est, ad radices juniperorum et cortices (32<sup>o</sup>) (219<sup>o</sup>) arborum.

Secunda differentia est voracitas de qua Proverbiorum XIX:<sup>14</sup> *Os impiorum devorat iniquitatem*, qua absque masticatione et saporatione tota festinatione deglutunt.

Tertia, foeditas sive abominabilitas, qua etiam ad vomitum revertuntur, Proverbiorum XXVI:<sup>15</sup> *Sicut canis qui revertitur ad vomitum, sic<sup>16</sup> imprudens, qui iterat stultitiam suam*, et Petri II, II.<sup>17</sup> *Contingit eis illud vere proverbii: Canis reversus ad vomitum: et sus lota in volutabro luti*.

Quarta est insatiabilitas, Proverbiorum XIII:<sup>18</sup> *Venter impiorum insatiabilis*. Et de inconsiderata rapiditate manifestum est quia nec vident nec etiam attendunt quid sit illud in quod hiantibus faucibus irruunt instar porcorum, qui prae rabie aviditatis et ingluviei in volutabra, in sterquilinia, in vasa furfuris non solum faucibus, sed et toto corpore incursant. Quid enim est spurca voluptas nisi porcinum volutabrum, nisi sterquilinium inquisitionis? Quid vas voluptatis cujuscumque carnalis nisi vas furfuris, cibum scilicet abominabilis voluptatis continens? Et attende quia quemadmodum porcus non est contentus in vas fauces immittere nisi et pedes anteriores infigat, aut etiam omnes si praevallet, sic isti pedes anteriores, idest affectus nobiles, non dico brutales, quos cum brutis communicant, sed sublimiores, scilicet quibus brutis antecellunt, vel intellectum et voluntatem in vasa spurcarum voluptatum inmergunt. Tantaque est rabies hujus famis ut quemadmodum porci nec morte sociorum nec securi carnificis absterrentur a furfure, sic nec isti<sup>19</sup> nec morte corporali, nec morte

<sup>10</sup> illorum B.

<sup>11</sup> Om. B.

<sup>12</sup> a parte B.

<sup>13</sup> Job xxx, 5.

<sup>14</sup> Prov. xix, 28.

<sup>15</sup> Prov. xxvi, 11.

<sup>16</sup> sicut A.

<sup>17</sup> II Pet. ii, 22.

<sup>18</sup> Prov. xiii, 25.

<sup>19</sup> illi B.

aeterna aliorum luxuriosorum, nec securi ad radicem arboris jam positae, de qua legitur Matthaei III<sup>20</sup> et Lucae III,<sup>21</sup> arceri possunt a spurcitia voluptatum.

Sicut canis ad projectum sibi lapidem, album panem illum existimans, faucibus et dentibus in illum involat et arripit, nec cessat donec repellatur ista duritia lapidis, sic isti<sup>22</sup> ad omne quod eis suave videtur toto se impetu praecipitant, donec difficultatum molestia ab eis quasi quadam lapidum duritia repellantur. Sicut<sup>23</sup> canis carnificinarius ad omne os quod carnifex projecit aut securi praeciderit fauces aperit et dentes parat, et jactu<sup>24</sup> ipsius ossis graviter percussus ab illo, non resilit et nihilominus ipso rostro quo laesus est ipsum arripit, sic et isti<sup>25</sup> difficultatibus adipiscendi voluptates interdum graviter laesi et molestiis earum usque ad sanguinem percussi, etiam ad litteram fauces et ventres nihilominus ad voluptates intendunt, et quod gravius est, nec in aliquo avertuntur cum canis saepius osse percussus ad os redire non audeat.

Quotiens verberantur ad litteram luxuriosi, quot difficultatibus et molestiis percutiuntur, et tamen ad eas redire hactenus non formidant!

Haec autem omnia diximus propter rabiditatem famis. De hac rabiditate, Job VI:<sup>26</sup> *Quae prius tangere nolebat anima mea, nunc prae angustia, cibi mei sunt.* Ad idem facit quod legitur de Esau, Genesis XXV,<sup>27</sup> qui edulio lentae rufae primogenita vendidit. Et Threnorum I:<sup>28</sup> *Dederunt pretiosa quaeque pro cibo ad refocillandam animam.* Et ejusdem II:<sup>29</sup> *Ita ergo comedent ne mulieres fructum suum parvulos suos ad mensuram palmae.* Et ejusdem IV:<sup>30</sup> *Manus mulierum misericordium coxerunt filios suos; facti sunt cibi earum, in contritione (33<sup>r</sup>) filiae populi mei.* Et ejusdem V:<sup>31</sup> *Aegypto dedimus manus et Assyriis, ut saturemur pane.* Item ejusdem eodem:<sup>32</sup> *Pellis nostra quasi clibanus exusta est, a facie tempestatum famis.* Et in Psalmo:<sup>33</sup> *Dum appropriant super me nocentes, ut edent carnes meas.* Et Job XIX:<sup>34</sup> *Quare persequimini me sicut Deus, et carnibus meis saturamini?* Et Isaiae XLIX:<sup>35</sup> *Cibabo hostes tuos carnibus suis.* Et ad Galatas V:<sup>36</sup> *Quod si invicem mordetis, et comeditis, videte ne ab invicem consumamini.*

Ista vero rabies quattuor generibus hominum maxime congruit. Primo<sup>37</sup> tyrannis qui devorant plebem meam sibi subditam sicut escam panis; de quo legitur Michaeae III:<sup>38</sup> *Comederunt carnem populi mei, et pellem desuper excoriarunt, et ossa confregerunt quasi in lebetem et considerunt.* Et Proverbiorum XXVIII:<sup>39</sup> *Leo rugiens, et ursus esuriens, princeps impius super populum pauperem.*

Secundo congruit eis qui vel pueros vel puellas ad quamcumque turpitudinem vendunt; quasi enim<sup>40</sup> quandam carnificinam infernalem exercent qui carnes puerorum vel puellarum polluendas venaliter exponunt et ipsi diabolo tandem devorandas tradunt, sicut legitur Joelis III:<sup>41</sup> *posuerunt puerum in prostibulo, et puellam vendiderunt pro vino ut biberent;* quemadmodum ergo cappam suam comedisse dicitur quis cum eam in cibo expenderit aut pro cibo vendiderit; sic non immerito comedere filios aut filias suas dicendi sunt qui eas pro cibo vendunt abusoribus aut corruptoribus. Tyranni vero, qui violenta tyrannide depauperant subditos, ex illa causa subditos comedere dicuntur, quia ea unde carnes subditorum alendae et augmentandae erant et ossa augenda et roboranda ab eis

<sup>20</sup> Mt. iii, 10.

<sup>21</sup> Lc. iii, 9.

<sup>22</sup> illi B.

<sup>23</sup> sic. B.

<sup>24</sup> jactus B.

<sup>25</sup> illi B.

<sup>26</sup> Job vi, 7.

<sup>27</sup> Gen. xxv, 30-4.

<sup>28</sup> Thren. i, 11.

<sup>29</sup> Thren. ii, 20

<sup>30</sup> Thren. iv, 10.

<sup>31</sup> Thren. v, 6.

<sup>32</sup> Thren v, 10.

<sup>33</sup> Ps. xxvi, 2.

<sup>34</sup> Job. xix, 22.

<sup>35</sup> Is. xlix, 26.

<sup>36</sup> Gal. v, 15.

<sup>37</sup> primum A.

<sup>38</sup> Mich. iii, 3.

<sup>39</sup> Prov. xxviii, 15.

<sup>40</sup> tamen B.

<sup>41</sup> Joel iii, 3.

auferunt eosque sic macie extenuant et debilitate conficiunt. Excoriant vero quia<sup>42</sup> pellem exteriorē, id est vel decorem corporis vel operimentum temporalium bonorum ab eis tollunt; temporalia enim pellis dicuntur, Job II: <sup>43</sup> *Pellem pro pelle, et universa quae habet, dabit homo pro anima sua*, hoc est pro ipsa carne quae velut pellis animae est, et<sup>44</sup> totam affluentiam exteriorē quae tanquam pellis operimento et protectioni est ipsi corpori.

Tertio vero congruit detractoribus juxta supradictum testimonium apostoli ad Galatas: <sup>45</sup> *Quod si invicem mordetis*, et cetera. Hujus<sup>46</sup> autem vitii, scilicet detractōnis, hujusque pestiferae famis tanto<sup>47</sup> est rabies atrocior quanto et in omnium devoratiōem velut conjurata videtur, (219<sup>48</sup>) quia nec bonis nec malis parcit; inferno saevior et os ejus ore inferni latius dum ille solos malos admittit, detractor autem utrosque devorat, sicut testatur veritas Matthaei XI: <sup>49</sup> *Venit Johannes, non manducans, neque bibens, et dicunt: daemonium habet. Venit Christus manducans et bibens, et dicunt: ecce homo vorax, et potator vini. Et cum mare malorum jam absorberit detractor, non solum spem habet quia Jordanis influat in os ejus, sed illum<sup>50</sup> similiter jam absorbuit, sicut legitur Job XL.<sup>51</sup>* Et ut breviter dicamus: et manducantes et non manducantes, et vivos et mortuos. Haec est belua omnibus voracior, omnibus immanior, omnibus abominabilior; voracior dum dentes ejus nihil effugit, ut diximus; immanior dum nec patri, id est praelato, vel matri, propriae ecclesiae vel universali, vel proprio filio quia nec subdito<sup>52</sup> <parcunt>. Quanti enim sunt metropolitani qui suffraganeos suos dentibus detractōnis lacerant! Quanti episcopi subditos suos, (33<sup>53</sup>) et quanti subditi qui vice versa praelatos suos aut ecclesias suas, quorum filii sunt, detrahendo devorant? Propter hoc dictum est Proverbiorum XX: <sup>54</sup> *qui maledicit patri suo et matri, extinguetur lumen ejus in mediis tenebris.* Et quicquid legitur, Levitici XX,<sup>55</sup> de maledictione, ad hoc ipsum spectat juxta tropologiam. Omne genus beluarum parcit filiis suis et lupi aquatici, qui vulgo lucii vocantur, non saeviunt in coetaneos suos aut in majores; detractores vero in patres et fratres, matres et filios pleno ore maledictione et amaritudine totisque dentibus et faucibus armantur.

Abominabilior vero quia ceteras beluas a cadaveribus aut vermes aut putredo seu fetor avertunt; rabiem vero detractoriae voracitatis ista, quae diximus, non solum provocant, sed inflammant. Quanto enim major putredo corruptionis, quanto major scaturigo vermium spiritualium, id est vitiorum, quanto major fetor infamiae fuerit peccatoris, qui non est nisi spirituale cadaver sive morticinum, tanto illum avidius, rabidius delectabiliusque comedunt, et velut aromata pretiosissima epularumque lautissimas delicias in ore dimasticant et revolvunt. Vidimus canes a jam putridis fetidisque cadaveribus non solum divertere, sed etiam resilire quasi qui fetorem et abominationem eorum non sustinerent; detractores vero spiritualia cadavera quacumque corruptione, quantumlibet abominabilia<sup>56</sup> velut delicias amplectuntur. Est et alia hujusmodi famis abominabilitas quae nusquam alibi reperitur; non enim contenta est semel comedere, quod dentibus apprehenderit neque numero aliquo comestionum contenta est, sed quem comedit heri comedit et hodie. Interroga quemvis<sup>57</sup> detractorem quot comestionibus hujusmodi velit<sup>58</sup> esse contentus, vel quotiens velit comedere illum cui detrahit, et non poterit determinare tibi numerum, nec etiam propriis comestionibus contentus est, sed quibuscumque audet,

<sup>42</sup> qui B.<sup>43</sup> Job ii, 4.<sup>44</sup> Om. A.<sup>45</sup> Gal. v, 15.<sup>46</sup> hujusmodi AB.<sup>47</sup> tanta B.<sup>48</sup> Mt. xi, 18.<sup>49</sup> nullum B.<sup>50</sup> Job xl, 18.<sup>51</sup> subito A.<sup>52</sup> Prov. xx, 20.<sup>53</sup> Lev. xx, 9.<sup>54</sup> abominabili B.<sup>55</sup> quamvis A.<sup>56</sup> velut AB.

apponit illum ad comedendum velut ferculum pretiosum atque deliciosum, molestumque habet si quis super omni maledictione sua non dixerit: Amen. Si quis, eo masticante proximum, per credulitatem vel consensum illum transglutire noluerit. Propter hoc dictum est, Proverbiorum XXIV:<sup>57</sup> *abominatio hominum detractor*, quia in ore abominationes aliorum semper portitat, et quae ipse jam comedit aliis comedenda apponit. Et cum canes et corvi sana eligant et putrida praetereant, detractor e converso propter hoc, cum nihil putridum, nihil abominabile in proximo invenit, velut<sup>58</sup> quadam rabie famis perit, et quemadmodum milvus vel lupo, immo quemadmodum diabolus, circuit insidians, quaerens quid devoret; et dum non invenit mira illusionem seipsum pascere et auditores jugulare conatur, dum fingit unde ipse primus se strangulet, deinde omnes voluntarios auditores. Omni morsu sive morcello, quod dentibus suis detractor apprehenderit, seipsum strangulat, omnesque qui per consensum vel credulitatem inde comedunt strangulantur. Toxicata sunt, strangulativa sunt, horrenda sunt humanis mentibus, abominabilia sunt sanis stomachis, quaecumque detractores comedunt aut aliis comedenda apponunt. Propter hoc dictum est, Proverbiorum XXIV:<sup>59</sup> *cum detractoribus ne commiscearis*, quia toxicatores et strangulatores sunt sociorum suorum. Habet et illud sacrilegae impietatis haec pestis, (34') quia violatrix est sepulcrorum et detumulatrix sepulchrorum. Quos enim humanis oculis abscondit vera pietas, ista crudelitas discooperit et revelat et etiam devorat; sicut enim naturalis pietatis est mortuos corporaliter operire sudariis aut vestibus et recondere sepulchris, impietatis vero et inhumanitatis contrarium, sic gratuita et spiritualis pietatis est mortuos spirituales, id est peccatores, aut bonis quae ipsi habent aut excusationibus quibus et veritati non derogetur et conscientia non laedatur obtegere, et bestias hujusmodi ab eorum devoratione compescere et arcere, et sacrilegos, quibus modis possibile fuerit, a violatione sepulchrorum avertere. Longe enim major inhumanitas est mortuum spiritualiter ludibrio et morsibus detractorum nudum exponere quam mortuum corporaliter detumulatum nudatumque bestiis et avibus devorandum tradere, quia major est inhumanitas semper spiritualis quam corporalis, et omnia spiritualia, et quae gratiae sunt in se, naturalibus et corporalibus. (220') Magis tamen peccaret qui hoc corporaliter faceret quam detractor; et hoc est quia magis novit et sentit hoc quam illud, et quia<sup>60</sup> majus scandalum carnalibus et<sup>61</sup> simplicibus generaret.

Quarto vero convenit omnibus illis qui quolibet modo ab ipso Christi corpore, quod est Ecclesia, alios abscindunt et in diaboli corpus, quod est ecclesia malignantium, trajiciunt eique incorporant. De hoc genere sunt quicumque vel mala docent vel mala suggerunt vel quolibet alio modo, hoc est muneribus, promissionibus, minis vel adulationibus vel precibus, ad mala pertrahunt. Tot habet dentes et fauces quibus animas devorat diabolus, et isti<sup>62</sup> omnes famem istam diabolicam, ab hisque vehementia,<sup>63</sup> satis indicant; sive enim dent sive promittant sive rogent sive terreant sive adulentur, quemadmodum canis, quia omnia ista non nisi ut<sup>64</sup> praedicto modo comedant, his omnibus indubitanter ostendunt. Quanto igitur in his vehementiores improbiioresque atque instantiores in his se exhibuerint, tanto majorem suae famis ardorem indicant. Vae autem stultis qui non, quod<sup>65</sup> ad devorationem eorum intendatur, attendunt! Sic ambitiosi per partes devorant matrem suam ecclesiam, scilicet in qua sublimari ambiunt. Quot<sup>66</sup> enim in consensum suae ambitionis induxerint, tot

<sup>57</sup> Prov. xxiv, 9.

<sup>58</sup> in B.

<sup>59</sup> Prov. xxiv, 21.

<sup>60</sup> Om. B.

<sup>61</sup> quam B.

<sup>62</sup> hii. B.

<sup>63</sup> lacuna (?).

<sup>64</sup> non ut nisi B.

<sup>65</sup> Om. B.

<sup>66</sup> quod B.

de fratribus suis in ventrem diaboli pertrahunt. Heu quam pauci istas diaboli fauces effugiunt. Sed et cum propria ora ambitionis non sufficiunt ad devorandos fratres, aliena ora et fauces ad hoc sibi asciscunt,<sup>67</sup> dum preces alienas ad hoc procurant. Pro dolor! Fauces magnatum ad devorandos canonicos ecclesiarum adeo facile applicat hodie diabolus.

Quid enim aliud est ambitiosum precum alienarum mendicare suffragia propter obtinendum honorem quem ambit quam singulis peccatorum dicere? Applica fauces et dentes et adjuva me ad devorandum illum quem per me devorare non sufficio, hoc est in<sup>68</sup> consensum meae ambitionis inclinare. Heu! Quot fauces magnatum et aliorum applicari vidi simul ad corpus unius Ecclesiae ut eam diabolo devorarent! De hoc genere sunt haeretici; sicut enim dictum est Petro, Actuum X:<sup>69</sup> *occide et manduca*, sic isti econtrario occidunt diabolo et manducant. De hoc (34') genere sunt mediatores et mediatrices turpitudinum; sicut enim per serpentem Evam et deinde Adam spiritualiter comedit diabolus, dum os carnaliter cibum vetitum comedere fecit, sic per mediatores hujusmodi mediationibus eorum carnalium voluptatum per eos inducit. Et merito per serpentem mediatores hujusmodi figurantur, non solum quia venenum spirituale in ore gestant, sed quia serpens ille pingitur pomum gestans in ore quasi illud ipso<sup>70</sup> ore suo Evae porrexerit primo, sic isti velut pomum in ore munus aut laudem aut voluptatem aut evasionem incommodi gestant in locutione.

De hoc genere sunt magnates qui familiam suam in primis singillatim devorant; et quicumque ad eos, ut eis adhaereant, veniunt, domum eorum et ventrem diaboli simul intrant, dum non aliter, nisi nequitias eorum consentiant, admittuntur. Si enim rapax est aut cupidus omnes ministros suos aut exactores aut insidiatores aut raptores aut turpium contractuum mediatores vult esse, sicut legitur, Ecclesiastici X:<sup>71</sup> *Secundum judicem populi, sic et ministri ejus*. Et Proverbiorum XXIX:<sup>72</sup> *Princeps, qui libenter audit verba mendacii, omnes ministros habet impios*. Sicut enim dixit Christus dominus, Johannis XII:<sup>73</sup> *volo pater ut ubi ego sum, illic sit et minister meus*, sic dicit unusquisque hujusmodi magnatum patri suo diabolo: volo pater et cetera, quasi sicut ego in ventre tuo sum, sic volo et familiam meam esse. Sic est et de aliis pestibus vitiorum. Propter hanc devorationem dictum est generaliter de malis:<sup>74</sup> *Sepulcrum patens est guttur eorum*. Qualiter autem fastidiant et abominentur mali magnates bonos ministros, ex ipso vomitu quo eos statim, ut bonos et inflexibiles ad malum deprehenderint, revomunt manifestum est. Si enim luxuriosus est, castumministerium ad modicum sustinet et statim ut opportunitatem habuerit illum evomit et sic<sup>75</sup> a se abjicit. Magna enim vorago diaboli sunt mali magnates; pessimi autem et Deo odibiliores praelati sunt ecclesiae mali; nec solum *sepulcrum patens est guttur eorum*, sed et barathrum infernale.

Secunda differentia. Voracitas vero quae est secunda differentia famis hujus infernalis et diabolicae apparet ex duobus: ex insensibilitate eorum quae devorantur et rapida festinantissimaque deglutione<sup>76</sup> eorum. In peccato enim non sentitur stimulus sive aculeus mortis quod ipsum est ex XV, I ad Corinthios:<sup>77</sup> *Stimulus mortis peccatum est*; absque punctione enim et compunctione transit per palatum cordis ejus ipsum peccatum; non sentitur amaritudo mortis spiritualis quae cum ipso morcello peccati glutitur. Non enim in vanum dicitur, et mors *in labiis eorum, quoniam quis audivit?*<sup>78</sup> Et Jeremiae II:<sup>79</sup> *Scito,*

<sup>67</sup> assistunt B.

<sup>68</sup> enim B.

<sup>69</sup> Act. x, 13.

<sup>70</sup> ipse B.

<sup>71</sup> Ecclus. x, 2.

<sup>72</sup> Prov. xxix, 12.

<sup>73</sup> Jo. xii, 26; xvii, 24.

<sup>74</sup> Ps. v, 11; Rom. iii, 13.

<sup>75</sup> Om. A.

<sup>76</sup> deglutione B.

<sup>77</sup> I Cor. xxv, 56.

<sup>78</sup> Ps. lviii, 8.

<sup>79</sup> Jer. ii, 19.

*quia malum et amarum est reliquisse te Dominum Deum tuum.* Ipsum etiam peccatum mors est sive mortiferum. Item non sentitur duritia qua fauces et dentes cordis inte-(35") -rius conteruntur. Haec autem duritia, quanta sit apparet ex (220") difficultate confractionis et contritionis, Isaiae XLVIII:<sup>80</sup> *Scio quia durus es tu, et nervus ferreus<sup>81</sup> cervix tua et frons tua aenea.* Et Jeremiae XVII:<sup>82</sup> *Peccatum Juda scriptum est stilo ferreo in ungue adamantino.* Ex difficultate etiam exustionis et resolutionis quia nec in igne tribulationis, nec in medio carbonum desolatoriorum, nec in medio innumerabilium inaestimabiliumque beneficiorum<sup>83</sup> Dei, quae omnia sicut faces ardent velut quodam divini amoris incendio, consumi vel resolvi possunt. Omnia enim divinae bonitatis beneficia velut faces sunt ardentes et titiones quos in corda nostra Deus injicit. Dum illa largitur ad dissolvendum peccatorum nostrorum gelicidium, ad consumendam congeriem seu acervum illorum, ad inflammandum amorem, duritiem istam sentiunt peccatores quando veraciter poenitent, quando illam jejuniis, vigiliis, flagellis, velut contundens confringere conantur<sup>84</sup> et multa difficultate praevalent. De hoc Proverbiorum XXVII:<sup>85</sup> *Si contuderis stultum in pila quasi ptisanas, feriente desuper pilo, non auferetur ab eo stultitia ejus.*

Tertia differentia. Non sentiuntur sordes ipsius peccati quia statim evomerentur et nullatenus in ventrem admitterentur. Tanta enim spurciciae est peccatum ut nauseam sui provocet et propter hoc solum retinetur a multis quia fetulentiam ejus non sentiunt prae angustia famis, sicut legitur Deuteronomii XXVIII:<sup>86</sup> *De illuvie secundinarum* non sentitur fetor. Praeconsulendae enim nares essent peccatoribus quemadmodum simiae facere consueverunt, sed nares fetidae fetorem aliis abominabiliter spargunt, sed nec alienum nec illum, quo refertissimae sunt, sentiunt; neque in peccato mendacium sentitur quo mentitur se vel suave vel utile vel magnificum vel satiativum sive repletivum. Propter quae vocatur panis mendacii. Nec sentitur sanguinolentia qua sanguinolentum est et sanguinis ipsius comedentis miserabile pretium alieni. Quis enim non horreret et statim non rejiceret cibum humano sanguine pollutum? Humano autem sanguine, id est ipso sanguine ejus qui comedit; cum illo enim et in illo totum sanguinem suum spiritualem, id est vitam consumit. Quia igitur peccatum non se peccatum sed longe aliud ostendit idcirco mendacium vocatur, Apocalypsis ultimo:<sup>87</sup> *Foris omnis qui amat et facit mendacium.* Si ista omnia praesentirentur ad trahendum seu transglutendum peccatum, nullatenus acceleraretur. De foeditate vero et abominabilitate, quae est tertia differentia hujus diabolicae famis, jam multa diximus et ideo pertransimus.

Quarta autem differentia hujus famis insatiabilitas est; cujus haec sunt causae.

#### <INSATIABILITATIS CAUSAE>

Causae insatiabilitatis decem.

Prima est error sive erroneitas, quae est declinatio a rectitudine sive recto. Error autem immensus est, ut supradiximus ex verbis Senecae.<sup>88</sup>

Secunda causa est in naturali sicut ipse Seneca dicit ad Lucilium:<sup>89</sup> *Vis scire utrum desideria tua naturalia sint, vide utrum finita; naturalia enim desideria finita sunt.* Modico enim et moderato natura contenta est. Modicum enim et finitum est quod sufficit fami et siti; et ita de aliis; voracitati autem et lecacitati nullus est finis.

<sup>80</sup> Is. xlviii, 4.

<sup>81</sup> ferrea B.

<sup>82</sup> Jer. xvii, 1.

<sup>83</sup> benefactorum B.

<sup>84</sup> conatur A.

<sup>85</sup> Prov. xxvii, 22.

<sup>86</sup> Deut. xxviii, 57.

<sup>87</sup> Apoc. xxii, 15.

<sup>88</sup> Seneca, Ep. Mor. XVI, 9.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

Tertia causa est ipsa natura temporalium quae famem et sitim sui provocant (35<sup>r</sup>) cum comestae spiritualiter fuerint et bibitae. Quemadmodum enim ligna ad ignem, sic temporalia sunt ad ipsam sui sitim et famem. *Secundum enim ligna silvae exardescit ignis*, Ecclesiastici XXVIII.<sup>90</sup> Et Joannis IV.<sup>91</sup> *Qui biberit ex hac aqua faciet iterum*. Et alibi:<sup>92</sup> Crescit amor nummi quantum ipsa pecunia crescit; et illud:<sup>93</sup> Quo plus sunt potae, plus sitiuntur aquae.

Quarta causa est quia comestores ipsa sua multiplicatione multiplicant, Ecclesiastes V.<sup>94</sup> *Ubi multae opes, multi et qui comedunt eas*.

Quinta, quia ipsum ventrem augent et augeri procurant. Venter enim avaritiae efficitur omne quod capax est alicujus boni temporalis. Ipse enim agger, quo implendam se credebatur avaritia, in ventrem convertitur dum ejus plenitudo sicut horrei et marsupii esuritur.

Sexta causa est ipsa rerum temporalium vanitas qua impotentes sunt implere. De hoc Ecclesiastes V.<sup>95</sup> *Avarus non implebitur pecunia*.

Septima causa est quia non ibi mittuntur ubi fames est atque vacuitas, hoc est in corde avari, immo foris ponuntur in horreis et marsupiiis.

Octava causa est quia cor humanum non est locus temporalium. Nihil autem non est natum implere nisi locum suum. Locus autem sapientiae proprius et aliorum donorum mens humana est. Sicut igitur arcam non posses implere sapientia, sic nec illam pecunia.

Nona causa est quia minori mensura quam Deo impleri non potest mens humana cum Dei capax sit. Non est igitur mirum, si omnia temporalia mentem humanam implere non sufficiunt, quae tantae capacitatis creata est ut Deum capere sufficiat.

Decima causa est hoc ipsum quia non comedit spiritualiter ipse peccator quod credit se comedere, sed potius somniat se comedere; somnium autem comestionis satiare non potest sicut legitur, Isaiae XXIX.<sup>96</sup> *Sicut somniat esuriens et comedit. Cum autem experrectus est, anima ejus vacua erit; et sicut somniat sitiens et bibit et, postquam fuerit expurgatus, adhuc sitit, sic erit multitudo omnium gentium quae dimicaverunt contra Ariel*. Comedere autem intelligimus in luxurioso ipsum obtinere voluptatem; in avaro ipsum obtinere vel acquirere divitias; in ambitioso ipsum obtinere vel acquirere honores. Et quod divites mundi illusionem somnii patiantur a divitiis, hoc est quod somnient se habere et contrectare divitias cum in veritate nec contrectent prout eis videtur Scriptura expresse in Psalmo:<sup>97</sup> *Dormierunt somnium suum et nihil invenerunt*; supple: *evigilantes, omnes viri divitiarum in manibus suis*. Et Job XXVII.<sup>98</sup> *Dives cum dormierit, nihil secum afferet*:<sup>99</sup> *evigilabit et nihil inveniet*. Similem illusionem patiuntur voluptuosi a voluptatibus. Non enim veraciter delectantur, sed se delectari somniant, Sapientiae VIII.<sup>1</sup> *Et delectamento somnii conveniente*. Ejusdem X.<sup>2</sup> *In magno viventes inscientiae bello, tot et tam magna mala pacem appellant*.

#### <PAUPERTATIS SPIRITUALIS PARTES>

Tormenta enim spiritualia sunt oblectamenta carnalia, sed illa non sentiunt animae mortificatae quemadmodum corpora mortua nec adustionem nec tormentum suum et hujusmodi. Ideo autem dicimus avarum et alios non comedere quia non acquirunt vel obtinent quod se obtinere vel acquirere opinantur; immo sicut dicit Augustinus:<sup>3</sup> (36<sup>r</sup>) Justissimo Dei judicio fit ut a divitiis, quas

<sup>90</sup> Ecclus. xxviii, 12.

<sup>91</sup> Jo. iv, 13-4.

<sup>92</sup> Juvenal, Sat. xiv, 139.

<sup>93</sup> Ovid, Fast. I, 215.

<sup>94</sup> Eccl. v, 10.

<sup>95</sup> Eccl. V, 9.

<sup>96</sup> Is. xxix, 8.

<sup>97</sup> Ps. lxxv, 6.

<sup>98</sup> Job xxvii, 19.

<sup>99</sup> affert B.

<sup>1</sup> Sap. vii, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Sap. xiv, 22.

<sup>3</sup> St. Augustine, (?)



injuste capere volunt, justissime capiantur. Sicut enim aves capiuntur laqueo et pisces hamo, dum eos se vere capere intendunt, sic isti tempore malo tentationis. Intellige, sicut mus non capit muscipulam vel quod in muscipula est, sed potius ab illo vel ab illa capitur, sic isti a deliciis vel divitiis vel honoribus quas se capere vanissime falsissimeque somniant verissime capiuntur. De hoc Sapientiae XIV:<sup>4</sup> *creaturae Dei in odium factae sunt et in tentationem animae hominum et muscipulam pedibus insipientium*. Potius enim in servos nequissimos ab ipsis rebus quas diximus acquiruntur quam eas acquirant. Et ideo non divitiae virorum, sed viri divitiarum dicit Scriptura. Item sicut sagittam vel gladium non potest dici acquirere qui alterutro eorum transfigitur nec potest alterutrum ostentare velut divitias nisi ignominiosissime et aperta dementia sicut leo vel ursus non potest dicere quod stipitem acquisiverit cui alligatus est, nec illum potest ostentare ut lucrum suum vel acquisitionem, sic nec miseri vanissimique somniores, quos diximus, res<sup>5</sup> quas se habere somniant ostentare non possunt. Omne enim quod amatur gladius est infixus visceribus amantis sicut apparet evidenter ex IV Canticorum:<sup>6</sup> *Vulnerasti cor meum, soror mea sponsa; vulnerasti cor meum*. Amor enim vulnus est quod non infligitur nisi ab amato sicut a gladio. Et omne amatum stipes est cui alligatus est amator. Et hoc est quoniam amor funiculus est et vinculum, sicut legitur, Osee XI:<sup>7</sup> *In funiculis Adam traham eos, in vinculis caritatis*. Et de hac insatiabilitate legis in Psalmo:<sup>8</sup> *Tamen patientur ut canes*. Et Isaiae LV:<sup>9</sup> *Quare appenditis argentum vestrum non in panibus et laborem vestrum, non in saturitate?* Et Aggei I:<sup>10</sup> *Comedistis et non estis satiati*.

Eadem differentiae circa sitim notandae erunt.<sup>11</sup> Tanta enim est vehementia sitis istius quia non attendit sitiens quam foedum, quam abominabile, quam spurcum horrendumve sit quod bibunt, sicut apparet ex III Jeremiae:<sup>12</sup> *Quid tibi vis in via Aegypti, ut bibas aquam turbidam?* Et Ecclesiastici XXVI:<sup>13</sup> *Sicut viator sitiens ad fontem os aperiet et ab omni aqua proxima bibet; subaudis passim et indifferenter quantumcumque spurca vel caenosa sit?* De hoc Job XXXIV:<sup>14</sup> *Quis est vir ut Job qui bibit substannationem velut aquam?* Et ejusdem XV:<sup>15</sup> *Quanto magis abominabilis est et inutilis homo, qui bibit quasi aquam iniquitatum?* Propter hanc sitim dicitur status peccati terra sitis, Jeremiae II:<sup>16</sup> Cetera omnia quae fami superius assignavimus, id est, decem causae insatiabilitatis ipsius siti eisdem testimoniis et exemplis assignari possunt. Specialiter autem siti convenit salsedo quae in omnibus deliciis et divitiis quemadmodum in aqua salsa vel in aqua marina reperitur. Quemadmodum igitur salsedo potus sitim auget et non extinguit, sic aqua praesentium divitiarum et deliciarum sitim excitat, non extinguit, Johannis IV:<sup>17</sup> *Qui biberit ex aqua sitiet iterum*. Et quia mundus mare, ideo aqua marina felicitas mundana congruit et siti spiritualiter et dicatur hydropisis spiritualis. Hujus figura legitur, Lucae IV,<sup>18</sup> ubi sanatus legitur hydropicus.

Tertia pars paupertatis istius spiritualis nuditas spiritualis est, cui opponitur vestis nuptialis; de qua Matthaei XX:<sup>19</sup> *Amice, quomodo huc intrasti (36°) non habens vestem nuptialem?* Haec autem vestis est vestis duplex sive forrata quae habet interius omnium virtutum varietatem, exterius autem omnium bonorum, sine quibus non est salus, decorem. Propter hanc varietatem dicitur tunica polymita, Genesis XXX.<sup>20</sup> Et vestis stragulata, Proverbiorum ultimo.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Sap. xiv, 11.

<sup>5</sup> eas B.

<sup>6</sup> Cant. Cant. iv, 9.

<sup>7</sup> Osee xi, 4.

<sup>8</sup> Ps. lvi, 7.

<sup>9</sup> Is. lv, 2.

<sup>10</sup> Agg. i, 6.

<sup>11</sup> sunt B.

<sup>12</sup> Jer. ii, 18.

<sup>13</sup> Ecclus. xxvi, 15.

<sup>14</sup> Job xxxiv, 7.

<sup>15</sup> Job xv, 16.

<sup>16</sup> Jer. ii, 6.

<sup>17</sup> Jo. iv, 13.

<sup>18</sup> Lc. xiv, 2.

<sup>19</sup> Mt. xx, 12.

<sup>20</sup> Gen. xxviii, 23; om. tunica A.

<sup>21</sup> Prov. xxxi, 22.

Et regina spiritualis, id est fidelis anima circumdata varietate, in Psalmo.<sup>23</sup> De hac nuditate praecessit figura, Genesis III.<sup>24</sup> *Timui inquit Adam, eo quod nudus essem et abscondi me.* Et expresse de ea legitur, Ezechielis XVI.<sup>24</sup> *Eras nuda et confusione plena.* Iterum Apocalypsis XVI.<sup>25</sup> *Beatus qui vigilat et custodit vestimenta sua, ne nudus ambulet, et videant turpitudinem ejus.* Et Osee II.<sup>26</sup> *Auferat fornicationes suas a facie sua ne forte spoliem eam nudam et statuam eam nudam secundum diem nativitatis ejus.* Similiter Ezechielis XVI.<sup>27</sup> *Nudabo ignominiam tuam coram eis et videbunt<sup>28</sup> turpitudinem tuam.* Sciendum autem quia mala opera et turpis conversatio exterior non operiunt ignominiam peccantium, immo discooperiunt et revelant. Et hoc est quod legitur, Isaiae LIX.<sup>29</sup> *Telae eorum non erunt in vestimentum, neque (221') operientur operibus suis.* Turpitudinem enim exteriorum operum testimonium est internae turpitudinis, sicut legitur, Ecclesiastici XX.<sup>30</sup> *Amictus corporis et risus dentium et incessus hominis enuntiant de illo.* Et iterum ejusdem XXVI.<sup>31</sup> *Fornicatio mulieris in extollentia oculorum.* Manifestum igitur est ex his quae diximus quia nudus est spiritualiter unusquisque secundum quod turpitudinem ejus spiritualis apparet; quemadmodum nudus est corporaliter vel in parte vel in toto, turpitudinem ejus corporalis apparet.

Et quemadmodum quattuor de causis quattuor genera hominum nuditatem suam corporalem non erubescunt, videlicet parvuli, deinde ebriosi, tertio furiosi, quarto dormientes seu mortui. Et in his<sup>32</sup> quattuor una et eadem est causa generalis, ignorantia scilicet ipsius nuditatis. Particulares revera quattuor sunt, scilicet puerilitas, ebriositas, furiositas et privatio sensus in dormitione et morte.

Quinta vero causa est aliena nuditas; inter nudas enim vix est qui nuditatem suam erubescat.

Sexta vero<sup>33</sup> causa est assuefactio discooperiendi se seu denudandi ut accidit in illis qui consueverunt pudenda sua vel posteriora discooperire.

Septima vero est credulitas latendi qua credit ipse qui nudus est vel discooperitus se ab aliis non videri. Sic et juxta istos modos septem causae quare non erubescunt nuditas spiritualis. Qui enim parvuli sunt spiritualiter, sicut legitur, Proverbiorum I.<sup>34</sup> *Usquequo, parvuli, diligitis infantiam, non erubescunt verecunda sua vel videri ab aliis vel etiam ostentare.* Similiter qui furiosi, qui ebrii, qui dormientes vel mortui. Et certum est peccatores omnes parvulos esse et ebriosos et furiosos et dormientes sive mortuos spiritualiter. Turpitudinem autem spiritualis est puerilitas spiritualis in barbato et sene. Quemadmodum et puerilitas corporalis in eis esset et ridenda et ridiculosa, verbi gratia, mamillas appetere et ad eas discooperitas tota aviditate accurrere, sine luctu et ejulatu ab eis separari non posse, poma et nuces magnis divitiis anteponeere et similia, quae non tam ridenda quam (37') vehementer stupenda et persequenda essent in aetate provectis, sic turpitudinem omnino non ferenda est in eis qui pro tempore seu aetate viri spiritualiter et senes esse deberent ad mamillas<sup>35</sup> spirituales, id est fontes vel vasa carnalium voluptatum puerili aviditate accurrere, et cum luctu et ejulatu eas insequi, et sine dolore et lacrimis amissionem vel ablationem eorum non<sup>36</sup> ferre. Poma et nuces temporalium bonorum quantumcumque magnorum puerili insipientia alicujus momenti aestimare, magnis divitiis, id est

<sup>23</sup> Ps. xlv, 10.<sup>24</sup> Gen. iii, 10.<sup>25</sup> Ezech. xvi, 7.<sup>26</sup> Apoc. xvi, 15.<sup>27</sup> Osee ii, 2-3.<sup>28</sup> Ezech. xvi, 37.<sup>29</sup> Add. omnem B.<sup>30</sup> Is. lix, 6.<sup>31</sup> Ecclus. xix, 27.<sup>32</sup> Ecclus. xxvi, 12.<sup>33</sup> Om. B.<sup>34</sup> Om. B.<sup>35</sup> Prov. i, 22.<sup>36</sup> mamas A.<sup>37</sup> Om. B.

spiritualibus ea amore vel sollicitudine anteferre, quid est nisi puerilitatis spiritualis vesania?

Pro dolor! Quot sunt senes et barbati nostri temporis et sapientiae magisterium, quod turpius est, profitentes qui, cum eis offertur unum hujusmodi pomum aut nux, tota aviditate recipiunt, tota aggratulatione assurgunt, tota devotione servos se subjiciunt offerentibus et creatores suos, factores, quia de nihilo, illos praedicare non verentur atque deificare! Nec advertunt quam ignominiose barbato et seni illudatur, cum ei mamma ad suggendum porrigitur, aut pomum sive nux pro munere praesentatur. Non attendunt miseri quam ignominiosum sit barbato et seni circumferre pomum vel nucem, quasi aliquid<sup>37</sup> magnum et ostentare illud ad gloriam. Hoc autem totum ideo diximus, quia praebenda seu dignitas quantacumque nec pomum et nec nux est virili animo, sicut dicit Seneca,<sup>38</sup> quia nihil majus animo cui magno nihil est magnum. Sed, ut jam tetigimus, infantes insensati sunt, sicut legitur Sapientiae XII:<sup>39</sup> *Infantium insensatorum more viventes*. Et Isaiae XLV:<sup>40</sup> *puer centum annorum . . . maledictus erit*. In nobis etiam, ut dicit Seneca,<sup>41</sup> non pueritia, sed, quod deterius est, puerilitas remanet; et iterum, erubescendum valde est, quod nomina habemus senum et vitia puerorum. Nonne ad hujusmodi homines dicitur, Proverbiorum I:<sup>42</sup> *Quousque parvuli<sup>43</sup> diligitis infantiam, et stulti ea, quae sunt <noxia>, cupient?*

Sic et ceterae peccatorum turpitudines ab his generibus hominum, quos enumeravimus, non erubescunt, quoniam, si erubescerentur, procul dubio tegerentur et absconderentur ab eis. Sicut enim pudenda corporalia et erubescenda omnia, cum ea videri ab aliis erubescimus, studiose illa abscondimus et velamus, sic immo multo fortius ipsa spiritualia verenda<sup>44</sup> nostra sive erubescenda multo studiosius operiremus et absconderemus, nisi aliqua antedictarum causarum, hoc est vel ignorantia generalis vel falsa latendi credulitas<sup>45</sup> vel alienae nuditatis miserrimum solacium aut<sup>46</sup> per consuetudinem male acquisita nobis impudentia impediret. Quibusdam enim ex assuetudine obteritur frons pudoris seu verecundiae, sicut legitur Jeremiae III:<sup>47</sup> *Frons mulieris meretricis facta est tibi, erubescere nescisti*. Specialiter autem<sup>48</sup> illi femora sua nudant spiritualiter, qui peccata luxuriae suae per jactantiam aliis revelent. Illi autem discoopertis natibus ambulant, quorum luxuria aliis apparet, sicut legitur Isaiae XX:<sup>49</sup> *Minabit rex Assyriorum captivitatem Aegypti et transmigra-(37)-tionem Aethiopiae juvenem et senem, nudam et discalceatam, discoopertis natibus ad ignominiam Aegypti*. Ita ergo ignominiose ducit eos rex Assyriorum diabolus in aeternae ignominiae Babylonem.

Sunt alii quorum turpitudinem revelat Dominus, dum eos scilicet in aperta peccata cadere (222<sup>r</sup>) permittit,<sup>50</sup> vel dum, quae occulta erant in eis, ad ignominiam eorum revelari facit, implens facies eorum ignominia, ut<sup>51</sup> quaerant nomen ejus, sicut legitur Jeremiae XIII:<sup>52</sup> *Ego nudavi femora tua contra faciem tuam et apparuit ignominia tua, adulteria tua et hinnitus*. Miserabiliter autem impudentes sunt et miserabile velamen ignominiae suae adhibent, qui pro eo solo non erubescunt quod alios erubescere non vident et sola nuditate aliena se operiunt diabolicoque miraculo volunt esse vestiti, quasi nuditas vestimentum esse possit, et quasi ideo minus nudi sint quia<sup>53</sup> inter nudos aut minor sit minorve<sup>54</sup> appareat ignominia quia cum multis apparet, aut minus irrideantur

<sup>37</sup> aliquid B.

<sup>38</sup> Seneca, Ep. Mor. VIII, 5.

<sup>39</sup> Sap. xli, 24.

<sup>40</sup> Is. xlv, 20.

<sup>41</sup> Seneca, Ep. Mor. IV, 2.

<sup>42</sup> Prov. i, 22.

<sup>43</sup> puerili B.

<sup>44</sup> virenda B.

<sup>45</sup> crudelitas B.

<sup>46</sup> autem AB.

<sup>47</sup> Jer. iii, 3.

<sup>48</sup> Om. B.

<sup>49</sup> Is. xxx, 4.

<sup>50</sup> permittitur B.

<sup>51</sup> et B.

<sup>52</sup> Jer. xlii, 26-7.

<sup>53</sup> Add. tunc B.

<sup>54</sup> Om. minor B.

ab hostibus invisibilibus quia cum multis iridentur. Qui inde credunt se in tuto esse, quoniam cum illis sunt qui in eadem damnatione sunt, quasi non sit timendum eis ab aliis. Irrisionum enim jacula magis ab aliis expectanda essent. Et omnino nuditas jaculis exponit, non protegit; et generaliter quicquid peccatum unum ferit in uno, et in omnibus; quicquid enim contra peccatum unum in aliquo dicitur ratione sola peccati, et in omnibus; et<sup>55</sup> propter hoc uno jaculo feriuntur omnes qui in eodem peccato sunt sive sentiant sive non. Non agnoscunt quam mirabiliter nudi sunt quia<sup>56</sup> aliena nuditate operire se conantur. Qui vero propter hoc non erubescunt, quia ignominiam suam latere credunt, sicut legitur Ecclesiastici XXIII.<sup>57</sup> *Omnis homo qui transgreditur lectum suum, contemnes animam suam et dicens: Quis videt me? tenebrae circumdant me et cetera.* Similes sunt parvulis qui, cum clausierint oculos suos vel velaverint pro eo quod ipsi se non vident, se non videri ab aliis opinantur.

Horum vero qui mala assuetudine dediscunt erubescantiam duo sunt genera. Alii enim assuetudine discooperiendi se, sicut dicit Seneca:<sup>58</sup> *desine turpe loqui; paulatim enim per verba pudor dediscitur.* Alii pro eo solo quod non arguuntur impudentes fiunt, quasi justo titulo possideatur quicquid in iudicium non deducitur, et<sup>59</sup> tutum sit ac munitissimum quicquid non<sup>60</sup> impugnatur; nec advertunt quod maxima argutio est ipsum non argui et<sup>61</sup> maxime impugnatio ipsum non impugnari. Non enim in vanum dictum est:<sup>62</sup> *ab increpatione tua, dormitaverunt qui ascenderunt equos.* Alii enim excitantur clamoribus infamiae, alii stimulis tentationum vel objurgationum, alii impulsibus persecutionum, alii tubis praedicationum, et dormire vel dormire non sinuntur in ignaviis suis. Quae igitur increpatione est a quo dormitant multi, nisi ipsum non increpari? Increpatione enim Domini praesens afflictio est, sicut dicit Gregorius super V Job:<sup>63</sup> *Increpationem (38') Domini ne reprobes, quia ipse vulnerat et medetur; percutiet, et manus ejus sanabunt.* Inde igitur dormitant quia non increpantur, et haec est summa ira Dei, ut dicit Augustinus,<sup>64</sup> cum parcat hic, ad hoc enim parcat ut in aeternum puniat, non parcat. Quemadmodum ergo mulier a viro abjecta cujus correctio desperatur, quemadmodum discipulus<sup>65</sup> ejectionis de scholis, cujus profectus desperatur, erubescere debet, sic et qui hic non increpantur, velut projectos et ejectos debent se reputare, quorum profectus vel correctio desperata est, sicut legitur Ezechielis XVI:<sup>66</sup> *auferetur zelus meus a te, et quiescam, nec irascar amplius. Eo quod non fueris recordata dierum adolescentiae tuae, et provocasti me et cetera.*

Erubescere debent et reputare se filios alienos et adulterinos, ex XII ad Hebraeos:<sup>67</sup> *Quod si extra disciplinam estis, adulterini et non filii estis.* Qui igitur de pace peccatorum non erubescunt, cum eis datur, evidenti testimonio adulterinitatis suae non erubescunt et de summa infelicitate sua gloriantur; nihil enim infelicius felicitate peccantium. Tanto igitur se durius increpari seu argui se agnoscant, quanto magis in ignaviis suis dormire sinuntur, et ab ipsa increpatione iracundiae diem esse advertant, hoc ipsum quod dormitant, quod derelinquuntur, quod projiciuntur, quod ea est vilitas eorum in conspectu Dei, ut non curentur, quod adeo ipsi Deo contemptibiles sunt, ut pro eis recuperandis vel salvandis, nec pugnare dignetur persecutionibus seu tribulationibus, nec objurgationibus litigare. Non erubescunt miserrimi quod<sup>68</sup> in sterquiliniis ignaviarum suarum projecti et derelicti nullo reclamatore, nullo

<sup>55</sup> Om. B.<sup>56</sup> qui A.<sup>58</sup> De Moribus Liber, attrib. to Seneca, no. 120; in L. Annaei Senecae Quae Superstitionum III, ed. F. Haase (Leipzig, 1895), p. 446.<sup>57</sup> Ecclus. xxiii, 25-6.<sup>59</sup> ac B.<sup>60</sup> vero B.<sup>61</sup> Om. B.<sup>62</sup> Ps. lxxv, 7.<sup>63</sup> St. Gregory, in Job VI, 25; PL 75, 752B-C.<sup>64</sup> St. Augustine, Enn. in Ps. 93, 16; PL 37, 1205.<sup>65</sup> discipulus B.<sup>66</sup> Ezech. xvi, 42.<sup>67</sup> Heb. xii, 8.<sup>68</sup> qui B.

miseratore, Isaiae XIV:<sup>69</sup> sicut *cadaver putridum non habens consortium*. Et in tanta pace possidet eas ille armatus, Matthaei XII<sup>70</sup> et Lucae XI,<sup>71</sup> ut non sit qui os aperiat et ganniat<sup>72</sup> pro eis liberandis, sicut legitur Isaiae X:<sup>73</sup> *Non erat qui aperiret os, et ganniret*. In eis autem, qui nuditatem istam vident, manifeste apparet et quanta sit ista nuditas, quantumque fugiatur ab eis, dum non est latebra ad quam non fugiant, non est adeo viliter vestitus aliquis sub cuius vestimento non insiliant, non sunt adeo sordidi putredine panniculi quibus se operire non studeant, et cum panni deficiunt ad arborum folia recurrunt, ut inde turpitudines suas operiant. Ad latebras fugiunt corporales, hoc certum est, sicut supra notavimus Ecclesiastici XXIII:<sup>74</sup> *Quis me videt?* et cetera. Et Joannis III:<sup>75</sup> *quis male agit, odit lucem*.

#### <LATEBRARUM GENERA>

Ad latebras etiam spirituales, sicut hypocritae, et omnes simulatores, qui decore quodam exterioris conversationis internas spurcitas abscondunt, munda-ntes quod de foris est calicis et catini, et dealbantes sepulcra, id est corpora sua, quae sunt animarum mortuorum sepulcra, id est corpora sua, quae sunt animarum mortuorum sepulcra, ut dicit Augustinus,<sup>76</sup> sicut legitur Lucae XI<sup>77</sup> et Matthaei XXIII.<sup>78</sup> Quid isti faciunt nisi quemadmodum, si quis cloacam spurcissimam pallio serico et auro intexto<sup>79</sup> operire auderet et exornare? Sic et isti cum tem- (38') -pla sacratissima et capsae sacrarum reliquiarum ex exteriori decore et ornatu appareant, nihil aliud (222') sunt quam sterquilinia vineata exteriori puritate et munditia aut deaurata exteriorum operum eminentia. Sterquilinia autem vocamus stercorum spiritalium acervos sive monticellos.

Alii ad iuramenta aliorum confugiunt exigentes et extorquentes iuramenta a fratribus sive de non revelando turpitudines eorum sive de velando. Quod deterius est, de mendaciis fratrum atque perjuriis operimentum sibi texere conantes, implent quod legitur, Isaiae XXVIII:<sup>80</sup> *posuimus mendacium spem nostram,*<sup>81</sup> et *mendacio protecti sumus*.

Alii ad sigilla magnatum et litteras testimoniales fugiunt ut sub eis lateant. Sic et usurarii sigillis hodie officialium et magnatum se abscondunt et hoc eo usque ut agnosci vel videri non possint, signaculo iustitiae iniquitatem usurariam et sigillo veritatis debitorem mendacium obtegunt.

Isti interdum solitudinem et singularitatem captant ut testes non possit habere super usura ipse qui ab eis accipit ad usuram. Et nonne ad illum pertinent de quo dicitur, Habacuc III:<sup>82</sup> *Exultatio eorum, sicut ejus qui devorat pauperem in abscondito*. Omnium autem latebrarum ignominiosissima sunt tria genera, videlicet cum in unam quis incurrit nequitiam ne in alia esse videatur sicut cum aperte fornicatur cum mulieribus, ne sodomita videatur. Iste in una cloaca se abscondit ne in alia esse videatur, in quo quanta sit illa spurcitia quae illa alia tanta se operit erubescens venire in palam evidenter ostendit. Magna enim revera est spurcitia et magnae erubescitiae, immo ignominiae, quae sub fornicationis sordibus ne appareat abscondi desiderat.

Secundum genus est eorum qui de seipsis turpissima confitentur ne superbi appareant. In quo apparet quam deformem reputant strumositatem superbiae quam tot tantisque sordibus obtegunt et obvolvunt ne appareat.<sup>83</sup>

Tertium genus est eorum qui erubescunt boni videri et mala faciunt ne boni

<sup>69</sup> Is. xiv, 19.

<sup>70</sup> Mt. xii, 29.

<sup>71</sup> Lc. xi, 21.

<sup>72</sup> Add. et B.

<sup>73</sup> Is. x, 14.

<sup>74</sup> Ecclus. xxiii, 25; cf. supra note 57.

<sup>75</sup> Jo. iii, 20.

<sup>76</sup> St. Augustine, *Enn.* in Ps. 87, 12; PL 37,

1117.

<sup>77</sup> Lc. xi, 39.

<sup>78</sup> Mt. xxiii, 27.

<sup>79</sup> texto B.

<sup>80</sup> Is. xxviii, 15.

<sup>81</sup> Om. B.

<sup>82</sup> Hab. iii, 14.

<sup>83</sup> appareant B.

videantur. Horum genus hominum perversissimum, qui nuditatem et turpitudinem solam non erubescunt; quia malunt turpitudines suas apparere et nuditatem quam vestiri, quam speciosi<sup>84</sup> videri; qui vestimenta bonorum operum, si qua habent, abjiciunt ne speciosi vel vestiti videantur. Malunt sordidi apparere et fetere quam mundi odorem bonae famae spargere. De hoc genere sunt qui dicunt: Non sum papelardus nec volo videri papelardus, malentes<sup>85</sup> videri saeculares et lascivi quam religiosi. Et ista perversitas in illis plerumque reperitur a quibus ipsa species et decor religionis exterior maxime requiritur, scilicet in claustralibus et praelatis. Jam enim postis ista et inundavit ad operiendos montes praelatorum et penetravit munitiones claustrorum. Isti non attendunt quod Dominus de hoc conqueritur, Jeremiae XXIII:<sup>86</sup> *in prophetis Jerusalem vidi similitudinem adulterii*. Non de veritate tantum conqueritur, sed de ipsa similitudine adulterii spiritualis.

Similiter Joelis I:<sup>87</sup> *Posuit vineam meam in desertum, et ficum meum decorticavit; nudam expoliavit eam, et projecit*. (39') Sunt ergo sicut ficus decorticata atque nudata cortice suo qui decorem conversationis abjecerunt. Et pro dolor! Non advertunt quod hoc fecerit diabolus, cum tamen textus expresse hoc dicat; non enim dicit ipsa se decorticavit. Nec advertunt quod extremae ebriositatis est atque dementiae vestes abjicere et nudum velle incedere. Et haec est de latebris, ad quas propter nuditatem spirituales fugiunt, <sicut> diximus. Sub vestimento vero aliorum prae nuditate sua fugiunt, qui bonorum consortium convictumque propter dissimilitudinem erubescences aut suae turpitudines socios sibi advocant aut ad sibi similes se transferunt. Quae translatio quid aliud est quam fuga sub hujusmodi hominum vestimenta turpissima et vilia ut sub eis lateant et abscondantur, hoc est sub eorum operibus vitae? Inter bonos enim tanquam inter vestitos nudi apparerent, inter malos absconduntur. Sed tunc potissimum vestimentis aliorum se protegunt cum mala opera eorum in velamentum nequitiarum suarum assumunt dicentes: Facimus sicut illi. Numquid meliores esse debemus quam illi? Hoc est quod legitur, Job XL:<sup>88</sup> *Protegent umbrae umbram ejus*. Non solum cum malus<sup>89</sup> malum contra objurgantem defendit, sed etiam cum malo exemplo suo malum velamentum excusationis eidem tribuit. Qui ergo exempla turpitudinis aliis praestant, diabolus non solum in se, sed in aliis vestiunt; nec solum vestiunt, sed insuper et exornant dum etiam honestum decorumque videri faciunt mutatione sua ipsum diaboli corpus spirituale in membris suis, hoc est reprobis.

Quorundam enim apud mundanos et saeculares adeo valet auctoritas ut pulchrum reputent et honestum quidquid illi duxerint faciendum et eo usque occalluit ista caecitas longiturnitate malarum<sup>90</sup> consuetudinum ut virtutes se magna vitia paene absque ulla contradictione mentiri audeant. Quanta autem sit nuditas aliorum, qui sordidissimos fetentissimosque<sup>91</sup> panniculos undecumque rapiunt, ut nuditatem suam operiant quis non videat? Extrema enim nuditas indubitanter est quae extremae vilitatis operimentis operiri desiderat quemadmodum et extrema fames quae terra<sup>92</sup> et lapidibus et lignis repleti conatur, qualis est avaritia. Si opera vestimenta sunt et totius vitae tenor vestis est spiritus, quid aliud sunt sordidissima opera singula quam sordidissimi fetentissimique panniculi, et tanto sordidiores quanto scientia aut dignitate eminentiores sunt qui haec faciunt, juxta illud: Omne<sup>93</sup> animi vitium tanto conspectus in se crimen habet quanto qui peccat major habetur; luxuria enim

<sup>84</sup> speciosam B.<sup>85</sup> nullatenus B.<sup>86</sup> Jer. xxiii, 14.<sup>87</sup> Joel i, 7.<sup>88</sup> Job. xl, 17.<sup>89</sup> malis B.<sup>90</sup> malorum B.<sup>91</sup> Om. que B.<sup>92</sup> Add. est B.<sup>93</sup> Add. vel B.

in sacerdote abominabilior longe est quam in laico. Manifestum (223<sup>r</sup>) est igitur quod unde magis se operire confidunt stultissimi excusatores nequitiarum suarum et unde<sup>84</sup> nequitiam suam minuere sperant, inde illam minus operiunt et plus augent.

TREDECIM INSANIAE EXCUSANTIUM PECCATA

Qui enim opera magnorum sive doctorum sive praelatorum vilia et spurca ad excusationem sui obtendunt, quotiens arguuntur dicentes: Quid mirum, si ego turpe illud feci quod tantus doctor aut tantus praelatus facere non est veritus?

Istorum igitur prima insania est quod ideo minora reputant peccata sua quia inveniuntur alia majora quasi majoritas aliorum magni- (39<sup>v</sup>) -tudini suorum aliquid detrahat.

Secunda insania est quod illa ad defensionem sui adhibent quae<sup>85</sup> magis damnata sunt. Solent enim innocentes patrocinari nocentibus, sed magis nocentes majorique damnationi jam addictos quis nisi insanus pro se velit intercedere?

Tertia insania est quod majoribus turpitudinibus suam operire contendunt cum turpitudine addita nonnisi augere turpitudinem possit. Cum ergo majoribus turpitudinibus se operiunt et obvolvunt quam suae sint; quod utique faciunt adhibentes sibi dictos panniculos magis turpes videri se faciunt, quemadmodum si aliquis aliquantum veste sordidatus sordidius vestimentum sibi adhibeat, numquid non sordidior apparebit?

Quarta insania est quia ipsa excusatio inquinatio est cum sit peccatum, et hoc non advertunt miseri excusatores. Propter hoc legitur:<sup>86</sup> *Non declines cor meum in verba malitiae*. Qui igitur peccato excusationem addit, sordem sordi indubitanter addit. Ex hoc ergo unde minus sordidos vel turpes se videri existimant inde et magis turpes sunt et recte videntibus apparent.

Quinta insania est de aliena miseria quaerere sibi solacium, et quia alius miserior est, ideo se reputare felicem, et quia alius magis vulneratus aut aeger, ideo reputare se sanum.

Sexta insania est quam Seneca<sup>87</sup> vocat summam malorum. Summa, inquit, malorum est quod ad exemplum malorum vivitur. In omnibus enim artificiis a bonis solis exempla sumuntur praeterquam in arte vivendi vel artificio. Quis enim architectus velit sequi deteriores in arte sua? Quis aurifex, et ita de aliis? In solo autem artificio vivendi ubi mala exempla perniciosissima sunt non solum a malis sed a pessimis exempla quaeruntur. Non solum enim mali sunt, sed etiam pessimi, in quocumque genere malitiae qui vel magisterio sacro vel dignitate ecclesiastica praediti illa se<sup>88</sup> et officium pariter inquinant. Sacer enim doctor vel praelatus in peccato carnis non solum malus, sed pessimus, et ita de aliis. Et hi sunt quorum exempla stulti maxime sequi contendunt.

Septima intolerabilis infrenitas aliquo ire velle quia ibi conspicit alium cecidisse et tanto audacius quanto illum videt ipso casu gravius vulneratum. Tanto enim audacius in peccato ruere stulti volunt, quanto majores litteratura vel officio ibi viderint corruisse quia et tanto gravius vulnerantur quanto ex altiori ceciderunt. Et hoc est quod dat stultis fiduciam, videlicet altum a quo alios cecidisse conspiciunt.

Octava est quod dum se operire credunt magis se detegunt. Ipsa enim revelatio et accusatio turpitudinum spiritualium, id est confessio earum, velatio seu absconsio eorum est, sicut legitur, Isaiae XLIII:<sup>89</sup> *Dic tu iniquitates tuas ut justificeris, quasi ipsa dictio sive confessio justificatio est*. Et auctoritas Augus-

<sup>84</sup> Add. ignominiam AB. Gloss (?).

<sup>85</sup> quo B.

<sup>86</sup> Ps. cxl, 4.

<sup>87</sup> Seneca, Ep. Mor. CXXIII, 6.

<sup>88</sup> Add. pariter B.

<sup>89</sup> Is. xliii, 26.

tini:<sup>1</sup> Si homo agnoscit, Deus ignoscit, et si homo accusat, Deus excusat.

Nona insania est quod cum possint operire turpitudines suas purpura et bysso et omni decore et pretiositate gemmarum, ad spurcissimos vilissimosque panniculos ut inde se operiant refugiant. Purpura enim caritas est, purpura, inquam, ardens et ipsa est operimentum peccatorum, sicut legitur, Proverbiorum X:<sup>2</sup> *universa delicta operit<sup>3</sup> caritas*. Et Jacobi ultimo<sup>4</sup>: *Caritas operit multitudinem* (40<sup>r</sup>) *peccatorum*. Byssus vero multiplici ablutione lacrimarum, multiplici tunsione pectoris et flagellorum candorem acquirens, poenitentialis purificatio est; gemmae pretiosissimae singulae virtutes et maxime eminentes. Ista absconsoria turpitudinum suarum habere possent isti quos nuditas ad tam vilia velamenta fugere compellit dum arguuntur vel ne arguantur.

Decima insania est ad foliorum operimenta fugere; et ista est hereditaria et patrimonialis ab Adam et Eva, primis parentibus, devoluta. Folia vocamus vana verba et infructuosa quibus turpitudines suas nonnulli velare nituntur, quemadmodum legitur de primis parentibus, Genesis III,<sup>5</sup> quod de foliis *fecerunt sibi perizomata*, id est succinctoria vel bracas. Et interdum etiam verba Scripturae sacrae non tam violenta quam sacrilega interpretatione in nequitiarum suarum velatione intorquere inflectereque contendunt.

Undecima insania est cum excusationibus velint velare turpitudines suas adhibent sibi turpitudinem maximam, id est superbiae strumam, sicut legitur Job XXXIV,<sup>6</sup> qui *addit super peccata sua superbiam* et cetera.

Duodecima insania est ipsa procax revelatio sive confessio peccatorum; et quasi impudentia ipsa se armant adversus arguentes dicentes: Feci et adhuc faciam, quid ad vos? Non dimitterem propter vos. De hoc, Proverbiorum XXI:<sup>7</sup> *Vir procaciter obfirmat vultum suum*.

Decima tertia enim pertinacia est quae idololatriae comparatur, Regum I, XV:<sup>8</sup> *peccatum ariolandi est, repugnare; et scelus idololatriae, nolle acquiescere*. Pertinaciam autem dicimus duritiam mentis qua tamquam virtute adversus monentes et objurgantes (223<sup>v</sup>) pugnatur, Proverbiorum XXIX:<sup>9</sup> *Viro, qui corripientem se dura cervice contemnit, repentinus superveniet interitus; et eum sanitas non sequetur*. De omnibus his, Job XXXI:<sup>10</sup> *Si abscondi quasi homo peccatum meum*. Quasi omnes isti modi, quibus homo abscondit in eo quod homo, non modi absconsionum sunt, sed potius denudationum et deturpationum, ut ostendimus.

Quanta autem deturpatio sit in muliere frontis attritio et carentia manifestum est. Frontem autem spirituales sibi attriverunt, et sine illa sunt qui verecundiam abjecerunt et impudentes effecti sunt. Unde vulgo effrontes et sine fronte vocantur. Et de hoc, Jeremiae III:<sup>11</sup> *frons mulieris meretricis facta est tibi; erubescere nescivisti*. Frons enim spiritualis mulieris meretricis impudentia est. De obstinata vero impudentia legitur, Isaiae LVIII:<sup>12</sup> *nervus ferreus cervix tua, et frons aenea*. Ex ista nuditate mentis obnoxii sunt aestui et frigori et muscarum omni generi. Vide qualiter tremunt prae frigore ad ventum detractionis, et qualiter tremunt antequam perflectur illo, et fugiunt a facie ejus, sicut et<sup>13</sup> supra ostendimus, quia nudi sunt, ne vestiti videantur. Timent enim multi videri boni, ut diximus, quemadmodum si mulier, castitatis amatrix,

<sup>1</sup> St. Augustine, *Enn. in Ps.* 74, 3; PL 36, 948.

<sup>2</sup> Prov. x, 12.

<sup>3</sup> Om. A.

<sup>4</sup> Jac. v, 20.

<sup>5</sup> Gen. iii, 7.

<sup>6</sup> Job. xxxiv, 37.

<sup>7</sup> Prov. xxi, 29.

<sup>8</sup> I Reg. xv, 23.

<sup>9</sup> Prov. xxix, 1.

<sup>10</sup> Job xxxi, 33.

<sup>11</sup> Jer. iii, 4.

<sup>12</sup> Is. xlvi, 3.

<sup>13</sup> Om. B.



timeat videri pudica et sancta, et prae timore isto velit videri meretrix et ornatu meretricio se praeparet;<sup>14</sup> quod hactenus in mulieribus non vidimus.<sup>15</sup>

Sicut autem rigor et tremor corporis ex frigore sunt et frigus indicat corporale, sic rigor et contractio cordis atque (40") tremor frigus indicant spirituale, quod non est nisi tremor. Et attende perversitatem frigoris istius et diabolicum miraculum, quia frigus istud cogit homines manere nudos et abjicere vestimenta. Attende etiam qualiter calescunt flante austro, id est molli vento adulationis, sicut legitur Job XXXVII:<sup>16</sup> *non vestimenta tua calida sunt, cum perflata fuerit terra austro?* Hujusmodi vento ita incallescunt ad mala interdum, a quibus refrigerant vento detractionis efflati, ut omnes difficultates peccandi impetu et aviditate concupiscentiarum suarum irrumpant, hoc est et saepem spinarum et maceriam, de quibus legitur Osee II:<sup>17</sup> *saepiam viam tuam spinis et saepiam illam maceria.* Et Jeremiae V:<sup>18</sup> *ecce magis hi simul confregerunt jugum, ruperunt vincula.* Aestum igitur hic intelligimus ardorem concupiscentiarum, frigus, timorem, malum, ut diximus. Et propter hoc dicitur in Psalmo:<sup>19</sup> *ignis, grando, nix, glacies et spiritus procellarum pars calicis eorum.* Muscae vero improbas, volatiles sordidas et pungentes cogitationes et affectiones; istae sunt muscae Aegyptiae, de quibus, Exodi VIII,<sup>20</sup> scilicet ciniphes et musca gravissima diversi generis. Hae sunt *muscae morientes, quae perdunt suavitatem unguenti*, Ecclesiastes IX:<sup>21</sup> His muscis non ex defectu, qui nuditas sit omnimoda, fatigantur quibuscumque improbae sunt.

Viri enim sancti, ut dicit Gregorius,<sup>22</sup> etiam turpissimis cogitationibus fatigantur. Viri enim sancti, qui non sacris occupationibus omnino cooperti sunt exterius, etsi forraturam, id est internum decorem virtutum habeant, a muscis hujusmodi infestantur, sicut apparet in claustralibus et nonnullis scholaribus. Quemadmodum enim pellis et pili proprii nec equos a vesperis, nec canes a coenomyiis defendere sufficiunt. Et propter hoc equis operimenta alia adhibentur, sic internarum virtutum decor, qui velut pellis animarum est, ex Job II:<sup>23</sup> *pellem pro pelle et cetera*, hoc est, pellem carnis pro pelle mentis, viros sanctos ab istarum muscarum infestatione protegere non valet, immo adhibendum est eis operimentum densissimum vehementis et continuatae occupationis. Vehementem autem occupationem accipimus, quae aliud cogitare non sinit, qualis est occupatio Scripturae sacrae, cum aliis impenditur lectionis. Psalmodia enim et meditatio et quae sunt hujusmodi ab his muscis non liberant nisi violenta et valde timorata fortitudine attentionis. Necesse enim habet singulis psalmodiae verbis alligare se quisquis muscarum istarum aculeo voluerit evadere in psallendo. Quam alligationem melius docet unctio et<sup>24</sup> experientia quam nos possimus verbis exprimere. Qui autem muscas istas abigere non conantur quid aliud quam instar quorundam damnatorum muscis comedendi expositi sunt? Et nota quod muscae quattuor de causis agminatim aggregantur.

Primam super ulcera et excoiaturas. Ulcus autem saniosum in anima humana luxuria est. Et propter hoc luxuriosi luxuriae stimulis velut improbissimarum muscarum aculeis infestantur. Si enim vere scabies spiritualis luxuria est, ut dicit Augustinus in libro *Confessionum*:<sup>25</sup> Delectabar scalpi scabiem libidinum mearum, quid aliud sunt corda luxuriosorum quam corda ulcerosa et scabiosa, quae numquam vacant aut a prurigine desideriorum aut a sanie profluente putridarum voluptatum.

Secunda causa est nuditas propter quam calvi capita sua galeris seu pileis (41") capita sua armant et protegunt non solum erubescences deformitatem

<sup>14</sup> praepararet A.

<sup>15</sup> videmus B.

<sup>16</sup> Job xxxvii, 17.

<sup>17</sup> Osee ii, 6.

<sup>18</sup> Jer. v, 5.

<sup>19</sup> Ps. cxlviii, 8.

<sup>20</sup> Exo. viii, 24.

<sup>21</sup> Eccl. x, 1.

<sup>22</sup> St. Gregory, In Job XVI, 42; PL 75, 1146C.

<sup>23</sup> Job. ii, 4.

<sup>24</sup> Om. B.

<sup>25</sup> St. Augustine, Confess. III, 1, 1 *passim*.

calvitiei, sed et muscarum aculeos formidantes. Qui cor forti occupatione non obtegunt, quod utique caput in nobis est, inquinandum illud et lacerandum muscis hujusmodi discoopertum sive nudum exponunt. Erubescendum est tanta diligentia capita equorum equitantes in aestate contra muscas protegere et capita propria, id est corda, muscis infernalibus laceranda et inquinanda exponere. Qui vel omnino otiosi sunt vel forti occupatione tanquam densissimo pilleo capita sua, id est corda, non muniunt, agmina hujusmodi muscarum in capitibus, (224<sup>r</sup>) id est in cordibus, incessanter circumferunt. Quid aliud quam Beelzebub, id est viri muscarum dicendi sunt? Sed et sacrificia quae offerunt, scilicet orationum, laudum, psalmodiarum tanta admixtione muscarum, quomodo Deo abominabilia non reddunt? Et si musca una cibum vel potum reddit abominabilem, quid tanta multitudo muscarum faciet in esca et potu nostri Redemptoris, id est in operibus nostris, quae velut esca et potus ejus sunt, sicut Ipsemet ostendit, Joannis IV.<sup>26</sup> loquens ad mulierem Samaritanam: *da mihi bibere*, insinuans se fidem et conversionem illius sitire. Et in Psalmo:<sup>27</sup> *cinerem*, id est incendio vitiorum paene consumptos peccatores, *tamquam panem manducabam*, hoc est tamquam electos. Et in cruce unum solum latronem comedit, sicut dicit Augustinus.<sup>28</sup> Quantum formidare debent muscosa corda, ne Deus illa abominetur atque rejiciat?

Tertia causa est unctuositas. Ista est saginatio comessionis et ebrietatis et hujusmodi.<sup>29</sup> Propter hanc hujusmodi homines, videlicet deliciis delibutos, velut desuper unctos muscae istae sequuntur et super eos acervatim aggregantur. His ergo consilium est ut, si volunt a se muscas ista abigere, quod eas attrahit, id est delibutionem a se auferant. Isti etenim sunt qui et de die et de nocte a muscis hujusmodi torquentur. *Multas enim curas eorum sequuntur somnia*, Ecclesiastes V.<sup>30</sup> Et iterum ejusdem eodem:<sup>31</sup> *saturitas divitis non sinit eum dormire*.

Quarta causa est mel, sicut dicit Hieronymus:<sup>32</sup> mel muscae sequuntur. Ista est praesentis pacis et tranquillitatis dulcedo. Attende igitur insaniam nudorum, qui tamquam ad provocandas muscas nuditati suae qua nullo vestimento bonorum operum operati sunt delinitionem unctionis et mellis adjiciunt, quod ad tormentum damnatis quibusdam fieri consuevit, ut mellis dulcedine et unctionis pinguedine provocatae et pungant profundius et mordeant avidius.

Quantam causam possum assignare humiditatem, quae ad luxuriam et divitiarum affluentiam pertinent, sicut legitur, Job XL:<sup>33</sup> *in secreto calami dormit Behemoth, in locis humentibus*. Tortorum est atque carnificum melle aut sanguine delinire corpora damnatorum. Ipsi ergo tortores et carnifices sui ipsorum sunt qui corda sua sic deliniunt, sicut legitur, Jacobi V:<sup>34</sup> *in luxuriis enutristis corda vestra*. Quod amplius est enutrire, scilicet quam delinire, quia hoc est profundius inficere et impugnare. Si sola superficialis aspersio unctionis tantam multitudinem muscarum provocat, quid faciet ipsa sagina? Propter hoc, qui a puero in luxuriis enutrientur corda sua, longe amplius pro muscis provocandis faciunt quam qui ad tempus. (41<sup>r</sup>) Assue enim alicui loco muscae difficilius abiguntur. Abraham autem in XV Genesis dicitur<sup>35</sup> volucres abegisse a sacrificio, quas non abigere, sed provocare student qui provocatoria muscarum sibi adhibent, et velut reclamatoria muscis ostendunt.

Quarta pars paupertatis algor est, sive algitas ex nimietate frigoris. Hujus igitur quatuor partes sunt, cujus prima est stupiditas sive insensibilitas, qua membra algida et algore stupida, nec in medio carbonum atque flammaram posita ardorem sentiunt. Et licet exterius interdum calefiant aut ardeant,

<sup>26</sup> Jo. iv, 7.<sup>27</sup> Ps. ci, 10.<sup>28</sup> St. Augustine, *Enn. in Ps.* 68, 9; PL 36, 848.<sup>29</sup> Add. et B.<sup>30</sup> Eccl. v, 2.<sup>31</sup> Ecc. v, 11.<sup>32</sup> Ps. Seneca, *De Rem. Fortuitorum* X, 4.<sup>33</sup> Job xi, 16.<sup>34</sup> Jac. v, 5.<sup>35</sup> Gen. xv, 11.

interius tamen algida remanent. Vide corda sacra eloquia sive docendo sive praedicando sive psallendo sive cantando sive legendo sive meditando assidue revolvendum. Ubi, quaeso, corda hujusmodi hominum versantur nisi in medio carbonum, qui in Psalmo dicuntur *carbones desolatorii*?<sup>38</sup> Et iterum alibi:<sup>37</sup> *Altissimus dedit vocem suam: grando et carbones ignis. Et alibi: Ignitum eloquium tuum vehementer. Et Jeremiae XXIII: Nonne verba mea sunt quasi ignis, et quasi malleus conterens petram?* Carbones etiam, juxta Gregorium<sup>40</sup> super primum Ezechielis, evangelistae sunt *aspectus eorum quasi carbonum ignis ardentium*. In medio evangelistarum hujusmodi homines assidue versantur vel quia, secundum eundem Gregorium,<sup>41</sup> juxta aliam lectionem, carbones sunt qui caritate quidem ardent, sed exempla lucis foris non exhibent; flammae vero sunt qui et caritate ardent et exempla lucis aliis foris praebent.

Qui inter ista duo genera hominum conversantur, nec sancti amoris ardore interius calescent, in medio carbonum atque flammarum indubitantur algent, quemadmodum et diabolus quondam in medio lapidum ignitorum usque in algorem istum refriguit et obstupuit. Eundem stuporem et insensibilitatem patiuntur qui Dei beneficia quam faces ardentes, et torres<sup>42</sup> sive titiones flammanes et intra nos atque circa nos injecti et circumjecti ad nos amore ejus inflammandos? De fornace siquidem divini amoris sive bonitatis omnia ejus beneficia in nos et circa nos procedentia, quid aliud nobis quam Dei bonitatem incredibili importunitate<sup>43</sup> ingerunt? Quid aliud quam flammam de illa<sup>44</sup> fornace nobis afferunt? Sed corda, sicut diximus, algore stupida atque insensibilia velut in tanta pyra innumerabilium inestimabiliumque lignorum, hoc est beneficiorum Dei, nullo ipsius amore calescent. Nomina enim hoc datum, donum, beneficium sicut recte intelligentibus amorem significant largitoris, sic et spiritualiter sentientibus, hoc est spirituali sensu praeditis, igne res eorum ardent, et illum ingerunt divini amoris. Sicut enim nomina in significando ad intellectum, sic res eorum in accipiendo se habebunt necessario ad effectum. Quod si forte hujusmodi homines in (224<sup>r</sup>) tanta pyra, ut diximus, positi,<sup>45</sup> tantis flammis, facibus, torribus atque carbonibus circumdati, obsessi ac repleti, interdum calescere videntur, exterius tamen est et superficiei tenus quod calescent, quemad- (42<sup>r</sup>)-modum stupidis algore mentis, attactu carbonum atque flammarum, exteriora videntur calescere, interioribus eorum in suo frigore remanentibus, sed statim ubi flammae amotae fuerint, evanescit calor ille exterior, sic et isti dum docent aut<sup>46</sup> praedicant, tanquam attactu flammarum atque carbonum, quos diximus, velut exterius accalescentes, rugata nare et abducto supercilio, vocem inaltant reprehensionis contra peccata, ita ut zelo fervere videantur; sed quod exterius tantum caluerint et quod non ab intimis iste fervor eruperit, probat amotio flammarum atque carbonum. Statim enim ubi docere vel praedicare cessaverunt etiam exterius frigidi, quemadmodum antea<sup>47</sup> inveniuntur. Nonnulli autem alieno igne flammæ, scilicet iræ, odii aut invidiae, igne sancti zeli interdum ardere videntur. Quod duobus signis evidenter perpenditur.

Primum si non aut in misericordia<sup>48</sup> aut ex misericordia peccantes corripiant. Scriptum est enim Psalmo:<sup>49</sup> *Corripiet me justus in misericordia, et increpabit me.* Et ad Galatas V:<sup>50</sup> *corripite hujusmodi in spiritu lenitatis et cetera.* Et Gregorius<sup>51</sup> super Ezechielem: zeli sancti districtio ex<sup>52</sup> misericordiae virtute

<sup>38</sup> Ps. cxix, 4.

<sup>37</sup> Ps. xvii, 14.

<sup>38</sup> Ps. cxviii, 140.

<sup>39</sup> Jer. xxiii, 29.

<sup>40</sup> St. Gregory, *In Ezechielem*, I, 5, 6; PL 76, 823A.

<sup>41</sup> St. Gregory, *In Ezech.* I, 5, 6; PL 76, 823C.

<sup>42</sup> tortores B.

<sup>43</sup> oportunitate B.

<sup>44</sup> illo B.

<sup>45</sup> Om. B.

<sup>46</sup> et B; corr. i. marg. aut A.

<sup>47</sup> ante B.

<sup>48</sup> unam B.

<sup>49</sup> Ps. cxl, 5.

<sup>50</sup> Gal. vi, 1.

<sup>51</sup> St. Gregory, *In Ezech.* I, 7, 2; PL 76, 841B.

<sup>52</sup> et B.

necesse est<sup>53</sup> ardeat ac clarescat. Hujusmodi autem homines in ira arguunt et in furore corripunt tantum contra Psalmistam. Ideo dicitur, Proverbiorum XIV:<sup>54</sup> *In ore stulti virga superbiae*, non correctionis. Et Ecclesiastici XXIX:<sup>55</sup> *Est correptio <mendax> in ore contumeliosi*. Mentitur enim se correptionem, quod morsus tantum est aut contumelia. Nisi enim ex justitia Dei sit, quae aut misericordia Dei est aut plurimum habet misericordiae, non ex justitia Dei est. *Ira enim viri justitiam Dei non operatur*, Jacobi I.<sup>56</sup> De hoc Ezechielis XXIV:<sup>57</sup> *cum austeritate imperabatis eis, et cum potentia*.

Secundo, quia in aliena peccata severi, in sua misericordes inveniuntur, dum suis non solummodo ipsi parcunt, sed etiam ab aliis parci volunt; et ita sibi ignoscentes, ut dixit, ille mihi ignosco, Maenius<sup>58</sup> inquit. In alios autem<sup>59</sup> saeviunt eo usque ut non severe correctores, quin potius saevi persecutores appareant. Propter quod spiritualiter aegrotantes, id est peccatores, non ad ipsos tamquam ad medicos, sed ab ipsis potius tamquam a persecutoribus et inimicis fugiunt. Probatio autem evidens eorum, quae diximus, illa est quia omnis virtus ordinata est, immo secundum Augustinum,<sup>60</sup> ordo amoris, et propter hoc operatio virtuosa necessario ordinata.

### <VIRTUS UT ORDO ET LUX>

Virtus enim omnis aut ut lux est aut ignis aut aliud hujusmodi per similitudinem. Lux autem omnis id in quo est maxime et primo illuminat, et ignis propinquiora cremabili a primo et maxime consumit, et quia cum dispositione itur in bellum, cum propinquioribus hostibus primum configitur. Isti autem totum e contrario faciunt et ideo totum praepostere atque perverse. Quis enim bellator mediis hostibus magisque nocentibus atque majoribus parcens ultiores et minus nocentes invadit. Sed sicut alibi<sup>61</sup> diximus: In Beelzebub ejiciunt daemonia et unus daemon in eis ejicit alium dum vitiis suis aliena curare conantur, verbi gratia, magister irae magistrum luxuriae, et ita de aliis. Ea igitur est perversitas hujusmodi hominum ut vulneribus suis alienis mederi velint, et suis aegritudinibus alienas curare, et claudicationibus suis aliorum gressus dirigere, et suis tenebris alios illuminare. (42<sup>a</sup>)

Secunda est contractio membrorum de qua in Psalmo:<sup>62</sup> *factus sum<sup>63</sup> sicut uter in pruina*. Quemadmodum uter in pruina corrugatur atque contrahitur, et capiendus liquoribus, dum aperiri distendique ne quid ineptum<sup>64</sup> efficitur, sic frigore spirituali, qui timor vel amor inferiorum est, ut jam dicem<us>, contrahuntur corda humana in semetipsa et retrahuntur ab aliis, minorantur in se ut magna non capiant.

Corrugantur ad duplicitates et simulationes; extendi se non patiuntur in fratrum utilitates, immo nec in altum<sup>65</sup> ut Dei amorem attingant vel Deo honorem suum reddant, nec in latum ut vel mala proximorum per compassionem attingant vel potius mala proximorum eos tangant; nec in dextrorsum per benevolentiam aut beneficentiam, ut beneficia eorum ad proximos perveniant, sed contracti in semetipsos, non solum sua retinere, sed aliena rapiendo, fraudando vel saltem concupiscendo studeant. Ad caelestes vero et spirituales liquores capiendos nec aperiri nec distendi valeant, videlicet ad balsamum sapientiae, oleum caritatis et misericordiae, vinum compunctionis vel jocunditatis internae, ad discerpendum et male sonandum promptissima. Si distendere ea quis voluerit monitis aut precibus in Dei amorem vel proximorum utilitatem, ut utres in pruina statim

<sup>53</sup> et B.

<sup>54</sup> Prov. xiv, 3.

<sup>55</sup> Ecclus. xix, 28.

<sup>56</sup> Jac. i, 21.

<sup>57</sup> Ezech. xxxiv, 4.

<sup>58</sup> Horace, Sat. I, 3, 23.

<sup>59</sup> Om. B.

<sup>60</sup> St. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei* XV, 22, 14.

<sup>61</sup> Lc. xi, 15.

<sup>62</sup> Ps. cxviii, 83.

<sup>63</sup> est B.

<sup>64</sup> impetum B.

<sup>65</sup> alterum B.

per iracundiam discerpuntur, si flagello tribulationis percussi fuerint, sonum horrendum malae obmurmurationis seu blasphemiae statim reddunt. Respice corda hujusmodi hominum et videbis pedes eorum spirituales atque manus ita contractos, ita recurvatos, ut potius eos uncus et uncinos ad retinendum atque trahendum iudices quam manus aut pedes; et jam non vasa vinaria aut olearia per capacitatem atque distentionem, sed potius ignis pabulum contractione et ariditate merito videri possint. Et sicut utres per pruinam omni usui inutiles (225<sup>r</sup>) efficiuntur cum ceterae pelles per pruinam non omnes usus suos aut utilitatem amittant, sic corda hujusmodi hominum nulli usui apta sunt, quemadmodum lumbare quod in Euphrate computruit, sicut legitur Jeremiae XIII.<sup>66</sup> Et vide quam horrenda sit ista contractio et a quanta amplitudine ad quantam parvitatem, et quod plus est, ut dicit Psalmista:<sup>67</sup> *ad nihilum redactus sum, et nescivi*.

Respice naturalem amplitudinem magnitudinemque cordis humani et invenies eam in omnes extentam et usque ad omnes pertingentem et, ut ita dicamus, omnes dilectionis brachiis amplexantem, et quodam sinu benignitatis omnes colligentem, dum omnium bona et mala naturaliter nos tangunt,<sup>68</sup> dum omnibus prodesse naturaliter volumus. Frigus autem timoris et amoris, quod diximus, adeo nos contraxit, ut alii uni soli patriae, alii uni soli professioni, alii soli generi suo, alii solis parentibus, alii solis uxori et filiis, et quod est omnium per-versissimum, alii sibi solis prodesse velint. Et usque ad religionis professores pervenit haec pestis, ut nonnulli ex eis infra limites ordinis sui, alii<sup>69</sup> infra limites domus suae, alii infra paucos familiares et notos suos reclusi sint et retracti, nulla affectione benevolentiae extensi ulterius, quod et loquela eorum manifestum facit, dum aut pro ordine suo tantum (43<sup>r</sup>) aut pro domibus suis aut pro amicis suis tantum interpellant et specialiter eos illis recommendant. Sed qui infra angustiam proprii corporis adeo reclusi, contracti et complicati sunt ut nihil habeant affectionis ulterius vel intra semetipsos, quod Apostolus in II ad Romanos<sup>70</sup> vocat homines *sine affectione* et in III, I ad Timotheum<sup>71</sup> *seipsos amantes*, in omni genere hominum monstruosius contracti sunt. Cum enim Dominus extendens sit caelos sicut pellem, ipsi econtrario contrahunt caelos<sup>72</sup> in pellem, immo in pelliculas contractas et corrugatissimas amplitudine caelorum complicant et contrahunt; et ita contracta corda nisi unctione et superfusione caelestis olei extendi in caelos denuo nequent. Et haec est una causa quare parvuli in baptismo unguuntur, scilicet ut<sup>73</sup> extendantur in caelos; pelles enim ariditate contractae aut aquae superfusione<sup>74</sup> aut unctione postmodum extenduntur. Et propter hoc in ipso baptismo adhibetur aqua; de hoc, Job VII:<sup>75</sup> *cutis mea aruit et contracta est*. Et Threnorum IV:<sup>76</sup> *Pellis nostra, quasi clibanus exusta est*. Et ejusdem III:<sup>77</sup> *Vetustam fecit pellem meam* et cetera.

Tertia vero est agglutinatio sive adhaerentia qualem efficit nimietas frigoris propter quam frigiditas dicitur virtus congregativa heterogeneorum,<sup>78</sup> id est reversarum naturarum, quoniam agglutinat ligna et lapides, ferrum, pannos et coria. Et haec causa propter quam ipsum amorem mundi frigus<sup>79</sup> diximus. Nulla enim magis diversa sunt natura inter corpora quam caelum et terra; sic et spiritualiter caelum clerus et claustrum praelati et doctores, terra vero terrena omnia.

Item multum diversa sunt natura anima humana et pecunia, agri,<sup>80</sup> vineae, metalla, gemmae et lapides. Et tamen haec tam diversa ab invicem amor mundi

<sup>66</sup> Jer. xiii, 7.

<sup>67</sup> Ps. lxxii, 22.

<sup>68</sup> tanguntur B.

<sup>69</sup> Om. B.

<sup>70</sup> Rom. i, 31.

<sup>71</sup> II Tim. iii, 2.

<sup>72</sup> caelum B.

<sup>73</sup> et B.

<sup>74</sup> bis. erh. cael. olei etc. B.

<sup>75</sup> Job vii, 5.

<sup>76</sup> Thren. v, 10.

<sup>77</sup> Thren. iii, 4.

<sup>78</sup> ethereogeneorum B.

<sup>79</sup> frigidus B.

<sup>80</sup> ager B.

conglutinat et adeo indissolubiliter cohaerere facit ut interdum nec morte etiam separentur, sicut accidit in illo qui quemdam familiarem suum jurare fecit ut sacculum pecuniae sub capite ejus poneret in sepulcro quasi diceret quia nec mortuus nec morte separari poterat a pecunia. Hoc etiam apparet in illis qui sepulcra sua<sup>81</sup> auro et argento et gemmis ornari constituunt, et hoc in testamentis suis; de quibus dicit Augustinus<sup>82</sup> quod nec mortui carere divitiis. Agglutinatatio autem ista et adhaerentia inde apparent,<sup>83</sup> quia ubicumque sint ipsae divitiae, ibi et corda, sicut testatur Veritas, Matthaei VII: <sup>84</sup> *ubi est thesaurus tuus, ibi est et cor tuum*. Et quocumque trahantur aut distrahantur divitiae, simul trahantur aut distrahantur corda cupidorum et avarorum post ipsas, ut testatur Dominus per Osee V,<sup>85</sup> quoniam *Ephraim coepit abire post sordes*, id est *stercora* divitiarum, ex IV ad Philippenses.<sup>86</sup> De hoc Ecclesiastici XXXI: <sup>87</sup> *beatus est dives qui post aurum non abiit*, subaudi: quocumque ipsum aurum trans-ferretur. Abeunt enim cupidi et avari post divitias quas habere videntur ut alligati et agglutinati eis. Post divitias vero quas habere desiderant, quemadmodum canes post ossa cum eis ostenduntur et verveces post sal et aves rapaces post reclamatoria et corvi et milvi post cadavera et muscae, ut dicit Hieronymus,<sup>88</sup> post mella.

Apparet etiam ex hoc ista (43<sup>a</sup>) adhaerentia et agglutinatio quia quae sibi cohaerent quasi agglutinata, si sensibilia sunt, non separantur ab invicem sine dolore et sine detractioe partis alterius vel ambarum, quae scilicet pars adhaeret glutino et per ipsum glutinum/abrumpitur a toto suo et sequens glutinum adhaeret alteri. Propter hoc nec a luxurioso voluptas carnalis nec ab avaro divitiae nec a superbo dominatio seu quodcumque aliud eorum quod superbus amat, ex eo quod superbus, sine dolore separantur; et quotiens separantur<sup>89</sup> velut<sup>90</sup> frustum cordis aliquid post se trahunt, et ista scissura sive divisio dolorem efficit. Dolor enim sensus est divisionis continui in corporibus; sic et dolor est hujusmodi hominum velut abruptio et<sup>91</sup> scissura quaedam spiritualis alicujus partis a corde ipsorum cum ista eis auferuntur aut cum eis frui prohibentur. Inde est dolor claustralium qui corda habent in mundo aut in parte aut in toto, corpora vero in claustris.

Quia igitur in divisione sunt corporis et animae aut ex parte aut ex toto, necessario in morte sunt vel totaliter vel pro parte (225<sup>a</sup>) et ideo non est mirum si in dolore. De ista agglutinatione est illud:<sup>92</sup> *conglutinator est in terra venter noster*, id est affectus in terrenis isto gelicidio adhaesit. Similiter et Ecclesiastici X<sup>93</sup> de avaro: *proiecit intima sua in vita sua*; proiecit scilicet in terram, id est in terrena; et quia gelicidio isto terrenis adhaerent intima avarorum, ideo nec colligi nec inde separari sine diruptione et dolore<sup>94</sup> possunt. De hoc Job XVI:<sup>95</sup> *effudit in terram omnia viscera mea* et cetera. De hoc est illud Psalmi:<sup>96</sup> *Adhaesit pavimento anima mea*; pavimento scilicet temporalium quod pedibus cordis, id est, affectibus calcare debuerat, adhaesit miserabili<sup>97</sup> gelicidio agglutinata. De hoc gelicidio Ecclesiastici III:<sup>98</sup> *solventur quasi glacies in sereno peccata tua*, et generaliter quicquid de *nive, glacie, grandine* et *gelu* ubique in Scriptura<sup>99</sup> legitur, totum ad hoc pertinet. Ex hac agglutinatione vel adhaerentia accidit ut discrepantur corda avarorum et omnium amantium temporalia quotiens

<sup>81</sup> suo B.<sup>82</sup> St. Augustine, *Enn. in Ps.* 48, 2; PL 36, 555-6.<sup>83</sup> apparet A.<sup>84</sup> Mt. vi, 21.<sup>85</sup> Osee v, 11.<sup>86</sup> Phil. iii, 8.<sup>87</sup> Eccclus. xxxi, 8.<sup>88</sup> Cf. *supra*, note 32.<sup>89</sup> Om. et . . . separantur B.<sup>90</sup> vedi B.<sup>91</sup> sive B.<sup>92</sup> Ps. xliii, 25.<sup>93</sup> Eccclus. x, 10.<sup>94</sup> Om. et dolore B.<sup>95</sup> Job. xvi, 14.<sup>96</sup> Ps. cxviii, 25.<sup>97</sup> mirabili B.<sup>98</sup> Eccclus. iii, 17.<sup>99</sup> Job xxviii, 32; Ps. cxlviii, 8; Jer. xxxvi, 30.

ab eis temporalia, quae amant, auferuntur, ita ut cum unoquoque quod eis aufertur aliquid cordis eorum frustum<sup>1</sup> pariter abrumpatur.<sup>2</sup> Vide igitur corda eorum adhaerentia et agglutinata agris et vineis, domibus, torcularibus, cupis et dollis, et nonnisi igne tribulationis aut divini amoris posse inde dissolvi, adeoque adhaerere pedes eorum spirituales, id est affectus et ventrem, id est cupiditatem ipsam seu amorem, quem habent in illa, non posse ab eis avelli nec posse aliter pedes eorum moveri nisi et illa moveantur.

Quam difficile igitur movebitur qui pedes tam indissolubili gelicidio alligatos habet et agglutinatos tantis ponderibus domorum, agrorum et vinearum! Quam difficile etiam intrabunt *per angustam portam*, de qua Lucae XIII:<sup>3</sup> et ambulant per *artam viam quae ducit ad vitam*, de qua Matthaei VII,<sup>4</sup> quibus tantae moles temporalium adhaerent. Propter hoc dicit Veritas, Matthaei XIX:<sup>5</sup> *quia dives difficile intrabit in regnum caelorum*. Et iterum:<sup>6</sup> *Facilius est camelum intrare per foramen acus, quam divitem in regnum caelorum*. Et iterum, Matthaei X:<sup>7</sup> *Quam difficile qui (44<sup>r</sup>) pecuniam habent, in regnum Dei introibunt*. Similiter et Lucae XVIII.<sup>8</sup> Modica enim est gibbositas cameli, immo nulla, comparatione molium quas nominavimus. Propter hoc in ipso ingressu regni, hoc est in ipsa poenitentia, quae janua est regni coelestis, adultis<sup>9</sup> monstruosa ipsa gibbositas, immo congeries montium et necessitate deponitur. Propter hoc dicitur, Job XXXVI:<sup>10</sup> *Depone magnitudinem tuam*. Et ejusdem XXIV:<sup>11</sup> *nec ambulet per viam vinearum*. Quemadmodum enim canes imperticantur vulgo, hoc est baculis collis eorum ex transverso alligatur, ne possint ambulare per vineas tempore, quo uvae sunt<sup>12</sup> in vineis, sic isti, et multo fortius, rerum suarum molibus prohibentur ambulare per viam angustam quae ducit ad vitam. Et sicut canis non viarum angustia sed impedimento, quod ipse gestat ambulare non sinitur per vineas, sic et isti. Etsi enim via ista arta dicatur et porta angusta, tamen ampla est et spatiosa ambulantis; sed moles istas et trabes, sicut diximus, spiritualiter portantibus angusta est, nec sufficit ipsis et hujusmodi molibus, quae ipsis per se spatiosa esset.

Imaginare igitur<sup>13</sup> miserum amatorem temporalium distentis manibus et pedibus effusisque visceribus sparsisque capillis super terram, dorso verso ad caelum jacere omnibusque praeenumeratis terrae, id est terrenis, gelicidio quo diximus adhaerere ut capillis, id est cogitationibus ibi teneatur, et caput, id est sensum vel intellectum elevare non sinatur, scilicet ut sublimia spiritualium vel aeternorum cogitare non valeat, capillis propriis, id est cogitationibus alligatus. Similiter manibus et pedibus, id est virtutibus operativis et affectibus totisque, ut diximus, visceribus, nihil eorum, quae habet, elevare valens a terra, hoc est a terrenis, ita miserabiliter jacet algidus in via mundi temporalium amator et illorum amore illis aggelatus et in se gelidus oculos, id est sollicitudines,<sup>14</sup> habens in pulvere terrenorum quos statuit declinare in terram, et dorsum habens ad coelum et Deum; Jeremiae III:<sup>15</sup> *verterunt ad me dorsum et non faciem*.

Quarta vero pars est mortificatio, ex qua sunt privatio sensus spiritualis et motus. Et de motu manifestum est quia spiritualiter immobiles sunt nec moveri possunt ab his quibus agglutinati sunt durante algore. Sicut enim verissime dictum est: *Ubi est thesaurus tuus, ibi est et cor tuum*, Matthaei VII<sup>16</sup> et ad Philippenses IV:<sup>17</sup> *Nostra autem conversatio in caelis est*, sic et corda hujusmodi hominum in his sunt quae amant et ab his, quamdiu durat amor hujusmodi,

<sup>1</sup> frustum B.

<sup>2</sup> abrumpitur B.

<sup>3</sup> Lc. xiii, 24.

<sup>4</sup> Mt. vii, 14.

<sup>5</sup> Mt. xix, 23.

<sup>6</sup> Mt. xix, 24.

<sup>7</sup> Mc. x, 23.

<sup>8</sup> Lc. xviii, 24.

<sup>9</sup> aducilis B.

<sup>10</sup> Job xxxvi, 19.

<sup>11</sup> Job xxiv, 18.

<sup>12</sup> sint B.

<sup>13</sup> autem B.

<sup>14</sup> solitudines A.

<sup>15</sup> Jer. xxxii, 33.

<sup>16</sup> Mt. vi, 21.

<sup>17</sup> Phil iii, 20.

non moventur. Sicut ergo non movetur corporaliter quod nec situm mutat corporalem neque locum, sic nec isti moventur spiritualiter dum nec situm mutant spirituales neque locum. Situm non mutant quia semper subsunt temporalibus ut servi dominis et ut onerati oneribus. Locum non mutant quia semper in eis sunt, quamdiu durat amor hujusmodi. De sensu autem licet manifestum sit ex eis quae diximus supra in capitulo de algore,<sup>19</sup> tamen ex hoc manifestum est quod ipsum suum gelicidium et insensibilitatem non sentiunt. Et haec est extrema insensibilitas,<sup>19</sup> videlicet insensibilitas ipsius insensibilitatis, immo etiam mors est. Haec autem mortificatio (44<sup>v</sup>) scilicet quae de algore provenit proprie tactus spiritualis est qua nec propria mala dolendo nec aliena condolendo sentiuntur. Est enim pietas velut tactus spiritualis quo aliena mala sentiuntur. De mortificatione vero singulorum sensuum in capitulo sequenti<sup>20</sup> singillatim prosequemur; (226<sup>v</sup>) interim autem sextam et septimam partes paupertatis tractabimus.

Quinta igitur pars paupertatis istius, carentia domicilii sive expositio ad injurias aeris. Domicilium autem spirituale vel domus caelestis accipienda est vel tabernaculum praesentis ecclesiae vel secretum bonae conscientiae. De domo caelesti ad Corinthiorum II, V:<sup>21</sup> *Habemus ex Deo, domum non manufactam, sed aeternam in caelis*. De tabernaculo vero in IV Isaiae:<sup>22</sup> *super omnem locum, gloria, protectio. Et tabernaculum in<sup>23</sup> umbraculum diei ab aestu,<sup>24</sup> in securitatem et absconsionem a turbine et a pluvia*. Secretum vero bonae conscientiae in tot domicilia vel receptacula dividitur, quot virtutes sunt vel dona gratiarum. Quid enim est memoria sacrae doctrinae, sive intellectus sacris dogmatibus refertus atque redundans, nisi horreum quantum ad ea quae pascunt, delectant, replent, augent et roborent? In his enim quattuor consistit comestio. Et quid est quantum ad ea quae laetificant et inebriant, et prae ebrietate denudari faciunt temporalibus deserendo ea, vel denudari verecundiora sua in confessione, oblivisci injuriarum, afflictionum, illusionum damnorumque<sup>25</sup> irrogatorum, gaudere et gloriari<sup>26</sup> ludibriis sive illusionibus irrogatis ab insania saecularium, et omnino stultum vel insanum ab eis reputari, quae omnia ad similitudinem<sup>27</sup> ebriorum corporaliter. Quid, inquam, est sacra scientia vel doctrina nisi vinum, et quid ejus receptaculum nisi cella vinaria sive cellarium? Sic et in eo quod ignis divini amoris nutrimentum, dolorum<sup>28</sup> spiritualium medicamentum, ciborum similiter condimentum, quid est nisi oleum, sicut legitur, Lucae XII,<sup>29</sup> quia Samaritanus infudit vulneribus sanciat, qui in latrones inciderat, vinum et oleum. Et Zachariae IX:<sup>30</sup> *Quid est bonum domini aut quid<sup>31</sup> pulchrum ejus, nisi frumentum electorum,<sup>32</sup> cibum subaudis, et vinum germinans virgines?* Quantum autem ad ea quae velut quaedam pressura expositionum et disputationum, quid aliud est intellectus mentis humanae, nisi torcular? Et hoc est quod legitur, Levitici XXVI:<sup>33</sup> *vino torcularia redundabunt*. Et Ecclesiastici XXXIII:<sup>34</sup> *quasi qui vindemiatur replevi torcular de cellariis*; Proverbiorum XXIV:<sup>35</sup> *In doctrina replebuntur cellaria, universa substantia pretiosa atque pulcherrima*. Et quia sacra eloquia aromata sunt, sicut legitur Ecclesiastici XXIV,<sup>36</sup> quid est receptaculum eorum, id est intellectus mentis humanae nisi apotheca? De hoc Joelis II:<sup>37</sup> *demolita<sup>38</sup> sunt horrea, dissipatae*

<sup>18</sup> Cf. p. 243.<sup>19</sup> sensibilitas B.<sup>20</sup> Cf. p. 263.<sup>21</sup> II Cor. v. 1.<sup>22</sup> Is. iv, 5-6.<sup>23</sup> et B.<sup>24</sup> Dei et aestus B.<sup>25</sup> et B.<sup>26</sup> gloriam B.<sup>27</sup> similitudinum B.<sup>28</sup> donorum B.<sup>29</sup> Lc. x, 33.<sup>30</sup> Zach. ix, 17.<sup>31</sup> Om. B.<sup>32</sup> Add ejus B; del. A.<sup>33</sup> Prov. iii, 10.<sup>34</sup> Eccclus. xxxiii, 17.<sup>35</sup> Prov. xxiv, 4.<sup>36</sup> Eccclus. xxiv, 20.<sup>37</sup> Joel i, 17.<sup>38</sup> demolite B.<sup>39</sup> Cf. Libellus de Alchimia, in Beati Alberti Magni Opera Omnia XXXVII, (Paris, 1898), p. 547. Et notandum quod metalla differunt



sunt apothecae. Et quoniam argentum et aurum sunt eadem sacra eloquia, argentum quidem igne examinatum propter splendorem veritatis, propter candorem puritatis, propter suavitatem sonoritatis, propter lucrum spiritualis negotiationis; aurum vero propter eminentiam pretiositatis, propter oboedientiam malleationis, propter perfectionem excoctionis sive maturitatis; aes enim, ut dixerunt alchimici,<sup>39</sup> non est nisi aurum crudum, et aurum non est nisi ad perfectum excoctum. Eo usque autem excoctum est aurum sapientiae in sacris eloquiis, ut inde dicatur, non solum excoctum, sed etiam ignitum, Apocalypsis III:<sup>40</sup> (45<sup>r</sup>) *Suadeo tibi emere a me aurum probatum et ignitum*. Nihil habet crudum caelestis sapientia, nihil immaturum, hoc est nihil puerilis adinventionis. Omnia habet examinatissima, omnia profunda; propter gravitatem enim ponderositatis, nihil enim leve; nihil habet temerarium. De hoc Ecclesiastici XXVIII:<sup>41</sup> *Aurum tuum et argentum confla et verbis tuis facito stateram*. Et Proverbiis:<sup>42</sup> *Verba sapientum statera ponderabuntur*. Propter interminabilitatem subtiliationis; aurum enim incredibiliter malleando subtiliatur ita, ut modica massa valde spatiosae deaurationi sufficiat. Per hanc subtiliationem transit in fila tenuissima et folia subtilissima, et ut intexatur vestimentis ad pretium et decorem et adhibeatur domibus, armis, ornamentis ad speciositatem et splendorem. Sic et modicae caelestis sapientiae tota vestis nuptialis intexitur, tota domus conscientiae interius vestitur, quemadmodum legitur Regum III, IV:<sup>43</sup> *Quia domum ante oraculum operuit Salomon auro purissimo*. Similiter et Paralipomenon II, III,<sup>44</sup> *quia deauravit eam intrinsecus auro mundissimo*. Modico sapientiae istius deaurantur arma virtutum. Quantumlibet enim sit, quod de auro isto datur alicui in via permodicum est; omni tamen deaurationi, quam diximus, sufficit, sicut uno verbo dicitur, Sapientiae VIII<sup>45</sup> per totum et VII. Similiter et Ecclesiastici VI:<sup>46</sup> *Decor vitae est in illa*, sicut in auro decor eorum quae diximus. Quia igitur receptaculum auri et argenti proprie thesaurus est, idcirco thesauri dicuntur in mente humana caelestis sapientiae et doctrinae, Proverbiorum VIII:<sup>47</sup> *ut ditem diligentes me et thesauros eorum repleam*. Et Ecclesiastici I:<sup>48</sup> *Omnem domum implebit a fructibus illius, et receptacula a thesauris illius*.

Pertinet etiam ad paupertatem spirituales non solum carentia domorum, quas nominavimus, sed etiam carentia domus aestivalis, domus hiemalis, caenaculi, auditorii, thalami, thermarum sive domus aestuariae et balneorum. Scimus etiam quia necesse domus sunt clibanus et molendinum et coquina sive culina. Quorum ergo conversatio in caelis non est, ex IV ad Philippenses,<sup>49</sup> qui cum thesauro suo corda in caelo non reposuerunt et cetera ex VII Matthaei;<sup>50</sup> qui corda fixa non habent ubi vera sunt gaudia, sicut dicit Gregorius,<sup>51</sup> injuriis ventorum adulationis et detractationis, injuriis grandinum et nivium, hoc est, omnium flagellorum quae et corda eorum percutiunt dolore et timore refrigerant, injuriis aestus et gelu, aestus scilicet persecutionis, et gelu delectationis, corda habent exposita. Et delectationem carnalem (226<sup>v</sup>) et frigus vocamus ex definitione frigiditatis quam supra posuimus. Voluptas enim maxime aggregativa et conglutinativa est heterogeneousorum.<sup>52</sup> ut supra exposuimus.

Et ut singula ista prosequamur. Ventus urens<sup>53</sup> detractationis sive uredo, et ventus auruginans adulationis sive aurugo non potest laedere cor quod in

inter se accidentali forma tantum, non essentiali . . . inde generatur cuprum, et non differt ab auro nisi in hoc, quod in auro non fuit corruptum . . .

<sup>39</sup> Apoc. iii, 18.

<sup>41</sup> Ecclus. xxviii, 29.

<sup>42</sup> Ecclus. xxi, 28.

<sup>43</sup> III Reg. vi, 21.

<sup>44</sup> II Par. iii, 4.

<sup>45</sup> Sap. vii & viii, passim.

<sup>46</sup> Ecclus. vi, 31.

<sup>47</sup> Prov. vii, 21.

<sup>48</sup> Ecclus. i, 21.

<sup>49</sup> Phil. iii, 20.

<sup>50</sup> Mt. vi, 21.

<sup>51</sup> St. Gregory, In Job XXIX, 20, 37; PL 76, 497C.

<sup>52</sup> ethereogeneous B.

<sup>53</sup> verus B.

caelestibus fixum est. Hujusmodi enim venti non flant nisi in mundo isto, sicut legitur, Jeremiae IV:<sup>54</sup> *Ventus urens in viis, quae sunt in deserto viae filiae populi mei, non ad ventilandum (45<sup>v</sup>) et ad purgandum.* Nullus enim utitur vento detractiois nisi qui per amorem cor habet in laude et vanitate humani favoris; nullus dissolvitur, auruginatur aut fascinatur, et I Sapientiae,<sup>55</sup> vento vanae laudationis, nisi qui cor per amorem illi vilissime prostituit et in ea jam fixit.

Sic de grandinibus flagellorum intelligendum est, nullum ea contundi nisi quem seorsum in agro mundi, extra domum scilicet vel tabernaculum, ipsa grando invenerit, sicut legitur Exodi IX:<sup>56</sup> *homines, et jumenta, et universa, quae inventa fuerint foris, nec congregata de agris, cecideritque super ea grando moriēntur.* Sic et pluvia beneficiorum quos foris invenerit, in agro scilicet mundi, dissolvit, immergit. Paries enim linitus absque temperamento, non solum lapidibus grandibus diruitur, sed etiam imbre inundante dissolvitur, sicut legitur Ezechielis XIII.<sup>57</sup> *Corda enim terrena pluvia beneficiorum temporalium in lutum conculcationis dissolvuntur, molliuntur, liquefiunt, sicut ibi dicitur:<sup>58</sup> liquefacta est terra, secundum unam expositionem.<sup>59</sup>* Grandine vero flagellorum in aliis quidquid habent vivens vel viride contunditur. Viride quidem intellectus, vivens autem in affectus, dum gramina et sata cogitationum flagella conterunt, ut bona eos cogitare non sinant. Viventia vero grandine pereunt, id est homines et jumenta, dum affectione sapientiae atque simplicitatis <vivunt> eadem grando exterminat. Quidam enim quasi in solitudinem rediguntur a facie flagellorum, ut nec remaneat in eis bona cogitatio nec bona affectio, quod in IX Exodi<sup>60</sup> et in I Job<sup>61</sup> figuratum est. Si autem vis scire qui sint foris et qui intra tempore grandinis, ex contritione vel contusione possessionum in satis et animalibus, id est, in<sup>62</sup> cogitationibus et affectionibus istud dinoscas. Occulta valde est ista paupertas et multis et in multis. Tot testimoniis irrefragabilibus se foris esse comprobant unusquisque, quot querelas, murmurationes, blasphemias loquitur de flagellis quae passus est vel patitur; sic tot testimonia fide dignissima ad probandum quod foris est et non in domo vel tabernaculo, quot gaudiis arridet temporalibus beneficiis, quot jactantiis excrepat. Dolores enim testimonia sunt vulnere<sup>63</sup> et contusionis et generaliter laesionum a grandine flagellorum; sic gaudia dissolutionis de inundantia pluviae beneficiorum temporalium ipsa est liquefactio et dissolutio cordis; signum certissimum est pluvialis admixtionis. Quis enim videat terram liquefactam et non advertat aquam admixtam?

Respice igitur omnes malos et videbis alios contusos atque contritos grandine flagellorum, alios vero liquefactos et dissolutos in lutum pluvia temporalium beneficiorum; et cum a facie grandinis etiam servi Pharaonis, id est mali fugiant a facie pluviae; perpauci fugiunt; perpauci enim sunt qui ista pluvia complui renuant quam David, qui dicebat:<sup>64</sup> *Renuit consolari anima mea.* Et multi nihil aliud quaerunt quam complui et aquis pluvialibus immergi. Et propter hoc etiam contendunt fieri tectum aliis, dum praese et superesse aliis omni importunitate (46<sup>v</sup>) -nitare et impudentia omnique impietate contendunt et ut in multis locis compluantur,<sup>65</sup> in multa loca se ingerunt. In tot enim ecclesiis praebendari volunt sive conscribi in quot imbrem istum inundare cognoscunt. Et quod videtur non solum ridiculum, sed dementia, sub pretextu pietatis et amicitiae etiam parvulos suos, id est nepotulos ad istum imbrem mira, ut mihi videtur, crudelitate exponunt; a grandine studio toto et viribus protegent, ad imbrem non minori sollicitudine, quos amant, exponunt. Et sic quos introducere in

<sup>54</sup> Jer. iv, 11.<sup>55</sup> Sap. i, 11.<sup>56</sup> Exo. ix, 19.<sup>57</sup> Ezech. xiii, 11-5.<sup>58</sup> Ps. lxxiv, 4.<sup>59</sup> Origen, *Hexapl.*, PG 16, 900.<sup>60</sup> Exo. ix, 18 et *passim*.<sup>61</sup> Job i, 13 *passim*.<sup>62</sup> Om. B.<sup>63</sup> mulierum B.<sup>64</sup> Ps. lxxvi, 3.<sup>65</sup> compluantur B.

domos ecclesiarum miserabili caecitate se credunt, ejiciunt, dum ad imbrem exponunt neque eos in ecclesiis canonicant aut instituunt<sup>66</sup> et omnino in nullis domibus sed potius in imbre ponunt.

Super hujusmodi homines pluit laqueos quia ipsa pluvia temporalium beneficiorum eis vertitur in laqueos dum eos irretit et retinet, sicut legitur Sapientiae XIV:<sup>67</sup> *Creaturae Dei in odium hominum factae sunt et in laqueum et<sup>68</sup> muscipulam pedibus insipientium*. Super impatientes vero carbones cadunt, sicut legitur in Psalmo:<sup>69</sup> *Cadent super eos carbones*. Et ipsa grando in carbones eis vertitur dum eos iracundia inflamat et exurit. Qui enim de flagellis irascuntur, quid aliud quam de grandine aduruntur? Et forte propter hoc dictum est in IX Exodi,<sup>70</sup> quia *grando et ignis mixta pariter ferebantur*. Et Sapientiae XVI:<sup>71</sup> *in aqua, quae omnia extinguit plus ignis valebat*, hoc est in aqua tribulationis iracundiarum incendium. Ista enim est perversitas perversorum ut aquis urantur et ignibus congelentur. Beneficia enim Dei faces sunt et torres sicut supra diximus,<sup>72</sup> (227<sup>r</sup>) et tamen ipsi mali congelantur ut supra exposuimus. Et cum grando multos compellat in domum fugere de agro mundanae conversationis, ut diximus, pluvia perpaucos, et non est mirum si in domum non admittuntur, qui spreta domo nudi esse sub pluviis elegerunt. Hi sunt quos per diem urit sol et luna per noctem. Sol, id est, splendor temporalis potentiae vel opulentiae, et luna, id est, claritas bonae famae, sicut exponit Gregorius super XXXI Job:<sup>73</sup> *Si vidi solem cum fulgeret et lunam incedentem clare*. Vae tenebris temporum nostrorum quando ista paupertas, qua miser dives non habet ubi caput reclinet et nudus est sub pluvia, divitiae reputatur et, quod est majoris insaniae, ipsa pluvia domus creditur et vocatur. Temporalia enim pluvia sunt quocumque modo disponantur. In tabernaculo vero praesentis ecclesiae hi sunt qui majoribus suis, praepositis videlicet seu praelatis, ut operimento ad pacem suam et tranquillitatem utuntur. Ut enim coccus in interioribus tabernaculi rutilet, ut<sup>74</sup> hyacinthus ibidem caeruleo colore resplendeat, saga cilicina desuper extensa sunt, ut dicit Gregorius super Job.<sup>75</sup> Et iterum,<sup>76</sup> qui ut<sup>77</sup> coccus in tabernaculo rutilas sagum quo protegeris cur accusas velut saga cilicina. Igitur in supremo tabernaculi sunt qui grandinibus tribulationum, ventis persecutionum, pluviis sollicitudinum pro subditis et expositi sunt. Sollicitudines enim temporales pluviae vocantur in Scriptura, Proverbiorum XIX:<sup>78</sup> *Tecta jugiter perstillantia, litigiosa mulier*, id est dignitas vel administratio tempor- (46<sup>r</sup>) - alis. Et iterum ejusdem XXVI:<sup>79</sup> *Tecta perstillantia in die frigoris, et litigiosa mulier comparantur*. Sicut enim tecta perstillantia sua perstillatione inquietant et refrigerant habitantem,<sup>80</sup> sic administratio temporalis inquietat et ab amore caelestium refrigerat sibi subditum, id est in ea ministrantem, et maxime nostris temporibus, ubi omnis administratio litigiosa est, id est litibus plena.

Extra tabernaculum igitur vel tectum sunt qui aliis non subsunt, et tecta domorum suarum diruunt<sup>81</sup> seu destruunt qui exemptiones procurant; dum enim praelatos desuper se auferunt qui, velut tectum seu tabernaculum, impetui imbrium et ventorum ad protectionem eorum expositi sunt, quid aliud quam tabernaculum suum dissipant tectum desuper auferentes et se imbribus, grandinibus et ventis exponunt? Vae illis qui solum tectum timent, cum sub illo solo securi sint, et imbres et ventos ac grandines timere nolunt qui malunt esse expositi quam protecti! Hi similes sunt stulto qui sub caelo comedere non

<sup>66</sup> constituunt A.

<sup>67</sup> Sap. xiv, 11.

<sup>68</sup> Add in B.

<sup>69</sup> Ps. cxxxix, 11.

<sup>70</sup> Exo. ix, 24.

<sup>71</sup> Sap. xvi, 17.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. p. 244.

<sup>73</sup> St. Gregory, In Job XXII, 6-7, 12-14; PL 76, 219A ff.

<sup>74</sup> et B.

<sup>75</sup> St. Gregory, In Job XXX, 6, 24; PL 76, 537B.

<sup>76</sup> St. Gregory, *ibid*.

<sup>77</sup> Om. B.

<sup>78</sup> Prov. xix, 13.

<sup>79</sup> Prov. xxvii, 15.

<sup>80</sup> Om. B.

<sup>81</sup> dirimunt B.

audebat timens ne caelum caderet super ipsum. Sic et isti sub tecto vel caelo potius praelatorum esse non audent timentes ne corruens eos obruat, immo quod verius est et majoris insaniae, ne stans ipsum caelum eos<sup>82</sup> conterat. Hoc enim maxime metuunt in praelatis scilicet, ne stent fortes in zelo rectitudinis. Sunt etiam nonnulli hujusmodi hominum qui in casu maxime confidunt tecti quantoque putridius corruptiusque fuerint, tanto securiores sub ipso sunt et se credunt magis esse in tuto, de sola putredine corruptioneque<sup>83</sup> praelatorum confidentes, de sola incorruptibilitate et rectitudine metuentes; sub caelo esse cujus ruinam vident non metuunt, hoc est sub praelatis quos ruere conspiciunt. Quam dissipatum est hodie tabernaculum istud! Propter hoc et grandini caelestium flagellorum expositus est Dei populus et supercecidit eis ignis ita<sup>84</sup> ut jam solem intelligentiae non videat. Fortissimum erat hujusmodi tabernaculum sive tectum tempore Abraham, Moysi, Aaron, Samuelis. Et hoc est quod legitur Isaiae LXIV.<sup>85</sup> *Non est qui consurgat et teneat te. Et iterum Ezechielis XXII:<sup>86</sup> quaesivi de eis virum, qui interponeret saepem, et staret oppositus contra me pro terra, ne dissiparem eam: et non inveni. Et effudi super eos indignationem meam, et in igne irae meae consumpsi eos.*

In tuto sunt, qui sub quatuor illis operimentis tabernaculi mystici sunt, videlicet quos protegunt pelles hyacinthinae apostolorum, pelles rubricatae martyrum, saga cilicina confessorum, qui paupertate, vilitate et exteriori infirmitate et quod est in eis praefulgidum fraternae miseriae assumptione seu compassione peccatoribus similes seipsos exhibuere, omnibus omnia facti ut Christo eos lucrifacerent, juxta Apostolum in IX, I ad Corinthios,<sup>87</sup> flentes cum flentibus et gaudentes cum gaudentibus, et juxta eundem in XII ad Romanos.<sup>88</sup> Saga enim de pilis caprarum confecta erant, sicut legitur, Exodi XXXVI.<sup>89</sup> In haedis autem et capris peccatores figurantur, Matthaei XXV.<sup>90</sup> Et iterum, sub turba sanctorum diversorum ordinum et variarum professionum, quae varietas in ipsa varietate principalis tentorii, quod ex quatuor con- (47) -fectum erat coloribus designatur, et maxime secundum Josephum<sup>91</sup> qui dicit quod intextum erat ex omnibus floribus quos gignit humus. Quod tabernaculum descripsit Apostolus in fine XII ad Romanos et designavit in principio XII<sup>92</sup> dicens: *Ideoque et nos impositam habentes tantam nubem testium*, eosdem vocans nubem propter refrigerium consolationis quos nos tabernaculum propter operimentum defensionis. Sic et Arcam Noe domum refugii<sup>93</sup> apparet fuisse tempore diluvii, quae procul dubio figura fuit ecclesiae.

Non enim solis grandinibus et imbribus expositi sunt, qui extra tabernaculum ecclesiae expositi sunt,<sup>94</sup> sed diluvio submerguntur. Mundus enim ex omni parte, qui utique (227) mare est, arcam ecclesiae circumdat ut quidquid de ecclesia ceciderit mare excipiat et submergat. Ergo non solum compluti aut grandine contriti, sed etiam aquis immersi sunt, qui extra tabernaculum ecclesiae se fecerunt. Ideo aestu concupiscentiarum alii denigrantur, alii aestu tribulationum; de quibus omnibus, Nahum II:<sup>95</sup> *facies omnium sicut nigredo ollae.*

Et haec breviter de mysticis domo et tabernaculo. Ceterum de aliis diligentius prosequendum. Dicemus ergo quia velut domus hiemalis caritas est vel patientia, ab hieme enim persecutionis ad tabernaculum patientiae fugiendum, cujus tectum nec lapides grandinis minutarum tribulationum, nec molares timet magnarum persecutionum. Vae illis qui statim ut grandinem senserint aut

<sup>82</sup> Om. B.<sup>83</sup> Om. que B.<sup>84</sup> Om. B.<sup>85</sup> Is. lxiv, 7.<sup>86</sup> Ezech. xxii, 30-1.<sup>87</sup> I Cor. ix, 21.<sup>88</sup> Rom. xii, 15.<sup>89</sup> Exo. xxxvi, 14.<sup>90</sup> Mt. xxi, 3.<sup>91</sup> Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities*, III, 126, in Loeb Classical Library, ed. H. St. J. Thackeray III (New York, 1930), p. 375.<sup>92</sup> Heb. xii, 1.<sup>93</sup> refrigerii B; cf. Gen. vi, 13.<sup>94</sup> Om. qui . . . sunt B.<sup>95</sup> Nahum ii, 10.

molares irruere conspexerint, ipsum tectum patientiae dissipant et quod grando vel molares non possint, scilicet tectum patientiae dissipare, ipsi incendio perficiunt! Ignem enim iracundiae aut odii quasi in adiutorium grandinis et molarum alterutris percussi statim adhibent. Certum autem est quod iste ignis tectum patientiae et quidquid boni gratuiti quod gratum faciat tecto illo protegebatur solus vastat. Tolle enim ignem istum solum et omnia quae diximus salva sunt sub grandine et molaribus antedictis.

Alii autem non minori insania imminente casu grandinis et molarium ipsam domum tanto tremore concutiunt quod ex necessitate cadit et hoc sine ictu alieno et impulsu, non quemadmodum domus Job cecidit impetu ventorum, Job I,<sup>86</sup> nec quemadmodum fanum idolorum quod Samson forti concussionem columnae dejecit, Judicum XVI,<sup>87</sup> sed solo vanissimae opinionis somnio. Interdum timore et tremore concutitur somniataque grandine et molaribus solum modo dejicitur et, sicut dicere solemus, a figmentis et Chimaeris pereunt homines hujusmodi. Vae illis apud quos et contra quos non minus potest vanitas somniorum quam ipsa veritas! Quod si dixeris non habeo hujusmodi tabernaculum, vel potius<sup>88</sup> domum patientiae, in<sup>89</sup> quae me recipiam ab instantia grandinis et aliorum periculorum, frater, antequam grando te tangeret, pacem habebas et in pace fuisse te dicis. Illam tene et serva; non, inquis, quia ille bellum facit mihi. Ille in bello est, ille utique suo non tuo. Non assumas tibi bellum; non enim potest esse bellum inter duos nisi utroque bellante.

Dimitte eum solum bellari, (47<sup>v</sup>) saltem adversum te ne adjuves eum contra te. Sed,<sup>1</sup> ut diximus, cum ille gladio adversum te pugnet, tu igne; ille adhibet gladium ad pugnandum te, et tu incendium; nec minus, immo<sup>2</sup> atrocius, igne quam gladio pugnatur. Saevit ille gladio in te, tu autem incendio. Qua fronte ab illo pacem requiris, quam nec tibi tu ipse indulges, nec ipse aufert aut turbat,<sup>3</sup> sed tu illam flammis exuris. Tuus enim ignis, tua est ira. Et iterum, ipsa ira tuum est peccatum, tua iniquitas, tua culpa, qua pacem perdidisti. Sola enim ira pacem abstulit de corde tuo. Hanc ergo culpam, iram scilicet, quae tota tua est et tota in te, ne dixeris alienam et ne refundas in alium. Quod si ille peccavit adversum te,<sup>4</sup> tu longe plus. Modicum enim valde quod abstulit, sed magnum valde est bonum pacis, quod tibi ipsemet abstulisti; nec solum illud sed et teipsum perdidisti; per iram enim possessio cordis amittitur, quemadmodum et per patientiam custoditur. *In patientia vestra possidebitis animas vestras*, Lucae XXI.<sup>5</sup>

Gloriatio igitur de exemptionum privilegiis tamquam de securitate et divitiis indubitanter insania est. Est enim gloriatio de dissipatione tecti, quae est magna paupertas et intolerabilis defectus in domo et expositio ad imbrem et grandinem defectusque defensionis ab injuriis aeris<sup>6</sup> non minor paupertas est quam nuditas vestium seu defectus. Eodem modo et jactatio de vindicta; similis jactatio, immo similis insania. Discooperta enim domus carensque<sup>7</sup> tecto patientiae ignominia est possidentis, sicut timor gehennae domus refugii<sup>8</sup> est atque refrigerii contra aestum concupiscentiarum. Timor enim, ut supradiximus de malo timore, frigus est; et hoc probat tremor subsequens statusque rivorum concupiscentiarum, quos velut quodam gelicidio restringens stare cogit, ne fluant. Vel, ut aliter dicamus, ipsa gehenna domus refrigerii est ad quam per timorem ab ardoribus concupiscentiarum fugimus. Timor enim frigus est; quod probat tremor et rivorum concupiscentiarum status et congelatio. Per timorem autem spiritualiter in eo sumus quod actualiter timemus.

<sup>86</sup> Job i, 9.

<sup>87</sup> Jud. xvi, 30.

<sup>88</sup> Om. B.

<sup>89</sup> Om. B.

<sup>1</sup> Add. tu B.

<sup>2</sup> in uno B.

<sup>3</sup> tribuat B.

<sup>4</sup> Om. B.

<sup>5</sup> Lc. xxi, 19.

<sup>6</sup> aereis A.

<sup>7</sup> pro B.

<sup>8</sup> refrigerii B.

Nota autem hic unum de mirabilibus timoris, videlicet quod<sup>9</sup> de aeternis ardoribus in praesenti praestat refrigerium, deinde extinctionem jaculorum igneorum inimici, de quibus in VI ad Ephesios III.<sup>10</sup> statum et congelationem<sup>11</sup> concupiscentialium fluviorum ut diximus.<sup>12</sup> Et per timorem respondetur ad illam interrogationem quae legitur Isaiae XXXIII.<sup>13</sup> *Quis poterit habitare de vobis cum igne devorante? quis habitavit ex vobis cum ardoribus sempiternis?* "Ego," potest respondere timor et timoratus, quia ipsi ardores sempiterni tria nobis praestant beneficia, quae diximus. De aliis vero mirabilibus<sup>14</sup> timoris est quod ipsum carcerem horrendissimum convertit in domum refugii a facie jaculorum quae diximus, ipsum locum immanissimorum<sup>15</sup> tormentorum in arcem defensionis. Ipsa tormenta, quae maxime<sup>16</sup> minatur<sup>17</sup> et ad quae maxime (228<sup>r</sup>) pertrahere contendit inimicus, in jacula convertit admirandae repugnationis. Omnibus enim tormentis hostem obruit et jacula ejusdem (48<sup>r</sup>) elidit et ignita extinguit, sicut testatur Apostolus in VI ad Ephesios.<sup>18</sup>

Aliud vero ejusdem miraculum est quod tanto igne contra ignem ut aqua utitur, hoc est ad extinguendum. Juxta hunc modum erit ipse paradisos caelestis domus refrigerii contra incendia tribulationum et ad illam per spem fugitur. Per spem enim spiritualiter in eo sumus in quo nos futuros esse speramus. Et propter hoc dictum est: *altissimum posuisti refugium tuum.*<sup>19</sup> Vere altissimum! Propter hoc dixit Vincentius:<sup>20</sup> Caelo altior effectus tua jam tormenta, tyranne, despicio. Sic posset dici ad timorem vel timentem: Profundissimum posuisti refugium tuum. Per spem igitur obsessi undique tribulationibus evolumus in sublime deliciarum aeternarum in quali statu se videns Propheta dicebat:<sup>21</sup> *Quis dabit mihi pennas sicut columbae, et volabo et requiescam?* Per spem igitur quasi de caelo pugnantes aeternis deliciis temporales tribulationes obruimus et velut aquis earum incendium extinguimus. Non solum igitur per spem ipsa patria beatitudinis domus est nobis refrigerii contra presentium tribulationum incendia, sed etiam arx munitionis inexpugnabilis; inde enim deliciis velut armis pugnamus. Non enim torrente voluptatis aeternae tribulationum ardores solum extinguimus, sed etiam caelestibus deliciis velut jaculis hostem transfigimus. Amor enim presentium voluptatum unus est de maximis hostibus nostris; amor vero mundi ceteris bestiis crudelior est, ut dicit Augustinus.<sup>22</sup> Utrumque autem spe aeternorum occidimus quia amorem presentium spes aeternorum extinguit, ut dicit Gregorius:<sup>23</sup> et gustato spiritu decipit<sup>24</sup> omnis caro, id est omnis carnalis voluptas, ut idem testatur Augustinus.<sup>25</sup> Quia igitur tentatio est *vita hominis super terram*, sicut legitur, Job VII.<sup>26</sup> Tentatio autem omnis aut per blanda est aut per adversa et contra tentationem blandorum confugiunt viri sancti per timorem ad inferos, contra tentationem<sup>27</sup> adversorum per spem confugiunt ad caelos. Dies igitur suos, qui utique tentationum sunt, sic dimidiant ut partem dent timori, partem autem spei, et quasi dimidio dierum suorum in inferno velut domo hiemali per timorem habitant; in caelo vero per spem alio dimidio tamquam in domo aestivali. Et hoc est quod legitur Isaiae XXXVIII:<sup>28</sup> *Ego dixi: In dimidio dierum meorum vadam ad portas inferi*, quasi reliquo dimidio ad portas caeli et<sup>29</sup> ad spem scilicet et timorem

<sup>9</sup> Om. B.

<sup>10</sup> Eph. vi, 16.

<sup>11</sup> concupiscentiam B.

<sup>12</sup> Om. B.

<sup>13</sup> Is. xxxiii, 14.

<sup>14</sup> Om. B.

<sup>15</sup> immanissimum B.

<sup>16</sup> Om. quae maxime B.

<sup>17</sup> initiatur (?) AB.

<sup>18</sup> Eph. vi, 16.

<sup>19</sup> Ps. xc, 9.

<sup>20</sup> Acta S. Vincentii Martyris, 2, in J.

Bollandus, Acta Sanctorum, Jan. III, p. 8b.

<sup>21</sup> Ps. liv, 7.

<sup>22</sup> St. Augustine, (?).

<sup>23</sup> St. Gregory, In Job XVIII, 9, 16; PL 76, 46D.

<sup>24</sup> Read desipit (?).

<sup>25</sup> St. Augustine (?).

<sup>26</sup> Jo. vii, 1.

<sup>27</sup> temptationes B.

<sup>28</sup> Is. xxxviii, 10.

<sup>29</sup> Om. A.

quae sunt duae dictae portae. Nos autem non multum distinguimus utrum ad timorem an ad gehennam per timorem confugiatur quia res una est, etsi respectus sive relationes diversae. E contrario vero de malis dicitur. Viri impii non dimidiabunt dies suos. Attende autem quia spes et timor omnibus futuris bonis et futuris malis jam ut armis utuntur et hoc inter mirabilia earum deputandum est, videlicet quod rebus, quae nondum sunt, se armant et muniunt et hostes expugnant.

Quia igitur scriptum est, Genesis VIII:<sup>30</sup> *aestas et hiems non requiescent*, quibus injuriis expositi sunt, qui nec habent domum aestivalem nec domum hiemalem manifestum est. Qui vero habent alteram sine altera, quid facient in altero tempore cum ista (48<sup>v</sup>) alternatio<sup>31</sup> temporum apud viros sanctos numquam cesset? *Omnes enim qui pie vivere volunt in Christo, persecutionem patiuntur*, II ad Timotheum III.<sup>32</sup> Persecutionem, dicit Augustinus,<sup>33</sup> aut a propriis concupiscentiis aut ab adversariis. Horreum vero illi non habent neque cellarium qui memoriam sacrae doctrinae amiserunt, vel si memoriam habent et in ea nihil vel audiendo vel legendo vel meditando reposuerunt. Horreum quidem habent, sed vacuum, sicut et molendinum habent, qui domum habent<sup>34</sup> disputandi et discutiendi et atterendi quodammodo frumentum sacrorum eloquiorum, sed dum illo non utuntur, nulli fructui illud habent; sic et qui gratiam meditandi, in qua debet exardescere ignis, furnum quidem habent sive coquinam, sed dum in ea non exardescit ignis divini amoris, inutiliter<sup>35</sup> vel illum vel illam habent; furnus enim et coquina sine igne inutiles sunt. Heu quot sunt in quorum meditationibus numquam exardescit ignis iste! Quod est signum, immo veritas paupertatis, scilicet continua frigiditas in furno et coquina. Sic dicimus quia aestuarium sive thermas aut balneatorium non habent qui donum luctus non habent. Aqua enim lacrimarum aqua balnei est spiritualis et resudatio animae salubriter aestuantis et interdum etiam delicate. Non enim solam medicinam habent lacrimae aut ablutionem, immo interdum delicias, sicut legitur de beato Augustino,<sup>36</sup> quia bene erat ei in lacrimis.

Sunt et aliae paupertates circa<sup>37</sup> haec. Quidam enim solum habent nudae fidei fundamentum et prae paupertate nihil adhuc Christi<sup>38</sup> fidei supraedificaverunt, nihil christianae vitae omnino desuper habentes; alii vero parietem linitum et dealbatum de foris et illum solum absque fundamento, ut heretici, linitum quidem et dealbatum decore exterioris conversationis. De quo, ex XIII Ezechielis,<sup>39</sup> aliquid supra notavimus. Nonnulli vero etiam domum habent integram, sed tecto debilissimo patientiae et humilitatis supertectam. Qui quidem in bonis operibus et prompti et copiosi sunt, sed ad opprobria et molestias supra modum debiles et infirmi; hujusmodi domorum tectum vento vel impulsu levissimo laeditur. Alii autem ipsum tectum depressum habent, dum nihil arduum, nihil magnificum aggredi audent. Alii vero tectum foraminosum et propter hoc jugem perstillationem patiuntur ut debiles ad operandum, (228<sup>v</sup>) sicut legitur Ecclesiastes X:<sup>40</sup> *In pigritiis humiliabitur contignatio, et in infirmitate manuum perstillabit domus*. Attende autem quia pluviam tripliciter supra intelleximus, et si in numero non distinximus, videlicet temporalem abundantiam, administrationum sollicitudinem, cogitationum noxiarum importunitatem. Idem autem vocamus hic domum quod Scriptura vocat nidum, sicut legitur in Psalmo:<sup>41</sup> *Etenim passer invenit sibi domum, et turtur nidum* et cetera. Et Job XXIX:<sup>42</sup> *In nidulo meo moriar*. Et Proverbiorum XXVII:<sup>43</sup> *Sicut avis*

<sup>30</sup> Gen. viii, 22.

<sup>31</sup> alteratio B.

<sup>32</sup> II Tim. iii, 1.

<sup>33</sup> St. Augustine (?).

<sup>34</sup> Om. qui domum habent B; read donum(?).

<sup>35</sup> inutile B.

<sup>36</sup> St. Augustine, Confess. IV, 5, 10.

<sup>37</sup> Read contra (?).

<sup>38</sup> ipsi A.

<sup>39</sup> Ezech. xiii, 10-17.

<sup>40</sup> Eccl. x, 18.

<sup>41</sup> Ps. lxxxiii, 4.

<sup>42</sup> Job. xxix, 18.

<sup>43</sup> Prov. xxvii, 8.

*transmigrans de loco suo, ita vir qui reliquit locum suum.* Magna autem paupertas est in plumibus pullis et qui adhuc ad pastum volare nequeunt nidi defectus, conculcationi enim et (49<sup>r</sup>) praedae expositi sunt.

Sexta paupertatis pars est debitorum obligatio. Et debita multiplicia sunt. Aliud est enim hereditarium sicut debitum mortis corporalis quo carnem nostram oneravit Adam in sua, et ideo vocatur debitum naturae usualiter. Unde et<sup>44</sup> cum quis moritur, dicitur exsolvere debitum naturae. Aliud vero est innatum, et hoc est illud quo jure naturali et divino Deo et proximis obligati sumus; honorem enim non devolutione hereditaria creatori debemus, sed innata sive nativa justitia. Est et debitum acquisitum, et hoc multiplex. Aliud est enim gratitudinis ex recepto beneficio; aliud officii, aliud servitutis, aliud ex contractu, et hoc ex mutuo vel locato, empto, vendito, commodato, deposito, societate.

Et de primo quidem debito, quod innatum sive nativum diximus, manifestum est, quia totum quod sumus vel possumus Deo debemus; sicut enim totum ab ipso recepimus, sic totum in ejus honorem et gloriam obsequiumque convertere debemus. Et si vis ista debita redigere ad numerum, attende ipsius Dei nominationes, sive quae sunt naturae ejus sive quae sunt gloriae sive quae sunt ei ad nos, et apparebit ex unaquaque quid ei debeatur; verbi gratia, quia veritas est, debetur ei fides; veritati enim credendum est. Et quia justitia, debetur ei timor. Et quia misericordia, debetur ei spes. Et quia sapientia intuens omnia erubescenda nostra, debetur ei pudor. Et quia est dominatissima majestas, debetur ei honor. Et quia speciosissimus, debetur ei amor. Et quia optimus, debetur ei amicitia. Et quia est sanctarum animarum suavissima refectio, debetur ei esuries et sitis. Et quia Deus, debetur ei summae honorificentiae cultus. Et quia Dominus, debetur ei et famulatus et feudale servitium et servitus. Et quia sponsus, debetur ei omnimode puritas castitatis. Et quia, ut ita loquamur, omnia ista quae diximus naturaliter est vel<sup>45</sup> in se vel ad nos; omnes enim istae nominationes naturaliter ei congruunt, hoc est circumscriptis gratiae beneficiis, ideo naturaliter omnium istorum ei debitores sumus. Et de fide, Ecclesiastici II: <sup>46</sup>*Qui timetis Dominum, credite illi.* Et iterum: <sup>47</sup>*Crede Deo, et recuperabit te.* Et iterum: <sup>48</sup>*Vae dissolutis corde, qui non credunt Deo!* Ibidem<sup>49</sup> etiam spe: *Spera in illum.* Et iterum: <sup>50</sup>*Qui timetis Dominum, sperate in illum.* Ibidem<sup>51</sup> de dilectione<sup>52</sup> vel amore: *Qui timetis Dominum, diligite illum.* Expressius autem de timore in VII ejusdem: <sup>53</sup>*In tota anima tua time Deum.* Et iterum<sup>54</sup> de dilectione: *In omni virtute tua, dilige eum qui te fecit.* Et de honore statim: *Honora Deum ex tota anima tua.* De timore et honore, Malachiae I: <sup>55</sup>*Si pater ego sum, ubi est amor meus? et si Dominus sum, ubi est timor meus?* De pudore vero, Jeremiae III: <sup>56</sup>*frons mulieris meretricis facta est tibi, erubescere nescivisti.* De siti<sup>57</sup> et esurie, Ecclesiastici XXIII: <sup>58</sup>*Qui edunt me adhuc esurient, et qui bibunt me adhuc sitient.* (49<sup>r</sup>) Et in Psalmo: <sup>59</sup>*Sitivit anima mea ad Deum fontem vivum.* Et Joannis VI: <sup>60</sup>*Ego sum panis vivus et cetera.* De fide vero spe et dilectione novae Legis Scriptura tota plena est. De amore simul amicitia, Sapientiae VIII: <sup>61</sup>*Amator factus sum formae illius.* Et iterum: <sup>62</sup>*In amicitia illius delectatio bona.* Et breviter, amorem et amicitiam liber Canticorum paene singulis syllabis sonat. Joannis vero XIV et XV

<sup>44</sup> Om. B.

<sup>45</sup> Om. B.

<sup>46</sup> Ecclus. ii, 8.

<sup>47</sup> Ecclus. ii, 6.

<sup>48</sup> Ecclus. ii, 15.

<sup>49</sup> Ecclus. ii, 6.

<sup>50</sup> Ecclus. ii, 9.

<sup>51</sup> Ecclus. ii, 10.

<sup>52</sup> delectatione B.

<sup>53</sup> Ecclus. vii, 31.

<sup>54</sup> Ecclus. vii, 32.

<sup>55</sup> Mal. i, 6.

<sup>56</sup> Jer. iii, 3.

<sup>57</sup> situ AB.

<sup>58</sup> Ecclus. xxiv, 9.

<sup>59</sup> Ps. xli, 3.

<sup>60</sup> Jo. vi, 41.

<sup>61</sup> Sap. viii, 2.

<sup>62</sup> Sap. viii, 3.



capitula<sup>65</sup> paene nihil aliud continent. Joannis II, prima canonica, tota ardet igne caritatis. Unde Gregorius:<sup>64</sup> Joannes omne quod loquitur, caritatis igne vaporatur. Et ut sermone universali utamur, omnes virtutes naturales, quarum motus in Deum sunt, debita naturalia sunt quibus Deo obligati nascimur. Ut autem sermone philosophico utamur, unumquodque istorum, videlicet credere Deo, timere Deum, sperare in eo, diligere eum, honorare eum,<sup>66</sup> debitum est per se. Quam obligationem omnis anima humana naturaliter apud semetipsam confitetur et poenae dignos poenaeque indigere. Si quis de aliquo illorum dubitaverit, ut si quis credendum esse Deo, timendum esse Deum, diligendum, honorandum per seipsum dubitaverit, non tam erroneus quam supplicio dignus ab omni humana anima naturaliter reputetur.

#### <VIRTUTES NATURALES>

Naturales autem virtutes vocamus, quarum et regulae intellectibus nostris naturaliter inscriptae sunt et affectiones virtutibus nostris motivis insitae, quarum genus affectum usualiter dicimus. Affectus enim sive vis motiva nostra in concupiscibilem et irascibilem dividitur tanquam genus in species suas. Regulas autem nominatarum virtutum dicimus istas: Deo esse credendum, Deum timendum, in Deo esse sperandum, Deum esse diligendum, Deum esse honorandum, Deo esse oboediendum, et ita de aliis. Nec dubitat ullus intellectus istas regulas inscriptas esse sibi naturaliter, et ideo non posse contradicere alicui earum nisi forte ad exterius rationem, quod est ore vel lingua; interius vero et apud se necesse habet consentire. Nec dubitandum (229<sup>r</sup>) est esuriem et sitim divinae suavitatis naturaliter nobis insitas vel inditas esse, sed errore virtutis appetitivae nostrae spiritualis et internae, quae de febre sive corruptione originalis iniquitatis procedit, depressas esse atque sepultas, sicut et ipsam Dei cognitionem tenebris originalis peccati et etiam aliorum paene usque ad inter-necionem obvolutam.

Sic et dicimus de virtute naturali ex qua honor sive honoratio Dei. Et attende quia depressio et corruptio hujus<sup>66</sup> virtutis radix est et causa adulationis et idololatriae, sicut depressio et corruptio virtutis concupiscibilis causa est luxuriae, et depressio corruptioque virtutis irascibilis causa est superbiae ceterarumque pestium, quae sorores aut filiae superbiae sive partes etiam nominantur. Et nota causam propter quam adulatio et idololatria universaliter de mundo hactenus non poterunt extirpari sicut neque luxuria neque superbia. Quemadmodum enim errantem vim concupiscibilem omnia illa sensibilia, quae aliquam habent licet permodicam divinae suavitatis aspersionem, in amorem suum et amplexus (50<sup>r</sup>) blandiendo seducentes traxerunt, sic errantem virtutem honorativam, quaecumque divinae altitudinis et magnificentiae visa sunt vel tenuem habere similitudinem, miserabiliter seducendo in honorificentiam suam cultumque traxerunt. Propter hoc et daemones et magi et secundum ipsos idololatrias statuae mentiri se deos propter divinorum operum quamdam similitudinem tam late tamque diu potuerunt. Futura enim praedicere et occulta pandere divinae virtutis solius videtur esse operatio. Sic et magorum praestigia divinae potentiae miracula seu mirabilia nonnullis visa sunt, et propter hoc tam magi quam daemones divinitatis cultum et honorificentiam usurpare sibi praesumserunt; quod et statuis Mercurius etiam attribuere non veritus est dicens eas deos ficticios fieri et in deos artificiales quorundam verborum et aromatum adhibitione converti, sicut ipsemet dicit in libro quem scripsit de Deo Deorum.<sup>67</sup>

<sup>65</sup> capitulum AB.

<sup>64</sup> St. Gregory, *In Ezech.* II, 3, 1; PL 76, 971B. Joannis verba pensemus, cujus omne quod loquitur charitatis igne vaporatur.

<sup>66</sup> enim B.

<sup>66</sup> hujusmodi B.

<sup>67</sup> Hermes Trismegistus, *Asclepius*, III, 23b, ed. W. Scott, *Hermetica I* (Oxford, 1924), p. 338.

## &lt;VIRTUTIS DEBITA&gt;

Haec sunt debita quae vocamus innata, quorum etiam innata est nobis recognitio atque confessio. Omnis enim conscientia istud testatur, recognoscit et confitetur deberi Deo. Non solum igitur debita sunt Deo ista quae diximus, sed etiam debita omnis conscientiae testimonio probata sive evicta, et quod fortius est, ipsa debentium confessione declarata. Quanta igitur injuria fit ea non solvere manifestum est. Rapina enim evidens est jus alienum de quo dubitari non potest contra voluntatem ejus cujus est detinere; adeo autem contra voluntatem Dei est hujusmodi tam impia tamque sacrilega detentio, adeoque contra ipsum ut nunquam possit de ea dare licentiam, numquam impune etiam tollerare. Istorum debitorum originalis corruptio fecit nos omnes non esse solvendo; corrupti enim et quasi arefecit radices virium naturalium quas supra nominavimus ut fructus Deo debitos ferre non valeant per seipsas, et ut aliud dicamus, quasi obligatae sunt et captivae tenentur durissima servitute oppressae apud extraneum, diabolum scilicet primo et maxime veterem hominem, secundo vel mundum, ita ut non nisi<sup>68</sup> illi fructificent et nisi illi servire non possunt. Et hoc est quod legitur:<sup>69</sup> *Defixit me Deus apud iniquum.*

Si consideraverimus totum hominem per singula, inveniemus vim rationabilem velut defixam apud diabolum captivamque teneri apud illum ita ut paene nihil ex ea haberi possit nisi quod vult diabolus. In quibus prima est incredulitas, id est,<sup>70</sup> tarditas ad credendum. Secunda est credulitas nimia, hoc est, nimia facilitas ad credendum. De quibus Seneca:<sup>71</sup> et omnibus et nulli credere vitium est. Tertia est perversitas per<sup>72</sup> quam ad bona incredibiles vel tardi ad credendum bona nonnulli sunt, ad mala vero facillimi et indissuasibiles. Quarta est levitas per quam in omnem ventum se ventilant nonnulli, contra id quod legitur Ecclesiastici V:<sup>73</sup> *non ventiles te in omnem ventum.* Hac etiam sunt sicut parvuli et circumferuntur (50") *omni vento doctrinae fluctuantes*, sicut legitur ad Ephesios IV.<sup>74</sup> Quinta est suspiciositas; quod vitium in claustris frequentius reperitur. Per hanc vix aliquid vel vident vel audiunt quod contra se vel dici vel fieri non statim suspicentur; his omnia signa, omnium intuitus suspecti sunt; quoscumque colloquentes viderint suspectos habent, ne de eis sinistrum aliquid colloquantur. Sexta est judicandi seu<sup>75</sup> opinandi temeritas, per quam fiunt *judices iniquarum cogitationum*, sicut legitur, Jacobi II.<sup>76</sup> In his judiciis et sententiis temeritatis, ut diximus, adeo obliviscuntur artis suae dialecticae, ita ut nec locos nec fallacias retineant sicut nec suspiciosi. Rationes enim et argumenta quibus ad opinandum vel judicandum moventur etiam parvuli et artis omnino inexpertes irriterent et sibilarent. Septima est sollicitudo, Matthaei VII,<sup>77</sup> prohibita. *Nolite*, inquit Veritas, *solliciti esse dicentes, quid manducabimus aut quid bibemus.* Et iterum:<sup>78</sup> *Nolite solliciti esse in crastinum.* Haec est vehementia et improbitas quaedam cogitandi ultra quam necesse sit; quae interdum, immo frequentius, quod deterius est, circumspectionem et providentiam se mentitur cum intolerabilis fatuitas sit et tempus perdere et cogitatum magnis debitum minimis impendere. Necesse enim habent qui in minimis effluunt in majoribus succingi, et qui in his (229") prolixi sicut in majoribus breves esse. Octava est inundatio cogitationum aut vanarum aut noxiarum quas nonnulli patiuntur in cordibus suis, quemadmodum scabiosi agmina muscarum in capitibus suis. Nona est erroneitas qua falsis assentire falsaue credere vel opinari nonnulli paratissimi sunt; ad vera autem credenda

<sup>68</sup> Om. B.<sup>69</sup> Job xvi, 1.<sup>70</sup> Om. B.<sup>71</sup> De Moribus Liber, attrib. to Seneca, no. 77; in L. Annaei Senecae Opera Quae Super-sunt III (Leipzig, 1895), p. 465.<sup>72</sup> Om. B.<sup>73</sup> Eccles. v, 11.<sup>74</sup> Eph. iv, 14.<sup>75</sup> vel B.<sup>76</sup> Jac. ii, 4.<sup>77</sup> Mt. vi, 31.<sup>78</sup> Mt. vi, 34.

aut tardi aut insuasibiles. Decima est dubietas sive imbecillitas opinionis qua non possunt quiescere mentes aliquorum vel conscientiae ut certam aliquam teneant sententiam, sed semper dubii emendicant consilia, nulli tamen acquiescunt. De hoc genere sunt nonnulli quibus numquam certum potest esse in Missa quod verba sacrae confectionis protulerint etiam quotienscumque ea reputant.<sup>79</sup> Possemus hanc dicere superbiam intellectus et indomabilitatem quam nec gravitas auctoris<sup>80</sup> premit nec rationum frena compescunt, apparetque tantam esse vanitatem indignationemque ut non inveniat ubi pedem figat vel potius figure dignetur. Speciale enim signum arrogantiae est, ut dicit Seneca:<sup>81</sup> nullum velle imitari, hoc est, sequi. Undecima est curiositas quae est prostitutio intellectus, passim cum quacumque veritate<sup>82</sup> libidinantis seu fornicantis, spreto naturali conjugio, quo primae veritati conjuncta est. Sponsa enim intellectus humani prima veritas indubitanter est et ad illam est naturaliter conversio ejus, et in ejus solius brachia desideriorum suorum naturaliter extendit amplexus. Ceteris autem utitur castus intellectus ad famulandum illi, (51<sup>a</sup>) nequaquam admittens eas ad amplexus et thorum.

Est autem curiositas qua quaeritur ipsum scire propter se solum, hoc est, non ad Dei gloriam, non ad proximarum aedificationem, non ad sui custodiam vel aliorum. Quemadmodum si quis videre quaerat non alio fine nisi ut videat, non ad hoc ut manus in operando vel pedes in ambulando regat; non ut sibi vel aliis per ipsum videre a quibuscumque discriminiibus caveat, sed in ipso videre fixus haeret. Hic est qui contra naturae justissimam institutionem oculis cogit sibi solis servire, totum corpus et singula membra eorum defraudans servitio.

Sunt autem debita virtutis rationabiles. Primum, ipsum discere descendique cupiditas, in Psalmo:<sup>83</sup> *erudimini qui judicatis terram*. Et de hoc fere totus liber Proverbiorum. Deinde scire, Osee IV:<sup>84</sup> *Quia tu repulisti scientiam Domini, repellam ego te ne sacerdotio fungaris mihi*. Et in Psalmo:<sup>85</sup> *Nescierunt neque intellexerunt*. Tertio <Ecclesiastici>:<sup>86</sup> *Investiga[re] illam*. Et in Psalmo:<sup>87</sup> *Beati qui scrutantur testimonia ejus*; et alibi.<sup>88</sup> Quarto debet inventionem, Proverbiorum III:<sup>89</sup> *Beatus homo qui invenit sapientiam*. Quinto debet ipsum credere, ad Hebraeos XI:<sup>90</sup> *Oportet accedentem ad Deum credere et cetera*. Et ejusdem II:<sup>91</sup> *Crede Deo et recuperabit te*. Et ejusdem III:<sup>92</sup> *Vae dissolutis corde qui non credunt Deo!* Sexto debet memoriam, Ecclesiastici VIII:<sup>93</sup> *Memorare novissima tua et cetera*. Et in Psalmo:<sup>94</sup> *Mementote mirabilium ejus quae fecit* Septimo debet attentionem, in Psalmo:<sup>95</sup> *Attende popule meus*. Octava debet cogitationem quae est de rebus in eo quod res sunt; et hoc est fundamentum primum et janua contemplationis. Et attende quia cogitatione utimur in rebus materialiter et non significative. Octavo debet meditationem; quam quidem non vere etymologizant mentis dictationem pro eo quod divitias morum, velut de quibusdam rerum ipsarum thesauris extrahit. Rebus enim utitur non<sup>96</sup> significatione, sed ad moralem eruditionem. Et inde dicta est meditatio a medio sive mediando, quia inter primum cogitationis et novissimum contemplationis res considerat, legit, interpretatur et velut libros morum eas efficiens in moralem aedificationem convertit, quemadmodum formica, Proverbiorum VI:<sup>97</sup> *O piger, vade ad formicam*. Sic locustam, leporem, stellionem, gallum. Et iterum, aquilam et colubrum, ejusdem XXX:<sup>98</sup> *Formica enim meditationi liber est*

<sup>79</sup> read repetant (?).

<sup>80</sup> aucts with u superscript over c AB.

<sup>81</sup> Seneca, Ep. Mor. LXXVI, 2-3.

<sup>82</sup> virtute B.

<sup>83</sup> Ps. ii, 10.

<sup>84</sup> Osee iv, 6.

<sup>85</sup> Ps. lxxxii, 5.

<sup>86</sup> Eccclus. vi, 28; add. etc. B.

<sup>87</sup> Ps. cxviii, 2.

<sup>88</sup> Ps. civ, 4.

<sup>89</sup> Prov. iii, 13.

<sup>90</sup> Heb. xxi, 6.

<sup>91</sup> Eccclus. ii, 6.

<sup>92</sup> Eccclus. ii, 15.

<sup>93</sup> Eccclus. viii, 40.

<sup>94</sup> Ps. civ, 5.

<sup>95</sup> Ps. lxxvii, 1.

<sup>96</sup> Om. B.

<sup>97</sup> Prov. iv, 6.

<sup>98</sup> Prov. xxx, 19-32.

providentiae, leo liber fortitudinis, locusta liber socialitatis vel sociabilitatis, stellio laboris et industriae, lepus liber vigilantiae et sollicitudinis propter timorositatem et quia apertis oculis dormit, et sic de aliis. Sunt et aliae hujusmodi innumerae lectiones, de quibus adhuc perpauca scripta sunt.

Nonum debitum est speculatio. Hac utimur rebus ut speculis ad speculandum ipsum creatorem. Quemadmodum enim in speculis relucent similitudines inspectorum, sic in creaturis nonnullis etsi permodicae et pertenuis, relucent similitudines vel potius vestigia creatoris. Providentia enim (51<sup>r</sup>) formicae nonnullum vestigium est sapientiae divinae, sic<sup>99</sup> et fortitudo leonis nonnullum vestigium est divinae fortitudinis; et omnino quicquid bonitatis, quicquid sapientiae, quicquid potentiae in rebus creatis apparere potest vestigium tantum est et universalis potentiae, sapientiae et bonitatis. Decimum<sup>r</sup> est contemplatio. Hac utimur rebus ad<sup>r</sup> admirationem creatoris, hoc est dicere in quantum sunt magnalia ejus, hoc est dicere, inquantum magna, inquantum multa, inquantum mira sive mirabilia. Et pertinet ad istam considerationem quicquid in creaturis erigit et illuminat mentem humanam directe et per se ad laudem et gloriam creatoris.

Manifestum igitur est ex his quae diximus qui quatuor sunt usus creaturarum quos debet vis nostra rationabilis. Primus est, ut diximus, cogitatio quae est nuda, materialis et informis creaturarum apprehensio; et haec est, ut diximus, prima. Est et fundamentum aliarum, et propter hoc puerilis et elementaris sive alphabetaria vel abecedaria quod in sugillationem et irrisionem philosophorum [enim]<sup>9</sup> qui in ea insensescere non erubuerunt. Turpis enim res est, ut dicit Seneca,<sup>4</sup> (230<sup>r</sup>) elementarius senex; intolerabilis etiam vanitas est quod philosophi et sapientes nominari praesumserunt, cum adhuc elementarii tantum sive abecedarii existant. Meditatio vero usus creaturarum est per quem creaturis utimur ut libris ad moralem instructionem sive eruditionem nostram. Speculatio est qua creaturis utimur ut speculis ad cognoscendum creatorem. Contemplatio enim creaturarum acceptio seu perceptio qua eis utimur ad magnificandum et glorificandum creatorem juxta considerationes quas diximus.

Praeter haec quae diximus sunt ea quae ad prophetiam pertinent, hoc est tria genera visionum, sed illarum non dicimus debitoricem vim nostram rationabilem. Novissima autem operationum ipsius quae et finis est propter quem aliae et ultima perfectio ipsius et ideo gloria ejusdem. Visio enim primae ac purissimae lucis et aspectus summae pulchritudinis. De debitis vero ipsius est sollicitudo, Micheae VII:<sup>5</sup> *Indicabo tibi quid sit bonum et quid Dominus requirat a te: Sollicite ambulare cum Deo tuo.* Et ad Romanos XII:<sup>6</sup> *Qui praeest in sollicitudine*, intelligere, hoc est interna sive significata signorum inspicere; deinde consiliari, quod est pericula et quae ad haec pertinent considerare. Novissimum, quod et alio ordine primum est sibi ipsi, hoc est prudentiae non inniti quod est de ea parum aut nihil confidere, Proverbiorum III:<sup>7</sup> *Ne sis sapiens apud te metipsum et ne innitaris prudentiae tuae.* Et ad Romanos XII:<sup>8</sup> *Nolite esse prudentes apud vosmetipsos.* Haec sunt debita virtutis nostrae rationabilis et sunt naturalia debita omnia quae diximus et innata, cum quibus nascimur. Sub his autem debitis etiam intelligimus comprehensa esse ea, quorum magisterium logica proficitur, videlicet sillogizare, resolvere, dissolvere, medium inveniri. Tria enim istorum pertinent ad id, quod supra nominavimus, investigare. Quartum vero ad (52<sup>r</sup>) id quod est invenire. Et attende quia omnia ista Deo debemus et ut servitia sive servitutes et ut oblationes seu sacrificia et ut fructus ex arbore sint fruges ex agro virtutis rationabilis. Et haec per singula est videre.

<sup>99</sup> Om. B.

<sup>1</sup> 12 B.

<sup>2</sup> Om. B.

<sup>3</sup> Before enim, dms del. A.

<sup>4</sup> Seneca, Ep. Mor. XXXVI, 4.

<sup>5</sup> Mich., vi, 8.

<sup>6</sup> Rom. xii, 8.

<sup>7</sup> Prov. iii, 7.

<sup>8</sup> Rom. xii, 8.

Attendendum enim est Deo et attendendus est ipse. Deinde intelligendus ex signis, sciendus ex primis et innatis impressionibus, credendus ex sensibilibus testimoniis, dicendus autem ex eisdem ex quibus est sciendus. Deinde cogitandus non solum quia ipse res est et rerum omnium et initium et finis, sed quia paene residuum temporis perditum<sup>9</sup> reputandum est in quo ipse non cogitatur, juxta Ptolemaei<sup>10</sup> sententiam. Deinde meditandus ex creaturis nos ad ejus conformationem quodammodo exhortantibus. Post haec speculandus ex creaturarum similitudinibus etsi longe dissimilibus. Deinde investigandus ipsarum creaturarum vestigiis. Novissime contemplandus; hoc ex magnificentia et mirificentia creaturarum glorificandus,<sup>11</sup> donec se videndum *sicuti est exhibeat*, sicut legitur Joannis I, III.<sup>12</sup> Continuo autem memorandus ex beneficiis, quorum largitio interpolationem non habet, et cujus admonitio per ipsas res nobis incessanter fit. Dum enim sensibus nostris opera ejus incessanter se ingerunt, de memorando creatore incessanter nos admonent.

Duodecima est ignorantiae tenebrositas sive vacuitas. Hi sunt undecim fructus quos vis nostra rationabilis apud diabolum, hoc est in terra diaboli plantata atque defixa, diabolo profert vel parit, et omnes illi fructus alieni ab ea. Fructificat ex terra diaboli, non ex natura sua, haec omnia. Terram autem diaboli corpus humanum vocamus, quamdiu non est per baptismum aut paenitentiam mundatum, ipsamque vim rationabilem in eo plantatam donec per solitudinem spiritualium ab eo avulsa sit et in spiritu sive spiritualibus transplantata juxta illud quod legitur in VIII ad Romanos:<sup>13</sup> *Qui in carne sunt, Deo placere non possunt.*

Juxta hunc modum de vi concupiscibili et irascibili sentiendum et distinguendum erit, ita ut corpus intelligatur et terra in qua plantat diabolus arbores virium nostrarum et carcer in quo captivas eas detinet. Et propter hoc exclamat ipsemet pro toto homine interiori, qui in tribus istis viribus consistit, in VII ad Romanos:<sup>14</sup> *Infelix ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis hujus*, quasi de carcere. Similiter et Psalmista:<sup>15</sup> *Infixus sum in limo profundi*, carceris subaudis, hoc est, in fetulentia terreni corporis, *et non est substantia mihi*, supple: quae a me requiritur. Infixis enim istis viribus omnino non est substantia qua dicta debita solvere possint. Infixa enim in carne vis concupiscibilis nec amare Deum nec delectari in Deo reddere potest, quemadmodum et triticum seminatum in terra siliginaria aut avenaria non triticum sed siliginem vel avenam reddit; interdum autem sinapium et etiam spinas juxta quod legitur Job (52<sup>o</sup>) XXXI:<sup>16</sup> *Pro frumento oritur mihi tribulus, et pro hordeo spina.* Vis autem concupiscibilis, quia non debet nisi<sup>17</sup> quattuor debita generalia, videlicet bonos amores, bona desideria, bonos dolores et bona gaudia, plantata in carne peccati vel mundo seu incarcerata in alterutro istorum, non est solvendo perfecte aliquod istorum quattuor, sed velut ex corruptione terrae alienae in qua plantatur perniciosum humorem exsugens non solum<sup>18</sup> sed alienum fructum profert, contra quod dictum est:<sup>19</sup> *Terra nostra dabit fructum suum*, quod de terra liberi arbitrii intelligendum est, sicut et illud III Genesis:<sup>20</sup> *Maledicta terra in opere tuo. Spinas et tribulos germinabit tibi*, tamen de terra corporis alio sensu utrumque testimonium accipitur. Sic et tamquam squalore (230<sup>o</sup>) et fetulentia carceris utrumque corrupta atque foedata, Deo accepta servitia exhibere non potest. Propter hoc putrida, sordida et abominabilia sunt et fetulentiam carceris olentia, tamquam urgente torture diabolo et oppressione carceris quodammodo extorquentibus.

<sup>9</sup> peditum A, peditum B.

<sup>10</sup> Ptolemy, Preface to the *Almagest* ca. finem (?).

<sup>11</sup> glorificandum B.

<sup>12</sup> I Jo. iii, 2.

<sup>13</sup> Rom. viii, 8.

<sup>14</sup> Rom. vii, 24.

<sup>15</sup> Ps. lxxviii, 3.

<sup>16</sup> Job xxxi, 40.

<sup>17</sup> in B.

<sup>18</sup> read suum (?); after solum, illud del. B.

<sup>19</sup> Ps. lxxxiv, 13.

<sup>20</sup> Gen. iii, 17-8.

Naturalium enim bonorum velut quaedam sepultura est originalis et consuetudinaria corruptio et tamquam magnarum flammarum ad instar permodicarum scintillarum velut per angustationem et compressionem redactio. Magna enim lucerna esset in anima humana vis rationabilis, magna flamma seu magnus ignis tam concupiscibilis quam irascibilis, nisi corpus mortis huius velut quoddam horrendum sepulcrum eas angustaret et premeret et admixtione tenebrositatis suae et fetulentiae eas inficeret. Propter quae duo mala incessanter qui ea cognoscunt et liberationem et purificationem quaerere non cessant. Haec enim duo mala tam magna tamque praeclara<sup>21</sup> bona ad instar scintillarum, ut diximus, redigerunt et permixtione perniciosissima corruperunt.

Ideoque nec fructum suum nobiles istae arbores nec debita servitia ipsae Dei de jure devotissimae ancillae Deo reddere possunt, antequam et liberatae sunt, juxta testimonium Apostoli quod diximus, et in mortis Christi similitudinem complantatae sunt, sicut in VI et in VII ad Romanos<sup>22</sup> legitur: *Si complantati fuerimus et cetera*. Et illud:<sup>23</sup> *Quis<sup>24</sup> me liberabit de corpore mortis huius?*

Sunt autem in universo debita generalia virtutis concupiscibilis sex, scilicet boni amores et bona odia, boni dolores et bona gaudia, boni appetitus et bona fastidia. Sicut enim quaedam appetenda sunt ipsa suavitate vel sapiditate sua, ita et quaedam fastidienda et abominanda sunt. Vae autem nobis cum ista debita non eis de quibus debentur reddimus, sicut quotiens malis amorem et bonis odium, bonis dolorem et malis gaudium, et malis iterum appetitum seu desiderium, bonis vero abominationem atque fastidium! Heu quot sunt qui ad aromata naeseant, quemadmodum illi qui dixerunt in libro Numerorum XXI:<sup>25</sup> *Anima nostra nauseat super cibo isto levissimo!* Et Proverbiorum (53<sup>r</sup>) XXVII:<sup>26</sup> *Anima saturata calcabit favum*. Quot sunt etiam qui aromata evomunt quorum venter aromata sustinere non potest? Sunt etiam qui odore aromatum miserabiliter pereunt. Quot enim sunt qui aromata sacrorum eloquiorum fastidium et velut abominationes, cum eis offeruntur, a se rejiciunt? Aromata vero virtutum totiens qui residuum peccati patiuntur totiens revomunt, quotiens ad vomitum redeunt<sup>27</sup> eaque indignatione vel debilitate laborant ut<sup>28</sup> aromata, quorum odor suavitatis Deo et toti caelesti curiae desiderabilis est, diu sustinere non possunt. Alii vero longe magis perniciose peste ventris laborant, qui nec modicum vel illa aromata recipiunt, videlicet quibus displicet et audire et facere bonum. Hi sunt maledicti qui declinant a mandatis Dei, et audiendis, subaudis, et faciendis. De his Isaias, XXX:<sup>29</sup> *Filii nolentes audire legem Dei. Qui dicunt videntibus: Nolite videre: et aspicientibus: Nolite aspicere nobis quae recta sunt*. Ecce qualiter aromata sacrorum eloquiorum abominantur atque fastidiunt!

Deinde subjungit qualiter aromata virtutum elongari a se velint, dicens ex persona eorum: *Auferte a me viam, declinate a me semitam*.<sup>30</sup> Odore vero suavitatis pereunt quidam quibus odor vitae, id est fama vel<sup>31</sup> opinio bonorum virorum, est odor mortis in mortem, sicut legitur, II ad Corinthios II,<sup>32</sup> quibus est pro fetore suavis odor; e contra ei quod legitur Isaiae IV:<sup>33</sup> *Erit pro suavi odore fetor*. Istis autem est odor pro fetore, dum tamquam fetorem huiusmodi odorem abominantur atque rejiciunt; fetorem vero infamiae atque detractionis toto hiatu narium amplexantur, totoque desideriis hauriunt. Si enim fama bona sive opinio odor suavitatis est, erit infamia sive infamatio ex necessitate fetor. Hunc fetorem tamquam thuribularii diaboli detractores spargunt, stercora seu spurcitas alienorum peccatorum naribus eos audientium ingerunt, et eo mortifero

<sup>21</sup> clara A.

<sup>22</sup> Rom. vi, 5.

<sup>23</sup> Rom. vii, 4.

<sup>24</sup> quid A.

<sup>25</sup> Num. xxi, 5.

<sup>26</sup> Prov. xxvii, 7.

<sup>27</sup> II Pet. ii, 22.

<sup>28</sup> et B.

<sup>29</sup> Is. xxx, 9-10.

<sup>30</sup> Is. xxx, 11.

<sup>31</sup> velut A.

<sup>32</sup> II Cor. ii, 16.

<sup>33</sup> Is. iii, 24.

nares eorum perfundunt. Talibus exeniis auditores suos honorant, talis aromata masticanda eis et ruminanda offerunt et apponunt.

Vis vero<sup>34</sup> irascibilis multis debitis naturaliter obligata est. Primum debet iram provocationi tentationis. Omni enim tentatione percutimur et ad iram justissimam ab hoste contra semetipsam, si bene irasci novimus, si magna injuria vel contumelia irrogata ad iram moveri possumus, provocamur. Non enim est cogitare contumeliam vel injuriam quam quaevis tentatio tentato non irroget. Nemo debet dubitare quin interpellari de turpitudine magnae reginae a vilissima persona contumelia sit. Omnis autem tentatio interpellatio est turpitudinis et adulterii spiritualis et sollicitatio ut a vero sponso recedatur et adulter diabolus admittatur. Deinde conspuatio faciei est, obruitio stercorebus, tractio per capillos, colaphizatio; os est diabolicum quo tentaris. Diabolus loquitur, dum turpia cogitata tentatis ingerit, quid aliud quam in facies ejus<sup>35</sup> spuit? Ore enim suo foeda cogitata in oculos cordis eorum projicit, et hoc est in facies eorum, videlicet<sup>36</sup> sordes ore faciebus eorum injicere. Manifeste autem sordes ore (53<sup>o</sup>) suo in faciem alienam projicit qui eas sic projicit in oculos alienos. Qui autem in oculos cujuscumque sordes projicit, certum est quod eundem sordibus seu stercorebus obruit. Terrena enim cogitata in oculis cordis ipsius cogitantis sunt, dum ea cogitat quae et terra sunt eo ipso quod terrena et pulvis quia oculos quibus injecta sunt (231<sup>o</sup>) obtenebrant, et lapides quia cor in quod projiciuntur conterunt nisi ictus eorum prudenter declinet ad cogitanda alia transferendo aut virtutum munimento se protegat, aut reperiendo bonum aliquod faciens elidat. Et hoc figuratum est II Regum XVI,<sup>37</sup> ubi Semei post David legitur jecisse lapides et sparsisse terram. Semei enim interpretatur, audi me, quod est si adulterum<sup>38</sup> sit qui semper audiri instant, tamen quolibet modo sive precibus sive cujuslibet suggestionibus tentantibus, sollicitantibus congruenter aptari potest. Quicumque<sup>39</sup> enim sollicitat alium quid aliud dicit quam, audi me, et quod aliud intendit omni sua sollicitudine quam super eo quod suadere conatur audiri? Ergo terra in faciem tentati spargitur quotiens per hostis antiqui suggestionem terrena tentatorum<sup>40</sup> mentibus ingeruntur. Quia vero capilli cogitationes sunt, per capillos te trahit diabolus quotiens per cogitationes ad illicita te trahere nititur. Colaphizat etiam te quotiens tentat, testante Apostolo in XII, II ad Corinthios: *"datus est mihi stimulus carnis meae angelus Satanae, qui me colaphizet."*

Vide igitur contumelias et injurias quibus te afficit diabolus quotiens tentat te, videlicet quia et faciem tuam conspuat terraque et lapidibus obruit, per capillos trahit et colaphis caedit. Absit a te patientia ista diabolica ut nulla ira vel indignatione adversus eundem movearis. Verum igitur est quod diximus quia, si bene irasci novimus omni tentatione adversus tentatorem, ira justissima excandescimus. Et hoc est quod supradiximus quia iram debet vis nostra irascibilis provocationem tentationis sive tentatis. Deinde secundo debet indignationem vilitati ejus rei super qua tentatur et vilificationem qua ab ipso hoste afficitur. Ut enim uno verbo dicatur, omne mundanum, id est omne quod mundus habet sive sit potentia sive opulentia sive vanitas sive voluptas, indignissimum est dignitate mentis humanae; et propter hoc vile est quicquid ei per suggestionem tentationis offertur. Et vilificatio ejus est, sicut jam exposuimus, omnis tentatio; indignatio autem proprie motus est in rem vilem ut vilem. Tercio debet pudorem propter turpitudinem ejus rei super qua tentatur. Et istae tres affectiones in muliere magnifici cordis inveniuntur quotiens a persona vili et longe eidem impari interpellatur de turpitudine. Irascitur enim hujusmodi personae et ideo persequitur eam. Indignatur et ei et turpitudini tamquam

<sup>34</sup> autem B.

<sup>35</sup> eis A.

<sup>36</sup> velut B.

<sup>37</sup> II Reg. xvi, 13.

<sup>38</sup> adulterium B.

<sup>39</sup> quomodocumque B.

<sup>40</sup> temptatorium A.

<sup>41</sup> II Cor. xii, 7.

indignae nobilitate et magnificentia sua. Erubescit ipsam interpellationem, non solum turpitudinem, nec vellet sciri quod huiusmodi persona ausa fuisset eam de turpitudine interpellare. Quarto vero debet eidem tentationi abominationem, et hoc aspernativam sive contemptivam sive<sup>42</sup> subsannativam, cujus indicium est corrugatio narium sive sannarum et aversio oculorum quasi a spurco et spurco et intolerabiliter sordenti sordido<sup>43</sup> seu fetenti. Quinto debet timorem tamquam nocivo. Sexto (54<sup>r</sup>) horrorem tamquam mortifero et venenato. Novissime vero debet ei bellum tamquam hosti, sed hoc ex ira; sic et conculcationem et hoc ex indignatione; eodem modo et operimentum sive excusationem, et hoc ex pudore, non autem operimentum sive excusationem palliationis sed innocentiae et resistentiae inculpabilis; sic et abominationem, rejectionem<sup>44</sup> et excreationem aut subsannationem corporales; de his enim loquimur. Eodem modo fugam et declinationem, et hoc ex timore; deinde festinatissimam resiltionem et hoc ex horrore.

Non aliter ergo tentationi et rei de qua tentatur et ipsi tentori reddit vis nostra irascibilis juxta meritum ipsorum, nisi et irascatur provocata, et indignetur vilificata, et erubescat deturpata et abominetur foedata, et fugiat damna imminientia et horreat mortis instantiam, et hostem ferientem referiat. Item nisi conculcet indignatione quidquid hostis suggerit, nisi se operiat innocentia et resistentia vel excuset manifesto dissensu et aperta suggestionis recusatione; nisi exscreat et exspuat abominatione, nisi fugiat timore et resiliat horrore, non totum reddit vel tentationi vel tentanti quod ei debetur ex meritis. Et de ira expresse legis ibi: <sup>45</sup> *irascimini et nolite peccare*; ibi Augustinus,<sup>46</sup> *irascaris servo tuo ne peccet amplius; irascere etiam tibi ipsi ne pecces amplius*.

De indignatione, Isaiae LXIII: <sup>47</sup> *Indignatio mea auxiliata est mihi*. Et II ad Corinthiorum VII, <sup>48</sup> *Ecce enim hoc ipsum, secundum Deum contristari vos quantam in vobis operatur sollicitudinem: sed et defensionem, sed indignationem*. De hoc Hieronimus.<sup>49</sup> Assume sanctam superbiam. Et philosophus:<sup>50</sup> *Etsi scirem deos ignoscituros et homines ignoraturos, peccare dedignarer*. Ad hoc pertinent illa duo: si natura negat, facit indignatio versum. Nullus honor faciet te dignum Caesaris ira. Quemadmodum enim quod ponitur sub pedibus corporalibus conculcat corporaliter, sic et quod ponitur sub pedibus spiritualibus, id est affectibus. Indignatio igitur conculcatio est spiritualis.

De pudore vero vel erubescencia, Jeremiae III: <sup>51</sup> *frons mulieris meretricis facta est tibi, erubescere nescivisti*. Et Ecclesiastici XLI: <sup>52</sup> *Erubescite a patre et matre de fornicatione*. Et Isaiae XXIII: <sup>53</sup> *Erubescet Sidon: ait mare*. Et ejusdem III: <sup>54</sup> *peccatum suum quasi Sodoma praedicaverunt, nec absconderunt*. Et Jeremiae V: <sup>55</sup> *Facies senum non erubuerunt*. Ezechielis XVI et XVIII fere per totum.

De abominatione, Ecclesiastes I: <sup>56</sup> *ubi multa sapientia, multa indignatio, stomachi spiritualis subaudis, non valenti sustinere spurcitas peccatorum*. Et est indignatio haec alia quam illa de qua praelocuti sumus. Unde usualiter indignationem stomachi pati dicuntur (231<sup>r</sup>) qui laborant frequenti vomitu vel qui facile provocantur ad illum. De hoc, Jeremiae XXV: <sup>57</sup> *Bibite, et inebriamini. vomite: et cadite*. Qui libenter et frequenter confitentur et dilationem confessionis aegre<sup>58</sup> sustinent, hi spirituales indignationem stomachi habent et (54<sup>r</sup>) illam virtuosam atque laudabilem. Non autem venter est, sed latrina, qui sine

<sup>42</sup> vel A.<sup>43</sup> sordendo B.<sup>44</sup> recreationem B.<sup>45</sup> Eph. iv, 26.<sup>46</sup> St. Augustine, *Enn. II in Ps. 25, 3*; PL 36, 189.<sup>47</sup> Is. lxiii, 5.<sup>48</sup> II Cor. vii, II.<sup>49</sup> St. Jerome, *Ep. XXII, 16*; PL 22, 403.<sup>50</sup> Cicero, *De Off. III, 8, 37*.<sup>51</sup> Jer. iii, 3.<sup>52</sup> Ecclus. xli, 21.<sup>53</sup> Is. xxiii, 4.<sup>54</sup> Is. iii, 9.<sup>55</sup> Thren. v, 12.<sup>56</sup> Eccl. i, 18.<sup>57</sup> Jer. xxv, 27.<sup>58</sup> egere B.



honore et abominatione faeces portat. Qui autem vel per jactantiam bona sua evomunt vel levi impulsu tentationis ea deserunt, mala indignatione stomachi laborant. Debet et irrisionem quam quis subsannationem sive cachinnationem vocet. Et haec est illusio de qua dicitur; draco iste quem formasti ad illudendum ei. Quis enim non irrideat diabolum, omni gigante fortioerem et cui nulla potestas sub coelo comparari potest, a quovis homine sancto in certamine superatum atque dejectum? Quantum enim de se risum fecit Goliath gigas a puero David victus et ab eodem decapitatus proprio gladio quis nesciat? De quo legitur I Regum XVI.<sup>60</sup>

Quaedam autem debet vis irascibilis nostra bina et bina, ut timorem et spem; timorem ne intumescat quasi comprimentem, et spem ne corruat quasi fulcientem ab inferiori. Deinde humilitatem et magnificentiam; humilitatem ne extollatur in elationem, et magnificentiam ne deiciatur in dejectionem. Deinde severitatem et misericordiam; severitatem ne mollescat in remissionem, misericordiam ne rigescat in crudelitatem. Deinde iram et placationem; placationem ne durescat in inexorabilitatem, et iram ne tepeascat in peccandi securitatem. Deinde mansuetudinem et justitiam; mansuetudinem ne efferetur in ferocitatem, justitiam ne ruat in pusillanimitatem. Proprie autem contrarietates, id est extrema, et media hujus virtutis, extrema scilicet vitiorum et media virtutum, sunt haec: audacia et timiditas, cujus medium fortitudo cum speciebus suis et ramis.

Deinde tumor,<sup>61</sup> qui vulgo grossities cordis et inflatio dicitur, cujus contrarium vitium dicitur pusillanimitas. Deinde crudelitas et remissio, cujus media severitas et misericordia. Deinde elatio et dejectio cujus medium modestia quae est species quaedam humilitatis. Sic et omnes partes superbiae ad eandem pertinent, et contraria vitia quae nimiae humilitates vulgo vocantur; media autem est humilitas cum speciebus suis et ramis. Deinde ferinitas et nimia familiaritas, cujus medium amicitas. Post haec inconstantia et immobilitas, cujus medium gravitas. Deinde tempestas et immutabilitas, tempestas in vi irascibili furor, quae, ut dicit Gregorius,<sup>62</sup> totam mentem degrandinat; immutabilitas autem ipsa est ignavia quam nullae contumeliae, nulla damna, nulla vulnera tentationum propriarum vel alienarum ad iram commovere potest ipsum qui ea laborat. Deinde misericordia<sup>63</sup> secundum acceptionem Tullianam<sup>64</sup> qua indubitantur vitium est et miseria magna cordis, qua non malis hominum nisi perverse, sed malis animalium multi compatiuntur, ut jugulari arietem videri non possunt nisi cum magno dolore cordis, nec mori hominem corpore, ad mortem autem animarum et ad veras miseras omnino insensibiles sunt. Et ideo contrarium vitium isti merito nominatur cordis insensibilitas. Media autem in his duabus contrarietatibus sunt tranquillitas et pietas. Post haec sunt impudentia et pudoritas quarum altera nulla turpitudine erubescitur, altera autem fere omnis (55') honestas absconditur. Harum medium verecundia est. Et prima nominatur effrontes et frontem meretricis habentis, Jeremiae III:<sup>65</sup> *frons mulieris meretricis facta est tibi, erubescere nescivisti*.

Species autem superbiae quinque sunt, quinque regibus Chananeorum, quorum colla pedibus filiorum Israel de praecepto Josue calcatae sunt, designatae.<sup>66</sup> Harum prima superbia, libido dominandi quae et cathedra pestilentiae dicitur. Huic virtus contraria amor serviendi seu ministrandi. Secunda est amor honoris quae usualiter ambitio dicitur. Hujus contraria virtus fuga est honoris et, cum perfecta est, amor est depressionis. Tertia est elatio quae est amor supereminentiae vel opinio mendax inde elatus extra alios vento seu vanitatis propriae opinionis, quemadmodum ille Phariseus in XVIII Lucae<sup>67</sup> dicens apud se: *Non*

<sup>60</sup> I Reg. xvii, 51.

<sup>61</sup> timor B.

<sup>62</sup> St. Gregory, In Job V, 40, 78; PL 75, 723D ff.

<sup>63</sup> misericordiam B.

<sup>64</sup> Cicero, Tusc. Disp. IV, 8, 18.

<sup>65</sup> Jer. iii, 4.

<sup>66</sup> Josue x, 24.

<sup>67</sup> Lc. xviii, 11.

*sum sicut ceteri hominum, et vulgo nominatur surcuidez.*<sup>67</sup> Hujus contraria virtus est quae his verbis Gregorii<sup>68</sup> intelligitur: Hoc speciale specimen electorum solet esse ut de se sentiant infra quam sint. Quarta est inanis gloria. Haec est amor alienae opinionis et vanae laudis. Haec facit homines chimaeras et figmenta, hoc est opinabiles esse<sup>69</sup> solummodo et in sola opinione totum habere et nihil in veritate. Hujus virtus contraria, cum perfecta est, amor est vilitatis; unde beatus Bernardus:<sup>70</sup> Verus humilis non vult videri humilis, sed vilis. Quinta est arrogantia quae sibi attribuit si quid videtur habere bonum. Hujus contraria devotio est qua totum divinae gratiae tribuitur. Christum enim non novit qui alii quam gratiae aliquid tribuit dicit Augustinus.<sup>70a</sup> Prima ergo species aufert Deo dominationem, secunda honorem, tertia excellentiam sive altitudinem sive<sup>71</sup> supereminentiam, quarta gloriam et laudem, quinta bonorum suorum possessionem; et haec est causa propter quam Deus odit superbiam, quia totum aufert ei quod suum est et directe adversus eum armatur.

Sunt et debita naturalia virtutis irascibilis: aversatio, execratio, detestatio. Est autem aversatio ad aliquid quasi post tergum rejectio sive versio ad aliquid posterioribus congruant aut posteriora illi quasi post poni tantum debeat et non venire in conspectum, Exodi XXIII:<sup>72</sup> *aversor impium*. Execratio vero (232") est repulsio alicujus vehemens tanquam profani et sacro contrarii, Ecclesiastici I:<sup>73</sup> *execratio peccatoribus sapientia. Execratio peccatori, cultura Dei*. Detestatio vero est rejectio alicujus a se tanquam maledicti et quod nefarium sit tolerari; quem motum insinuat illud verbum, *tolle, tolle*.<sup>74</sup> Irrisio autem, id est simulatus risus in contumeliam alicujus, ad vim irascibilem pertinet. Cum autem est risus verus ex quocumque, ad vim concupiscibilem, de qua hic non agimus. Haec igitur omnia quae nominavimus, id est aversatio,<sup>75</sup> execratio, detestatio et irrisio sine dubio debentur malis culpa, hoc est vitiis et peccatis, quia illa et aversanda sunt indubitanter et execranda et detestanda et irridenda non simulatione falsitatis sed simulatione qua (55") respondetur ridiculo.<sup>76</sup> Illusio autem exterior operatio est de irrisione intima procedens, cujus partes et modos ibi exposuimus: *Draco iste quem formasti ad illudendum ei*.<sup>77</sup> De hac Job XL:<sup>78</sup> *Numquid illudes behemoth quasi avi*.

Debet autem anima humana gratitudinem naturaliter, id est naturali obligatione et largitori omnium bonorum Deo et unicuique benefactori. Hujus prima operatio est gratiarum actio et non nisi impensi beneficii recognitio et obnoxietatis professio. Secunda benedictio<sup>79</sup> est bonorum ipsi benefactori imprecatio, sicut e contrario maledictio malorum imprecatio est. Tertia laus sive collaudatio quae est bonitatis benefactoris ad alios annuntiatio. Quarta est glorificatio, haec est pervagata lata et clara laudatio.

His debitis quantum defraudetur Deus apparet ex innumerabilitate, immensitate, continuate beneficiorum ipsius. Si enim ingratus merito judicatur qui modicum beneficium gratiarum actione non prosequitur, quanta est ingratitudo immensa beneficia innumera et continue recipientis et nulla gratiarum actione prosequentis. Ad bona enim exenia humana immensa sunt et super omnem comparisonem excedentia donum vitae, donum sensus, donum intellectus, dona membrorum omnium et virium, ut de gratiae beneficiis taceamus.

Innumera etiam sunt haec; continua etiam est largitio ipsorum. Ipsa enim conservatio ipsorum quae sola benignitate creatoris conservantur et tenentur in

<sup>67</sup> F. Godefroy, *Dict. de l'ancienne langue française*, (Paris, 1892), s.v. *sourcuider*.

<sup>68</sup> St. Gregory, In Job XXXIV, 22, 43; PL 76, 712A.

<sup>69</sup> Add. et B.

<sup>70</sup> Ps. Bernard, *Quomodo homo possit bono proficere et Deo placere*; PL 184, 1171B.

<sup>70a</sup> St. Augustine (?).

<sup>71</sup> vel A.

<sup>72</sup> Exo. xxiii, 7.

<sup>73</sup> Ecclus. i, 26-32.

<sup>74</sup> Jo. xix, 15.

<sup>75</sup> aversio B.

<sup>76</sup> ridiculoso B.

<sup>77</sup> Ps. xciii, 26.

<sup>78</sup> Jo. xl, 4; cf. xl, 10&20.

<sup>79</sup> Add. hoc A.

esse, ne in non esse recidant, quasi continua est largitio ipsorum. Incessanter enim nobis tribuuntur a largitore bonorum quae incessanter amitteremus incessanterque, quantum in eis est et etiam in nobis, effluerent ac nobis deperirent nisi illa nobis omnipotens ejus benignitas continue conservaret. Quid autem dicemus de donis fortunae seu temporis quibus undique obruimur, replemur, immergimur, obsidemur? Nulla enim est ex creaturis visibilibus aut sensibilibus, quae non in nostrum obsequium aut ipsam suam substantiam aut vires fructus et labores et omnino quicquid habet quod nostris possit usibus deservire, non effundat. Vide caelos ipsos, stellas et luminaria infatigabili revolutione lucem nobis et signa et tempora vitalis caterorumque hujusmodi quae paucissimis nota sunt indefesso circuitu ministrare non cessant. Similis largitatis profusio similisque ministeriorum sedulitas in luna, stellis et caelis omnibus ab eis, qui haec videre idonei sunt, evidenter videtur. Deinde respice aera velut nuntium quemdam, delatorem luminis et caloris fidelissimum, qui totum sinum<sup>80</sup> capacitatis ad recipiendum superioribus expandit, totumque (56") quod receperit inferioribus refundit. Respice nubes in eo discurrentes et in protectionem tuam et omnium eorum quibus calor nocere posset seipsas velut quemdam defensionis clipeum opposcentes. Respice nubes aquosas velut quasdam aquarum hydrias ventis bajulantibus quocumque circumferri ad rigandos agros tuos et aliorum, ad humectandum et roscitandum aera, ad praestandum refrigerium contra vehementiam aestus, sicut legitur Job XXXVII:<sup>82</sup> *nubes spargunt lumen suum. Quae lustrant cuncta per circuitum, quocumque eas voluntas gubernantis duxerit, ad omne quod praecipitur illis. In quocumque loco misericordiae suae eas jusserit inveniri.* Respice ventos et aquas in evectionibus<sup>83</sup> machinarum revolutionibus totis viribus laborantes. Respice aquas ad innumerabiles usus seu utilitates per varios meatus atque ductus quocumque seu quacumque eis permittitur seipsas non solum infundentes, sed etiam consumentes pisces quanta possunt fecunditate producentes et nutrientes. Respice terras propter metalla effossas et lapides propter fruges proscissas,<sup>84</sup> contritas, exustas incendio et nihilominus gelu, aestu et gelu confectas. Respice vegetabilia alia in usum servitutis hominum nasci. Respice plantas et totum fructificare usibus nostris, quarum nec fructibus nec foliis nec floribus nec corticibus nec ligno nec radicibus parcitur et tandem nec etiam cineribus.

Quid est de fusione, malleatione, sectione metallarum et lapidum? Quid de labore, oneribus, excubiis et sagacitate animalium ad venandum? Nobis vel utilia vel necessaria dicemus. Tormenta vero animalium quis enumeret, scilicet depilationem lanam habentium, deplumationem volatilium, decoriationem et laniationem quadrupedum? Elixationem, assationem, devorationem et consumptionem carniū eorum quis enumeret? His et tantis beneficiis temporalibus obruti, obsessi, inmersi, ut diximus, nihil paene gratitudinis reddimus largitori. Quis autem mirari sufficiat angelorum famulatum qui omnes administratorii sunt propter eos qui hereditatem capiunt salutis ut legitur ad Hebraeos II?<sup>85</sup> (232") Deinde tormenta martyrum et necem ipsam; labores confessorum aliorumque rectorum sive spiritualium sive temporalium; deinde operas artificum, sudores agricolarum, studia doctorum; quae omnia propter solum temporale obsequium hic perstringimus. Beneficia vero gratiae quis cogitare sufficiat,<sup>86</sup> quis aestimare praesumat, cum nec temporalia nec naturalia etiam gratiae sint seu gratuiti

<sup>80</sup> Om. B.

<sup>81</sup> suum B.

<sup>82</sup> Job xxxvii, 11-3.

<sup>83</sup> evectionibus B.

<sup>84</sup> precisas B.

<sup>85</sup> Heb. ii. 16.

<sup>86</sup> Om. quis . . . sufficiat B.

nullatenus comparanda? Quid delictorum remissionem capiat quando dictum est: *delicta quis intelligit?*<sup>87</sup> Quis beneficium incarnationis, passionis et mortis dominicae vel fari vel admirari valeat, immo quis ad ea non stupeat? Quis dona gratiarum etiam minora, scilicet prophetiam et genera linguorum, de quibus in XII, I ad Corinthios,<sup>88</sup> non ultra omnia temporalia admiretur? Quis gratiam adoptionis consideret et gloriam hereditatis aeternae eaque<sup>89</sup> quae *oculus non vidit, et auris non audivit, et (56°) in cor hominis non ascendit, quae prae-paravit Deus diligentibus se?*<sup>90</sup> De quibus Isaia LXIV<sup>a</sup> et ad Romanos XI.<sup>91</sup>

Quia igitur pro magnitudine beneficii est semper ingratitudinis magnitudo, ubi nec numerus est nec mensura nec pondus beneficiorum erit ingratitudinis vitium absque numero, pondere et mensura; quod est dicere et importabilis et innumerabilis et immensa. Et haec est causa, ut opinor, quare dicit auctoritas,<sup>92</sup> quod<sup>93</sup> omnium vitiorum maximum<sup>94</sup> est ingratitudo. Quod enim pro omnibus et singulis beneficiis debetur, gratitudo est. Debetur autem tribus de causis, ut fructus ex semine et ut census recognitionis ex praedio et ut feudi descriptio seu debiti confessio. Omnia quidem beneficia in nobis seminat Deus ut fructum inde gratitudinis colligat. Hunc censum recognitionis in omnibus donis suis sibi retinuit irremissibiliter; hanc descriptionem vult habere feudorum suorum, hanc confessionem debitorum. Est igitur ingratus velut terra devorans semen suum quod fovere et multiplicare debuerat; et velut censuarius debitum retinens censi, et velut feudarius celans feudum domino feudali, et velut debitor negans debitum tam apertum. Vae tibi tam modica terra, quae tanta et tot absorbes semina tanquam infernus! Vae tibi censuari, qui tot furta sive rapinas in dominum tuum censuarium in momento committis! Vae tibi subdite, qui tot infidelitatum et proditorum reum te facis! Vae tibi debitor, qui tot et tanta debita negare praesumis et talia quae furtorum tuorum testes irrefragabiles sunt! Ipsa enim beneficia testes sunt seu testimonia ingratitudinis. Quot enim bona seu Dei dona obtinet ingratus, tot habet testes, tot insignia, tot probationes latrociniorum suorum. Et, ut expressius dicamus, beneficia Dei quaecumque ingratus habere videtur, non aliter habet quam quemadmodum fur latrocinia collo et humeris suis appensa ad contumeliam et testimonium latrocinii; nec aliter sua potest dicere nisi quemadmodum fur hujusmodi insignia. Sicut enim fur in insigniis hujusmodi nihil juris habet, sic nec iste in donis quorum ingratus est. Et sicut ad solam sui accusationem et contumeliam illa habet fur, sic et iste.

Attende autem de vitio ingratitudinis quia illa habet singularis perniciositatis, quod ipsum solum nulla natura patitur. Nulla enim est natura in animalibus quae benefactori suo grata non sit, quae beneficiis ad amorem et gratiam non mollescat; nulla adeo fera vel indomita quae donis non mitescat. Et haec est una causa propter quam dicitur quia ingratitudo est omnium maximum vitiorum. Cum enim in animalibus omnia vitiorum genera videantur invenitur enim in nonnullis proditio, sicut in lupo africano qui dicitur hyena et in vulpe; invenitur et avaritia in corvo et monedula; in leone superbia, in multis generibus rapina; in equis luxuria et superbia; invenitur invidia in onagris qui proprios filios a se rejiciunt vel occidunt ne onagrabus misceantur, et in cervo qui dextrum cornu, cum ei ceciderit, abscondit (57°) invidens vel hominibus vel aliis animalibus virtutem medicinalem quam in eo natura docente cognoscit; invenitur et pusillanimitas in leporibus, et stulta timorositatis quae umbraticitas vocatur in equis, et gulositas in canibus et porcis, ignavia et pigritia sive somnolentia in armitis; ingratitudo vero sola in nullo genere reperitur.

<sup>87</sup> Ps. xviii, 13.<sup>88</sup> I Cor. xii, 10.<sup>89</sup> ea. B.<sup>90</sup> I Cor. ii, 9.<sup>91</sup> Is. lxiv, 4.<sup>92</sup> Rom. xi, 33.<sup>93</sup> Seneca, Ep. Mor. I, 10, 4.<sup>94</sup> maxima B.<sup>95</sup> quid B.

Alia etiam videtur in hoc causa quia universa natura videtur clamare contra eam; dum enim universa natura quodammodo gratiam praedicat, ingratitudinem detestatur.

Tertia causa est quia universa bona, etiam quae obtineri videntur per ingratitudinem amittuntur. Ingratus enim non nisi fur alienorum beneficiorum eo ipso quod ingratus. Fur autem nihil juris habet in eis quae furatus est. Per ingratitudinem igitur amittuntur omnia quae haberi videntur et insuper quae habenda sperari poterant. Qui enim acceptorum beneficiorum ingratum se exhibet, non solum jus amisit eorundem, sed etiam, indignum se fecit cui alia tribuantur. Non immerito dixit Psalmista: <sup>96</sup> *Benedicam dominum in omni tempore: semper laus ejus in ore meo*; quod in patria solummodo implendum videtur, sicut testari videtur Boethius in fine libri sui de Trinitate: <sup>97</sup> *operatio erit ibi laus perpetua redemptoris. Et Isaiae LXI: <sup>98</sup> Gaudium et laetitia invenietur in ea, gratiarum actio ea vox laudis. Et illud: <sup>99</sup> Memoriam abundantiae suavitatis tuae eructabunt. Et Apocalypsis IV: <sup>1</sup> requiem non habebant die ac nocte dicentes: sanctus, sanctus.*

Si enim secundum quod praesentatur exenia vel dona necesse est reddere gratiarum actiones et laudes; hoc autem impossibile est fieri in via quia nec angustia intellectus sufficit recognoscendis beneficiis, nec modicitas loquellae ac particularitas sufficit eloquendis, manifestum est virtutem gratitudinis compleri non posse in via, complemento cui nihil desit, nec operationes ejus posse esse perfectas. Praeterea quia necesse alias aut se ingerere aut procurari (233<sup>r</sup>) cogitationes aliasque intermisceri locutiones, continua autem est divinorum beneficiorum largitio, impossibile est ut divinae largitioni nostra respondeat hic laudatio. Illa enim continua atque innumerabilium donorum numerositate densissima, haec autem interpolata et innumerabilium occupationum admixtione rarissima.<sup>2</sup> In patria vero tota et una occupatio erit dona gloriae recipere et gratias agere sicut in praedictis testimoniis Boethii et Isaiae evidenter dicitur. Ibi, inquit Boethius, delectatio erit cibis operatio et cetera, et gaudium et laetitiam invenietur in ea et cetera.<sup>3</sup>

Ultima autem et maxima operationum virtutis gratitudinis est benefactori simili vicissitudine respondere, quemadmodum dicit Joannes, I canonicae IV: <sup>4</sup> *si Deus dilexit nos, et nos debemus invicem diligere. Et iterum ejusdem III: <sup>5</sup> quoniam ille pro nobis animam posuit; et nos debemus pro fratribus animas ponere.* Cum enim omne beneficium receptorem obliget ad antidota, necessario obligat eum ad similia et aequalia si in potestate ejus sit similia vel aequalia rependere, et in hoc ad majora quia praeventit sua beneficentia receptorem. Quis enim dubitet illum qui liberalitate sua praeventit alium ex ipsa praeventione in aliquo sibi facere debitorem. Quoniam autem morti (57<sup>r</sup>) Salvatoris nihil ex parte aliqua comparandum retribuere vel rependere possumus, a nobis non requiritur nisi ut quatenus possumus eidem retribuamus, sic dicit Psalmista: <sup>6</sup> *Quid retribuam domino pro omnibus, quae retribuit mihi?* quasi quid dignum vel comparabile; quasi dicat, nihil; sed tamen pro modo meae paupertatis non pro immensitate divitiarum suarum respondens: *calicem salutaris accipiam.*<sup>7</sup> Ex hac vicissitudine oriuntur omnia illa membra, sicut obtulit se pro nobis, ita et nos debemus nos offerre pro illo; sicut excepit iram patris pro nobis, ita et nos iras hominum pro illo; et ad hunc modum de aliis. Tot ergo vicissitudinum

<sup>96</sup> Ps. xxxiii, 1.

<sup>97</sup> Boethius, *De Fide*, ca. finem; PL 64, 1338B, ed. R. Peiper (Leipzig, 1871), p. 185.

<sup>98</sup> Is. li, 3.

<sup>99</sup> Ps. cxliv, 7.

<sup>1</sup> Apoc. iv, 8.

<sup>2</sup> Innumerabilium admixtione operationum carissima donorum numerositate densissima haec autem interpolata et innumerabilium

admixtione operationum occupatione rarissima B. Admixtione operationum carissima del. B.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *supra*, notes 97-8.

<sup>4</sup> I Jo. iv, 11.

<sup>5</sup> I Jo. iii, 16.

<sup>6</sup> Ps. cxv, 1.

<sup>7</sup> Ps. cxv, 13.

debitores Christo domino sumus quot talia beneficia ab ipso recipimus, ut sicut *pro nobis maledictum factus est*, ex VI, II ad Corinthios,<sup>8</sup> ita et maledictum pro illo efficiamur, sicut hostia pro nobis et nos pro illo.

Secunda pars debiti contracti est quod oritur ex suscepto officio et hujus tot sunt rami quot sunt unicuique suscepta officia. Quia ergo christianus et regis habet officium et sacerdotis ex unctione baptismali sicut evidens est ex II, II canonicae Petri<sup>9</sup> et I Apocalypsis<sup>10</sup> ubi legitur: *Vos estis genus electum, regale sacerdotium*, et qui fecit nos regnum et sacerdotes Deo et Patri. Et Exodi XIX:<sup>11</sup> *eritis mihi regnum sacerdotale*. Iterum ex testimoniis evangelicis officium negotiatoris ex XIX Lucae<sup>12</sup> et XXV Matthaei<sup>13</sup> et XIV Marcae,<sup>14</sup> videlicet ex parabola mnarum et talentorum. Item officium patrisfamilias ex Matthaei XXIV:<sup>15</sup> *si sciret paterfamilias* et cetera. Item officium dispensatoris et ministri, ex IV, I ad Corinthios et VI ejusdem:<sup>16</sup> *Sic nos existimet homo ut ministros Christi, et dispensatores ministeriorum Dei*, et in VI, II:<sup>17</sup> *in omnibus exhibeamus nos sicut Dei ministros*. Item ex XXIV Matthaei:<sup>18</sup> *Quis putas, est fidelis servus, et prudens, quem constituit dominus super familiam suam, ut det illis cibum in tempore?* Item ex XII Lucae:<sup>19</sup> *Quis, putas, est fidelis dispensator, et prudens?* Et ex XVI ejusdem:<sup>20</sup> *Homo quidam habebat villicum*, in parabola illa per totum. Et in XVII ejusdem:<sup>21</sup> *Quis vestrum habebat servum arantem* et cetera. Item officium militis et certantis ex VII Job:<sup>22</sup> *Militia est vita hominis supra terram*, alia littera tentatio. Et ex II Ecclesiastici:<sup>23</sup> *Fili accedens ad servitutem Dei* et cetera. Item agricolae et vinitoris ex XX Matthaei:<sup>24</sup> *Simile est regnum caelorum homini patrifamilias* ex illa parabola: *Voca operarios*. Et ex XXIV Proverbiorum:<sup>25</sup> *Per agrum pigri hominis transivi, et per vineam stulti viri* et cetera. Item officium sponsae ex XXV Matthaei:<sup>26</sup> *Media nocte clamor factus est: Ecce sponsa venit*. Et ex XI, II ad Corinthios:<sup>27</sup> *Despondi vos uni viro virginem castam*. Et ex libro Canticorum fere per totum. Et ex XIX et XXI Apocalypsis:<sup>28</sup> *venerunt nuptiae Agni, et uxor ejus praeparavit se*. Et illud:<sup>29</sup> *vidi civitatem sanctam Jerusalem* et cetera a Deo, *paratam et ornatam* tamquam sponsam ornatam viro suo. Item officium servi expectantis dominum suum ex XXIV Matthaei<sup>30</sup> et XIII Marcae.<sup>31</sup> Item janitoris seu excubatoris ex eisdem capitulis. Item agonistae et currentis ad bravium ex IX, I ad Corinthios<sup>32</sup> et II, II ad Timotheum:<sup>33</sup> *qui certat in agone, non coronabitur nisi qui legitime certaverit*. Item peregrini et viatoris: *ego advena et peregrinus sum, sicut omnes patres mei*.<sup>34</sup> Et generaliter quicquid in Scriptura de viis et ambulatione seu cursu legitur, totum ad hoc pertinet. Intelligimus autem per negotiatorem omnia genera negotiatorum in quacumque parte seu specie seu ramo negotiationis. Item habet officium navigatoris aurigae et equitis sive equi rectoris. Item officium inquisitorum et inventoris et cetera.<sup>35</sup>

## EXPLICIT TRACTATUS DE BONO ET MALO

<sup>8</sup> Gal. iii, 13.

<sup>9</sup> I Pet. ii, 9.

<sup>10</sup> Apoc. i, 6.

<sup>11</sup> Exo. xix, 6.

<sup>12</sup> Lc. xix, 11.

<sup>13</sup> Mt. xxv, 14.

<sup>14</sup> Mc. xiii, 30.

<sup>15</sup> Mt. xxiv, 43.

<sup>16</sup> I Cor. iv, 1; I, vi, 1-4.

<sup>17</sup> II Cor. vi, 4.

<sup>18</sup> Mt. xxiv, 45.

<sup>19</sup> Lc. xii, 4.

<sup>20</sup> Lc. xvi, 1.

<sup>21</sup> Lc. xvi, 7; habebit B.

<sup>22</sup> Job vii, 1.

<sup>23</sup> Ecclus. ii, 1.

<sup>24</sup> Mt. xx, 8.

<sup>25</sup> Prov. xxiv, 30.

<sup>26</sup> Mt. xxv, 6.

<sup>27</sup> II Cor. xi, 2.

<sup>28</sup> Apoc. xix, 7; xxi, 2.

<sup>29</sup> Apoc. xxxi, 3.

<sup>30</sup> Mt. xxiv, 46.

<sup>31</sup> Mc. xiii, 34.

<sup>32</sup> I Cor. ix, 24.

<sup>33</sup> II Tim. ii, 5.

<sup>34</sup> Ps. xxxviii, 13.

<sup>35</sup> Om. B.